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PREFACE 
This volume i s  a compendium of risk seminars held at I IASA from October 1980 to Sep- 
tember 1981. Since risk i s  a relatively new area of research, there is considerable variety 
in the way different individuals approach the subject. This has the advantage of bringing 
a number of viewpoints into the area from which one can begin to develop a body of evi- 
dence as well as a foundation for future studies. I t  also presents a challenge to researchers 
to consolidate relevant concepts into a paradigm enabling a body of empirical research to 
be undertaken that will make an impact on the worlds of science and decision. 
The papers in this volume present ingredients that will prove useful for future efforts 
in the risk field. Part.1 consists of papers that represent attempts to develop conceptual 
frameworks from several different perspectives. The papers in Part II deal with the role 
of risk assessment and analysis as well as the concept of acceptable risk in the context of 
societal decision-making. Part I II contains papers that address the way laypersons as well 
as experts actually assess the risk associated with specific hazards. Part IV concerns meth- 
odological issues associated with estimating probabilities and values for uncertain events. 
The concluding section (Part V) i s  devoted to alternative approaches for managing risk, 
such as decision analysis, communicating information, resolving conflicts, inspection, and 
the performance of insurance markets. 
The Risk Seminars represent an attempt to increase the networking role played by 
IIASA. A special word of appreciation goes to Craig Sinclair who jointly initiated these 
risk seminars and planned them with me until he left IlASA in December 1980. 1 am 
grateful to Noel Blackwell for helping to organize this volume and to Eryl Ley for her 
assistance in producing the manuscript. Finally, this volume would not have been possible 
without the support of Alec Lee, Chairman of the Management and Technology Area, 
Andrzej Wierzbicki, Chairman of the System and Decision Sciences Area, Roger Levien, 
former Director of IIASA, and C.S. Holling, Director of IIASA, who have encouraged 
the Risk Group in i t s  efforts. 
HOWARD KUNREUTHER 
March 1982 
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CONCEPTUAL ISSUES I N  RISK 

DECISION M A K I N G  FOR LOW PROBABILITY EVENTS: 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK* 
Howard Kunreuther 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Recent empirical evidence from field surveys and controlled laboratory experiments reveal 
anomalies with respect to decisions by individuals to protect themselves against low prob- 
ability. high loss events. In particular, behavior is  frequently at odds with what would be 
predicted by standard models of choice which involve benefitcon comparisons. 
Th~s paper develops a framework for analyzing decisions for low probability events and 
discusses their policy implications. The framework highlights the following four inter- 
related components: 
(1) Type of information collected by individuals in making their decisions (i.e., 
accuracy of data on losses, probabilities and protective options); 
(2)  The decision process of individuals (e.9.. expected utility maximization, 
threshold models); 
(3) Implications of policies on specific groups (e.9.. affected individuals, general 
taxpayers); and 
(4) Welfare implications (e.g., equity and efficiency considerations). 
Examples from nudies on natural hazards, health and safety problems will be used to 
illustrate how this framework synthesizes descriptive models of choice with policy pre- 
scription. The paper concludes by suggesting directions for future research. 
'The remarch mporred In rh~s paper Is supportad by rhe Bundnm~n~snr~urn fur Fonchung und T r h -  
nologla F R G mnrran no 321175911RGB 8001 Wh~le support for ch~r w r k  1% gratefully u. 
knowledged. the vlawr axpressed am rhe author's o w ,  and e n  not r y a r u r ~ l y  tharad by tha sponsor. 
I. INTRODUCTION* 
Society has become increasingly concerned with developing appropriate 
measures lor mitigating the consequences of low probability events which have 
potentially large losses. It should be recognized a t  the  outset  that  what is a low 
probability event for one interested party may be viewed a s  a high probability 
event for another. Similarly, the  relative magnitude of the  losses is also a func- 
tion of where one sits. For example, the chances of suUering a severe property 
loss from a natural disaster or a severe injury from a n  automobile accident may 
be viewed a s  very small by a single individual but treated a s  relatively high by a 
government agency concerned w i t h  national losses. Property damage from a 
Bre may appear  staggering to the  d e c t e d  family but seem relatively small a t  a 
more aggregate level because of the  different bases used to evaluate conse- 
quences. 
ms paper proposes a conceptual framework for dealing with events which 
are  perceived to have a small chance of occurrencs by a t  Least one of the 
interested parties. The approach emphasizes the importance of undertaking 
descriptive analysis as a critical input for prescriptive recommendations. 
After o u t b i n g  the framework (Section 11). I will illustrate its applicability in 
Section 111 with several examples which have both personal significance (e.g.. 
safety of power mowers and motor vehicles) as  well as  societal importance (e.g.. 
siting of LVC facilities). The importance of understanding decision processes a s  
1 would like to  thsnlc Uday Apte for helping to  gather material an the lllutrative examples 
&cussed in section I1 of the paper. 
a critical input to policy is underscored by empirical data on individual decision 
making with respect to insurance protection against natural hazards. Section IV 
summarizes key results from a large-scale field survey and controlled laboratory 
experiments which comprised this four-year study and illustrates the possible 
roles that the public and private sectors can play in providing better protection 
against future losses. In the concluding section. a more formal model is pro- 
posed which incorporates the decision processes and the role of inlormation as 
critical inputs, for developing prescriptive measures. 
Feu re  1 depicts a conceptual framework for structuring the analysis. An 
appropriate starting point is Problem Formulation (Box 1). Before undertaking a 
detailed analysis one needs to  identify and define the problem. What are the 
goals and objectives corresponding to the particular area of concern? Can one 
gain insight into the nature of the problem through an historical perspective? 
This initial dehi t ional  phase is critically important as it enables one to  under- 
take a detailed descriptive or behavioral analysis which can then be linked to 
alternative strategies. Furthermore, i t  helps limit the types f policies or  plans 
that  a re  relevant and provides guidelines for evaluating them. P 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for analysis structure 
Let us turn now to the descriptive phase. We need to define and describe 
explicitly the anterested parties (Box 2 )  impacted by the problem. Three sectors 
are  considered in the illustrative examples which follow: consumers (i.e.. those 
who demand the particular products or a re  directly or indirectly afTected by it); 
firms or  enterprises (i.e., the organizations or business or supply the product); 
and government (i.e., public sector agencies or bureaus who interact with the 
private sector-consumers and enterprises). For each problem there are  a set of 
legal and political constraints whlch determine how information currently flows 
between the chree sectors and the groups within each sector. It is important to 
understand the dynamics of thls interaction: who interacts with whom, and when  
this interaction takes place. 
The other key element of the descriptive phase is the decision processes 
(Box 3) of each of the involved interested parties. By decision processes we 
mean the collection and processing of information relevant to the problem being 
analyzed. Recent empirical evidence from field and experimental studies have 
revealed systematic biases with respect to the processing of information and 
simplified rules in combining data in malang decisions (FischhoU, e t  al. 1980: 
Kunreuther. et  al. 1978; and Tversky and Kahneman 1974). These findings shed 
considerable light on the relative importance of external events. such as past 
experience, as well as internal dynamics, such as discussions with others. in 
influencing decisions on low probability events. It is thus clear that the collec- 
tion and processing of information a re  Likely to be closely tied to  the  relevant 
constraints and the interactions between the interested parties. 
Turning now to the prescriptive phase, there is a need to jonnulate  a l t m a -  
f i v e  plans or courses of actions (Box 4) for coping with a particular problem. The 
generation of goals and objectives for any problem will suggest a set  of plans to 
be considered. TWO types of institutional arrangements between the interested 
parties circumscribe the  types of plans which can be considered. One e r t reme 
is for consumers and firms to interact through a market  system without any 
government involvement. The other extreme is for government to  impose strict 
regulations which gives the  private sector no freedom of choice. Most strategies 
are  between these two extremes: the government sector utilizes incentives such 
as subsidies and taxes along with some regulations and information exchange to 
guide consumer and firm market  interactions. 
Finally, there  is a need to g v d u t e  plans (Box 5 ) .  How well diflerent poli- 
cies perform will be influenced by the decision processes of the  interested par- 
ties. The rankmg of 'dinerent policies is also contingent upon the relative impor- 
tance given to the  interested parties. If residents in hazard-prone areas a re  
deemed important enough to merit special t reatment  after a disaster, then 
Strategy A may be much more appealing than Strategy B. On the other hand, if 
disaster victims are  deemed responsible lor their o m  recovery, then Strategy B 
may be seen as preferable to Strategy A. In evaluating different measures one 
has to include the compliance costs which must be p by the sellers as well as 9 the enforcement costs which utilize government funds. 
111. ILLUSTRATIVE !iXA!!fPLES 
The framework depicted in Figure 1 can be applied to a se t  of problems 
which lnvolve protective measures to reduce the probability of an event or miti- 
gate its consequences. The section begins with those which involve personal 
safety and conclude with broader societal issues. The purpose of these illustra- 
tions is to show how the framework can structure analysis; no detailed evalua- 
tion of alternatives is undertaken. 
S a f e r  P o w e r  Mowers 
Should power mowers be made safer? Each year approximately 75.000 peo- 
ple ccme in contact with moving power mower blades which can cause severe 
injuries. Nearly 10.000 o i  the blade-contact injuries involve amputations of 
fingers or toes (Washington Post 1979a). The problem involves a tradeofl 
between the costs of producing a safer mower and the reduction in injuries 
which presumably would result. In this case, the relevant interested parties are  
the homeowner or gardener who has or deslres a power mower: the lawn mower 
industry; and the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC). the regulatory 
agency with the responsibility for approving safety standards in this area. 
The decision processes of consumers plays a critical role in evaluating any 
policy. I f  individuals are careless because they feel tha t  n0thir.g can happen to 
them when they utilize a mower, then it may be necessary to make power 
mowers safdr. In addition, or as an alternative, warnings could be provided on 
the dangers of,the mower (e.g.. not to use it on wet grass). Fow well this mfor'- 
mation is actually processed by individuals determines how well such a policy 
works. 
With respect to alternative plans. q e  CPCS has proposed mandatory safety 
standards in designing power mowers. Industry claims that this regulation, 
which would increase the cost of a power mower by $35, is too strong. In 
o v a l u d i n g  these plans questions of product Liability arise: Is the m,<~ufac ture r  
responsible should there be an injury from a mower? A recent case awarded 
$6000 to a man who lost part  of his foot in a lawn mower. The company claimed 
that  the  accident, which occurred because the person's foot slipped on wet 
grass, could have been avoided had he read the user manual which warned : "Do 
not use this mower on Wet Crass." In this case ignorance was considered an 
excuse and the  claim was upheld (Business Week, February 12. 1979). 
Motor Vehicle Safe ty  
What are the appropriate safety measures for reducing deaths and injuries 
from motor vehicles? This question has some significance when one studies the  
statistics for the Un~ted  States: "In 1977, motor vehicles caused 47.700 deaths, 
1,900,000 disabling injuries. and approximately $12 billion in property damage" 
(Bick and Hohenemser 1979). At present less than 20% of the  drivers or 
passengers in private vehicles protect themselves by wearlng seat belts even 
though they are  installed in all cars. Here, the  prcblem involves the t m d e o f s  
between personal freedom and possible adverse consequences to individuals and 
society when people do not voluntarily protect themselves. The relevant 
interested part ies  a r e  the drivers and passengers, the automobile industry, and 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. the regulatory agency 
empowered to deal with motor vehcle  safety. 
Echoing the  same theme as above, the decision processes of consumers are  
critically important tor designing prescriptive measures. Empirical evidence 
from laboratory studies suggests that one reason people do not voluntarily take 
protective action such as wearing safety belts, is because they feel that the  pro- 
bability of an accident is so small that  they don't have to worry about it (Slovic. 
e t  al. 1978). A survey conducted by National Analysts (1971) for the  Department 
of Transportation revealed that those most likely to wear belts a re  ones who 
have been asked by others to wear them. This raises the question of the impor- 
tance of personal influence in the decision makmg process. 
At a policy level there a re  several options which can be considered. Market 
mechanisms such as lower insurance premiums for cars  equipped with passive 
r e s t r a n t s  (e.g.. automatic belts or air bags) could encourage people to volun- 
tarily adopt these measures. Some countries do not pay insurance claims for 
tnjuries if it is shown that  the individual has not protected himself with a safety 
belt, thereby providing economic incentives for individuals to use them. A 
stronger measure, utilized in some countries is to impose a fine for those not 
wearing the  belt. An exrreme measure would be to require tha t  all autos be 
equipped with a passive restraint .  Each of these measures  has to be evaluated 
on a number  of hmensions,  t he  most important  being the  costs of imposing the  
part icular approach and the potential benefits. As in all the esampies in this 
section some part ies will be helped while o thers  will suffer de?ending on which 
alternative is chosen. 
Cigarette Smoking 
Should one impose restr ict ions on cigarettes to de te r  ~ndividuals from 
smolnng and if so how should this be done? This question is st imulated by 
empirical da ta  which suggests that  annually 350,000 lives a re  lost and approri-  
mately $18 billion In hospital bills a r e  incurred from diseases caused by smoking 
(Washington Post 1979b). The relevant inlerested parties a r e  smokers,  non- 
smokers,  the  tobacco industry and the Office of Smolung and Health, a regula- 
tory agency concerned with the eflects of c igare t te  smoking. 
The decision processes of smokers  are  critical to the  d e s ~ g n  of alternative 
policies. If individuals a r e  aware tha t  smokmg is harmful to them but  ignore 
these potential effects, ei ther because they feel "nothing will happen to  me,"  
then additional information campaigns a r e  unlikely to change behavior. There is 
also the question as to how sensitive the  smoker  is t o  price changes in cigarettes 
should additional taxes be imposed. 
The spec t rum of a l t m a t i ~ e  plans range from marke t  solutions (do nothing 
and  let people sutTer the consequences) to s t r ic t  regulation (banning 
cigarettes). Recent proposals have involved a se t  of incentive systems, such as  
increasing taxes  and using the  revenue to  help smokers  quit (Harris 1980). o r  
prohbit ing smoking in certain public places (e.g.. hospitals, theaters,  and retail 
s tores)  (Washington Post 1979b). In evaluating these plans one recognizes tha t  
diAerent importance weights on the  relevant in teres ted  part ies may lead to 
different rankings. F3r example. a policy of "da nothing" favors the  smokers and 
the tobacco industry wt..LLe banning cigarette? has t h e  reverse effect. Taxation 
policies and  fines for smoking in certain places falls somewhere between the  
above two extremes.  
Siting o f  LNC Facllztzes 
Liquefied natural gas ( L N G )  1s a potential source of energy which requires a 
fairly ccrnpllcated techr.oicgica1 process tha t  has the potential. albeit with very 
low probability, of creating severe Losses. To import LNG the gas has to be con- 
verted to  Liquid form at  about 1,'600 the volume. It 1s shipped in specially con- 
s t ructed  tankers  acd received a t  a terminal where it undergoes regasification 
and is then ds t r ibu ted .  The entire sys tem (i.e., the  l~quefication facility, the  
LNG tanker and the rece:vlng terminal and regasification Facil~ty) can cost  more  
than $1 billion to construct  (Of ice  of Technology Assessment 1977). The slting 
problem of interest  1s whether one should locate facilities for regas~fying and 
shipp~ng LNG and ~f so where would be the bes t  piace. The mlerested parties a re  
the  residents of areas  c9tistdered as potential sites, those benefiting from this 
additional source of energy, the  gas companies or consortium who a r e  willing to 
invest m a proposed pro,ect and governmenr, apencles a t  the Federal. s tate.  and 
local level who have responsibility tor trading of! the costs (including potential 
losses from an accident) and benefits ot any decision. 
Turning now to the decision process associated with siting, there are ques- 
tions as to how each of the groups utilize information on the probability of any 
accident to an LNG terminal and the resulting consequences. One of the contro- 
versies emerging in the siting debate is whether one can or should specify an 
acceptable level of risk. Some risk assessments of a particular site focus on the 
chances of a catastrophic accident and conclude that it is acceptable if the pro- 
bability is below some critical level Others have utilized worst case scenarios 
and paid attention to the consequences without paying much attention to the 
chances of its o ~ c u r r e n c e . ~  There is also a need to understand how the diaerent 
interested parties weigh the sde ty  issue in relation to other concerns of a siting 
policy such as the economic impacts, eaects on the environment and how LNG 
s e m s  national energy policy. 
The formulation of alternative strategies will be greatly impacted by the 
decision process of the diaerent parties. One way of clarifying Merences  
between the groups is to specify who is responsible for damages should an 
accident occur. If the location of an LNG facility is viewed primarily as  a private 
venture, then some form of insurance should be oaered to gas companies to pro- 
tect them against catastrophic losses. If this type of coverage is not available on 
the private market. then government may have to provide this protection. A 
complementary set of plans may involve compensating residents of a proposed 
siting area for decreases in their real estate value and perhaps provide them 
with lower energy rates in return for their increased risk in the future. An alter- 
native is to pass regulations such as the one by the Department of Energy which 
requires that  new sites be in remote areas or in locations with relatively small 
population densities. 
N. INSURANCE AGAINST NATL.RAL HAZARDS~ 
Let us now turn to a more detailed strdy of homeowner decisions on 
whether to protect themselves against the consequences of natural hazards. 
The results raise a set of policy-related issues. They also shed light on the deci- 
sion processes individuals are ldcely to use when dealing with situations such as' 
those discussed in the previous section. 
Problem Formulation 
The problem of interest is the appropriate role of the public and private 
sectors in providing insurance protection against the consequences of natural 
hazards and relief in the aftermath of a disaster. An tustoricai perspective with 
respect to this problem is relevant here. Annual losses from natural disasters in 
the United States is frequently over $1 billion dollars. Relatively few homeown- 
ers have voluntarily purchased insurance against the consequences of floods and 
earthquakes. even though coverage is easily avadable and in the case of floods 
highly subsidized by the federal government. In the past, the U.S government 
has responded to the financial plight of the uninsured victims by providing 
liberal relief in the form of low interest loans and grants to a ~ d  the recovery 
efforts. 
Evidence o n  increased federal disaster  relief is provlded by comparative 
da ta  on the Small Business Administrat,ion (SEA) disaster  loan program. The 
growth of the program is easily seen in Figure 2; the  increase is particularly 
significant in the  case of home loans where both the  total  number and total  dol- 
la r  values in t h e  1968-76 period were more than 25 t imes what they were in t h e  
Arst 12 years of the  program. I t  is striking that  t h e  $1.2 billion approved by the  
SEA for victims of Tropical Storm Agnes represented almost four t imes the  
ent i re  amount  allocated by the  SEA For all disasters between fiscal years  1954 
and  1965. Over $540 million of the amount  approved by the  SBA for victims of 
this  disaster  were in the  form of forgiveness g ran t s  w h c h  did not have t o  be 
r epa id  
Figure 2. Small business administration disaster  loans. 
Interested Parties 
Insurance against floods is provided by the Federal Insurance Adrninistra- 
tion with tughly subsidized r a t e s  on existing property: new property is charged a 
premium based on es t imated risk. For insurance to  be oflered to  residents and 
businesses in a hazard-prone region, the community mus t  agree  to  adopt land 
use regulations and building codes to  reduce  fu ture  losses from the  hazard. 
Earthquake coverage is offered to  t h e  public by private companies. Even though 
coverage is not expensive ($2 per  SlOOO coverage on wood-frame homes in Cali- 
fornia with a 5% deductible), less than 3% of the  homeowners in this earthquake- 
prone s t a t e  have bought this Insurance. 
The interested part ies for this problem are thus  the  Federal  Insurance 
Administration ( a  government agency), the  p r ~ v a t e  insurance industry (i.e., 
companies and agents) ,  the Small Business Admin~stration. the  residents in 
hazard-prone areas. and the  general taxpayer who covers the subsidized portion 
of flood coverage and the  subsidized portion of disaster  relief. 
Decision Processes 
What are the factors whch influence individuals to purchase insurance pro- 
tection against relatively low probability events such as floods and earthquakes? 
To answer this question fleld survey questionnaires and controlled laboratory 
experiments were undertaken. The field survey involved face-to-face interviews 
with 2.055 homeowners residing in 43 areas throughout the United States sub- 
ject to coastal and riverine flooding, and 1,008 homeowners living in 18 
earthquake-prone areas of California. Half the respondents had purchased flood 
or earthquake insurance, the other half had not. The controlled laboratory 
experiments undertaken by Paul Slovic. Baruch Rschhoff, and Sarah Lichten- 
stein, at Decision Research, shed light on the causal relationships between vari- 
ables entering into the 'insurance decision. A few of the key Bndings from this 
study which relate to individual decision processes are now summarized 
Although most uninsured homeowners interviewed were aware that flood 
and earthquake coverage existed, the majority were unaware that they were eli- 
gible to purchase a policy. Those who were aware had no reliable knowledge of 
the costs of a policy. The subsidized flood rate is between $2.50 and $3.50 per 
$1000 coverage depending on the proportion of coverage devoted to structure 
and contents. The earthquake premium on wood-frame homes in California 
averages $2 per $1000. Hence any homeowner estimating the respective rates 
between $2 and $4 for flood coverage and $1 and $3 for earthquake insurance 
was classided as  reasonably accurate. Figure 3 shows that most of the insured 
homeowners were accurate in their estimate or underestimated the premium. 
Few uninsured individuals had accurate information and a large proportion 
ovenstimated the premium. This finding suggests that the uninsured individu- 
als had not made any conscious efTort to obtain information on rates from their 
insurance agent even if they knew coverage was available. 
u r n  XL U-m <a cn n-a .a u u r .  
h..r b. 
Figure 3. Subjective est~rnates of insurance premium 
(per $1.000 coverage) 
With respect to the hazard itself, both insured and unirisured individuals 
had imperfect information on the probability and consequences of a severe flood 
or earthquake causing damage to their property and contents. When homeom-  
e r s  were asked to estimate the chance of a severe flood or  earthquake damaging 
their property in the next year. 15 percent of the  respondents in flood areas and 
0 percent of those in earthquake are-, were unable to provide any sort  of esti- 
mate. Some people thought the probability of a disaster hitting them was quite 
high-1 chance in 10-yet they said they had purchased no disaster insurance. 
Others believed the chances of a disaster aflecting them was almost nil-1 in 
100.000-yet they had purchased disaster insurance. It seems clear that  a 
number of individuals participating in the  Beld survey do not understand the 
concept of probability. The findings are consistent with the  heuristics and 
biases implied by controlled laboratory experiments over the past decade 
(Fischhofl, e t  aL 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
It is tempting to attribute t h L  casual att i tude about the  risks of natural 
hazards and protective activities to homeowners' beliefs that  the  federal govern- 
ment w i l l  bail them out in a crisis. But Figure 4 indicates that the majority of 
uninsured residents anticipate no aid a t  all from the government even when 
they expected to  suder  Large losses from a disaster. Most of these people were 
aware that the  SEA provides aid to the victims. but they had little knowledge of 
the  Loan terms or  whether they could receive forgiveness grants. On the basis of 
these results, one can conclude that most homeowners in hazard-prone areas 
have not even considered how they would recover should they suder  flood or  
earthquake damage. Inatead they treat such events as being so  unlikely tha t  
they ignore the consequences altogether. 
Figure 4. Impact of federal aid on uninsured homeowners. 
What variables influence a person's declsion to p u r c h a ~ e  insurance? A key 
lactor is a belief that the hazard is a serious problem. This concern is found pri- 
marily arnong people who have had past experience with the hazard. "You ask 
me why I didn't have Lnsurance before the June 1972 flood" said one homeowner 
in Norristown, Pennsylvania. "We had the flood in September of '71 and I had two 
leet or water in my basement. And I felt this I can  tolerate and this is probably 
as high as  it will ever get." To his chagrin, this man suffered severe property 
damage in 1972. Only then did he decide that he needed insurance. Another 
uninsured flood victim, said that his rationale was that  "the $60 in premiums 
they could use for something else. But now they don't care  if the dgure was 
$600. They're going to take insurance because they've been through it twice 
and they've learned a lesson from it." 
As shown in Figure 5, another important factor in influencing the purchase 
of a policy appears to be knowing someone who has  purchased coverage o r  dis- 
cussing insurance with a friend, neighbor or  relative. The following example 
graphically illustrates this point. In a pretes t  of the questionnaire in San Fran- 
cisco. a homeowner responded to one of the questions by saying that  he did not 
have earthquake insurance. A friend of his who was listening to the  interview 
commented that he had himself purchased such insurance a few years before. 
The respondent was dumbfounded and asked his friend about the availability of 
earthquake coverage and how much it cost. "I'm going to have to look into 
earthquake insurance mysell." he added. 
Figure 5. Interpersonal communication between insured and uninsured. 
The controlled laboratory experiments on insura ce  undertaken at  Decision 
Research provides further insight into these results.'Subjects were exposed to 
a variety of risks tha t  had different losses and probabilities associated with 
them. By keeping the premium constant for all risks and varylng the losses and 
probabilities in such a way that the expected loss (loss multiptied by probab~tity) 
was the  same, it was possible to test  the importance of probability and loss on 
insurance purchase decisions. 
One would expect that individuals should prefer to insure themselves 
against events having a low probability of occurrence but a high loss rather than 
against those having a high probability and low loss. The reverse was found to be 
true for a variety of experimental formats. These results suggest that if the 
chances or an event are  sufTiclently low, people do not even reflect on its conse- 
quences. In other words, people are  primarily interested in buying insurance if 
they feel the probab~lity of a disaster 1s high enough for them to stand a good 
chance of gektinq a return. They thus n e w  insurance as an ~ n v e s t m e n t  rather 
than aa protection. 
F o r m u l a t i n g  i l l t e r n c r t i v e  P o l i c i e s  
There are a set  of allernative policies for dealing with the natural hazards 
problem outlined above. The current institutional arrangements for floods and 
earthquakes i l lustrabs the role of incentives and regulations to supplement 
market  mechanisms. ' 
In the case of the flood hazard, the federal government oders subsidized 
premiums as an incentive for residents to purchase coverage. They also a r e  
imposing speciflc land use regulations on communities who participate in the  
flood program More recently banks have required homeowners to purchase 
flood insurance as  a condition for obtaining a mortgage. Those who apply for 
federal relief after a disaster are  also required to purchase coverage as a condi- 
tion for obtaining a low interest loan. For these groups. Bood insurance is man- 
datory rather than voluntary. 
Protection against earthquake damage has been more of a private ra ther  
than public &air. No one is required to purchase insurance a s  a condition for a 
mortgage or a disaster loan. Even though coverage is available. :here has been 
no great  effort made by insurance companies or  their agents to  actively market 
policies. The insurance industry claims that  it does'not have enough rein- 
surance capacity to cover the damage from a catastrophic quake in a populated 
area  of California if most residents and businesses were protected with 
insurance. Today the principal government role with respect to the  hazard is 
through local bulding codes and ordnances on the design of structures and the  
provisions of federal aid to cover the uninsured portion of an  earthquake loss. 
Other programs for coping with the problem are  stimulated by the following 
questions: 
(1) What types of information would enable peop!e to make bet ter  deci- 
sions for coping with the risk? How can either the insurance industry. 
government at  all levels (i.e., federal, state,  and local) and/or public 
interest groups aid in t h s  effort? 
One course of action is to make flood and earthquake coverage more 
attractive by presenting information through normal channels. The 
insurance agent may serve an important and useful function in this 
regard. To the extent that  he has the trust  of his clients, he can stimu- 
late their awareness of the hazard by teUing them the chances of a 
disaster occurring and the potential losses that could result. One way 
for the  &gent to increase the client's concern with the hazard may be 
to present information on the probability of a disaster on a different 
time interval than the traditional one year period. For example, in 
describing the chances of a 100 year flood, the agent could note tha t  
for someone living in a house for 25 years, the chances of suffering 
damage at least once will be .22. He can also provide details as to what 
coverage is available and how much it costs. Since most individuals 
seem to treat Insurance as an investment, the agent should educate 
his cl' nts that the biggest recurn on their policy is to have no return 
a t  all. tf 
(2) What is the balance between the use of market  mechanisms for equat- 
ing supply and demand, developing appropriate incentives (e.g.. taxes 
and subsidies) as  well as  regulatory measures (e.g., required insurance 
coverage) in the design of a hazards strategy? 
Financial institutions may play a key role here  by requiring some type 
of natural hazard insurance as  a condition for a mortgage on residen- 
tial property. Several types of policies deserve consideration. One 
option would be a broader form of homeowners insurance which com- 
bines flood and earthquake. A less extreme proposal would be to  add 
only earthquake coverage to a standard homeomers  p o k y  and main- 
tain the currezt  flood insurance program. A third option would be to 
maintain the  current  insurance coverage and provide disaster relief to 
special groups or for special situations. Distributional cost  considera- 
tions may suggest tha t  special t reatment  be given to low-income or 
elderly residents. 
Evaluat ing  S t ra teg ies  
Any strategy or  program impacts on the interested parties in m e r e n t  
ways. The evaluation phase forces policy makers  to come to grips with the ques- 
tion as  to the appropriate role of the public and private sectors in hazard 
management. To illustrate, consider two contrasting scenarios. In scenario 1. 
acts of Cod. such as  floods and earthquakes, a re  viewed a s  a public responsibil- 
ity; then liberal disaster relief should be  provided to all victims and/or highly 
subsidized insurance offered to  residents in hazard-prone areas. In scenario 2, 
individuals a r e  expected to assume the  responsibility for protecting themselves 
against the hazard; then private insurance should be offered and those who 
decide not to  purchase coverage voluntarily w i l l  be forced t o  suUer the  conse- 
quences. Scenario 1 is equivalent t o  assigning a high weight to potential victims 
and a low weight to  the  general taxpayer. Scenario 2 gives increased impor- 
tance t o  the  general taxpayer. In this case, policies which require individuals 
faced with a risk to bear the cost of potential losses a r e  viewed as  being attrac- 
tive. How this evaluation process currently takes  place and should take place in 
the  future is  an important topic for discussion. 
V. TOWARDS A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF CHOICE 
The examples presented above suggest the need for an understanding of the 
decision processes of the interested parties before one can recommend 
different policies. A first step in this direction is depicted in Figure 6 where the 
three interested parties-consumers, flrms, and government-are linked t o  a se t  
of events (e.g., catastrophes, accidents) each of which has a probability and Loss 
associated with it. To make the problem more concrete and realistic assume 
that  there  a re  n different consumer groups some of which have dirTerent possi- 
ble losses and probabht ies  associated with a particular event. For example. 
there may be diflerent exposures to a certain hazard so that  the  chances of 
incurring a specified loss will differ between individuals. Assume that  there a re  
m identical firms each providing the same type of protection (e.g.. insurance) 
against the consequences of these events. 
Figure 6. Descriptive component. 
P e r f m a n c e  of a Market S y s t e m  
Given this simplfied world it should then  be possible to  analyze how well a 
marke t  system opera tes  under  a variety of different assumptions regardmg t h e  
accuracy of information by consumers  and firms on t h e  d is t r ibut~on of events. 
For example. suppose consumers and firms have perfect  information on the  pro- 
bability and loss distribution of events. What type of insurance policies wi l l  be  
oflered t o  consumer  groups? How does the  situation change when there  is 
imperfect  information by  either or both of these  part ies? 
A similar analysis can  be  undertaken if one postulates d f l e r e n t  types of 
decision rules used by consumers o r  firms. For example. suppose that  each con- 
sumer  evaluates the  benefits and costs of purchasing insurance and chooses a n  
amount  (possibly no coverage) which maximizes expected utility. How much 
insurance will each consumer  group purchase and what types of coverage will 
firm3 offer? Suppose. on the  o ther  hand, tha t  consumers utilize a threshold 
model of cholce: if t he  probability of the  event is perceived t o  be below some 
critical level then the  person ignores i ts  consequences and  does  not consider 
any type of protection: otherwise they purchase the  amount  of coverag? which 
maximizes expected utility. What impact will such a behavioral model have on 
the  types of insurance poilcies oflered by firms and the  degree of protection 
adopted by consumers? In a similar vein one can investigate the  Impact of a 
model where factors such as past  experience and discussionz with friends and 
neighbors trigger sea rch  for new information and interest  In protective meas- 
u res  such as insurance. 
The impact of d d e r e n c  assumpJtions regarding the accuracy of information 
and alternative decision rules can  be investigated either a t  one p o ~ n t  of time or  
in a dynamic context. When one Looks a t  the  situation over t ime then there  is a 
need to  specify the  different rules tha t  consumers and firms a re  likely to  u t~ l i ze  
for updating information on the probability and consequences of specific events. 
As shown by Arrow (1963) and Akerlof (1970) there  a re  problems of adverse 
selection when firms have misinformation or imperfect informatlon on the risks 
each of the n consumer groups a re  facing. For example, if firms cannot distin- 
guish between high and low rlsk groups they may set  a premium based on the 
average probability of a loss. I f  consumers have accurate information on the 
hazard. high risk groups will Bnd this policy to be much more attractive than low 
risk groups. and will purchase a proportionately larger share of the total cover- 
age. Over time, claims experience leads drms to se t  higher and higher premi- 
ums. thus making insurance Less and Less attractive to  those in the lower risk 
classes. Eventually the only group who 5nds insurance to be attractive are  
those in the highest risk class. 
The above example illustrating market failure is important for prescriptive 
purposes because it indicates that  the private sector  may not provide satisfac- 
tory protective solutions to potentially disastrous events, either because of 
misinformation and/or because of the decision processes of the interested par- 
ties. The lack of protection may then be very costly t o  both the disaster victims 
(who may not be able to  get  protection o r  a re  unaware of the  consequences of 
the  hazard) as  well as  the general taxpayer (who may have to  foot the bill after a 
disaster occurs). The example also suggests the importance of determining 
what information consumers and Arms have available, how accurate  these da ta  
a re  and how they a re  actually utilized in the decision-making process. 
Role of Government 
If consumers and/or Frms have misinformation, one of the important roles 
that  the  third party,  government, can play is t o  provide bet ter  data  on the 
hazard itself (e.g.. losses, probabilities of its occurrence) as well as  ways of pro- 
tecting oneself (e.g.. available insurance. type of coverage and its cost). It can 
also provide monetary incentives t o  encourage certain actions (i.e., subsidies) 
a s  well a s  disincentives (i.e.. fines, taxes) t o  inhibit or  discourage certain types 
of behavior. Finally, i t  can regulate or require certain types of actions. 
The success of each of these approaches depends on the decision processes 
of the interested parties and the objectives of different policies. Thus, if consu- 
mers  are maximizing expected u t i l~ ty  then a subsidized insurance premium 
would lead t o  an increase in demand for coverage. This type of incentive system 
would have no eBect for any consumer who behaved according to a threshold 
model and perceived the probability of a event to  be below h ~ s  critical level. In 
the latter case the only way to induce interest  In insurance is to provide infor- 
mation on the  hazard so that the probabdity 1s perceived to be above the c r i t i cd  
level(s) or to  require the person to have insurance coverage. 
From a dynamic viewpomt there is a need to  understand differences in ez- 
ante estimates and ex-post valuations and their effect on policy. Prior t o  a 
disaster an indvidual is Likely to behave mth one set  of estlrnates of the proba- 
bility and losses. After an event occurs he may revlse his estimate considerably. 
partly on the basis of the new tnformation (i.e.. updating h s  prior estimates of 
probabilities and losses) but also because of the nature of this declsion process 
(e.g.. he now views the probability to be above a critical threshold level and 
hence is concerned w ~ t h  possible losses). I f  government policy responds to  
these ex post percept~on changes in a way that was unantlclpated prior to the 
disaster, this process has to be understood before one designs policies. A clear 
example of this behavlor IS tn the  natural hazards field: government provided 
liberal disaster after the occurrence of a disaster because few people protected 
themselves prior to the event. I f  crises normally trigger unanticipated reac- 
tions due to po1it:cal and social pressures (c.f.. the Three Mile Island response), 
then this process must be taken into account in designing appropriate stra- 
tegies for dealing with low probability-high consequence events. 
Finally, there are a set of philosophical and ethical issues that have to be 
addressed directly when evaluating the role of governmont as part of any alter- 
native plan. Given our increased understanding of the imperfect information 
and sirnpli5ed rules that people use in making decisions, there is the open ques- 
tion as to "when should we protect individuals from themselves?" If poiicy mak- 
ers  have learned from experience that there is ex post regret by uninsured con- 
sumers after an event, what type of incentives or regulations, if any, should be 
taken ex ante? There is no.easy answer to this query but it should be explicitly 
addressed as an issue regarding the appropriate role of government in dealing 
with the consequences of low probability events. I t  also illustrates the interac- 
tion between the descriptive and prescriptive components depicted in the con- 
ceptual framework ( F i u r e  1) which has motivated this paper. 
For an excellent discussion of how one can specify goals and objectives for 
societal problem:, see Keeney and R d a  1978, Chapters 1 & 2. 
For an analysis of alternative remedies proposed by the Federal Trade Com- 
mission in the context of these and other costs, see Federal Trade Commis- 
sion 1979. 
The s p e c s c  standards are that the foot cannot reach the blade of the 
mower and that the blade must stop within 3 seconds of release of the 
power switch so the hand cannot reach the turning blade. 
These diflerences are clearly seen in the LUG siting debate in California. 
For more detail on this case, see Ahearn 1980. in press; Deutsch in press; 
Kunreuther 1980; and Linnerooth 1980. 
The material in the next section summarizes the findings from a four-year 
study supported by funds from the National Science Foundation. Readers 
interested in more detail are referred to Kunreuther. et al. 1978. 
Mom details on the insurance experiments can be found in Slovic. et al. 
1977. The material also appears in Kunreuther, e t  al. 1978, Chap. 7. 
A more detailed discussion of policy options appears in Ginsberg and Kun- 
reuther (in press). 
Kunreuther and Schoemaker (in press) provlde a more detailed discussion 
of the role of the agcnt and the insurance .ridustry in promoting the sale of 
flood coverage. 
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THE CULTURAL APPROACH TO RISK: 
T H E  CASE OF POVERTY 
Michael Thompson 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Are the poor all alike or are they different? Both, obviously. The similarities are handled 
by political economy - a long-established and familiar approach; the differences are 
handled by political culture - a newly-emerging and unfamiliar approach. Political culture 
looks, not at how people are differentiated by constraints - by what they can't do - but 
at how people are differentiated by capabilities - by the different things they do with 
what they can do. 
If poverty has to do with the absence of the chance to  choose, then non-poverty has to 
do with the presence of the chance to choose. This leads to the consideration of the possi- 
bility of personal strategies for resource management and for need management. There 
are four logically possible management strategies and one coping strategy, and the cultural 
hypothesis is that an individual will be led to adopt one of these strategies and to reject 
the others by virtue of his social context and i t s  associated cosmology. 
Fieldwork in Britain and informal guided interviews in the United States support this 
hypothesis and reveal that less than half of those officially classified as "poor" conform 
to the official image of poverty. 
Political culture has implications that go beyond the arena of poverty policy. In suggest- 
ing that the economist's category "land" is not a "given" but is created and destroyed by 
social processes, it offers a way of identifying the cultural bias of an institution and a way 
of compensating for that bias. For instance, if we assume that IIASA's bias is towards 
caste-ism (that is, towards a personal strategy in which needs are given and only resources 
are manageable) then we should not be surprised to discover that those who argue from 
a more sectist social context (a context in which the adopted strategy i s  to manage needs 
downwards) find credible a level of energy demand two-and-a-half times lower than 
I IASA's minimum. This cultural approach provides us with a method for handling such 
disjunctions in credibility, and with a way of understanding the sorts of "perceptiongaps" 
that exist between the different parties in current debates about risk, without requiring 
us to play the "cosmic exile" and pronounce on who is right and who is wrong. 
INTRODUCTION 
nThe very rich are different from you and me," said 
Scott Fitzgerald. "Yes," replied Eemingway, "they've got more 
money.n Economists, by and large, side with Hemingway; anthro- 
pologists with Scott Fitzgerald. Both, in taking sides, have 
missed the whole point of this literary exchange which is that 
these two positions are not to be seen as contradictory. Scott 
Fitzgerald is not denying that the very rich have more money than 
he and Hemingway; he is insisting that, over and above that 
distinction of degree, there is some other distinction of kind. 
He is saying that, at right angles to this clearly visible 
economic axis, there is a cultural axis which has been overlooked 
What is more, whilst the economic axis is a continuum with 
individuals spread out all the way along it and sliding this way 
and that as their fortunes wax and wane, the cultural axis in- 
volves discontinuities - individuals, far from being spread out 
along it, are clumped around certain points and, far from 
sliding smoothly back and forth, they can only shift their 
positions (if at all) by either headlong careers or sudden dis- 
continuous jumps from one clump to another. 
Having criticised Hemingway for missing (albeit deliberately) 
the whole point of the argument, let me now redress the balance 
a little and take Scott Fitzgerald to task for not carrying his 
reasoning through to its logical conclusion. Having gone to all 
the trouble of setting up his two axes - one a continuum, the 
other a disco~tinuum - he then qoes and spoils it all by assuming 
that they represent dependent variables - that as you move up one 
you move up the other. But why should only the very rich be 
different from you and me? Who,corne to that, is to say that 
you and I are the same? And why shouldn't some of the very rich 
be different, not just from you and me, but from othcrs among 
the very rich as well? In other words, what Scott Fitzgerald 
has overlooked is that his two axes may represent two fully 
independent variables. Let me now try to rectify that orrission. 
The anthropologist does not disagree with the economist; he 
concedes that the very rich have got more money than the 
not-so-very rich and that, in consequence, they are able to do 
all sorts of things that others with less money are not able to 
do. What the anthropologist is saying is that, when the 
economist has said that, that is not all that can be said. We 
can go on and, slicing through social life along a very different 
orientation, look, not at how people are differentiated by 
constraints - by what the17 can't do - but at how they are 
differentiated by capabilities - by the different things they 
do with what they can do. 
Now, of course, it is quite possible that Scott Fitzgerald, 
though he did not pause to consider whether his two variables 
might be independent of one another, was nevertheless right but 
the fact that the economic axis deals with problems and with 
continuities, whilst the cultural axis deals with capabilities 
and with discontinuities, suggests that this is unlikely. The 
mathematician will raise objections to such non-kosher dependen- 
cies and the statistician will throw up his arms in horror if 
asked to marry aggregations and disaggregations in this way. To 
these fundamental distinctions between the two axes we must add 
a contingent one: the economic axis is a well-trodden path that 
has been mapped and signposted by generations of travellers; the 
cultural axis is known only through the fragmentary reports of 
a few explorers and our attempt to traverse it will inevitably 
be a much more tentative and speculative business. 
But at least we can make some preparations against the un- 
certainties that lie ahead. What might we expect to find out 
there? We should expect to find several, but not innumerable, 
distinctly different ways in which people who are all subject 
to the same constraints set about making the most of whatever 
possibilities these constraints leave open to them. Whilst it 
is only to be expected that these different ways of managing 
are likely to flourish in all their glorious variety in situations 
where the constraints are least severe, we should nevertheless 
be prepared to encounter them even when the constraints are at 
their most stringent. In other words, we should not be 
surprised to find just as many differences in kind among the 
very poor as among the.very rich. And, if our expectations 
are confounded, .... if we don't find any of these differences, 
even among the very rich? Then, come home Ernest; all is for- 
given 1 
A MODEL OF THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE 
Begin with the idea that individuals can be differentiated 
by the ways in which they are caught up in the process of social 
life, and further assume that these different ways of being 
caught up can be adequately described by just two axes - one 
( g r o u p )  describing the way an individual is caught up in the 
processes of group formation, the other ( g r i d )  the way he is 
caught up in the processes of personal network-building (both 
his own network and those of other people). These assumptions 
give us two dimensions of social c o n t s x t  and the next step is the 
quite reasonable one of assuming that the extent to which an 
individual will, in the conduct of his social life, end up by 
manipulating others or by being himself manipulated by others 
varies according to his social context. 
Given these assumptions, we can represent the relationship 
between these three variables - the two dimensions of social 
context and the level of manipulation that they result in - 
by a three-dimensional graph. One such graph,which 
happens to be the one that underlies all that follows, looks 
like this (Figure 1): 
Figure 1. The Social Landscape. 
I will not make any attempt here to justify this model' but 
will simply point out the way in which it satisfies the criteria 
implicit in Scott Fitzgerald's ideas about cultural difference. 
If individuals are clumped around certain points, instead 
of being spread out all over the continuum, then this means that 
there must be some stabilizable equilibria (the clumps) separated 
by zones of instability (the regions where there are no clumps). 
In this model there are five such regions where clumps can form; 
they are the five flat bits - the two hilztops located above 
opposite ends of one diagonal of the social context square, the 
two basins above opposite ends of the other diaqonal, and the 
saddZe point that lies above the place where these two diagonals 
cross. 
The flatness of the surface is a necessary condition for 
stability but it is not a sufficient condition. For an 
individual to come to rest at such a locality he will have to 
be following an appropriate s t r a t e p p ;  to stabilize yourself on 
a hilltop you will have to follow a strategy of always moving 
towards higher ground, to stabilize yourself in a basin you will 
have always to move towards the lower ground, and to stabilize 
yourself on the saddlepoint you will have to make sure that you 
always pull back from steepening slopes. Depending on which 
strategy you are following (and on where you happen to be to 
start off with) you will eventually find yourself clumped with 
socially similar individuals at one of these flat bits. I f ,  for 
some reason, you change your strategy then off you will slide 
until you eventus.11~ fetch up at an equilibrium that is 
stabilized by your new strategy. 
Conversely, if you are subjected to a sufficiently large 
perturbation, you will be dislodged from your equilibrium c ' e s p i t e  
your strategy. In such an eventuality you will find yourself 
sliding around on the slippery slopes (the regions of dis- 
equilibrium) that lie between those flat bits. If we introduce 
the further refinement that individuals always try to reach a 
stable equilibrium and that they may be prepared to change their 
strategies in order to reach one, then we obtain a not-too-un- 
realistic picture of social life in which the various clumps 
are always present yet individuals are often on the move between 
them. To this can be added the further realistic refinement of 
variations in the steepness of the slopes between t h e ~ e  clumps. 
Along two sides of the square the slopes contain overhangs 
(cusp catastrophes) and this means that transitions between the 
equilibria they separate will be sudden and discontinuous; the 
other two slopes do not overhang and transitions here will be 
continuous and, perhaps, quite gradual. 
An interesting feature of the overhanging sections is that 
they each permit two very different equilibria (a hilltop and a 
basin) to be stabilized at the same social context. This means 
that, within the overhanging regions, a change in strategy will 
result in a sudden switch - a conversion - from one stable 
equilibrium to another without any intervening region of in- 
stability. Another interesting property of this graph is that the 
voluines that it encloses above and below the social context 
plane are equal; manipulating and being manipulated exactly 
cancel one another out - power and impotence are equa1,but not 
opposite. Power is distributed along the watershed linking the 
two hilltops; impotence, at right angles to this, along the 
troughs that run up to the saddlepoint from each of the basins. 
But it is time to get back to the question of poverty. The 
point of the picture is simply that it will illuminate the argu- 
ment that follows by revealing some of the remarkable kinds of 
properties that a system capable of the sort of variations that 
Scott Fitzgerald is insisting are there will have to possess. 
At this stage, it is not to be taken as anything more than a 
light organising framework for approaching soine hitherto un- 
explored terrain; a way of making three concepts graphically 
clear - stabilizable equilibria, appropriate strategies for 
stabilizing them, and unstable transitions (sometimes smooth, 
sometimes discontinuous) between them. 
HOW TO DRAW THE PROFILES OF THE POOR 
why should it be that inflation, the effects of inflation 
upon minorities, the programmes designed to assist them, and 
the steps taken by their members to cope with all these, present 
a picture so muddled that an expensive research project entitled 
"Inflation and Deprivation: A Political Analysis" is needed to 
clarify it? We, or at any rate the economists amongst us, know 
what inflation is, so it can't be that. So the chances are that 
the mess has, as usual, to do with people; and my guess is that 
those whom the problem-solvers have assigned to the convenient 
pigeon-hole "deprived" (or "oppressed ethnic minorities and the 
permanently poor") are not, in fact, all birds of the same 
feather. 
Oscar Wilde once said: "If only the poor had profiles there 
would be no difficulty in solving the problem of poverty". By this he did not mean simply that if only they were two dimensional, 
and so had no stomachs to fill, there would be no problem. Rather, 
the trouble was that "the poor" could only be perceived by the 
problem-solvers as an anonymous m+ps. If only they could discern 
the features of the poor - perceive them in all their individual 
diversity - the problem would be solved. The irritating thing 
about wilde is not that he is so facetious and so witty - too 
clever by half - but that he is usually right as well. If he 
is right about the poor, then the task facing us is an anthro- 
pological one: drawing the profiles of the poor. 
The task now is to devise a way of actually bringing this 
anthropological approach to bear on poverty in Britain. A 
convenient way of doing this is to look at the British definition 
of poverty. In fact there are (at least) three definitions - 
the implicit, the technical, and the practical - and the anthro- 
pological approach can be neatly slotted into the gaps between 
them. 
1. The implicit definition of poverty: 'What really matters 
are the chances - or lack of them - people face: not 
the decisions they make, faced with these chances.. . .In 
defining poverty, we should give priority to those who 
lack the opportunity to give themselves and their 
families an adequate incone. ' 2  So poverty is essentially 
the relative absence of the chance to choose. 
2. The technical definition of poverty: Put like this, it 
is tempting to conclude that poverty is a consequence 
of inequality but the technical definition of poverty 
does not draw that conclusion; it simply states that 
povertr is Tack of command over resources relative to 
needs. 
3. The practical definition of poverty: This involves two 
large assumptions: first, that command over resources 
is measurable in terms of net income, second, that needs 
are expressible in terms of the current level of 
Supplementary Benefits. 3 
~f these two assumptions are valid then the two explicit 
definitions define roughly the same thing, and policy (based on 
the practical definition) will, give or take a few approximations, 
be directed SgUarely at the problem (identified in terms of the 
technical definition). But if the assumptions are not valid 
then policy may not have anything to do with problem; indeed, it 
r,ay even be that policy is a cause of the problem. 
The technical definition: lack of command over resources 
relative to needs: is a persorial definition - it tells us when 
and why a particular individual is in poverty. The practical 
definition is an impersonal definition - command over resources 
is measured in terms of net income regardless of variations in 
individual resourcefulness, and the universal measure of needs 
in terms of the Supplementary Benefit level can take no account 
of the fact that some individuals are more needy than others. 
Within the technical definition, the poor have profiles. Within 
the practical definition, they have none. So how, in practice, 
can we draw their profiles? 
Consider an individual (not necessarily a poor individual). 
He will have certain wants: a minimal daily intake of calories 
sufficient to sustain life, air, water, and an ambient temperature 
which, if his environment is harsh, may require a microclimate. 
In this latter eventuality, his wants will have to include such 
items as shelter, fuel, and clothing. And then, of course, there 
is security from attack and the problem of reproduction. As he 
makes the transfer from total isolation to involvement with 
others so his wants become submerged by his needs.4 All theories 
of needs have run up against this obstacle: how to distinguish 
a 'basic need' ( a want) from a 'derived need' ( a need) .' AS 
we become social animals what we want is needs. Nevertheless 
there is, somewhere, a minimal, universal, biologically defined 
level of wants: those inputs to the individual that will sustain, 
not his social life, just his life. 
You can increase or decrease your needs but you cannot do 
anything about your wants. If you practice infanticide and 
abandon the elderly you do not need to provide for your young 
family or look after your ageing grandmother. Indeed, as swift6 
pointed out in the context of Irish poverty, you can actually 
satisfy your wants by divesting yourself of your needs: you 
can eat your children. Swift knew what absolute poverty was 
and he knew how to distinguish a want from a need. The current 
British definition of poverty does not make this distinction: 
both needs and wants are lumped together as wants. If we wish 
to draw the profiles of the poor, we have to start with Swift: 
you can manage your needs and you can manage your resources but 
You cannot manage your wants. The Lord Buddha, before he found 
the r.iddle path, managed his needs in such a way that their level 
fell far below his wants: he chose to limit his intake to just 
one her.p seed per day. Since his wants were considerably above 
this level, he could not have sustained his physical existence 
indefinitely but, since a wide range of choice was open to him, 
he was not poor even though he was starving! The famine-stricken 
Irish peasants were not prepared to eat their children - they 
needed them. The tragedy of this situation was that their 
com~and over resources did not even meet their wants, let alone 
their needs. 
Now of course, the British Department of Yealth and Social 
security$ comes across few, if any, Buddhas in its day-to-day 
business nor, thank heaven, does it have to deal with potato 
famines. My purpose in starting with these extreme examples - 
Buddha's venture along the ascetic path and Swift's policy re- 
comendations for eighteenth century Ireland - is to emphasise 
that people manage - that there can be enormous personal scope 
for resource management and for need management. If, in 
contemporary Britain, individuals do (or could) exercise some 
such scope, then the technical and the practical definitions of 
poverty define very different things. If this is the case, then 
an anthropological approach capable of drawing the profiles of 
the poor would be most useful. 
How Could Anthropology Help? 
There are two possible reasons for adopting the practical 
(no profile) definition of poverty - one justified by equity, 
the other by efficiency. 
a) The equity argument is that it is unfair to single out 
individuals. The policy must be applied impartially 
and what better way to make sure of this than to use 
a theoretical framework that is incapabZe of distin- 
guishing between individuals? 
b) The efficiency argument is that it is impossible to 
take individual needs into account (needs and priorities 
are as gloriously varied as are individuals). You would 
have to have a separate policy for every single 
individual. 
The anthropologist might reply, first, that if the needs of 
individuals vary it is not fair to treat them all the same and, 
second, that perhaps there exists some middle ground between the 
extremes of universalized and individualised needs. The needs 
of individuals may exhibit a diversity so vast as to be unhandle- 
able, but the number of ways in which individuals can personally 
manage whatever their varied needs are in relation to their 
management of their varied levels of command over resources may 
be quite limited. There is, as they say, more than one way to 
skin a rabbit but, at the same time, there aren't that many 
different ways. The following logical possibilities exist: 
1. You can manage neither your needs nor your resources. 
2 .  You can manage your needs but not your resources. 
3. You can manage your resources but not your needs. 
4. You can manage your needs and your resources. 
These four logical possibilities assume simply that, with 
respect to needs and to resources, you either can cr cannot 
manage them. But, of course, these are not all-or-nothing 
states - you may be able to manage a little or a lot, a bit 
more or a bit less. The significance of these all-or-nothing 
states is that they nap out the various extremes that it is 
possible for you to attain. Take, first of all, the implicit 
assumption that poverty is to do with the absence of the chance 
to choose. There are two different ways in which you may get 
the chance to choose: you can choose in one way if you have 
scope to personally manage your needs, and you can choose in 
another way if yo3 have scope to personally manage your command 
over resources. We can represent this by drawing two axes: 
'individual scope to manage needs1 and 'individual scope to manage 
resources'. The only calibrations that we put on these axes are 
CAN'T at the origin and CAW at the two extremities. The four 
logical possibilities are depicted like this (Figure 2): 
SCOPE TO $ W A G E  
NEEDS 
CAN'T (311 I t SCOPE TO MANAGE RESOURCES 
CAN 
Figure 2. Two degrees of freedom 
Possibility (1) has no degrees of freedom; if you are plotted 
there you can't manage your needs and you can't manage your re- 
sources. Possibilities (2) and (3) each have one degree of 
freedom and this is fully depicted on the graph. But possibility 
( U )  has two degrees of freedom and to represent this adequately 
we will have to have a third axis. 
If you can manage both needs and resources you can also 
manage the overlap between them. Depending upon how you mix 
simultaneously increases or decreases in needs and resources, 
so you can vary the size of the overlap. With possibilities 
(2) and (3) you cannot mix, and when you have chosen to increase 
or decrease your one variable you have also chosen the direction 
of change in the size of the overlap. At possibility (4) you 
have the choice of managing or not managing the direction of 
change in the size of the overlap according to the following 
simple matrix (Figure 3) : 
Tncrease 
-:eeds 
needs 
Decrease resources Increase resources 
Y- 
RESOURCE WAGEblENT 
Overlap must get 
smaller 
'Overlap may get 
bigger or smaller 
Figure 3. A Third Degree of Freedom 
Overlap may get 
bigger or smaller 
1 merlap must get 
bigger 
With two combinations of mix you have scope to manage the 
direction of change in the size of the overlap, and with the 
other two possible combinations you do not have this scope. So, 
by virtue of this third axis -scope to manage the overlap 
between needs and resources -possibility (4) provides not one 
but two attainable extremes (Figure 4): 
Scope to manage 
overlap between 
needs and resources 
CAN e 
Figure 4. The Three Degrees of Freedom 
As an individual moves from 'can't to 'can' in one, two or all 
three of these directions, so he qradually acquires more and 
more of one,two or all three of these freedoms. The result 
is a three dimensional space that defines the limit of where it 
is possible for him to go (Figure 5) : 
Scope t o  manage 
overlap between 
needs and re - 
scope manage 
CAN ' T c A ~  ‘ 
Scope to  manage resources 
Figure 5 .  The Five Extremes 
This picture reveals quite clearly that there are five extremes - 
five points or corners to this space - that it is possible for 
the individual to reach. If the space was spherical then any 
five points on its surface would be no different from any other 
five points on it, but this is not the case here.8 These five 
points are altogether different from any other five points on 
the surface - they are singularities - and it is this special 
quality that gives rise tothe five distinct personal strategies. 
Poverty in Wonderland 
It is now possible to say something about the separation 
between the technical and the practical definitions of poverty. 
First of all, neither of them has much connection with what I 
have called the implicit definition of poverty - the absence of 
the chance to choose. Only at possibility (1) is the chance to 
choose completely absent and this means that, as one moves away 
from any of the other four extremes and towards possibility (11, 
so one moves into poverty - poverty, that is, in terms of the 
implicit definition. Eut in the technical definition poverty 
is something else altogether - the shrinking of the overlap 
between resources and needs. Possibility (1) says nothing about 
the size of the overlap: it just says that you have no control 
over its size. If the overlap you have no control over happens 
to be narrow or, worse still, negative you will be both implicitly 
and technically poor but, if the gap happens to be large you 
will be implicitly poor and technically rich. At any of the 
other four possibilities you cannot be implicitly poor but, since 
you have the scope to manage your needs or your resources or 
both your needs and your resources, you can (if you so choose) 
be technically poor. 
When it comes to the practical definition, things get even 
worse. The practical definition assumes that there is no such 
thing as personal scope for managing needs and resources: people 
just have needs and they just hsve resources. Of course, different 
sorts of people are assumed to have different sorts of needs - 
a single parent's needs are differently assessed from those of 
an elderly widow - but these needs apply to social categories 
not to individuals. So the practical definition puts everyone 
at possibility (1). By the practical definition, the whole world 
is poor, implicitly. 
These three definitions of poverty are all social: they 
stress the fact that man does not live by bread alone. Indeed, 
they stress it to such an extent that they overlook the fact 
that there has to be some bread. If you continually manage your 
needs downwards, there will eventually cone a point where they 
fall below your wants. You will then be in a fourth kind of 
poverty: you will be starving. But, since you are choosing 
to bring your needs to this level, you are not implicitly poor. 
Similarly, if your command over resources declined to such an 
extent that you could no longer satisfy your wants, then the 
fact that you could still manage your needs (and consequently 
could still increase the overlap between your needs and your 
resources) would enable you to die a wealthy man, technically. 
We must take Swift seriously and recognise that implicit poverty, 
technical poverty, and practical poverty are all different kinds 
of socio-poverty and that they do not always coincide with 
bio-poverty: that extreme state where either needs, or resources, 
or both needs and resources, fall below the level of wants. 
So this anthropological approach helps us to understand what 
a complex business poverty is, and how contradictory our con- 
ceptions of it can be. Rather than providing us with a definition 
of poverty, it maps out the complexities and the contradictions: 
it reveals the vertical separations and the horizontal displace- 
ments between the four definitions (bio-poverty and the three 
varieties of socio-poverty) that constitute the traditional 
British approach to poverty. (Figure 6) 
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Figure 6. Complexity and Contradiction 
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a )  If your aim is to avoid implicit poverty you must acquire 
the chance to choose. That is, you must move yourself 
away from possibility (1) towards one of the other four 
extremes. 
b) If your aim is to avoid technical poverty you must manage 
your needs or your resources or both your needs and your 
resources so as to make the overlap between them as 
large as possible (or, at least, large enouqh). 
C) If your aim is to avoid bio-poverty you must make sure 
that, in achieving these first two aims, you do not 
reduce your needs too much. This means that, other things 
being equal, it is preferable to increase your resources 
rather than to decrease your needs. 
If you are fortunate enough to have the chance to choose, 
then, depending on what scopes are available to you and depending 
upon which of these aims you deem to be paramount, you will 
strive to manage your resources and your needs in such a way as 
to maximize certain variables and to minimize others (these 
variables being resources, needs, and the overlap between resources 
and needs). The significance of the four extreme possibilities 
that exist when you have the chance to choose is that they reveal 
that there are four, and only four, different ways of setting 
about these maximisings and minimisings: that there are four, 
and only four, management strategies. And, of course, there is 
in addition just one way of not being able to manage: not so 
much a strategy as a way of living with a situation over which 
you can have no control.9 
Stripped to the barest essentials, these five strategies 
may be described as follows: 
Possibility (1): Keep your fingers crossed and hope that 
Lady Luck will smile on you. Survive. 
Possibility (2): Decrease needs to increase overlap. 
Possibility (3): Increase resources to increase overlap. 
Possibility (4a): Increase resources and decrease needs to 
increase overlap. 
Possibility (4b): Increase resources and increase needs to 
decrease overlap. 
(For strategies (4a) and (4b) to separate we have to assume 
that increasing resources requires a lot of effort. With 
(4a) you maximise your chance to choose and minimise your 
effort. With (4b) you accept a high level of effort in 
order to maximise the satisfaction of needs.) 
Two tasks remain. First, to demonstrate that these five 
strategies coincide with the five possible 'clumps' that are 
already predicted in the hypothetical model. Second, to 
demonstrate that all five possibilities are, in fact, taken up 
in contemporary Britain and in the United States and that each 
of the five strategies is adopted according to the social con- 
text predictions of this hypothesis. 
MANAGING AND NOT MANAGING NEEDS 
Most people, I suspect, will have little difficulty with 
the idea that you can manage your needs, upwards and downwards. 
What may be more difficult for them to accept is that some people 
are not in a position to do this. But those individuals whose 
lives are hedged about with all sorts of socially-imposed pre- 
scriptions will find it very difficult to do anything to their 
needs - they are, in one way or another, just given to them. 
For instance, the young subaltern in a smart regiment will 
find that his time, his dress, his social relations, his 
recreations, even his eating, his drinking and his sleeping (and 
his sleeping partners) are almost totally imposed by virtue of 
his fairly lowly position within a complex hierarchical orga- 
nisation. He has to wear a well-cut suit on an informal evening 
in the mess and he has to wear expensive mess dress on a dinner 
night. All sorts of compulsory items, ranging from donations 
to regimental charities to subscriptions to the Polo Loan Fund, 
are added to his mess bill. If he has no private income, and 
so no scope to increase his resources, he may be.tempted to try 
to decrease his needs. He will find it almost impossible to do 
so. The additional items on his mess bill are compulsory, the 
dinner nights are compulsory, even the excessive drinking of 
champagne and the marvellously idiotic and dangerous games that 
go with it are compulsory. If he has a private income, he may 
be tempted to increase his needs - hard drinking, hard gambling, 
and hard riding are the traditional avenues. But, if his drinks 
bill, his bridge book debts, and his stable charges rise above 
a quite low threshold, he will be up in front of the Colonel 
told to bring his mess bill down to a more acceptable level. 1 tnd 
A complex hierarchical organisation m a i n t a i n s  itself by 
imposing equally complex and hierarchically-patterned levels of 
needs upon the individuals who compose it. The result is that 
an individual will find that, though his level of needs may be 
set at quite a high level, he can neither manage it up nor down. 
At least the young subaltern's lack of scope makes sense to him. 
It confirms him in his particular rank, defines the gradations 
between his station and those above and below him in the frame- 
work, enables those in these stations to recognise him and treat 
him appropriately, and impresses upon him the fact that he enjoys 
the privilege of holding a responsible position within a fine 
disciplined body of men. But what of those who, having little 
command over resources and a low level of needs, find themselves 
prevented from lowering their needs still further? 
Poverty Versus Conspicuous Non-Consumption 
It is well known that it is those educated and resourceful 
individuals with their fifteen year old Morris Minors, their 
cottages in Wales, and their copies of which magazine who make 
the best peasants these days - shopping around for supermarket 
bargains, tending their kohl-rabi patches, knocking up nourishing 
stews from skirt of this and belly of that, stuffing their deep 
freezes with bartered allotment produce and keeping their spare 
cash hidden from the ta:: man in a stripped pine chest under 
their Victorian brass beds. In other words, the poor pay more. ' ' 
This whole area - managing or not managing a low level of 
needs downwards - is a political minefield and I must take care 
not to blow myself up. Let me just state the simple fact that, 
if the one who can manage his needs trades down and moves into 
a run-down house, he will probably get a letter telling him 
that it is now listed as a building of outstanding architectural 
or historical interest, and that, if the one who can't manage 
his needs moves into the house next door, he will in all likeli- 
hood get a letter informing him that it has been condemned and 
is no longer fit for human habitation. l 2  At every turn the non- 
manager is hemmed in by presciptions that make little sense to 
him and frustrate all his attempts to manage. These prescriptions 
are not imposed by nature (though those who do the imposing may 
insist that they are). They are socially-imposed - by the setting 
of the Supplementary Benefit level, and by the implementation 
of the various policies designed to prevent individuals falling 
below it. 
The majority of wage and salary earners in Britain have 
their tax deducted at source - they receive a regular weekly or 
monthly income, there is no prohlem in determining the level of 
tax that is due, and any small imbalances can be sorted out by 
the computer at the end of the tax year. Other indirect taxes 
are collected automatically - Mr. Average pays for his petrol 
and his beer and the tax component in the price is sorted out 
somewhere down the line between the retailer and the supplier; 
the same sort of thing happens when he buys a new car or sells 
his old one; if he has any capital it is probably tied up in 
his house and if he sells that at a profit it is exempt from 
capital gains tax. 
Only nearer the top of the pile, among the company directors, 
the self-employed, those with investment portfolios, more thzn 
one house, property abroad, and so on... do things get more 
complicated. It is only here that value-added tax, capital gains 
tax, capital transfer tax, dollar premiums, residential statuses, 
currency exchange controls, exotic rates of personal taxation, 
and so on.. . begin to bite. l 3  There is no doubt that this is a 
legislative jungle, but the person fortunate enough to enter it 
knows that he is entering it, wants to enter it, and what is more 
knows that there are plenty of guides (taxation advisers, invest- 
ment consultants) who, for a tolerable fee, will be only too 
glad to smooth his path through it. 
The astonishing thing about British poverty is that those 
at the very bottom of the pile find themselves in exactly the 
same predicament as those at the very top; except that, for them, 
there are no guides and they have to enter the jungle whether 
they want to or not. 
There is now a bewildering variety of government pro- 
grammes, operating on quite different principles, which 
are designed to relieve poverty .... None, save expert 
administrators and welfare rights advisers, can under- 
stand who should get what or why.lQ 
So these individuals who are caught in 'the poverty trap' - 
prevented from managing their needs downwards by the intervention 
of the state's safety net, and prevented from managing their 
resources upwards by the too-rapid removal of means-tested 
benefits - are actually forced into poverty (in terms of both 
the technical definition and the implicit definition) by pro- 
grammes 'designed to relieve poverty' (in terms of the practical 
definition) . 
Could this counterproductive state of affairs be remedied 
by doing away with the safety net altogether or, less drastically, 
by lowering it a little and removing the means-tested benefits 
rather less rapidly? 
Well, there is no clear-cut answer; it depends on which kind 
of poverty you want to relieve. It depends on how many people, 
once the net is removed or lowered, swim and how many of them 
sink; and it depends on how far you can lower the level of 
Supplementary Benefits before it passes below the level of wants. 
The dilemma is that tender paternalistic attempts to relieve 
technical poverty and practical poverty may just drive people 
into implicit poverty, whilst tough radical measures may get 
rid of socio-poverty by driving people into bio-poverty instead. 
Perhaps we should stand back from the immediate problem for a 
moment and, instead of asking how we can decrease poverty (in 
its various definitions) ask ourselves instead how we can 
increase wealth. In other words, how can people acquire the scope 
to manage their command over resources and tc manage the gap 
between their needs and their resources? How do they gain more 
degrees of freedom, and does an increase in one man's scope 
inevitably mean a corresponding reduction in another's? Can we 
help them to do this, and if so, how? 
MANAGING AND NOT MANAGING RESOURCES 
Development experts tell us that in countries like India 
wealth and land are virtually synonymous. They urge that we 
start by recognising that this is so and they recommend develop- 
ment programmes that, one way or another, will increase the 
productive efficiency of that land. On this view India's re- 
sources are finite and fixed; when it comes to land, as Mark 
Twain pointed out, they don't make it any more. But could it not 
be that India is poor because  the Indians insist on seeing wealth 
and land as synonymous? At the.periphery of Indian society all 
sorts of people (Parsees, Sikhs, Tibetans) have become immenselv 
wealthy thanks to their ability'not to see wealth solely in terms 
of land. 1 5  
Obviously, resources do have a physical base but the Indian 
example suggests that it is not the resources that are actually 
there, but the resources that are p e r c e i v e d  to be there, that 
matter. We are given and denied resources, not by nature, but 
by our i d e a  of n a t u r e .  
The anthropological hypothesis is that ideas of nature are 
socially generated - that there are only a few different kinds 
of ideas of nature that are socially viable, and that an 
individual will find one of these kinds of ideas credible (and 
the others incredible) by virtue of his social context. This 
anthropological argument is complex but it can be illustrated 
very simply by looking at the self-evident, yet contradictory, 
metaphors and catch-phrases that different people find credible 
images for describing the resources that are available to them. 
A hundred years ago, the courageous and enterprising seeker 
after wealth heeded the sound advice : 'Go West, young man.' 
Because of this open frontier, his gain did not result in anyone 
else's loss (at any rate, it was not perceived as doing so). 
Eventually that particular frontier was closed and there are now 
many experts who will tell us that all frontiers are closed. On 
the cosmic scale, there can ,be no such thing as an open frontier 
in 'Spaceship Earth' and, on a more domestic level, we can do 
nothing about the size of the 'national cake' - it is already 
baked - all we can do is argue about how to share it out. 
Culinary metaphors, it seems, are much favoured by those 
whose idea of nature insists that there is no scope for' increasing 
our resources. Ecological accountants tell us that there is no 
such thing as a free lunch and, of course, the 'national cake' 
metaphor is buttressed by the compelling nursery truth that you 
cannot have your cake and eat it. Yet, self-evident and 
indisputable though these truths may seem, there are individuals 
who hold to other equally self-evident truths that totally 
contradict them. Paul Ehrlich's ecological balance sheet is 
contradicted by Andrew Marvell's r.letaphysica1 lunch: 
Ripe apples drop about my head; 
The luscious clusters of the vine 
Upon my mouth do crush their wine. 
The nectarine and curious peach 
Into my arms themselves do reach.16 
Those who share such a cornuco2ian17 idea of nature where, even 
in the desert manna falls from heaven, are declaring that it is 
impossible to draw up a balance sheet. For them, nature is in- 
exhaustible. 
Ideas of nature, and the self-evident truths that justify 
and enforce them, are profoundly moralistic. In Nancy Mitford's 
novel Love in a Cold Climate her three outrageous heroes, be- 
having with total hedonistic disregard for these natural laws, 
seen all set to receive their just desserts. To the dismay of 
their 'cake mentality' critics, they sail serenely on into a 
three-sided relationship that breaks all the social rules. 
Cedric, theeffeteaesthete whose exuberant style has opened up 
these triangular capabilities, triumphantly proclaims their 
success : 
So here we all are, my darling, having our lovely cake 
and eating it too, One's great aim in life.18 
So if we look, not at nature, but at ideas of nature we must 
recognise that there are at least two contradictory versions that 
people can fin6 credible and that enbec?ded in each of them are 
two very different moralities. 
ACCOUNTABLE NATURE 
Eletaphors of closure: 
'national cake' 
'spaceship earth' 
CORNUCOPIAN NATURE 
Metaphors of openness: 
'Plenty more fish in the sea' 
'Go West, young man' 
Justifications: Justifications: 
'You can't have your cake 'You can have your cake and 
and eat it' eat it' 
'There's no such thing as a 'Cast thy bread upon the waters' 
free lunch' 
'Consider the lilies of the 
field....' 
What are the consequences of all this for the personal management 
of resources? 
With cornucopian nature there can be no obstacles to an 
individual managing his resources up or down. If he manages them 
up it does not follow that he is driving someone else's level 
down nor, if he manages them down, can he expect the approbation 
of his fellows in return for the benefits they enjoy as a 
consequence of his forebearance. With accountable nature the 
picture is very different. If an individual manages his resources 
up then, somewhere along the line, others are being deprived and, 
if he manages them down, others somewhere should feel the benefit. 
This is the notorious zero-surn mentality that some observers 
have diagnosed as the underlying cause of 'The British Disease. ' ' 9  
But this zero-sum mentality can manifest itself in very different 
ways, depending upon the social context in which it arises. 
With accountable nature the zero sum game is concerned with the 
control of fixed and finite resources; with cornucopian nature 
it is concerned with something else--control over the horn of 
plenty . 
In a strongly individualised context the inevitability of 
one man's gain being another man's loss becomes one of the 
regrettable facts of life: an individual who manages his 
resources upwards will justify his behaviour with the excuse: 
'if I don't do it someone else will.' Here credibility is 
given to the image of nature 'red in tooth and claw'. It is 
'the law of the jungle' in which the strong succeed and the weak 
go to the wall. This inevitable process continually sorts out 
the weak from the strong: the former cannot manage their 
resources, the latter can. But the weak may still find the 
cornucopian idea of nature credible. It is just that the 
strong have gained control of the horn of plenty and it only 
disgorges resources in their direction. The weak, as a result, 
are easily attracted to millenarian movements that promise to 
turn the world upside down and point the horn in their direction 
instead. 
~ u t  if, instead of this Hobbesian war of all against all, 
individuals are given or denied access to resources according to 
whether they are included or excluded from social groups, this 
free-for-all is stopped before it can start. Strong sanctions 
can be applied to individuals who put self before whole. In the 
French Foreign Legion the man who steals from his comrades will 
be pinned to the barrack-room table by bayonets through the 
palms o£ his hands,an unpopular member of a mountaineering 
expedition may be accused of 'secret eating,' and a non-conforming 
union member may be sent to coventry20 by his workmates. And, 
behind these severe sanctions, there always lies the threat of 
a worse one - expulsion from the group. In Britain recently, 
journalists who did not obey a strike call were expelled from 
their union. Since union and employees operate a closed shop 
agreement, these journalists lost not just their union cards 
but their jobs as well. 
In such contexts th~,individual's scope to manage his 
resources is almost nil. Resources are managed collectively: 
the small hunting band divides the day's catch (be it a buffalo 
or a rabbit) according to strictly observed rules, in the forced 
bivouac the Mars-bar is divided with surgical precision, and in 
the fundamentalist farming community no one works in the fields 
on Sunday. If access to resources is obtained by membership 
of just one simple egalitarian group then there is little scope 
for the collective management of resources: the village land 
or the national cake is given - all the group can do is see that 
it is divided fairly. But if there are several possibly over- 
lapping groups, and if there are hierarchical divisions both 
within and between these groups, then a particular group can press 
for a larger share of the cake - after all its only loyalty is 
to its members - somebody else (the Government, the economy ... God) 
can worry about how the cake can be cut to give each group its 
entitlement. It is in this way that individual members of 
complex groups can, by acting collectively, acquire the scope 
to collectively manage their resources. If such groups are fairly 
evenly matched and all press their claims with equal ytgour such 
management of resources may well result in inflation. 
By contrast, the members of simple (small tight-knit 
egalitarian) groups are likely to devote much of their energy 
to maintaining the boundary of the group - protecting the soft 
vulnerable 'us' from the nasty predatory 'them'. Looking under 
every sheep's clothing in case it conceals a wolf, and looking 
under every bed in case there is a red hidden there, are time- 
consuming activities. Similarly, the need for scrupulous fairness 
will lead them to place great emphasis on precedent and tradition. 
These preoccupations are likely to draw attention away from the 
possibility of collectively increasing their resources, for to 
do this would require time, energy and innovation. Indeed, 
since innovation and personal resource management are quite 
possibly among the nasty activities that make those outside the 
boundary of the group so predatory, there is a strong chance 
that belief in the fixed nature of resources, and rejection of 
innovation, will become essential qualificatior?~ for qroup 
membership. 
In the case of one group within a complex hierarchical 
arrangement of groups, its scope to collectively manage its 
resources is quite independent of the total level of resources. 
The group': aim is not to increase its resources by increasing 
the size of the cake but to increase its share of the cake. In 
such conditions the size of the cake may increase but the chances 
are that it will stay the same or even shrink. What is signifi- 
cant is not what is happening to the size of the cake but that 
no one is very interested in what is happening to it. Ideas of 
nature, though still accountable, will be little developed among 
group members. Their attitude is likely to be that nature is 
someone else's department. For them, nature performs a sub- 
servient role, fitting itself to the demands of the social order. 
Their idea of nature and of society is that they are isomorphic 
and clearly separate systems. 2 3  Le Corbusier's 'ville radieuse' , 
in which vast complex white buildings are raised on legs above 
the well-ordered parkland that flows around and under them, 
provides aconcreteexpression of this idea of nature and of man's 
place within it. 
To'predict just when and where environmental concern will 
appear is not easy. It tends to appear in strongly group contexts 
but in some strongly grouped contexts (trades unions, for . 
instance) it is remarkably absent. This is a complex problem 
for the anthropologist to unravel but fortunately it need not 
concern us too much. All we need to note here is that, thanks 
to the contradictory ideas of nature - cornucopian and account- 
able - resources, though based in nature, become subject to 
social control. Depending upon what sort of control is being 
operated, individuals will find themselves able or unable to 
manage their command over resources. 
SOCIAL CONTEXT AND PERSONAL STRATEGY 
All I need to do now is to put forward some credible and 
useable hypothesis showing the way the five personal management 
strategies relate to variations in social context. 
Whether you can or cannot manage your needs depends, I have 
argued, on whether you are subject to socially-imposed pre- 
scriptions. So one dimension of social context can be envisaged 
as running ,from total prescription to total freedom from pre- 
scription. A second, and quite independent dimension, runs 
between one extreme where an individual derives all his support 
from group membership to the other extreme where he is excluded 
from all such groups. (Figure 7) 
+ 
total freedom from prescription 
totally -Y" 
individualised 
Figure 7. Social Context 
5 totaily 
collectivised 
The hypothesis is that the five alternative strategies generated 
by the ability orinabilityto personally manage your needs and 
your resources relate to your social context in the following 
manner. In doing this they arrange themselves in a pattern 
that exactly matches the five possible clumps in the initial 
hypothetical m0del.2~ (Figure 8) 
(YOU c a n n o t  manage y o u r  n e e d s r  You c a n  ( c o l l e c t i v e l y )  \ 
o r  you r  r e s o u r c e s .  I 1'1 manage you r  r e s o u r c e s  b u t  STRATEGY. S u r v i v e .  n o t  y c u r  n e e d s .  STRATEGY. Maximlse r e s o u r c e s  ( c o l l e c -  
t i v e l y )  I 
You c a n  manage you r  nee  s,  
you r  r e s o u r c e s  and  t h e  o v e r -  
.+ l a p  be tween.  STRATEGY. Man- 
a g e  n e e d s  and  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
maximize  o v e r l a p .  C
Figure 8. The Five Strategies and Social Context. 
/YOU c a n  manage n e e d s  and  
r e s o u r c e s  b u t  n o t  t h e  over- '  
l a p .  STRATEGY. Maximize 
need-  and  r e s o u r c e s .  
CONCLUSION 
7 You c a n  ( c o l l e c t i v e l y )  
manage y o u r  n e e d s  b u t  n o t  
\ 
y o u r  r e s o u r c e s .  STRATEGY. 
Xaximize  o v e r l a p  by  ( c o l l e c -  
It was possible, within the constraints of this pilot 
project, to carry out some fielawork (in Britain), aimed at in- 
vestigating some of the social consequences of the model, and 
also a very small test (in the United States) of the hypotheses 
that this model generates. 
L t i v e l y )  m i n i m i z i n g  needs .  ) 
The fieldwork was designed to explore some of the more 
prominent features of the social landscape revealed by the model. 
In particular, 
a) the saddlepoint was explored by looking at a self- 
sufficient 'organic' farm in Norfolk, at a self- 
employed graphic designer in London, and at a marginal 
sheep farm in the Lake District; 
b) the two individualized contexts, and the smooth transi- 
tions between them, were explored by looking at some 
individuals engaged in 'the hidden economy' - two 
part-tine stripteaseartistes and a self-employed 
builder in London; 
c) the two collectivised contexts, the smooth transition 
between them, and the discontinuous transition between 
the simple group context (positive group, negative grid) 
and t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  c o n t e x t  ( n e g a t i v e  g r o u p ,  
n e g a t i v e  g r i d )  were e x p l o r e d  by l o o k i n g  a t  some o f  t h e  
B e n g a l i  immigran ts  i n  t h e i r  c e n t r a l  London g h e t t o  i n  
S p i t a l f i e l d s .  
The h y p o t h e s i s  was t h e n  p u t  t o  t h e  t e s t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  
W e  ( E l l e n  Tenenbaum and m y s e l f )  d e s i g n e d  a n  i n t e r v i e w  f o r m a t  
c o m p r i s i n g  n i n e  r a t h e r  g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n s  and t h e n  Tenenbaum 
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n f o r m a l  g u i d e d  i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  f i f t e e n  i n d i v i d u a l s  
(men and women, b l a c k  and w h i t e )  i n  Washington D.C. and i n  r u r a l  
West V i r g i n i a .  A l l  f i f t e e n  were ' o f f i c i a l l y  p o o r . '  T h e s e  i n t e r -  
v iews  were d e s i g n e d  t o  r e v e a l  b o t h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  
and t h e  p e r s o n a l  management/coping s t r a t e g y  t h a t  he / she  was 
u s i n g .  
I n  a l l  f i f t e e n  c a s e s  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t s  and s t r a t e g i e s  
( s c o r e d  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  by Tenenbaum and m y s e l f )  matched i n  t h e  
manner p r e d i c t e d  by t h e  h y p o t h e s i s ,  and it t u r n e d  o u t  t h a t  less 
t h a n  h a l f  o f  o u r  ( a d m i t t e d l y  s m a l l )  sample  were  p o o r  i n  t h e  way 
t h e  p o o r  a r e  o f f i c i a l l y  assumed t o  be p o o r .  ( F i g u r e  g )  
The official view 
of poverty (the practi- 
cal definition) 
Poor in these t~ 
contexts are known 
(from anthropological 
field work2S) to exist 
- but they are not easily 
(or quickly) approachable 
for interviewing. 
F i g u r e  q .  The P r o f i l e s  o f  F i f t e e n  o f  t h e  American P o o r .  
F i n a l l y ,  what  h a s  a l l  t h i s  g o t  t o  do  w i t h  r i s k ?  T h i s  s o r t  
of approach ,  by s h i f t i n g  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  from a  s i n g l e  raw n a t u r e  
t o  a  s m a l l  number o f  s o c i a l l y  p r o c e s s e d  i d e a s  o f  n a t u r e ,  p r o v i d e s  
t h e  b a s i s  f o r  a  c u l t u r a l  t h e o r y  o f  r i s k  p e r c e p t i o n  and o f  r i s k  
h a n d l i n g .  
I t  s u g g e s t s :  
a )  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  s y s t e m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s o c i a l  
c o n t e x t  and r i s k  s e l e c t i o n .  T h a t  is ,  an  i n d i v i d u a l  
w i l l  c r e a t e  f o r  h i m s e l f  a n  env i ronment  o f  r i s k s  t h a t  
upholds  t h e  i d e a  o f  n a t u r e  t h a t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  
s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  i n  which h e  f i n d s  h i m s e l f .  
b )  t h a t  r i s k  a c c e p t a n c e ,  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  and r i s k  a b s o r p t i o n  
a r e  n o t  modes o f  b e h a v i o r  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  
a d a p t a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e  e x t e r n a l  
wor ld  b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  a r e  d i s t i n c t i v e  s o c i a l  s t y l e s  o f  
a c t i o n  t h a t  emerge i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  
r i s k  env i ronments  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  a s  s o c i a l  b e i n g s ,  
c o n s t r u c t  f o r  themse lves .  
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NOTES 
For its justification see: THOPIPCON, Michael, "A Three 
Dimensional Model" in DOUGLAS, Mary and OSTRANDER, David (eds.). 
E s s a y s  i n  t h e  S o c i o l o g y  o f  P e r c e p t i o n .  Routledge, Kegan Paul, 
London, and Basic Books, New York. (To be published 
January 1981). 
PIACHAUD, David. "Inequality and social New S o c i e t y  
Vol. 47 No. 859 March 22 1979. p. 670. 
PIACHAUD, David. " Who are the poor, and what is the best way 
to help them." New S o c i e t y  Vol. 47 No. 858 March 15 1979. 
Wants and needs may seem to be the wrong way round here. I 
am following the philosopher's usage: 'our basic repertoire 
of wants is given. We are not free tocreateor annihilate 
wants.' MIDGLEY, Mary. B e a s t  and Man: The  R o o t s  o f  Human 
N a t u r e .  Harvester, 1979. 
E.9. 1 PUUINOWSKI1 MASLOW, INGLEHARDT 
SWIFT, Jonathan. A m o d e s t  p r o p o s a l  f o r  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  
C h i l d r e n  o f  Poor P e o p l e  f rom b e i n g  a  B u r t h e n  t o  t h e i r  
F a r e n t s  o r  t h e  C o u n t r y ,  and  f o r  mak ing  t h e m B e n e f i c i a Z  t o  t h e  
P u b l i c k ,  1729. 
The govermnent department responsible for the implementation 
of poverty policy. 
Of course, these freedoms may not.unfreeze in the exponential 
manner depicted here - this is just one  of the ways they aay 
unfreeze. But, regardless of the way they unfreeze, the 
topological properties of this space renain the same. 
A distinction that we make in ordinary language between 
'managing' (personal scope) and 'coping' (no personal scope). 
This vignette is drawn from six years of participant 
observation by the author. 
Ref. to book of that title 
See THOl.1PSON, Michael. R u b b i s h  T h e o r u :  The C r e a e i o n  and 
D e s t r u c t i o n  of V a l u e .  oxford University Press 1979. 
Some of these - currency exchange controls and the 
associated dollar premium - have now been abolished by the 
Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher. 
PIACHAUD, op.cit.15 March. p. 603. 
See THOMPSON, Michael. The aesthetics of risk: culture or 
context? in SCHWING, R., and ALBERS, W. (eds.) S o c i e t a l  R i s k  
A s s e s s m e n t ,  Plenum New York 1980. 
From The Garden,  written before 1653, first published in 
MisceZZaneoue  Poems, 1681. 
See COTGROVE, Stephen. Catastrophe or cornucopia. Reu 
S o c i e t y  Vol. 47 N o .  859 March 22, 1979. 
The penultinate sentence of the novel, the ultimate being: 
'Yes, I know,' I said, 'The Boreleys think it's simply 
terrible. ' 
DAHRENDORF', Ralf. 
A form of ostracism in which all verbal communication is 
withdrawn. 
The only scope he has is that he can manage his resources 
sharply down by choosing to leave his group. 
A sociologist (Goldthorpe) has defined inflation as 'the 
monetary expression of distributional conflict' without, 
alas, saying anything about the k i n d  of distributional 
conflict that produces this particular k i n d  of monetary 
expression. This anthropological hypothesis suggests that 
inflation is likely in social settings where fairly evenly- 
matched complex groups predominate. 
An economist (Jay) has argued that the only way to get rid 
of inflation is to somehow arrange things so that the 
workers 'become infected with the entrepreneurial realities.' 
Re, alas, does aot go on to offer any suggestions as to how 
this massive aggregate shift of individuals towards 
individualised social contexts might be effected. 
GOLDTHORPE, 'The current inflation: towards a socio~ogica~ 
account' in HIRSCH and GOLDTHORPE (eds.) The P o l i t i c a l  
Economy o f  I n f l a t i o n .  1976. 
JAY, Peter. Employment, inflation and politics.' OccasionaZ 
Papers  o f  t h e  IEA, 1976 .  
23. For an elaboration of this see DOUGLAS, Mary. Cultural Bias. 
OccasionaZ Papers  o f  t h e  Royal  AnthropoZogicaZ I n s t i t u t e  
1978 .  
24. The way the individualised and collectivised extremes relate 
to group  - the way the individual is caught up in the process 
of group formation - is probably fairly obvious. The way 
in which prescription varies in relation to grid - the 
processes of personal network building - is probably less 
clear. For some discussion of this see: THOMPSON, Michael. 
'A Three Dimensional Flodel' and 'The Problem of the Centre' 
both in DOUGLAS, Mary and OSTRANDER, David (eds.). E s s a y s  
i n  t h e  Soc ioZogy  o f  P e r c e p t i o n .  P.outledge,~egan Paul, 
London and Basic Books, New York. (To be published 
January 1 9 8 1 ) .  
25 .  See, for instance: STACK, Carol B. A Z Z  Our Kin:  S t r a t e g i e s  
f o r  S u r v i v a z  i n  a  B lack  Community.  Harper and Row, New,York, 
1975 ,  and SHEEHAN, Susan. A W e l f a r e  Mother .  Mentor, 
New York, 1977 .  
ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSES TO H A Z A R D  
Barry A. Turner 
Reader in the Sociology of Organisations, 
Department of Sociology, 
University of Exeter, 
United Kingdom 
A number of organisational and occupational responses to hazard are reviewed. Attention 
is first paid to  the characteristics of those occupational groups within organisations which 
confront known danger, their cohesive and solidary qualities being stressed. Studies of 
organisational responses to crises are then outlined. When danger is less immediately 
apparent, analytical attention switches from a discussion of organisational behaviour under 
emergency conditions to models which stress perception of hazard and organisational 
intelligence gathering. Such models have formed the core of the American "disaster 
studies" approach to hazard responses, which starts with a notional rational model and 
details those factors which produce deviations from rationality. 
Difficulties which have been experienced in the use of some of the models outlined to 
guide empirical investigations are taken as a cue to review the wider context of  these 
kinds of models, and to question the range over which they are applicable. Particular 
attention is paid to a discussion of:  
Assumptions of rational behaviour, or of minor deviations from it. Organisational 
studies which commence from assumptions of minimum rather than maximum 
rationality are noted. 
The interorganisational and political context. Organisations operate in an interde- 
pendent and highly politicised environment. Responses to hazard are influenced 
by the competitive predatory or aggressive responses of other members of inter- 
organisational networks, as well as by benevolent responses. Government has 
been recognised as a source of legislation and of possible aid, but safety matters 
are often subject to political lobbying, and health and safety legislation has 
recently been studied by political scientists as an example of "agenda control", 
where interorganisational lobbying and media coverage influence the content of 
the political agenda. 
The cultural environment. The models outlined embody a number of cultural 
assumptions: the state is assumed to be beneficient in disaster and organisations 
are assumed to have an "unwritten insurance contract" with the state. Anthro- 
pological studies of responses to hazard exhibited by both small, traditional 
societies and by segments of ex-colonial societies are ignored. The ethnocentric 
features of quantifiable risk as a way of responding to hazard are discussed. 
In conclusion, the question of organisational response to  hazard is linked to Fox's recent 
suggestion that industrial societies are now undergoing a fundamental public reassessment 
of the way in which hazard and risk and modes of dealing with them should be under- 
stood. Because of this, these problems should not be regarded as isolated technical prob- 
lems the potential importance of which challenges our abilities to deal with them dis- 
passionately. 
Orgnnisational responses to  hazard are c lose ly  t i e d  up w i t h  
issues o f  social  and technical cont ro l .  Modern organisatlons are 
faced w1 th a var ie ty  o f  technical  hazards which i n t e r tw ine  w i t h  
soc ia l  fac tors  and t h i s  a r t i c l e  cxplores some o f  the ways i n  which 
these hazards are dea l t  w l  th. The lack o f  f i r m  and useful  data I n  
t h i s  area creates a ce r t a i n  amount o f  d i f f i c u l t y ,  but  i t  nonetheless 
seems to be i ns t r uc t i ve  to consider some o f  the models t ha t  have 
been developed t o  look a t  organisat ional responses to hazard. 
One o f  the most i n f l u e n t i a l  modes o f  i nqu i r y  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  i s  
one t h a t  could perhaps be l abe l l ed  the 'American d isas te r  studies'  
model. A t  i t s  hear t  i s  an approach to cogni ti vc elements o f  decision- 
making under r i s k  which has been very c l e a r l y  se t  ou t  by Slov ic ,  
Kunreuther and White (1974). This psychological/managerial approach 
to decision making has been Imported i n t o  d isas te r  studies and i s  
l i nked  w i th  the work o f  a number o f  o ther  associated researchers, 
notably Anderson, Haas, Hutton, Kates, f i i l e t i  and others. The 
essent ia l  feati lres o f  t h i s  model have recent ly  been use fu l l y  su~mar.ised 
by M i l e t i  (1960). 
The node1 i s  concernad, not  w i th  bchaviour under d i r e c t  
conf rontat ion w i th  danger, bu t  w i t h  the mnner  i n  which groups and 
organisations o r i e n t  thcrnselves t o  known threats,  w i t h  the ways i n  
which they t r y  to cope w l  t h  these threats, and w i th  the character- 
i s t i c s  o f  ra t iona l  response i n  such a s i tuat ion.  I t  develops i t s  
dist inct !vc fcaturcs by s t a r t i ng  wi tli En exemplary pa t te rn  o f  ra t iona l  
n?spot~:r! t o  r i s k  c r  I:;,zard and t h e n  modirying t h i s  pat tern t o  take 
cam o f  t yp ica l  sha r t f a l l s  frc4n rat ional i t : :  vhich h ~ v e  been obscrved. 
The posture which, 1 t i s  suggcstCd, rrould r ~ t i o n a l l y  be adopted 
toerards r i s k  i s  one i n  which p r o b a b i l l t i c s  o f  damage o r  i n j u r y  are  
assessed, t he  p o t e n t i a l  p o l i c i e s  f o r  a d j u s t i n g  t o  these p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
a re  revlevred, the  Impacts o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c i e s  a r e  assessed and one 
o r  another o f  these msponses are  chosen. 
However, i t  i s  recognised t h a t  t h i s  p a t t e r n  i s  r a r e l y  adopted i n  
p rac t i ce ,  and i n  what we might  c a l l  a  'modi f ied  r a t i o n a l  model', t h ree  
c l u s t e r s  o f  f ac to rs  a re  seen as d i s t o r t i n g  a  poss lb le  r a t i o n a l  response: 
those f a c t o r s  (rrhich seem t o  be assumed t o  be l a r g e l y  psychological  
r a t h e r  than c u l t u r a l  o r  o rgan isa t i ona l )  which a f f e c t  t h e  percept ion of  
r i s k ;  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r a l  features o f  t h e  un l  t concerned which 
a f f e c t  t he  perceived costs  and capac i t i es  o f  response; and the  e f f e c t s  
o f  i ncen t i ves  from o t h e r  'system u n i t s ' ,  no tab l y  those prov ided by 
d l  r e c t i  ves , rewards and regu l  a t i ons  emanating from t h e  government. 
I n  a  b r i e f  c r i t i q u e  o f  t h i s  model, M i l e t i  notes t h a t  l i t t l e  i s  
known o f  how one poss ib le  adjustment i n t e r a c t s  w i t h  another, t h a t  
research has concentrated upon p o l i c y  adopt ion r a t h e r  than upon p o l  i c y  
implementation, and t h a t  the  model i s  an aggregate one I n  which the  
var iab les  have been drawn from d i f f e r e n t  studies,  r a t h e r  than be ing 
observed together.  
For  the purposes o f  t h i s  paper, I would l i k e  t o  assoc ia te  w i t h  
a  rode1 which shares sorne emphases and a l s o  some f a i l i n g s  w i t h  the 
d i s a s t e r  model ( I d e n t i f y i n g  r e f .  1). This nlodel, based upon an 
ana lys is  o f  p u b l i c  j c q u i r i e s  i n t o  a  number o f  l a q e - s c a l e  accidents 
i n  B r i t a i n  between 1965 and i975, extends o r  f i l l s  o u t  Herber t  Sicon's 
(1957) view o f  t he  c o g n i t i v e  features o f  organlsat lons,  s t ress ing  t h e i r  
In tended ly  r a t i o n a l  c h a r ~ c t e r  and the  fac to rs  which l i n i t  ot- bound 
t h e i r  ab i  1  i t y  t o  achieve t h i s  intended r a t i o n n l  i ty. This  v iew presents 
organ isat ions dea l i ng  r!f th R a i ~ r d  as aacie up of h ie ra rch ies  o f  over- 
lapp ing decis ion-naklns groups, i d e n t i f l e d  by the comon c l u s t e r s  of  
assumptions which they share i n  t h e i r  decision-making a c t i v i t i e s .  
Each of these 'bounded dec is ion zones' gathers I n t e l  l i gcnce  from 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l l y  re levant  po r t i ons  o f  the  wor ld  as b e s t  they may, and 
incorporates some o f  i t  i n t o  i ts own decision-making a c t i v i t i e s .  Those 
zones which are  powerful enough o r  persuasive e n o u ~ h  t ransmi t  some o f  
t he  i n t e l l i g e n c e  t o  o t h e r  zones w i t h i n  t h e  organ isat ion .  Th is  gives 
us o view o f  organ isat iona l  adjustment t o  chances i n  the  environment 
as an I n e v i t a b l y  discontinuous process. The g rea te r  the  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  
betvieen the cu r ren t  percept ion o f  the  environcent and i t s  ac tua l  s ta te ,  
the  g rea te r  w i l l  be the need f o r  eventual and s t r e s s f u l  adjustment 
lrri t h i n  the  organlsat ion.  
T'nls p i c t u r e  o f  organ1 sat lons t r y i n g  t o  c o p  w l  t h  p o t e n t i a l  
hazards I n  the environment by reans o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i o n  of  an imper fec t  
i n t c l l l g c n c e  qather lng prccess w i t h  discont inuous surpr ises  of  a more 
o r  l ess  catastn7phic nature  i s  one which seems t o  f i t  w e l l  t he  
r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y  gathersd accounts -. o f  o rgan isa t i ona l  behaviour used from 
repo r t s  of p u b l i c  inquiries I n t o  la rge-sca le  accidents. It tends t o  
d i v i d e  up ac t i ons  i n  the  past  i n t o  those which were rou t i ne ,  sa fe  and 
s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  dea l i ng  w i t h  k n o w  cond i t ions  whose hazards cou ld  be 
subdued; and those whlch were unant ic ipated,  'unseemly' (Roberts e t  a1 
1980), provoked by overlooked fac tors ,  i n  short ,  s l i p s  and e r r o r s  whjch 
even tua l l y  produced the acc iden t  o r  d i s a s t e r  i n  quest ion.  The impact 
o f  such e r r o r s  a re  s m a r i s e d  i n  the statement t h a t  "unintended 
conseourr?ces pmduced w i t h i n  organ isat iona l  s e t t i n g s  make non-random 
use of the  r ~ l c s  o f  the organ isat ion  i n  t h c i r  propagation". 
( I d e n t i f y i n g  reference 2) .  
The i v p l l c a t i c n  i r  t l ~ u s  that ,  i t 1  b u l l  d ina a c a s t l e  o f  r e t i o n a l i  ty, 
l f r n i t ed  and f a l l i b l e  hu!?an ber'nqs cannot a* lo id  a lso  b u i l d i n g  i n t o  t h e  
54 
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  some breaches whfch may even tua l l y  be used t o  
penet ra te  the cas t i e .  Tlie i conograph4 c represen t a t l o n  whf ch cones 
t o  my mind i n  d iscuss ing t h i s  i s  supp l ied  by the k inds  o f  coaplex 
'won-produced pa t te rns '  shown i n  F igure  1, which a r e  computer-produced 
by 'worns' g iven s imple r a t i o n a l  dec is ion r u l e s  t o  apply t o  the 
choices t h a t  they meet a t  every node on t h e i r  path i n  search o f  ' food ' .  
The pa t te rns  produced by such r a t i o n a l  decision-making a c t i v i t y  l ook  
impenetrable, b u t  t hey  have the mathemat ical ly  demonstrable p rope r t y  
that ,  as a by-product o f  t h e i r  mode o f  c reat ion ,  t he re  i s  always a c lear ,  
unused p a t h  r i g h t  i n t o  the cent re  o f  t h e  maze, by which i t  may be 
penetrated. Hhon the  ' w o n '  f i n d s  this pa th  and fo l l ows  i t  t o  i t s  
o r i g i n ,  no f u r t h e r  ' food'  ex i s t s ,  no f u r t h e r  movement I s  poss ib le  and 
the  p r o g r m e  becomes s e l  f - t e n i  na t i n g .  (Gardner, 1973; \!add1 ngton , 
1977: 135-60). 
The two models o u t l i n e d  so f a r  have i n  c o m n  t h e i r  s t ress  upon 
c o g n i t i o n  w i t h i n  and outs ide the organisat ion,  t h e i r  s t ress  upon 
decision-making, t h e i r  s t ress  upon the i n t e l l i g e n c e  func t i on  o f  
gather ing usefu l  i n f o m a t i o n  from the environment and t h e i r  cons idera t ion  
o f  behaviour when i t  i s  be ing o r i e n t e d  t o  poss ib le  f u t u r e  danger r a t h e r  
than behaviour i n  ccn f ron t i ng  i m d i a t e  o r  .itirninent danger. I n  f a c t ,  
I t  i s  poss ib le  t3 vary t h l s  l a s t  c o n d i t i o n  w i thou t  va ry ing  thc  o the r  
p rope r t i es  o f  the  nodel so t h a t  we can ask hon an in tended ly  r a t i c n a l ,  
r isk-assessing,  i n t a l l  igencz-?ather ing orgcn isat ion  r r i l l  respond t o  
the advpnt o f  danger, and s o m  w r i t e r s  have done t h i s .  Sometimes, o f  
course, the  organ isat ion  dces n o t  respond a t  a l l ,  and many acc ident  
I n q u i r i e s  are  concerned t o  dcscritle prec4sely t h i s  c o r ~ d i i i o n .  
Cons!dcr the i l s e  o f  an orysn.lsa:!on w:~ich was discussed a ?eiq 
years ago i n  an o f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  governnent i nqu i r y .  This organisat 'on 
Cloud path drneracld by  a scnfle worm 1,2,,,,3e4 
Figure 1 
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was tlescr.i:~ed as b ~ i n g  "safety  conscious" (para. 202), as not  p lac ing 
pressures o f  production before matters o f  sa ie ty  (para. 206) and as 
con t inua l l y  tak ing "conscious and pos i t i ve  steps" w i t h  the ob jec t i ve  
o f  safety  i n  mlnd (para. 201). I n  consequence o f  such conslderations 
the authors o f  the repor t  e n t i r e l y  absolved a1 1 persons involved w i th  
the  company from any suggestion t h a t  t h e i r  des i re  t o  resume production 
i n  the p l an t  which t h e i r  organisat ion operated a f t e r  a shutdown caused 
them knowingly to embark upon a hazardous course i n  disregard f o r  the 
safety  o f  those operat ing the p l a n t  (para. 57). (Department o f  
Employment, 1975). 
The organisat ion i n  question was flypro Ltd., and the inc lden t  
which pronpted the repor t  was the explosion a t  the Fllxborough p l a n t  
h i c h  k l l  l ed  28 people, demolished much o f  the p l an t  and provoked a 
na j o r  e r i  t i s h  governmn t i n i t i a t i v e  to deal w i th  i n d u s t r i a l  hazards. 
And y e t  i t  i s  no t  he lp fu l  t o  t a l k  .about t h i s  organisat ion 'responding' 
to the hazard which produced the explosion, f o r  the awareness o f  such 
a p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  the minds o f  those concerned w i t h  the p l a n t  seemed t o  
be minimal, if, indeed, i t w a s  present a t  a l l .  A l len  (1977) and inany 
others have drawn a t ten t ion  t o  featurns o f  the repor t  such as the 
curious apparent incocpatabi l  i t y  between the cornents From the Report 
o f  th2 Court o f  Inqu i ry  mentioned above and the f a c t  t h a t  the p l an t  
operated by t h i s  organisat ion he ld  over 360,000 oal lons o f  cyclohexane, 
nctpth.1, toluene and gasalene on a s i t e  which was l icensed t o  s to re  only 
8,500 gallons; the f a c t  t ha t  there were associated 'sho~~tcomings'  i n  
f t s  safety pmccdums and uncer ta in t ies  about r espons ib i l i t i e s  f o r  
safety;  and the f a c t  t ha t  a major repa i r  t o  a p l an t  processing very 
large quantl t i e s  o f  cycicrl~exnne a t  high tenperaturas and pressures was 
car r ied  ou t  w i t h  l i m i t e d  design, inspect ion and t e s t  procedures. 
But t h i s  apparent incornpatabi l i ty hinqes on the question nl i ich 
has been explored i n  a psychological context by S lov ic  and others, o f  
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the percep t ion  o f  hazard. Hazards on the sca le  which emerqed were 
no t  be ing  'responded t o '  by Nypro, s imply because they were n o t  
io~agir ied o r  considered. We cannot t he re fo re  use Plypro as a case study 
o f  response t o  hazard, b u t  must regard i t  r a t h e r  as an example o f  t he  
f a i l u r e  o f  organ isat iona l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  gather ing i n  t h i s  c r u c i a l  area 
(see a l s o  Stech, 1979). The Fl lxborough case presents i n  perhaps an 
extreme form the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  f a i l u r e  o r  of the  
f a i l u r e  o f  f o r e s i g h t  which i s  charted i n  most re t rospec t i ve  i n q u i r i e s  
i n t o  accidents. ( I d e n t i f y i n g  reference 3 ) .  
When the  In te l7 igence  f a i l u r e  i s  l e s s  complete, and the organ isat ion  
becanes aware o f  r a p i d l y  developing threats ,  I t  i s  poss ib le  to cons t ruc t  
models o f  1 i ke ly  behavioi l r  under such condi t ions.  For  exarnpl e, 
Burgess (1976) has s e t  o u t  a number o f  specu1at i .w p ropos i t i ons  about 
responses t o  t h r e a t  which e x p l i c i t l y  t y y  to I n t e g r a t e  the  ' d i s a s t e r  
s tud ies '  m d e l  w i t h  o rgan isa t i on  theory, s e l e c t i n g  t h a t  branch of  
o rgan isa t i on  theory which t r s a t s  organ isat ions as goal-or iented,  
boundary-maintaining e n t i t i e s ,  seeking t o  sus ta in  an e q u i l i b r i m  w i t h  
t h e i r  environment. B u y c s s  i d e n t i f i e s  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  poss ib le  
o rgan isa t i ona l  response t o  ~nassive threaten ing changes i n  the en\*ironnient: 
passive env i  ron1;lental moni b r i n g ;  a defensive response t o  th rea t ;  
o p p o r t u n i s t i c  responses wnich t ry  t o  take advantage o f  the  o rgan isa t i on ' s  
s i t g a t i o n ;  and an a c t i v i s n  i n  which t h e  organ isat ion  a t tc r ip ts  t o  
change the env lmnnent  " i n  o rde r  t o  main ta in  the e q u i l  i b r i u n  between 
I t s e l  f and the envi  ronnicnt". Burgess t ' e l  ates these d i f f e r e n t  1 eve1 s 
of  response t o  t h c  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  porrcr and v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  the 
organ isat ions concerned and t o  the changes i n  demand f o r  the 
orgar i isa t ions '  goods o r  services.  (See aiso Q u a r a n t c l l i ,  l!)ii;). 
Dcve'ioprr;=lnts ~ U C ~ I  as Y u r ~ e s s ' s  niay be r e l a t e d  t o  anothcr s t rand 
o f  l . i . t c ra ture  which has proceeded nore o r  l ess  independent1 y o f  the 
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' r l is i lstee studies'  sctiool: t ha t  strand conccrncd w i t h  the p o l i t i c o -  
organisat ional i nvcs t iga t lon  of perception o f  and msponse t o  cr ises. 
This has i t s  o r i g i ns  i n  the work o f  I kmann (1963, 1969, 1972). who 
proposed t ha t  a c r i s i s  ar ises when a th rea t  t o  an organisat ional u n i t  
i s  combined wi th  a 1,imited decfsion time and an element o f  surpr ise. 
E ~ q ~ i r i  ca l  tests  o f  Hermann's model have been on ly  p a r t l y  convincing, 
the element o f  surpr ise being p a r t i c u l a r l y  t roublesom. (Helmann, 1972; 
Lentncr. 1972; see also Ident i fy ing reference 4 ) .  Recently, ho~icver, 
o cogni t ive rmde! 05 decision-making f n  c r i s i s  condit ions has been 
developed by Smart and Vertinsky (1977) which i d e n t i f i e s  the possible 
'pathologies' o f  c r i s i s  decision-raking as: narrowing o f  cogni t ive 
processes; In fo rna t ion  d is to r t ion ;  group pathologies such as Janis 's  
'groupthink' (Janis.1972); r i g i d i t i e s  i n  progranh~ina; a lack o f  
preparedass f o r  decision about c r i s i s  issues and inadequate implement- 
a t i on  o f  decisions. 
Som ten ta t i ve  support f o r  t h i s  formulat ion may he found i n  
discussions o f  the inadequate responses o f  pub l i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  sucli 
as .un ive rs i t i es  t o  the curirerent c l imate o f  s ca r c i t y  and retrcnchncnt 
(Rubin,1979; Eozenann and Slusher, 1979), but  a more per t inen t  develop- 
ment :s t l ic  m d i f i c ~ t . l o n  which has more recent ly  beer! developed by 
B i l l  ings and h i s  co l  l~aqrres (Gi l  l l n ~ s ,  P l i  1 bum and Schanlman, !9TA) 
frnn Hcmilnn's theory as a m d c l  o f  c r i s i s  pcrccpt ion. This m d e l  has 
been tested w i th  sore success agzfnst data derived fmn the response 
o f  owanisat ions to the c ~ r t a i l r ~ n t  o f  natural  yas supplies i n  Ohio 
dur in? the w in te r  o f  1976-77. The ~ ~ s u l  tan t  model sees a perceived 
c r i s i s  a r i s i n g  when percoption o f  a problem i s  t r i g ~ e r e d ,  when thc 
pcrccivcd v ~ l ~ ~ e  ant1 l i l - .e l  ihood OF ioss as a rcsrrl t o f  the o r o b l m  i s  
judged t o  he serious arid when there i s  a need t o  respond t:o the 
probloc i n  a l i n r i  tcd t!r,:e. The elerrmt s f  s u n r i s e  i s  dropped fi-om 
t h i s  mdc l .  The d c t ~ i i s  o f  B i l l i n g s :  :li:burn and Schaalmm's model 
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(Scc F i g l ~ r e  2) contain In te res t ing  parz1:els t o  t h a t  devclopcd by 
Slovic,  Kunreuther and Cliilte ('974) and i t  would scem to r.la t ha t  the 
two could be conpared and poss ib ly  amalgamated w i t h  advantage. 
lJhat I have been ou t l i n l ng  up t o  t h i s  p o l n i  are  a number o f  
conveq lng  pieces o f  work which seem to p o i n t  t o  a degree of agreement 
about the nature o f  organisat ional responses t o  hazard, t h i s  agreement 
cent r ing upon the use o f  orqanisations as the u n i t  o f  analysis, upon 
i n t e l l  igcnce gather ing and th rea t  perccpt lon a t  the boundary between 
the organisat ion and i t s  envi mnnent and upon .subsequent intendedly 
ra t iona l ,  bu t  u l t ima te ly  imperfectly r a t i ona l  , i n t e rna l  assessr~n ts  o f  
and adfustments to the perceived r i s k .  There i s  a great  degree o f  
coherence between the major elements o f  thcse mde ls ,  and yet,  i f  I 
might put  i t  t h i s  way, I would no t  wish to guarantee w own surv iva l  
i n  a. hazardous s i t ua t i on  using so l e l y  the kinds o f  guides t o  
organisat ional act ions i n  condit icns o f  danger t ha t  I have been 
discussing so far .  
To try t o  j n t r o d ~ ~ c c  the concerns t h z t  l i e  behind t h l s  comcnt, 
concerns about the l im i t a t i ons  o f  the approaches discussed so far, rly 
own included, l e t  me mention another model o f  organisat ional response 
t o  hazard and d lsas tc r  which has recent ly  been produced and tested. 
Bardo (197C) begins w i th  another va r ian t  of the 'American i i isastcl-  
model ' , i h l s  tlme one produced by Brou l l  l e t t e  and Quarantel 1 i (1971 : 
See a lso a r o u l l l e i t c ,  1970) uhich i s  not  included i n  H i l e t i ' s  discussion. 
This s t a r t i n g  ~rodel sugfests t h a t  under ccndit ions o f  threat ,  
bureaucratic orsanisations s h i f t  to  a ti2bur2aucratised state, e i t h e r  
w i th  regard to  t he  t a s k s  rt!iicn : i l l? b~lrcuoeracy i s  tack l i cc ,  w i t h  r epa rd  
t o  the s t ructure o f  the  burezucracy. 01- t:itli regard t o  both tasks and 
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Figure 2 
A Model of Crisis Perception: Billings, Mulburn and Schaalman, 1980 
Sensing a Problem Defining a Problem as a Crisis 
---------------------- 
I Indicators of Size of discrepancy: 
I existing Problem sensed if 1 stale discrepancy cxceeds 1 
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I planning. or 
1 other people's standards) L-----------------I 
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problem. aroa 
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apparent discrepancy 
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/- 
solution (contingency plan), 
or original solution 
Perceived value 
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r e .  TI.€ p z r t i c u l a r  f o r n  o f  rcrpor:se i s  seen as a  fur ic t ion  o f  
a  nut lbcr o f  f a t i i  li b r  fac tors :  5 p e  o f  burcauc rz t i c  s t ruc tu re ;  
cnri.p?i?cy c a p z h i l i t y ;  i n t e r n a l  perception o f  derands o f  the  s t ress  
s i t u a t i o n ;  perceivc!d e f fec t iveness;  and ex terna l  f ac to rs  such as 
s i t u a t i o n a l ,  eco logfca l ,  i n te ro rgan isa t i ona l  and s o c i e t a l  contexts.  
Oardo elaborates t h i s  model a  l i t t l e  i n  order  t o  take account o f  
the resycnse trhich an orgar l isa t ion  makes when i t  ilcplements a  
p rev ious l y  conceived ecergency plan, and produces a typo logy o f  n ine  
forms o f  response t o  hazard (See F igure  3). tie thcn wislles t o  combine 
these w i t h  Bar ton 's  f i v e  processual pliascs o f  d isas ter :  p red i sas te r  
per iod;  dc tec t io r i  and c o n u n i c a t i o n  o f  warning; i m d i a t e  m l a t i v e l y  
unorganised response; organised soc ia l  response; and long-run post-  
d i s a s t e r  equ i l i b r i um.  (See F igure  4) .  
He then t r i e s  t o  apply t h i s  q u i t e  c o ~ ? l c x  node1 t o  an ac tua l  case 
o f  an o r g i n i s a t i o n  responding t o  hazard: s p e c i f i c a l l y  t he  p u b l i c  works 
depar t rent  o f  a middle-sized c i t y  on t h e  East Coast o f  t hc  Uni tcd  States 
t o  f i o o d i n g  caused by I lu r r icanc fignos i n  June, 1972. He encounters two 
d i f f i c ~ t l  i e s  whiclr I f i n d  i n s t r u c t i v e ;  f i r s t l y ,  Ear ton 's  developmental 
sequence, abst rac ted f ~ r n  several e a r l  i e r  d isas ters ,  proved d i f f i c u l t  t o  
apply unanbiguour;ly, considerable problems being experienced I n  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  one phase f m m  another, and i n  dea l ing  w i t h  over- 
lapp inq phases. I t  bias a l so  nccsssary to  s p l i t  Earton's four th  
category i n t o  txo :  organiscd cspcnsc  t c  the i::-~cdiatc t i i r ca t ;  and 
orgariised short-n:n,  post-impact I-esporlse. With rc!lard t o  t l i c  
01-qar; i s ~ i i b r : i 1 1  t:,pc!lo~~~t .!n th?  KOI~LI;, \11:>1; is p r i r t i ~ i ~ l d ~ l y  no tab l e  IS 
t h a t  i:;lr:io \.ins il~\cLl c t o  i d ~ 1 - 1 t i f j 1  ;l sinqle  response o f  t l ~  pub1 i c  
Figure 3 
Nine Possible Forms of Bureaucratic Responses to Disaster 
(Bardo, 1978) 
STRUCTURES FUNCTIONS 
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Barton's Processual Phases of Disaster 
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11. Detection and Communication of warning 
111. Immediate relatively unorqanised response 
IV. Organised social response: 
IVa. Organised response to the immediate threat 
IVb. Organised short-run, post-impact response 
V. Long run post-disaster equilibrium 
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o r y i n i s a t i o n  (;I each o f  the phases. llitll thc  u ine  poss ib le  types o f  
response, Earr!,~ firurd, 2s can 5e seen f r o n  Fi?ur= 5, t h a t  even i n  
s t z b l e  per iods,  h i s  o r ~ a n i  sn t i on  cou ld  be discerned t o  be behaving 
i n  th ree d i f f e r e n t  ways.   bile i n  t he  b ~ o  halves o f  t he  m d i f i e d  f o u r t h  
phase, f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  modes o f  rcsponse wcre i d e n t i f i e d .  
Bardo stresses the processuai nature  o f  the everlts w i t h  which 
h~ was dealing, prcposes n o d i f i c c t i o n s  t o  the models used, and urqes 
caut ion I n  es tab1 i s l i i n g  the e n p i r i  ca l  sequence of  events i n  I n d i v i d u a l  
app l i ca t i ons .  t ihat  I would de r i ve  f r o m  h i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  study, horrever, 
i s  t he  conclusion t h a t  e x i s t i n g  t h e o r e t i c a l  ca tegor ies  i n  t h i s  area o f  
i n q u i r y  at- l i k e l y  t o  have t o  be e labora ted ad hoc when they a m  matched 
up aga ins t  t h e  r e a l  world, t h a t  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  o rgan isa t i ona l  
responses t o  hazard can u s e f u l l y  be considcrcd as a movement from one 
h d e  of behaviour to another, b u t  must be vier!ed as a m u l t i p l e  a r ray  o f  
p a r a l l e l  responses w i t h  a t  l e a s t  th ree and sonetines f o u r  o r  f i v e  o r  
more d i f f e r e n t  types o f  responses t o  hazard t s k i n g  p lace s imul taneously 
i n ' a  s ing le ,  modest o ~ a n i s a t i o n ,  and t h a t ,  s ince organ isat ions a r e  n o t  
un l ta r f ,  they do n o t  i n  any cases o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  deal w i t h  hazards 
s ing l y ,  b u t  i n  m u l t i p l e  vlays. (See a l s o  3'lanshzn. 1978). 
I f  I nay m v e  here to a r a r e  gcncl-a1 l e v e l ,  I ~ o u l r l  a l so  l i k e  to 
d r x i  f r c r !  Bardo's experience a mm 9cn1:ral ccn?cnt vh i ch  app l ies  to  
a11 o f  t he  accounts t h a t  i havc considercd so fa r .  I riroul d li kc t o  
suggcst t h a t  the wor ld  i s  nuch mre m s s y  and nuch l e s s  systematic 
than these moc'cls r~ou l ( !  i n p l y .  l lha t  I wovld now 1 i k e  to  do, therefore,  
f s  t o  s ~ l p y c s t  t h a t  ~ P C S F !   CIS need t o  be s e t  i n  a t ? r m d e r  ccn tcx t  
which l. ir?i t s  ~ t l d  qua1 ff:es i f l e i  r usefuine;~,  and k!hich a1 so dl-at.1~ 
z t t c n t i o n  t.o t l ~ c  t:r-cd t o  considrr otho.  l evc ls  than t i le  p u r r i y  
Figure 5. Combination of Types or Dureaucratic response in 
Different Phases of Disaster (Bardo, 1978) 
Predisaster 
Detection and communication of warning 
Immediate relatively unorganised 
response 
Organised response to immediate threat 
Short run post impact response 
Long run post- 
disaster equi- 
librium 
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or.~ilnis,i t iona l  on2. I vrould 7 i  ke tcr arracge  IT!^ ca:i~ents un;!er three 
i n s  : r'irsi;, discussion r:?rr!~des o f  response kh icn  do r iot  s t a r t  
frm the assunptions o f  r a t i ona l i t y ;  sxond, discussion OF the 
in terorganlsat ional  and p o l i  t f -1  context o f  decision mdels ;  and 
t h i r d ,  dfscussion or' the cu l t u ra l  context o f  rvsponses t o  hazard. 
1. Analyses b : !~ i t k  do not  assme r a t i o n a l i t y  
Under t h i s  f i r s t  headlng, I mainly wlsh to  draw a t t en t i on  t o  the 
l l m l t s  o f  a r a t i ona l  model o f  organlsat ienal behaviour, and t o  note 
o ther  modcs o f  response. Some o ~ a n l s a t l o n a l  wr i te rs ,  ra ther  than 
merely stressing, as I have done so far,  t h a t  t h e m  I s  a di f ference 
between idea l  notions o f  pe r f ec t l y  r a t i ona l  ac t ion  and the actua l  
behavlour o f  ind iv iduals  and organisations , havc pointed out  t h a t  more 
adequate explanations are often provided by r e ~ a r d i n g  events and act lons 
as excuses f o r  prospective and ret rospect ive r a t f  onal i sa t lons  of 
behaviour which serve t o  cloak non-rat ional sequences o f  events w l t h  
an appearence o f  r a t i o n a l i t y .  Such u r l  te1-s as Dalton (19591 and 
ke ick (1969) wcognised i n  t h e i r  studies t ha t  many decisions k11 t h i n  
organlsations are matters o f  fact ion, o f  expedlency o r  o f  career 
advancement. 
March and Oisen and t h e l r  s t d e n t s  (:.:i!rch and Olsen, 1976) 
pr?sent a p fc tu rc  o f  the oroanisat lonal world as one I n  which such 
decision-making as takes place I s  essen t ia l l y  an ah iguous a c t i v i t y ,  
indulged i n  f o r  anblguous nlotives. Here no t  on ly  do choices get t l e d  
up w i t h  personal preferences and 01-ganisational modcs o f  rhetor ic ,  but 
the time and ener?y which fndividua7s have t o  a l loca te  among competlng 
issues and concerns assum major importance i n  expla'ining irehavfour. 
I n  t h i s  v1w1 o f  orpan.isations, decisions are as o f t an  taken because of 
thc prcscncc cf a 'solu;io~l :oa!::nc Tor- 6 pr-oblem' as because tile out- 
c o ~ e  i s  a ra t iona l  rezponscr to the qccst ian ~t i;sue. The 'garbaqc can' 
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t:icnl-:/ o l  dccf s:ol~-n.kin? t h a t  :larch and Olsen p u t  f o r . n r d  s u g g ~ s t s  
t h a t  corn1 t 3 c  d,?cis:ons rispel-' not  n e c c i s a r i l y  q o n  r a t i o n a l  pmcesses 
o f  de l i be ra t i on ,  bu t  upon the i n t e r a c t i o n s  betv!ei?n t ! ~ c  energy l e v e l s  
o f  the p a r t i e s  t o  thr? decis ion and the  assorted contents o f  t h e  
I garbage czn' t 5 a t  c o n s t l t ~ r t c s  the  agenda, vhen It I s  emptied o u t  
before the  corn1 t tee .  
It may be desirable t h a t  .organisatiot?s respond t o  hazards i n  a 
reasonable and r a t i o n a l  manner*, b u t  i t  I s  a c o m n p l a c e  t h a t  i n  
p r a c t i c e  they r a r e l y  behave i n  such a manner, and any adequate 
theor ies  dea l ing  w i t h  t h e  socio-technical aspects o f  hazard have t o  
reconc i l e  these two opposing tendencles. kle my perhaps see these 
tendencies p a r t i c u l a r l y  c l e a r l y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  what am o f t e n  presented 
as the m t l o n a l  approaches pa r  excel lence t o  hazards, those o f  cost-  
benef l  t analys l  s and r i s k  assessment. But  a recent  au tho r i  t a t 1  ve 
p v l e w  of cost-benefi t analys ls  Ir! r e l a t i o n  t o  hazards (Baram, 1930) 
noted t h a t  experts reconmnndlng t h l  s node o f  analysfs t y p l c a l  f y  o u t l i n e  
i t s  shortconings and l in i  ta t ions,  present  a t e n t a t f v e  ana lys i s  of  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  case, b u t  conclude by u rg ing  that ,  i n  s p l t e  o f  i t s  f au l t s ,  
t h e i r  ana lys i s  he used as a bas is  f o r  decis ions.  I \ f i sh  tr, discuss 
s ~ m  aspects o f  r i s k  and r i s k  a s s e s s ~ e n t  l a t e r  i n  another context :  a l l  
t h a t  we nced note here are t h a t  such techniques are  n o t  immune frori t h e  
'5artag9 can theory ' ,  and t h a t  they nay v e l l  p rov ide us wit!? examples 
o f  ' ~ 0 1 1 1 t i o i l s  l ook in?  f o r  problens' ,  as U a n n  has slrggested t h a t  they 
arc i n  the A n e r i c ~ n  hazard l e g i s l a t i o n  context .  (Baram, 1980). 
Another way o f  ga in inq  a d l  f f c r e n t  perspect ivc upon organ isat iona l  
responses t o  hazard from t h a t  provlded by the ' n o d l f l c d  r a t i o n a l  ' 
appmaci~  i s  by l o o k i  l:g a t  the evirierlcc fmra occupat.iona1 s t l id ies  about 
ho!f tho occupationai f ron t -1  i l ic troops o f  hazard ,  t h o s ~  ~ m p l o y c d  i n  
G~ngero:rs occupatf ons rcsl~ofic! t o  the1 r work. s'; tuat ions.  Studies o f  
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c4c?c[?-~ea f i s l ~ ~ n r c r ~  (l'o5gic e t  1 , 7?7F j , ~..il,cl-s (Fi.tzpatric!c, 15tO; 
Yausht and S~:i.ttl. 1?EO), I l i ch  :tee1 e rec to rs  (I:aas, 1977) and s i m i l a r  
occupations (Aran, 1974. C c r r i ~ z n  e t  a l .  1933) o ive  us a p i c t u r e  of 
groups  hose t y p i c a l  response t o  hazard i s  t o  develop a s o l i d a r y  
cohesiveness, a lbe i  @ a cohesiveness \rrhicll i s  somet ims r a t h e r  b r u t a l l y  
achieved (Vaught and Sni th, 19EO). 
Ucth thc  isolation and the danqer wi1ic5 c h a r a c e r i s e  such 
occcpations pror.xtc cohesion end s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ,  a shar ing o f  danger 
and a susp ic ion o f  cu ts ide rs  \rho do n o t  sharc it. And a l l  o f  these 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  c c r t r i  bute tc\qar ls the devclcpr-cnt o f  an occupat ional  
subcu l ture  of  danger (Fi tzpatr ic l : ,  1?20) \:hich i s  s i r i l a r  i n  sol= ways 
t o  the d i s a s t e r  s u b c u l t u i ~  developed ancncst those whose hornes are  
frequently exposed t o  na tu ra l  hazards (!iannir;an and t!ucrcr;;an, 1978). 
The sul?cul t u r n  provides shared ~?c rsgec t i ves  which cnhancc the 
group's c o n t r o l  ove r  t h c i r  work s i t c a t i o n ,  v ~ h i c h  ~ a x i m i s e  autonomy and 
minimise dcp~ndance upon outsiders. Fear i s  of ten,  tllough l l o t  always, 
denied w i t h i n  the qroup as a way o f  r a k i n g  the  i n t e r n a l  environment more 
pred ic tab le .  end qroup noms arc vcry  i ~ p o r t a n t  bc th  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  and 
t e s t i n g  nevi sicr::bcrs and i n  encouraging tlic;;; t o  behave p red ic tab l y  i n  the 
face of  danqcr. (tlaas. 1977; blayer and Fosenblatt, 1975). Safety my 
bc taken se r ious l y  a t  cfie l e v e l  by regard ing fi poss ib le  hazards as 
e x t m m l y  dancernus (though t h i s  may n o t  i nc lude  a l l  cond i t ions  seen es 
hazardous by outs iders) .  bu t  these occupational qmups d i f f e r e n t i n t e  i n  
p r a c t l c e  betwcen d i  f f e r c n t  k inds o f  hazard. Miners, f o r  exaniple, g i ve  
pas t  i n z t r c c t i o n  t o  nehccmers about: e\!eryday daricers such as f a l l s  and 
s l l p s ,  l ess  about dansers o f  an inten: iediate k i r ~ d  sucll as ~ n i s f i r e d  
explosions, and i n  the face of  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  major liazards such as 
f i r e s  2r.d l ~ r ~ e  c d x - i n s  they a r c  vcrc' st-oic an!! f ~ t a l i s t i c .  
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:;here t h ? r c  i s  a sore l f v e l  y ~ c r c c i v ~ d  unce r ta in t y  i n  exposure 
t a  2anc?r, : o x  r c l i s n c e  i s  p l xczd  u;on l x k  znr! prov i tancc ,  and, as 
the  a n t h r t a o l  cgf s t  :Fa1 i n w s k l  sucqested dccad2s aco (:Cl ino:;.ski, 1948), 
the tcndancy t o  cncac? i n  r i t u a l s  and t o  n a i n t a i n  tabcos i s  g rea te r  
t he  FOE the l n r l i v i c u a l s  and groups concerned are  exposed t c  a c t c a l  
danger. (Poggic -- e t  a l ,  1976. See a l s o  Turner, 1967; Vaupht and 
S l d t h ,  1980). 
There are, o f  course, r a t i o n a l  aspects t o  t he  k inds  o f  Group 
responses t o  danger t h a t  I have j u s t  been descr ib ing ,  and, indeed, i t  
has been demonstrated t h a t  t he  group c u l t u m  and n o m  can be 
success fu l l y  modi f ied by  t h e  feedback o f  i n f o r r a t i o n  t o  omup r ~ m b a r s  
about t h e  dangen o f  p a r t i c u l a r  courses o f  a c t i o n  (Andriessen, 1975; 
Zohar -- e t  a l , 19@0; Zohar, 19C0; B l ignaut ,  1379) b u t  these responses 
o v e r a l l  cannot m a d i  l y  be seen as ins tsnces o f  dec i s i on - l~ak ing  i n  
cond i t i ons  o f  uncer ta in ty ,  and can be niorc success fu l l y  understood as 
the  development o f  what t h e  soc io loq i  s t  Durkheim c a l l e d  ' rechan ica l  
s o l i d a r i t y ' ,  a Srcup response which t i c s  the  grcup toge the r  by both  
r e a l  and s y ~ b o l i c  t h r e a t s - i n  o rde r  t o  shar? and equa l i se  the  experience 
o f  d i r e c t  exposure t o  danger. (Curl:heim, 1?64; See a l s o  Goldbart  and 
Cooper, 1975). 
We m y  ask t he  quest ion  o f  how f a r  o r ~ a n i s a t i o n s  o f  g rea te r  
complex i ty  than occupat ional  work groups respond t o  hazard, and 
whether responses o f  t he  k i n d  dlscusscd here can he discerned i n  the  
l a r g e r  organ isa t ions .  Ouchi (1930) I n  a recent  d iscuss ion o f  t he  
I i m l t s  o f  b u r c s u c r ~ t f c  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  has suggested t h a t  an o rgan i sa t i cna l  
type which i!e l a b e l s  t i le  ' c l a n ' ,  end r!hich inc ludes elenents o f  
r ,cchanical  so? i h r i  t y ,  i - ~ y  I)c rorc anpropt-iate f o r  c o n f r o n t i n g  
c z r t a i n  t:mes o f  un ie r t z  i n t y  than c. i  t h c r  the n!;rl:et Oi- t l i c  Surc?aucrati c 
conf igurs t ions  ( !J. i l l iacson,  1375). I:: ra:, be u:cful i n  the f u t u r e  t o  
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exploi.,? t l l , ?  i.cl ationsnip o f  Ouchf ' s  rodcl to rc.sconsc?s to  hazard. 
2. Interor~znisat ional  and poli t l ca l  context of dcclsion-models 
Tumlng now to the wldcr context of orrsnisational response to 
hazard, ve have seen alr?ac!:/ that  the prevalent rrodr?ls In t h i s  f ie ld  
take single ornanisations as the i r  uni t  of analysis,  stressing the i r  
response to  hazard as a response to  a threat to the equilibrium which 
they seek to maintain with the i r  environmnt. The envlronrent I s  
acknowledged to contain other orcanisations, b u t  these are rather  a 
long way off.  Kost of the models dfscussed make some reference to  
lnteror~anlsat 'fonal re la t i  onships, b u t  i t  I s  di ff lcul  t to  escape the 
feeling tht, a t  present, these references have the ef fec t  m r e  of 
paying l i p  servlce to  current sh l f t s  In tlilnkinn i~bout organisations 
rather than changing in any signif icant  way the nature of the analyses 
and the assumptions tha t  underlie them. (See also Dynes, 1978). 
The prevailing v!a4 of or?.anlsations represented by these models 
I s ,  as I have suggested, one \rhlch I s  cornin!: increasingly in to  questlon 
In organisatlon studles (Perrm~, 1999). Quite apart from the standard 
sociolcgical ol.ject.lons to  the hammy-ladan, s tructural  functiorial 
view of the world which they embody, i t  i s  caning t o  be rnuch m r c  
acknowlcri?ed t h a t  the envi roi-m~nt 1s not a kind of neutral sou? within 
which the orcanisation f loa t s ,  b u t  tha t  i t  i s  rather  a closely inter-  
meshed netvork of  lat ti on ships bct:~een other orcjanisatlons, sone of 
which are collaborative, b u t  msny of vlhic!~ -:tfll h2 conpetitlve. A 
Sreater concentration upon i nteror~anisat ional  networks w i  11 lead 
rapidly to dlscussions of the poll t lca l  econonry of the network, a n d  t o  
analyses In terns of resoilrce flons and ?ol.lc?r hlocs, z n d  to dlscussions 
of thc economlc and social class s t ruc t t~ re  of t h ~  society concerned as 
i t  r?lr.t?s t o  orcanisatlonal L~haviaur. The interci-:anis~tincal 
envl n n r - r ? n t ,  that  I s  to sfiy, will be se?n as a highly turbulent one, 
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which i s  a l s o  h i g h l y  p o l l  t i c i s e d .  Accounts o f  the  responses o f  
I n d i v i d u a l  organisat lons which ignore  the way i n  which t r e a t r e n t s  of 
hazard fit I n t o  t h i s  w ider  p i c t u r e  w i l l  on ly  o f f e r  a p a r t i a l  ana lys is .  
The organ isat iona l  contex t  i s  inf luenced, f o r  example, by 
government l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and by the debate and lobby ing whiclr both 
precedes and fo l l ows  the passage o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .  I n  the face, f o r  
example, o f  t he  US f i gu res  o f  14,000 deaths a t  work pe r  year  and an 
est imated 390,OGO workers dying annual ly fron occupat ion-related 
I l l nesses ,  Donnelly (1978) has noted how the s t rong involvement o f  t he  
American business conanunity i n  the law c rea t i on  s h g e  o f  t he  
Occupational Hea l th  and Safe ty  Act, 1970, and i n  i t s  subsequent opera t ion  
has meant t h a t  the  OHSA Admin is t ra t ion  i s  hawered  i n  i t s  task by 
l i m i t e d  resources. I n  the Uni ted Kingdom, Carson's s tud les  (Carson, 
1372) o f  t he  Factory Inspectora te  have l e d  him t o  suggest t he  general 
p ropos i t i on  t h a t  Inspectorates always become 'captured'  by the  
organ lsat ions which they a r e  t r y i n g  t o  po l ice .  And i n  the  face o f  t he  
t h r e a t  o f  pmposed l e g i s l a t i o n  whlch n i g h t  seek t o  impose a 'zero 
release'  c c n e p t  upon i n d u s t r y  to reduc2 harmful waste p o l l u t i o n ,  the  
American chemical indust ry ,  a l ready facing mu1 t i - b i l l  i o n  law s u i t s  over 
hazat-dous w&ste issues, i s  p m t e s t l n g  t h a t  such lerjis:irt!on r;ould b r i n g  
i n d u s t r y  to a he1 t. (Alexander, 1980. See a1 so Huntcr  and Cmwley, 1979). 
Such i nterorgan i  sa t i ona l  pol  i tl c a l  ac t1  v l  t i e s  h a w  1 cd p o l i t i c a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  r e c e n t l y  to look i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a t  l e g i s l a t i o n  about safety 
and hea l th  hazards as instances o f  the way i n  which t o p i c s  cone t o  
f i n d  themselves upon what they c a l l  the  ' p o l i t l c a l  agenda' (Brooks 
c t  a l ,  1976). Debates about the con t ro l  o f  technology ( E l l i o t t  and 
- -- 
E l l i o t t ,  1976; 3oylc,  E l l i o t t  and Roay, i977) o r  about t l i r ea ts  t o  the 
envirot?r;rnt, have come about p a r t l y  ht?cause o f  i n d i v i d u a l  concern 
w i t h  thesc problcms, and p a r t l y  because o f  t he  newsworthiness o f  the 
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issues concernsd. (Brookes -- e t  a1, 1376). Downs (1972a, 1972b; See 
also Solcsbury, 1976) sugcjcst: t h a t  there i s  an issue cycle w l~ lch  
br ings top ics t o  the a t ten t ion  o f  the publ ic ,  places them on the 
p o l i t i c a l  agenda, bu t  then allows them t o  fade, whether lor no t  the 
o r i g f na l  problem has been solved: bu t  he also suggests t ha t  issues 
r e l a t i n g  t o  health, hazards and the environment have a p a r t i c u l a r i t y ,  
a ready m d i  a-potent ial  and an abi 1 i t y  t o  draw leg1 timacy from wider 
soc ia l  values which makes i t  l i k e l y  t h a t  they w i l l  remain on the 
p o l i t i c a l  agenda f o r  sone time t o  come. The prec ise manner i n  which 
such issues are dea l t  w i t h  as they reach the p o l i t i c a l  agenda var ies 
according t o  the type o f  governmental system w i t h i n  which the 
organisations concerned are operating. Wil l iams (1977) d i f f e ren t i a t es  
between what he c a l l s  the 'c losed consensual' s t y l e  o f  the United 
Kingdom i n  deal ing w i t h  occupational sa fe ty  dangers and envl I-onmental 
hazards, the Swedish 'open consensual' approach and the American 'open 
adversary' system. (See a lso w i l i i a m  and Bates, 1976; S t r inger  and 
Richardson, 1980). 
Governmental l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  provide one clement i n  thc 
in temrgsn isa t iana l  context, bu t  any one organisat ion w i l l  be 
embedded i n  a se t t i ng  ut l ich places i t  i n  a re la t io i l sh ip  w i t h  o ther  
organisations and, ra ther  than attempting t o  produce a s l ng l o  theory 
o r  node1 wliich re la tes t o  a l l  possible organisations, i t  i s  perhaps 
more appropriate, as the anthmpolog is t  Torry has suggested (1 979a), 
t o  t r y  t o  rap var ia t ions i n  coping mdes w i t h i n  a hierarchy of 
organisat ional un i t s  extending f r o m  i nd iv idua ls  2nd households t o  nat ion- 
states. Torry h imsel f  has begun the pre l imfnary work f o r  such a mapping, 
concentrating upon studiss made outside rodern fndus t r ia l  :ocieties. 
T o r y  c r i t . i c f zcs  homeostaticaliy based views of the responses o f  
saal l  sac le t ies  t o  hazad,  arguing ins iaad t ha t  hazard and danger are 
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frequent, a1 tholrgh 1sr;elp unrccogniscd agents o f  i r r e v e r s i b l e  soc ia l  
chanse. Such 'cciping responses' as occur, th,orefore, are r a re l y  
maintaining the status quo, o r  susta in ing equi l  i b r i m ,  bu t  are 
producing f onm o f  adaptation to hazard and d isas te r  which nay be much 
less sa t i s fac to ry  than t h a t  t o  those concerned. Torry (1979b) i n  an 
extensive review o f  the anthropological l i t e ra tu re ,  l i s t s  types of 
such changes which include increased and sometimes f o r c i b l e  changes i n  
exchange and resource t rans fe r  w i t h  neighbouring societ ies, the sca l ing  
down and retrenchment o f  soc ie ta l  a c t i v i t i e s  and the adoption o f  form3 
o f  r l t u a l  regulat ion. But a lso such responses now normally take place 
i n  the context o f  the admin is t ra t ive hierarchy created by the super- 
imposi t ion o f  a nodern s ta te  adn in fs t ra t ion  upon the smal ler patterns 
o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  societ ies, and w i t h i n  t h i s  context, Torry de ta i l s  studies 
which repor t  responses t o  hazard and d isaster  a f fected by p o l i t i c a l  
considerations, by loca l  and nat ional r i v a l r i e s ,  by the arousal o f  
otherwise subdued ethnic,  re l i g ious  o r  c lass con f l i c t s ,  and by ignorance 
a t  the centre about the needs o f  the periphery. 
In terorganisat icna l  network responses to  hazard i n  such contexts 
are characterised by Torry (1978) as g i v i ng  r i s e  t o  organisat ional 
cooptation as weaker organisations a m  dominated by the strong, t o  
organisat ional predatdon as some organisations w i l f u l l y  try t o  weaken 
o r  e l iminate others; to organisat ional c l u t t e r  when a va r i e t y  o f  
agencies move in ,  pe l l -mel l ,  to try t o  cope w i t h  hazard, and to 
bureaucratic i n e r t i a  when the re levant  admin is t ra t ion proves i t s e l f  t o  
be incapable o f  act ion f o r  a number o f  masons ranging from 
organisat ional r i g l d i  t y  to  the adoption o f  a l a i s se r - f a i  re philosophy. 
A1 t ! iou~h Torry 's  reviews concentrete upon less developed countries, we 
should antlc!pate, a t  l eas t  u n t i l  i t  i s  proved othenvise, t h a t  s i m i l a r  
ranges of in tarorqanisat ional  responses cay e x i s t  w i t h i n  more developed 
sett ings; or, a t  the least,  we should remafn aware o f  the p o s s i b i l i t y  
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o f  c u l t u r a l  and soc ie tz l  va r ia t ion  i n  the patterns o f  tPsponse t o  
hazard, and recognise t h a t  we are pmducing c u l t u r a l l y  spec i f j c  
ra ther  than c u l t u r a l l y  universal  models when we look on ly  z t  our o m  
soci e t i  es . 
3. The cu l t u ra l  context o f  responses t o  hazard 
I t  j s  important because i t  has impl icat ions f o r  current  debates 
i n  our  OWTI soc ie t ies t o  develop t h i s  po i n t  a l i t t l e  f u r t he r  by tu rn ing  
t o  look nore e x p l i c i t l y  a t  some factors  which may in f luence cu l t u ra l  
var ia t ion.  We tend very r ead i l y  to  take f o r  granted our  expectation 
t ha t  i n  times o f  d isrupt ion and danger, cornnunity f ee l i ng  w i l l  be 
maintained, l o o t i n g  and p ro f i t ee r i ng  w i l l  be kept down, and t ha t  
organ1 sations ni l  1 be ab le t o  take advantage o f  an 'unwri t ten insurance 
cont ract '  w i t h  the state, which w i l l  supply a i d  when t l i ings get  too bad. 
But these assumptions are themselves loccted i n  spec i f i c  h i s t o r i c a l  
and cu l t u ra l  contexts. Jones (1977, 1978) has ou t l i ned  how our  present 
conception o f  the s ta te ' s  r o l e  i n  hazard rcanagenent arose w i t h  the 
attempts o f  I t a l i s n  c i t y  states i n  the l a t e  middle ages t o  counter the 
threats  t o  both t h e i r  tax revenues and t h e i r  i n te rna l  order  provoked 
by disasters. The poss ib l l  i ty o f  ec t i ve  hazard management then rested 
upon the economies o f  scale which new and large:. pol 1 t i c a l  e n t i  t i e s  
could pmvide i n  response t o  hazard, and upon the emergence o f  a 
consensus t ha t  d lsaster  management was no t  against prov3 dence, and t ha t  
attempts a t  management should be supported a t  the expense of i m e d l a t c  
se l f - i n te res t .  
These l a s t  trro assumptions viere by no x a n s  universal ,  fo r  whi le  
techniques o f  mclndcl<ng plague. Pd~nine and nn i r a l  cpidcrnics spread 
gradcal l y  t o  France, England and Austm- i ic~~qary,  tliese countries were 
unable t c  pcrsuadc the Gttonan Emp'irc t o  adopt p i a y e  c o n t m l  measures, 
wfth the r e s u l t  t ha t  the cordons san l ta f rcs  o r f g i n a l l y  se t  up around 
-- 
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ports receivins t r a f f i c  frcm the south-enst were extended unt i l  by 
the eighteenth-century a thcusand-mile long cordon san i ta f re  extended 
from the Adriatic to Transylvania, following the l ines  of the mil i tary 
boundary and reinforced by lookout posts within musket shot o f  each 
other. The differ ing cultural a t t i tudes  to  hazard management which 
led to the creation of th i s  ba r r i e r  were evident a1 so i n  the  
d i f  f i cu l  t i e s  encountered by nineteenth-century, European-inspired 
attempts t o  reduce the tendency of famine i n  couritries such as India, 
China and Japan to enhance exls t ing inequi t ies ,  by the introduction of 
hazard managecent. 
I t  is not only our attitudes to hazard managefi~cnt which may be 
cul tural ly  bounded, f o r  the very notions which we use t o  discuss these 
problems are  not universal, but seem t o  have sprung up as  par t  o f  the 
world view associated w i t h  the self-reinforcing pursuit  of control 
over the material world v~hlch began with the Renaissance. Tie medical 
sociologis t ,  Renee Fox (1980) has recently recorded her personal 
rea l i sa t ion  t ha t  notions of uncertainty and r i sk  were not pa r t  of the 
world view of the peoples-that she vras studying i n  Zaire, f o r  example, 
f o r  she found there t ha t  happenings were e i t h e r  adverse o r  fe l ic i tous ,  
rarely neutral ,  and t ha t  they were a l l  seen as being deteminately 
caused by supernatural, psychological o r  imperscnal forccs, in  a view 
of the world which l e f t  no room f o r  the concept of probabilit ies.  The 
notions of r isk and uncertainty as they apply to  both physical and 
financial hazard also s i t  uneasily w i t h i n  some other  cul tures ,  such as 
those based, f o r  example, upon Islamic thought (Rodinson, 1974). And 
even within our own world view, when we pry in to  the real significance 
of notions l i ke  p m b ~ b i l i  t y ,  randorncss and r i sk ,  we find then underlain 
w i t h  phiiosophical ambiguities. 
We r!ay discern the eccrgence of these notions i n  Bri t i sh ,  I t a l i an  
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and French usasc o f  the  seventeenth century: the  s h i f t  from th? 
rlei ining a t  t h a t  t ime o f  the  word ' r i s k '  as a 'ventureus c o u n e '  t o  
the  e a r l y  e ighteenth-cer~tury  meaning o f  ' t he  chance o r  hazard o f  
c o ; n d ~ r c i a l  loss,  s p c c i f i c a l  ly  I n  the case o f  insured proper ty  o r  goods' 
would seem t o  p a r a l l e l  the movement from a soc ie t y  which placed a h i g h  
value upon adventurism (Hani l  ton, 1978) and upon booty capi  t a l i s n ,  where 
the  r i s k  o f  a death o r  g l o r y  exped i t ion  was n o t  m a n i n g f u l l y  q u a n t i f i a b l e  
t o  one based upon m t i o n a l  bureaucra t ic  c a p i t a l i s m  c a l c u l a b l e  t o  a 
f r o c t i o n  o f  a penny by accountants. 
Th is  s h i f t  i s  seen, too, i n  the emergence o f  t he  e a r l y  n ineteenth- 
century usage of r i s k  i n  the  mathematical theory  o f  p m b a b i l i t i e s ,  which 
def ines i t  as "such a f r a c t i o n  o f  the  sum to be l o s t  o r  gained as 
expresses the  chance o f  l o s i n g  o r  ga in ing  it", t he  f i n a n c i a l  sources 
o f  t h?  n o t i ~ n  be ing s t i l l  c l e a r l y  v i s i b l e .  Gle are f requen t l y  urged t o  
make use o f  c a l c u l a b l e  approaches based upon no t i ons  o f  r i s k  and r i s k  
assessnent i n  o r i e n t i n g  ourselves to  hazard (Hanna, 1979) and we r e a d i l y  
tend t o  assume t h a t  any r a t i o n a l  response by organ isat ions and t h e i r  
members must be couched i n  terms o f  r i s k  and the c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  (Strangert ,  1977, Singer, 1978) b u t  i t  i s  i n p o r t a n t  n o t  
to  l o s e  s i g h t  o f  the f a c t  t h a t  such ideas o n l y  mke sense i n  a 
cont ingent,  ca l cu lab le  v i w  o f  the  world, where a range o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
f u t u r e  worlds, f i n a n c i a l  o r  physical ,  a re  r e a d i l y  envisaged, i n  which 
the c o i n  nay equa l l y  e a s i l y  cone down as heads o r  as t a i l s .  
But  we s t i l l  f i n d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  equat ing t h i s  view w i t h  other,  
humanistic strands i n  o u r  cu l tu res ,  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which appear n o s t  
m g u l a r l y  when we fece the quest ion o f  q u a n t i f y i n g  the r i s k  o f  saving 
a hun~an l i f e ,  o r  t r y  t o  p u t  n f i n a n c i a l  value upon a h ~ n a n  l i f e .  The 
corlsfstent, coi:elunt i r i s is tence o f  those \.rho favour  a ca l cu lab le  
appmach t o  these p r tb l cns  f requen t l y  ovctwhelrzs what secm t o  be mre 
t r ad i t i ona l  opposing views, bu t  Baraw (19a0) i n  a reccnt sweeping 
c r i t i q c s  o f  th? use o f  cost-benef i t  analysis i n  a legal  context, has 
pointed out  t ha t  nany o f  the advocates o f  such approaches t r e a t  o f  
such e th ica l  and phi losophical  questions by dcfaul t, and he argues 
f o r  a l i m i t  to be piaced upon the use o f  such techniques, leaving 
serious e th i ca l  issues t o  be se t t l ed  by open debate. (See also 
Fischoff ,  1977). The Insistence o f  some conteriporary workers upon 
guarantees o f  heal 'ih a t  rrork ra ther  than f inanc ia l  compensation f o r  the 
loss o f  heal th  perhaps r e f l e c t s  t h i s  challenge t o  c a l c u l a b i l i t y  a t  a 
d i  f f e r e n t  1 eve1 . (Boesi , 1976). 
Discussion and Concl usions 
The v is ion  o f  a world o f  inexorable and con t inua l l y  developing 
technical  pmgress which was prevalent i n  the n ine teen- f i f t i es ,  w i t h  
i t s  com l l ayy  o f  a continuous reduct ion i n  threats fm the mater ia l  
world, i s  t o  some extent  under challenge today. Not on ly  are we 
pxvok i ng  new kinds o f  technical dangers by our own advances, bu t  we 
have becom nore aware o f  our  own dependance upon r e s t r a i n t  i n  socio- 
technical  matters as we come t o  a greater understanding of the 
mechanisms by which we po l l u t e  our  own envimnrnents and pmvoke new 
f o r m  of disaster.  Our dependance upon each other  i s  c lose ly  i n t e r -  
twined w i t h  our dependance upon n a t u ~ :  we have t o  cont ro l  a global 
socio-technical environment i n  which we k n w  t h a t  the worst outcorn of 
a f a i l u r e  o f  cont ro l  wor~ld lead t o  d isaster  f o r  us a l l .  Because o f  
the impcndc.1-able nature o f  t h i s  need ?or cont ro l ,  we are emotionally 
involved i n  I t  as an enterpr ise (El ias, 1956). This involvement sl~ows 
i t s e l f  i n  increasing discussions o f  and l eg i s l a t i on  about health,  r i s k  
and safety (The Tir;es, 1900; S lov ic ,  IC8O) and t h e i r  appearance on the 
p o l i t i c 2 1  a~cnda,  i n  panics where no inc iden t  has occurred, and y e t  one 
i s  expected (2oscnryen -- e t  a1 1975; f!ew Sc ien t i s t ,  1980), i n  popular 
77 
discussions o f  d isaster  (Iioss, 1980); i n  the popu la r i t y  o f  d i sas te r  
movies where an overreacl~ing technology i s  cu t  down t o  s ize and 
surv iva l  i s  made possible by a re turn t o  a more p r i m i t i v e  l i f e - s t y l e  
(Schecther e t  a1 . 1978). I t  shows i t s e l f  i n  the  incompatabf 1 i t y  o f  the 
arguments o f  the pro- and ant i -nuclear lobbies (E iser  and van der 
P l  i g t .  1980) i n  the c o n f l i c t i n g  views about whether the leve ls  of 
hazard we are facing are genuinely increasing, o r  whether our concern 
w i t h  safety  and hazard i s  a luxury  good. made poss ib le  by i n c ~ ~ a s e d  
aff luence (Slovic.  1980; Singer. 1978) ; and I n  the c o n f l i c t i n g  views 
about whether ,the hazards o f  advancing technology accmulatc  more 
r ap i d l y  than the benef i ts  (Clutterbuck. 1976). whether the reverse i s  
t rue  (Singer, 1978). o r  whether t h i s  l a t t e r  view i s  merely one o f  many 
unproven assmptlons bu i  1 t i n t o  the debate over hazard (Wi 11 iams, 1977). 
If we want t o  study organisat ional responses t o  hazard. then we 
Inmediately get involved i n  somc o f  these c o n f l i c t s  o f  views, f o r  the 
leve l  o f  pub l i c  debate iind the growing understanding o f  the nature o f  
the pat terns o f  events which make the worker, the consumer and the 
general pub l i c  suscept ible t o  hazard in f luence the manner Cn which 
hazard i s  perceived by ~cnbers o f  organisations and in f luence the 
po l i c i es  and the responses which are decided upon, as we1 1 as exer t ing 
t h e i r  e f f ec t s  upon the l e g i s l a t i v e  environment o f  the decision-maker. 
Renee Fox has recent ly  presented a most thoughtful  discussion 
(Fox, 1980) o f  the changing concerns o f  Western and more p a r t i c u l a r l y  
American soc ie tv  about red ica l  hazards and the  kinds o f  problems and 
uncer ta in t ies  t h a t  surround current  medical pract ice.  Fox suggests 
t ha t  the d e ~ r e e  and kinds o f  f c m n t  occurr ing i n  the medical area 
over er ror .  r i s k  and hazard are i n d i  cators t ha t  we are i n  the midst o f  
a FrCcCSj of quest ioniny and changing sone o f  cur  fundamental ways o f  
t h f n k i n g  about uncertainty.  (See also Rosenkrantz . 19.90; Kennedy, 1980). 
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She argues t h a t  p r i b l i c  concern i n  the medical f i e l d  shows i t s e l f  i n  
a preoccupation w i t h  c e r t a i n  C:?nds o f  novel 'worst  cases' which serve 
as paradiges f o r  discussion, the recombinant DNA debate be ing such a 
paradigm i n  the b i o - m d i c a l  f i e l d .  She notes t h a t  the  Amr i can  l e g a l  
system i s  being us$d t o  try t o  cope w i t h  these new pmblems, and she 
discusses recent  cases concerning organ t ransp lants ,  s o l d i e r s  exposed 
to r a d i a t i o n  from nuc lear  tes ts ,  genet ic  counse l l i ng  and arguments about 
medical treatments f o r  leukemia based upon p r o b a b i l i t y ,  a l l  o f  which 
r a i s e  issues which a r e  fundamental i n  the soc ie t y  and t h e  p o l l  ty, 
matters o f  b i r t h ,  l i f e ,  death and i d e n t i t y ,  and she p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t he  
l e g a l  p ro fess ion  i s  drawing back from making decls lons i n  these most 
d l  ffi c u l  t a reas. 
It does n o t  seem to ne t o  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  develop and extend Fox's 
arguments about changing concepts o f  h e a l t h  care and suscept ib i  1 i ty, o f  
t o l e r z b l e  r i s k  and i n e q u i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  r i s k  d i r e c t l y  t o  non- 
medical technology, w i t h  nuc lear  enertjy and i t s  assoc ia t ion  i n  the  
p u b l i c  mind w i t h  nuc lear  weapons, as t h e  = levant  'wors t  case' paradigm. 
As i n  t he  medical f i e l d ,  we f i n d  t h e  sane cur ious paradox t h a t  the  
p u b l i c  can be simultaneously i nd ignan t  over  the  cont inged incapac i t y  o f  
s p e c i a l i s t s  t o  s a t i s f y  the  cu r ren t  techn ica l  needs o f  the populat ion,  
and anxicus about t he  crrogancc o f  man i n  cha l leng ing nature  w i t h  h i s  
advanced technoloay. Fox r e f e r s  to a "bol;ndless i r r r ? s o l u t i o n  i n  the 
process" which I s  associated w i t h  the f a c t  t h a t  "our  sense o f  the  
beneficcncc and r e s i l i e n c e  o f  troth nat t l re and man-rritlc phenomena has 
somehow been shaken i n  ways t h a t  h e i ~ h t c n  our  scnse o f  ignorance, 
mystery, f a l l i b i l i t y ,  f r a i l t y  and vulnerabf 11 ty t o  a host  o f  h o s t i l e  
fnf lucnccs i n s i d e  and around us". hs  i n  the  m d l c a l  f i e l d ,  Bararn (1900) 
d e t a i l s  thp i n  ~ i h l c h  t h e  l;lv;:crr, a m  drawin5 back from o r  a re  i n  
d ispute  aho r~ t  t hc  c x t c n t  t o  which they sho~rlrf reso lve pt.c\hlcms o f  
79 
safety and techn ica l  r l s l :  f o r  the  pub l ic ,  o r  whather o t h e r  p u b l i c  
bodies should decide these quest ions f o r  them. 
Fox concludes t h a t  ou r  cu r ren t  p r e o c c u p a t i ~ n  w i t h  t h i s  area 
forms a "synbo l ic  languzge through u h i c h  we a re  cornun icat ing  some o f  
our  deepest quest f  ons about the cogn i t ive ,  m r a l  and netaphysi ca l  
t r a d i t i o n s  o f  ou r  c u l t u r a l  t r a d i t i o n "  and t h a t  thtvugh t h i s  debate we 
arc  changing our  views o f  liow ne r e l a t e  t o  soc ie ty  and t o  ou r  planet. 
Whether we agree w i t h  t h i s  o r  n o t  i t  seem t o  ne c l e a r  that ,  wh i l e  we 
cannot throrr away our  r e l i a n c e  upon s y s t e m t i c ,  r a t i o n a l  thought, which 
i n  a  sense i s  a l l  t h a t  m d e r n  man has, i f  we are  t o  t a c k l e  these problems 
o f  hazard w i t h i n  and around ou r  orcan isat ions w i t h  a  genuine and 
substant ive  r e t i o n a l  i t y  r a t h e r  than mrely a f o r m 1  and s u p e r f i c i a l  
r a t i o n a l i t y .  we need t o  recoanise t h a t  many human responses cannot s o l e l y  
be co~ ls ide red  i n  t e r n  o f  an app l ied  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  anc! t h a t  matters o f  
o rgan isa t i ona l  responses t o  hazard cannot be t r e a t e d  s o l e l y  as i s o l a t e d  
techn ica l  problens which a r i s e  w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  systcm u n i t s ,  and which 
can be reso lved by techniques whose f u l l  d e v e l c p ~ c n t  l i e s  j u s t  around 
the corner. Organisat ional  responses a re  a p a r t  o f ,  and are i n t e r -  
penetrated by the fn te ro rgan isa t i ona l  p o l f t i c a l  eccnony o f  our soc ie ty .  
and by ou r  otrn c u l t u r a l  assumptions and a t t i t u d e s  towards r i s k  and 
hazard and by cut-rent r a d i c a l  s h i f t s  i n  these attitudes. Glc need t o  
t r e a t  these i r p g r t a n t  problems w i t h  a  degree o f  detachment i f  we arc t o  
handle them, b u t  3 f i r s t  step torrards t h i s  detachment i s  a recogn i t i on  
of the  genuine compiexi ty o f  the  issues. 
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SOCIETY AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED RESEARCH: 
O N  T H E  SOCIO-POLITICAL FUNCTIONS O F  RISK ASSESSMENT 
J. Conrad 
Battelle e. V., 
Frankfurt-am-&in, FRG 
This paper critiques the usefulness of decision analysis as a conceptual framework for 
managing societal risk problems. This type of scientific approach, although very useful 
in structuring specific problems, does not take into account the political aspects of the 
process. A conceptual frame of reference i s  proposed which views risk assessment in a 
somewhat broader societal context than that implied by decision analysis. The paper 
concludes by examining the sociopolitical functions of risk assessment in recent debates 
on new technological developments. 
'IRather than being something that is inherent in the external 
world, risk and its abmence are qualities that are conferred 
upon it by social processes. These social processes, as they 
set down others that have no counterpart in physical reality, 
create a fluctuating pool of risks somewhere between us and 
the universe. Since any debate about risk must take place 
within a social netting, it will inevitably be a debate about 
the properties of this fluid pool. Anyone who claims that it 
is not - that it is about the concrete expanse that lies some- 
where beyond this pool - is falsely claiming to be a 'cosmic 
exile ' I' and 
"Risk, though it has some roots in nature, is inevitably sub- 
ject to social processes. Since we (being member. of society) 
are at one end of these processes, we can never gain access to 
the raw unprocessed reality. Whether we like it or not, the 
risks to which we have access are processed risks." (Thompson 
1980: 18). 
So risks do not constitute independent objective facts but 
are moulded and defined in processes of social communication; 
risks are neither "right" nor "wrong", "small" or "largew, 
but depend in their qualifications upon the consensus of those 
concerned, which usually prevents the development of a common 
standard for risk comparison. The acceptance or non-acceptance 
of risks change in the course of time; this may lead to ac- 
cepted daily routines of the management of risks previously 
perceived as extraordinarily dangerous just as to an increased 
sensitivity to risks people were formerly unaware of. (cf. 
Bechmann/Frederichs 1980a). 
Thompson goes on: "If only we concede that this is so, and 
stop pretending that we can get at the risks before they have 
been processed, then we can begin to understand something 
about them - we can begin to understand the processes of which 
they are the endproducts. And the first thing that we must 
understand is that these processes have very little to do with 
the individual as an isolated entity; they demand very little 
of his i ~ a t e  sensory apparatus but a great deal of his 
socially-acquired referential apparatus. They are pre-eminently 
social processes.n(Thompson 1980:18) 
This is not to deny the value of formal sciences and approaches. 
(Mathematics would soon teach anyone better). However, it 
points to the relevance of social context and societal sub- 
stance which in the end determine the applicability and utili- 
sation of, e.g., decision analysis. 
2 Problems of a decision-theoretical perspective: 
a concrete example 
In his paper, Lathrop describes the decision process around 
the attempt to site an LNG facility on the Californian coast, 
where different institutions involved performed or organized 
their own risk analyses, and where no site has been approved 
yet, after a negotiation and regulation phase of nearly a 
decade. 
Lathrop's conclusions which are impstant in this context are 
the following: 
"Beyond differences in how risks are evaluated, political or- 
ganisations cope with the uncertainties inherent in risk 
management in ways very different from that assumed in typical 
risk assessments." (Lathrop 1980: 8) 
"These political decision making processes do not take the 
probabilistic perspective of the risk analyst, are not ready 
to incorporate uncertainty into risk evaluation.in any way 
resembling the expected utility approach, and refuse to ex- 
plicitly trade off risk to life and limb against any other 
dimension." (Lathrop 1980: 9) 
From the viewpoint of systems theory, which in principle is 
still a formal theory about society, this appears quite 
natural and unavoidable. Every output of one subsystem pro- 
cessed for utilisation in another one inevitably undergoes a 
transformation. So even if technical analysis taken into 
account in the economic or political or family decision-mak- 
ing process, it loses its purity and receives an economic, 
political, religious, etc. 'mark' and meaning. That is, 
scientific advice will be transformed and used according to 
non-scientific criteria of other social systems. T o  hope to 
avoid or to counteract this transformation process is politic- 
ally naive. And to have the technical analysis done in one's 
own subsystem, e.g. the politico-administrative system - let's 
assume this possibility - overlooks and denies the advantages 
and consequences of processes of societal differentiation. 
Not all scientific research can be done in the political 
system, for instance. At least, de-differentiation has its 
price. (Certainly, another possibility is the rejection of 
systems theory as an adequate concept of features of (modern) 
society. But the results of Lathrops's case study - and many 
other examples as well, to be sure - seem to indicate the 
contrary.) Lathrop goes .on: 
"The most serious problem in the use of a decision analytic 
siting evaluation model, such as the one proposed by Keeney 
(1980~1, is that the decision structure assumed by the model 
does not match the institutional structure making the siting 
decision." (Lathrop 1980: 10) 
In view of all the agencies with different objectives involved, 
"it becomes very hard to identify any single self-awere 
decision-making process where all the trade-offs were made. 
T o  be sure, the overall process results in some decision, 
which can be analyaed as being consistent with particular 
implicit trade-off., bu.t any similarity between trade-offs 
consciously made and thoae inferred is likely to be simply 
fortuitous. It is not clear where a decision analytic evalua- 
tion model would fit into such a process, whose trade-offs 
should be used to set the parameters, or even to whom the 
analysis should be delivered. "(Lathrop 1980: 11) 
Also, "no analysis was used in turn to aggregate this range 
of analyses into sumamry measures to guide the setting of the 
remote siting constraint. The drafting of the legislation 
was a matter of examining the range of analyses, then making 
direct intuitive judgements as to the most appropriate con- 
atraint. In this case, then, analyses were used in the draft- 
ing of legislation, but only for very low-level inputs that 
were not very directly related to the costs and benefits in- 
volved in the actual decision." (Lathrop 1980: 11) 
Again, the old problem of decision theory is encountered which 
means that there is no single decision-making or consistent 
decision-making body and that it is hopeless to develop any 
kind of "algorithm" to aggregate different - maybe "rationalw - 
analyses in an analytical way. Consequently, there is no way 
of achieving an all-embracing risk-benefit decision algorithm 
in politics, at least as long as the limiting conditions of 
complete consensus or of total manipulation in a society do 
not exist. In other words, the subjective rationality of 
action and system rationality never coincide. (Naschold 1971) 
'!The actual outcomes of environmental policies are influenced 
more by the institutional arrangements, and by people's 
attempts t o  manipulate them in their own interests, than by 
the technical characteristics of the instrument used." (von 
Winterfeldt et al. 1978: 8). 
Now, what are the (research) recommendations of Lathrop? 
"Extend the scope of risk evaluation measures to account as 
much as possible for societal concerns." And, more specifi- 
cally, "Future research should seek to close that gap by 
developing hybrid risk evaluation aids that are sensitive to 
societal concerns, yet provide clear risk management deci- 
sion aids." 
"Develop risk management decision aids that are compatible 
with the essentially non-probabilistic orientation of the 
political decision maker.I8 
"Examine analytic techniques for aggregating the results of 
several different analyses, and select and adapt the most 
promising ones for use i n  the political process.@@ (Lathrop 
1980: 13) 
Such a research direction, from my point of view, does not 
take really into account the basic problem involved, both as 
a methodological and a sociological one, which has often been 
discussed (cf. Naschold 1971, Conrad 1978). The dependence 
on the specific context of risk judgements implies that 
"every human action or inaction involves some risk, but also 
that the risk form any given action will tend to ramify, more 
or less strongly, through all other areas of human experience 
Therefore, the hope that one can give a taxonomy, evaluation 
and finally technical fix to the problems of risks, is i n  
substance as ambitious as the programme oi putting all of 
human experience and value on to a scale of measurement, for 
mathematical or political manipulation." (Ravetz 1980: 6) 
So, sarcastically speaking, the rationality underlying these 
suggestions is one which allows for continuous and endless 
research. 
I certainly admit the uaefulness of the tools of decision 
analysis or of simulation models. My main concern is to put 
them into perspective. I agree that the ways and means of 
bridging the gap between science and politics and administra- 
tion can be improved, including the use of formal skills and 
instruments. And I believe in the possibility of theoretical 
reconstructions of political processes which in turn can guide 
political deciaion-making. 
I doubt, however, that .scientific analysis can essentially 
replace politics, that the focus on one aspect, on one prob- 
lem dimension, such as risk - I assume that one does not 
intend to bring in all other aspects through the backdoor 
again, as indicated in the citation from Ravetz - will give 
technical analysis and formal methods of aggregation real 
weight, and that formal models and methods, like decision 
analysis do have a great chance to play a major role in 
political practise. Even if we assume that we are able to 
take into account all important aspects and process dynamics, 
the necessary complexity of such a model and its requirements 
for decomposition in the specific case are usually always 
inferior to the concrete experience, intuition and aptitude 
of the practitioner, given the time constraints in politics. 
( ~ n  analogous example is the minor practical relevance of 
formal methods in research management and the setting of re- 
search priorities.) 
"It 1s impossible to model uncertainties and trade-offs in de- 
tail and at the same time consider a highly dynamic and inter- 
active decision process." (von Winterfeldt et al. 1978: 68). 
SO, the conceptual frame offered by decision theory and other 
approaches is more important than their case-specific utilisa- 
tion in every detail for the decision maker. 
"Such models can never substitute for good judgment and 
decision making, but they can clarify and provide a basis 
for communication." (von Winterfeldt et al. 1978: 70). 
It should be added that my treatment of Lathrop's paper could 
not do justice to it, as I just took out these points to have 
a straw man to illustrate my criticisms. 
3 Conceptual frame of the polity 
Perceiving risk assessment, at least as far as we are con- 
cerned with this subject here, mainly within the scope of the 
interaction processes of science and politics. I'm now going 
to sketch those structures and processes of which risks are 
the end-products or outputs, as cited above. 
Let me say first some words about my conceptual framework for 
policy analysis originating from politico-economic and sys- 
tems-theoretical approaches of political theory - which 
clearly has to be understood only as a n  analytical model. 
Problems of politics are generated in society and are trans- 
ferred in the field of politics to be worked up and treated 
there. Thus, the po'lity does not define its socially relevant 
problems itself but essentially reacts to problems of system 
and social integration and their mediation (see Lookwood 1964 
for a n  explanation of these terms)..In western industrial 
societies, these problems are strongly determined by the 
structures and the dynamics of capitalist forms of sociali- 
sation (Vergesellschaftung in German). flPolitics" as organised 
processes of decision-making can not be reduced to coercive 
relationships, to integration of social norms and values, or 
be interpreted according to a market and exchange model. In- 
stead policy implies thematising, organising and treating 
problems of social and system integration abstracting from 
objectives and aims and without a n  inherent logic in the 
sense of a principle opportunism (prinzipienfester Opportu- 
nismus in German, Luhmann 19;0), what puts any substantiated 
policy concept, which is based on rational-scientific principles 
of organisation, into question. The particular achievement of 
politics is precisely to treat ends as well as means as 
contingent. lloreover the actors follow their interests accord- 
ing to opportunities and the situational context without ac- 
cepting any commitment to specific rules, norms or tasks. 
Seglects, omissious, injuries which rise inevitably under 
these circumstances are periodically "removed" via political 
crises. Themes for the treatment of which the political 
agencies and bodies could not organise time, means and con- 
sensus reach the practically relevant sphere of political 
attention because of their greater actuality of conflict and 
crisis. Therefore, the problem of politics is mainly to keep 
up the flexibility of its mechanisms of selection.. 
In order to be able to deal with and to manage social problems 
and conflicts the political system needs a certain autonomy 
in the social, substantial and time dimension. The political 
system needs (a limited amount of) time to establish its own 
information and conversion processes; it has to be reasonably 
acknowledged and accepted by its societal environment and it 
has to produce outputs fairly continuously which have their 
customers and clients; it must not be opposed to only one 
closed power in its environment but needs dependenciea from 
different relevant environments which can be selectively called 
on, used and outbalanced against one another. 
The state in capitalism, separated from economy but determined 
by it in many respects is not the central decision-making 
system of society but one of several primary social subsystems. 
'The following determinants of political decision-making in 
general, i.e. of a11 policies, have to be stressed in 
particular: 
1) The political system is by no means autonomous in choos- 
ing its tasks and ends. It is more reactive in character 
than active. 
2 )  There are not only general (human), but also specific 
informational limits affecting political decision-mak- 
ing, which mainly result from the decentralised structure 
of capitalist economy to which policy-making refers and 
is bound. 
3) The political system is basically dependent on fiscal 
resources to be extracted from the production process 
('growth dividendt). This extractability is not un- 
limited, and this fact results in various determina- 
tions of political decision-making. 
4 )  Another limitation of political decision-making stems 
from the ever precarious power base of the political 
system. It has to execute its decision and although 
the system is also producing legitimation (cf. Luhmann 
1969), social compliance cannot be regarded as un- 
limited." (Ronge 1980: 221). 
"From a methodological point of view, the state's determina- 
tion is far more one of structure - i.e. it is 'built-int: we 
speak of withinputs, non-decisions, and inherent selectivity 
or bias - than one of intentions and activities. And it is 
exactly this fact which makes all decision theory approaches 
to politics so inadequate. T o  state it with a little over- 
stress: policy-making is more than, and different from, 
political decision-makingw. (Ronge 1980: 222). 
In the various phases of a policy cycle - problem perception, 
problem definition, policy and program formulation, decision, 
implementation, feedback and evaluation - the political bodies 
can use cognitive, normative and coercive/repressive as 
well as reflexive strategies, i.e. non-policies and meta- 
policies, using their two essential media: money and law - 
financial and juridical instruments. 
So far a rough sketch of my conceptual framework for policy 
analysis which will be applied later to the case of risk 
assessment. I don't think real world politicians behave 
exclusively in accordance with this concept, just because 
they never are only politicians. I assume, however, that the 
concept reflects the more basic generalisable characteristics 
of politics in a bourgeois society. 
From such a point of view it becomes immediately clear that 
task-oriented systematic decision aids like risk analysis 
and evaluation can achieve only a minor political status, as 
reported by Lathrop for the LNG-facility-siting-decision pro- 
cess. Similarly Winterfeldt et al. (1978: 67) state: 
"While policy analysis can provide a broad picture of the 
standard setting problem, the decision and game theoretic 
models developed are meant to aid regulators in finding good 
solutions once a specific subproblem for standard setting is 
identified. Specific here means that pre-decisions have been 
made about regulation alternatives, objectives, and possibly 
information sources to be used in the standard setting task." 
O n  the other hand, it is questionable how much further a more 
general formalised (decision) model could proceed which would 
take into account m y  qualitative description of the political 
process, since it would be a very abstract one with little 
help for practical purposes where the specific situational 
circumstances matter. 
4 Structures of problem-oriented research 
In comparison to normal disciplinary science, problem-oriented 
research usually does not have the strong internal cognitive 
guidelines, characteristic of the former one. Problem-oriented 
research centres on externally defined problems. 
"The communication relationship of the ... scientists organised 
about a common problem field is a particular form of scientific 
public. For all its participants it creates additional reference 
persons outside the academic cultures of their own disciplines 
(or, for that matter, their companies or authorities). This 
stabilises the problem orientation of their work. It also 
ensures reputation for their research, even by criteria of 
social relevance. In a certain sense, this community manages 
the interdisciplinary character of problem treatment. 
This leads to a 'forum at which conflicts can be made visible 
about the relevance of ,specific targets and strategies for 
underlying common problem' (op. cit., p. 2 4 6 ) .  Apparently, 
such problem communities are indicative of 'a new social 
organisation of science in which research is neither tied to 
the rules of a disciplinary matrix nor fixed to specific 
political or industrial projects, but can deal with the impli- 
cations of a given problem in relative independence' (op. cit., 
p. 248)."(Frederichs 1980: 125 f; innercitation: Bohme et al. 
1978 1. 
Certainly, there is always a tendency towards a certain degree 
of autonomy in scientific communities in problem definition, 
analysis and theoretical integration at the cognitive level, 
as well as in the recruitment of scientists, the judgment of 
scientific work and the distribution of reputation at the 
social level as can be derived from the principles of func- 
tional differentiation of society, as indicated elsewhere 
(Luhmann 1977; 1981). Problem communities are able to reject 
their instrumentalisation for special purposes by orienting 
their research towards theoretical conceptualisations of the 
problem. This requires, however, a common paradigm of the 
research community. When this is not the case and "an immature 
field takes on the task of expanding its research effort for 
the solution of some urgent practical problem, there will be 
a tendency for the outcome of its labours to be a weighty 
argument establishing the conclusions that its sponsors and 
its public wanted all along." (Ravetz 1971: 399) 
Problem-oriented science has to take into consideration the 
criteria of selection, the problem horizon, the level of 
abstraction, the possibilities of action and the goal system 
of the user in order to be potentially useful for practice, 
and has to reconstruct accordingly the features of the 
practical problem by using existing scientific knowledge and 
theories. Applicability is not only a question of selection 
of themes but also one of the methodical' and conceptual 
integrability of problem structures, of the chosen mode of 
generalisation and its level of concretisabon. The adequacy 
of these depends critically on the purpose and context of 
utilisation which shows the normative content of analyses 
oriented towards application. 
On the other hand, the transfer and acceptance of scientific 
knowledge requires its science-analogous application and the 
capability for a change in sense by context alteration (Luh- 
mann) by the user. The first point implies a certain ratio- 
nalisation of practice, since llrationalisation of practise 
and its adequate scientific reconstruction are mutual condi- 
tions." (Kaufmann 1977: 60). The second point means, that 
"adequate output of scientific research for the political 
system, for example, requires not only scientific competence 
but also political competence to be able to use the results 
of scientific research for political purposes. If this is not 
the case, scientists will often have no other option but to 
use the contract as an opportunity to gain access to funds 
and research fields." (Conrad 1980: 243) 
5 Risk assessment as problem-oriented research 
I'm now going to describe briefly risk assessment as a problem- 
oriented research field with a policy consulting function on 
the basis of the considerations in the two previous sections. 
"Risk research may be regarded as an attempt to counter, by 
scientific means, the uneasiness about technological risks 
now frequently felt in society. The scientific system reacts 
to this challenge by differentiating a 'problem community' ... 
However, the basic problem of risk research, namely the problem 
of creating tolerable risks, has not 80 far resulted in a 
clearly defined research program. The heterogeneity of the 
topics of risks research can be explained in part by its 
reacting to changes in the risk problems brought about by 
societal definition processes. Although this sensitivity to 
societal problem definitions does not favour consistency in 
the field of research, it is important if advising politicians 
is regarded as one of the functions of risk research." 
(Frederichs 1980: 123) 
Johnston (1980: 107) has arguedwthat the form  frisk assess- 
ment research, its progress or lack thereof, its fragmentation 
and its political contextuality can be explained by three 
major characteristics of the field: 
1) its goal direction 
2) its lack of maturity 
3) its reliance on inappropriate models." 
Hence, it cannot be said that risk assessment has really 
created its own specific methods or - in spite of numerous 
risk conferences and seminars - organised its own scientific 
community since the publication of Starr's somewhat paradigm- 
atic article more than ten years ago. 
On the contrary, an elaborate institutional framework is still 
lacking. Scientists treat problems of risk and acceptance 
mainly from the perspective of their own discipline and 
specialty, e.g. probability theory, decision theory, cost- 
benefit analysis, utility theory, game theory, system analysis, 
psychometrics, psychology of perception, operations research, 
policy sciences, research into participation or survey re- 
search. The methods applied are those used in the areas of 
technology assessment, cost-benefit analysis and decision 
analysis, which form the analytical frame for risk assessment 
(Slovic et al. 1977). No genuine theoretical approach, such 
as is necessary for an independent but finalised field of 
science is discernible, and heuristics predominate. Therefore, 
it seems that risk assessment as an area dealing mainly with 
hazardous outcomes of technologies and their consequences, 
i.e. with problems defined by society, has no real prospect 
of forming a finalised specialty and a problem community as 
long as there exists no common cognitive, action-guiding 
paradigm integrating the different aspects of practical risk 
problems. The formal concept of risk is not really able to 
cover psychological and social dimensions. Thus, the view is 
more appropriate that "risk research is partly a reaction to 
the societal actualisation of the risk problems involved in 
large-scale technology, but its development also appears to 
be influenced by the course of those societal definition pro- 
cesses which shape the risk problem. The interest of risk 
research in the phenomena of individual or societal risk 
acceptance, which has been added to the scientific goal of 
developing objective risk criteria, may be taken as an indi- 
cation of the reaction capability of research to societal 
problem definitions." (Frederichs 1980: 128) 
In this perspective, risk assessment is first the outcome of 
some general societal development trends such as the increas- 
ing importance of safety/security as a social value due to 
societal processes of functional differentiation (Kaufmann 
1973) and the spread of large-scale technologies. 
Second, perhaps, the results and not only the (diffuse) desire 
to obtain useful results contribute to be establishment of 
risk assessment research. 
Depending on the perspective it is possible to interpret the 
present situation - and we may again take the example of the 
LNG-facility-siting in California - either by inferring that 
the current political decision making processes are not (yet) 
rationalised enough to really enjoy the fruits of risk assess- 
ment studies or that risk research has not (yet) reached the 
maturity and relative autonomy and independence of a pro- 
ductive problem-oriented research field to supply socially 
useful results. 
According to my concept of politics, it is clear that I prefer 
the latter viewpoint. However, this does not mean that risk 
assessment can not provide useful information. Yet if accepted 
(standard. of) risks are the outcome of complex social system 
processes following other criteria, risk assessment cannot 
do more than provide data and information which may or may not 
be used i n  the context of (political) decision-making processes, 
including insights into the treatment and management of rislcs 
in these processes themselves. Owing to the immaturity of 
risk research, these data and information can easily be put 
into question, depending on the interest of those involved. 
Certainly, in specific technical contexts, risk analysis may 
well guide decisions about safety measures. etc., such as air- 
plane construction and development, chemical plant, nuclear 
installations. These are contexts where the usefulness of 
risk assessments has already been proven and can be assumed, 
although some doubts can be raised also i n  this case (cf. 
Mazur 1980). But in the wider political context the value of 
risk assessment will probably remain rather limited, especial- 
ly as long as there is no sufficient consensus among the 
scientists and experts in this field. Only if experts in risk 
assessment succeed in gaining social acceptance in science as 
well as by their clients, they may play a mediating role be- 
tween the science system producing specialised knowledge and 
the administrative planning and decision-making bodies in 
society, as can be seen in the institutionalisation of 
intellectual techniqueand novel professions in the areas of 
planning and consulting. In view of the social features of 
risk indicated in the beginning, however, the probability of 
such a development should not be overestimated. 
6 Sociopolitical functions of risk debates 
If the policy-guiding (technical) role and the analytical 
importance of risk assessment are rather limited, one may 
wonder if there are other reasons which can explain the 
prominent role of risk in public and administrative debates 
in recent times. 
One possibility is, of course, not to search for other func- 
tions of risk assessment, but simply t o  explain the fact 
genetically. Historical analysis and reconstruction obviously 
can trace back the origin and development of the risk subject 
quite well (cf. Mazur 1980, Conrad/Krebsbach-Gnath 1980a, 
Bechma~/Frederichs 1980b). However, every historical recon- 
struction uses theoretical concepts which first permit the 
selection of events, the construction of paths of development, 
the formation of consistent images, the explanation of the 
exclusion of alternative historical developments, etc. Thus 
it is worthwhile to look explicitly for possible functional 
relationships which help us understand the role of risk assess- 
ment on a structural level. 
The first point I want to mention is well-known: the rise of 
risk assessment research is strongly connected with the 
nuclear energy controversy. Since the substantive contribu- 
tions of risk analysis to the safety of nuclear installations 
are not sufficient to explain the prominence of the risk 
issue in the debate, another function, which is not covered 
by the actual approach resulting from a decision analysis 
viewpoint, appears to be more significant. 
Risk represented for a long time the topical focus from which 
the controversy gained its momentum. Owing t o  the character- 
istics and richness of the risk problem in technical and 
cognitive terms, in the focus of technological controversies 
is frequently the question of risk. Risk is the common 
element on which every public discussion is centred but with- 
out necessarily covering all the dimensions at the bottom of 
the controversary. "A subject of this kind does not cristallise 
by chance but depends on the degree to which it enables oppos- 
ing views t o  be articulated and can be used a s  a n  instrument 
to define one's own standpoint." (Frederichs/Loeben, 1979: 9). 
From this it follows that it is neither meaningful to try to 
reach agreement on the subject of risk nor is such agreement 
to be expected as long a s  the more general context i n  which 
risks arose and the background of conflicts in the field of 
technology policy remain valid. In this context the discus- 
sion of risk assumes first and foremost the function of a 
ritual: 
- it serves as a means of coming t o  terms in symbolical 
terms with the potential dangers of the technology in 
question which cannot be eliminated in reality; 
- in many cases it conceals other, more central dimensions 
of the conflict surrounding large-acale technologies; 
- it allows conflicts to be carried out in an increasingly 
ritualised form (e.g. in law suits). 
Another function of risk assessment can be derived from its 
explicit role of scientific policy consulting. Operationalised 
for the purposes of safety research and technology, such a 
risk concept shifts the debate into a field which requires 
specific competences. The necessary skills to understand or 
even to perform these formalised and often sophisticated 
approaches of risk assessment priviledge the expert and - to 
a certain degree - the bureaucrat. As a result, besided the 
substance of the argument in risk debates, the formalised and 
scientific (scientifically dressed) character of the debate 
already introduces a bias into it. The lay public can either 
trust the results of the experts1 calculation and reasoning 
or has to look for counter experts in order to raise critical 
points. In any case it is dependent on the expert. This situa- 
tion is not unique in the area of risk assessment, but only 
confirms a more general trend of development. The backing by 
technical expertise is expected to also provide the necessary 
legitimation for administrative decisions via the aureola of 
scientific justification and objectivity. In the nuclear con- 
troversy, in particular, risk figures and comparisons show 
nuclear power in a very favourable light. However, it turned 
out that scientific expertise does hardly fulfill any longer 
this legitimatory function in technological controversies and 
is reduced to just one more weapon in a political arsenal 
(Nelkin 1979, Nowotny 1979, Conrad 1981). On the contrary, 
the prestige of science itself is suffering in this process. 
The development of the whole Inhaber story - i.e. not only 
the Inhaber report itself but the disputes and tactical moves 
afterwards - is a real good example for demonstrating all 
these socio-political functions of risk assessment. It also 
shows how the respective social context determines the func- 
tion of risk assessment studies. 
One final function should be indicated: with the diminishing 
significance of the risk issue as a symbol and ritual in the 
(nuclear) energy debate, it appears to bear a growing transfer 
function: other technologies are caught up into the whirl- 
pool which contributes to the continuity and spread of risk 
debates. 
7 Conclusions 
These reflections on probable social functions of (public) 
risk debates hopefully have illustrated somewhat why it can 
be politically short-sighted and even dangerous t o  focus 
(exclusively) on the analysis and improvement of risk assess- 
ment in a methodological or technical sense, if aimed at its 
utilisation and implementation in political decision-making. 
The neglect of power, of structural withinputs and selective 
filtering mechanisms in the political process, the disregard 
of implications and restrictions of the established differen- 
tiation of science and politics lead either t o  an overestima- 
tion of the possibilities of systematic (hierarchical) problem 
solutions for realisation, justified neither methodologically 
nor theoretically nor empirically by social practice, or to 
a theoretical helplessness which could also be a conclusion 
from Lathrop's description of decision processes about 
facility siting. 
From the point of view of politics the substantial results of 
risk assessment studies may be of (some) importance, certain- 
ly; the political utilisation of these studies, however, 
inevitably provides them with a political "stigmatisation", 
which changes their character just because of the other con- 
text, and other functions of risk assessment often will play 
a more important role. 
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PART II 
RISK ANALYSIS ISSUES 

REFLECTIONS O N  RISK ASSESSMENT* 
Alvin M. Weinberg 
Institute for Energy Analysis, 
Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 
Oak Ridge, TN 37830 
Even perfect knowledge of the dose-response a t  low levels of exposure (and therefore risk) 
does not resolve the problems of setting standards. This paper discusses that in any case 
de minimus (or threshold levels) ought to be the guiding principle for setting standards 
to the extent that the costs of hazards can be internalized. The role of the market mecha- 
nism in establishing the de minimus standard ought to be acknowledged. 
'Reprinted with permission from Risk Analysis, Volume l(1). 1981, pp. 5-7. O 1981 Society for 
Risk Analvsie.. 
More than 10 years have paycd slnce Chauncey 
Stan publ~shed his famous paper In Scrence ln whlch 
he proposed that the assessment of nsk poscd by 
technology mlght be amenable to quantltatlve analy- 
sls"' Many papers and books have slnce appeared 
that have analyzed and reanalyzed the assessment of 
nsk from the polnts of view of the technologst, the 
systems analyst, the decls~on analyst, the psycholo- 
gst. and the philosopher Though I do not clam 
lntlmatc a q m n t a n c e  wlth t h ~ s  1:terature. I have read 
enough of ~t to convlnce me of the usefulness both of 
careful analys~s of the way In whlch nsks are actually 
assessed, as well as more abstract study of underlytng 
methodologes I therefore welcome the new journal, 
R ~ s k  Analysts. where practltloners of the art of nsk 
assessment can exchange thnr wews and resulu 
I use the word "an" lntent~onally I can hardly 
concelve of large parts of nsk assessment becomlng a 
sclence T h ~ s  IS not to say that careful analys~s of 
undcrlylng assumptions that go into nsk assessment 
IS frultlas, or that careful observat~on of damage 
caused by large insults 1s not a part of nence.  But 
there are, and wlll always be, strong trans-sc~ent~fic 
elements In nsk assessment We should be prepared 
to r m y l z e  thesc. and accept them 
Wlll~am W Lowrance ln h s  paper. "The Nature 
of hsk." ldentlfles SIX classes of hazards: ( I )  ~nfec- 
tlous and degenerat~ve diseases, (2)  natural 
catastrophes. ( 3 )  falure of large technologcal sys- 
tems, (4) discrete. small-scale hazards. (5) low-level, 
delayed-effect hatards, and ( 6 )  xx~opollt~cal d srup- 
tlons 12' Most of nsk assessment today IS focused on 
(3).  falure of large technologrcal systems. and on (5). 
low-level delayed-effect hazards. Both of thesc I would 
class~fy as "rare events" because In nc~ther lnstance IS 
11 pract~cal to bulld enough nuclear reactors or DC- 
10's to observe the failure rate. or to conduct expen- 
ments on a sufficiently large scale to actually see a 
response at very low dose. To be sure. in the case of 
DC-10's and reactors. event-tm analysls can yleld 
estimates of overall failure rates; but thesc rates arc 
extremely small. Thus the most powerful method of 
sc~ence-experimental observation-is inapplicable 
to the estimat~on of overall risk in exactly those 
Instances where public policy most demands assess- 
ment of risk. This intrinsic uncertainty is reflected in 
the bitter controversy that rages over the safety of 
nuclear reactors, or over the use of the strict linear 
hypothesis in setting standards for low-level exposure 
to carcinogens and mutagens. 
Much of Risk Analysis will be devoted to refin- 
ing and quantifying our estimates of risk in situat~ons 
where exposures arc large and quantification is possi- 
ble-where nsk analysis is indeed pan of science. 
But ~f one concedes that ~n the more imponant cases 
of small exposures or r a n  events there are essentially 
unknowable elements in nsk assessment, we are still 
left with the practical problem of setting standards of 
acceptable risk. How do we dec~de what 1s an ac- 
ceptable risk in circumstances where the assessment 
of nsk is beyond the profic~ency of science. that is, 1s 
trans-scientific? 
Arbitrary elements obviously must creep into 
standard-setting when the risks themselves are so 
hard to assess. But. ~f we are honest, we must adm~t 
that even when the nsks can be quantified, the settlng 
of standards IS lntnnsically a pollt~cal act-that is. 
the standards themselves must ln final analysls be 
arb~trary. or must invoke some principle that goes 
beyond mere quanufication of the risk. Thus we now 
believe that the 55-mph speed limit saves several 
thousand l~vcs per year. Why not reduce the speed 
limit further since even more traffic fatalities would 
thereby be avoided? We chose 55. rather than 50 or 
60 mph. not by applying an elaborate cost-benefit 
calculus. but by a political process. 
No manipulation of cost-benefit calculus can 
obscure this essential arbitrariness in setting stan- 
dards of acceptable nsk. wen when the risk itself is 
accurately known. Would it not be more straightfor- 
ward. then, to invoke some strategy other than cost- 
bcnefit analysis upon which to bare standard% 
especially in those situations where the risks are 
unquantifiable? 
One such possibility is the invocation of a de 
minimis principle: &low a certain level of exposure 
or insult, we shall simply accept whatever residual 
nsk is incurred; we only assure ounelves that the risk 
is "small." The arbitrariness lies then in deciding 
what is a de minimu exposure, whether to radiation, 
or chrmids.  or other imult, that results in a "small" 
risk. 
Where the insult u a m m a d e  addition to an 
existing background as is the case for radiation, an 
exposure "small" compared to the natural bad-  
ground seems to me to be a sensible standard. much 
more sensible than a standard based on futile at- 
tempts to compute the number of casualties caused 
by the existing and ineradicable background and then 
striking an arbitrary balance between cost and 
benefit. 
The issue hangs around the definition of "small" 
compared to natural background. Here I am taken by 
H. Adler's suggestion that "small" be defined as the 
standard deviation of the natural background."' For 
low LET radation. in the continental United States, 
this amounts to about 20 mr/yr: This is close to the 
25 mr/yr limit set by the Environmental Rotation 
Agency for allowable exposure to effluents from the 
nuclear-fuel cycle. 
The ascnce of this approach to setting an ac- 
ceptable de minlmi~ level is comparison of risks-in 
this caw the risk of manmade radiation compared to 
background radiation. We make the implicit assump 
tion that backpound radiation poses an acceptable 
risk, whatever that risk may be (and which we do not 
uy to quantify). An exposure that is small compared 
to thir is a fornori acceptable. Can this principle be 
extended to risks lor which there is no natural back- 
ground? A possibility that dewrves consideration is 
first to evaluate the risk. say of a chemical for which 
a standard is required. agaurst the risk of radiation at 
sufficiently high levels of exposures that the risks of 
each can bc unequvocally determined. One could 
then invoke a principle of consistency: The allowable 
exposure to the chemical in question should cause no 
more damage than that caused by the de minimrs 
level previously set for radiation. The damage caused 
by the de minimis level for radiation and for the 
chemical In question is determined by the linear 
hypothesis. To be sure. this xheme invokes the linear 
hypothesis against which I have often inveighed: but 
it invokes it in "weak" form-not as an estimator of 
damage. but as a means of comparing two, essentially 
unknowable. risks. 
Though I find the previous proporals attractive 
in principle. and I sense that & minimis is being 
talked about in the standard-setting community, I am 
left with an uneasy feeling that such proposals leave 
out an essential rcal~ty: that standards must always 
be set in a social matrix. Whcn the standard setter 
finally comes out is inevitably influenced by the 
social milieux in which he operates. Can the social 
structure in which standards must be set actually be 
exploited to anive at more smsible standards? The 
Soviet Union and the United States represent the two 
e x t r a  social structures: a centrally planned system 
and a market system. On the whole, standards set in 
the Soviet Union for. say. radiation exposure, resem- 
ble those in the United States; the glaring exception 
is microwave exposure levels which, in the Soviet 
Union, are considerably lower than in the United 
States. On the other hand. U.S. nuclear reactors have 
been enclosed in containment vessels since the bcgu~- 
ning; Soviet -ton until recently have had no 
containment doma. Thus it would not be easy to 
attribute tr; the one system or the other a greater 
w n m  for the public's safety. 
This flies in the face of some cumntly fashion- 
able doctrine: Socialist systems, not concerned with 
profit, are supposedly more likely to err on the side 
of safety than arc capitalist societies. That this is not 
manifestly the care may suggest that an important. 
and insufficiently recopzed sanction exists within 
our market society to ensure a balance betwcen risks 
and benefits. between costs and safety. 
The risk-benefit balance is really a 2 X  2 risk- 
benefit matrix with four elements: public risk, public 
benefit. pnvate risk, private benefit (Fig. 1). For each 
technology a risk-benefit matrix can be constructed. 
For example, in the case of nuclear reactors, the 
public nsks arc radiation hazard and proliferation: 
the public benefit is abundant energy. The pnvate 
risk is the financial loss. even failure, of the organiza- 
uon responsible for the reactor. (The s u ~ v a l  of 
Fl& I. D P - k l i i  matrix lor reacton 
R m w  
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the Metropolitan Edison Company was placed in 
jeopardy by the events at T h r a  Mile Island.) The 
private benefit is profit. 
The risk-benefit philosopher (if I can use this 
description) or those who claim to speak in the public 
interest, are concerned with the public risks and 
public benefits. For them a decision as to when a 
nuclear reactor is safe enough amounts to weighing 
the risk of excas radiation against the benefit of 
abundant energy-say reduction in impon of oil. 
The whole theory and philosophy of regulation of 
risks is. I believe. based on the assumption that only 
these public risks and benefits are gennane to 
answering the question, "What is safe enough?" 
Thic conventional view neglects the very real, 
and powerful, sanctions imposed on a manufacturer 
by the private risks he incurs if his products fail. The 
heaviest loser at T h r a  Mile Island was the utility and 
the manufacturer responsible for the reactor. One can 
expect reactors to be built and operated more safely 
in the future because, as a result of Three Mile 
Island, every actor in the nuclear enterprise rcalircs 
that unlas he operates safely. he can be put out of 
bus ins .  This is powerful medicine indeed: The bal- 
ance between safety and cost (which is the underlying 
balance in all setting of standards). will surely be 
moved toward safety as a result of the accident at 
Three Mile Island. 
Can the market system by itself, without govern- 
men1 intervention, be counted upon to strike a proper 
balance. to maintain public risk at an acceptable 
level? The simple answer is no- government. that is, 
nonmarket interventions-will always be needed. But 
if  the  cost^ of inadequate safety could be sufficiently 
internalized-is.. if designers and managers of enter- 
prises that create and market products or devices that 
p o x  risk. could be made sufficiently aware of the 
private risks they incur if  they draw the private 
risk-benefit line incorrectly. I should think we would 
rather automatically acheve a pragmatic balance be- 
tween risk and benefit that would be an important 
adjunct to the balance we now achieve by direct 
intervention. I do not want to minimize the difficul- 
ties that lie in the way of ~nternalizing the costs of 
inadequate safety. Clearly an informed and con- 
cerned citizenry is required if the private sector is to 
receive signals that are strong enough to affect the 
balance sheet significantly. 
The issue 1 raise is not pan of science. yet it 
seems to me to be very relevant. if not to the analysis 
of risk. then to the more practical. related question of 
how to set standards of acceptable risk. I hope that 
Risk Analysis continues to make room in its pages for 
dialogue on risk policy. Perhaps more important. I 
hope those who work on the scientific side of risk 
analysis will interest themselva in the formulation of 
policy that flows from their scientific findings. 
R # I h  
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RISKS O F  RISK DECISIONS" 
Chauncey Starr and Chris Whipple 
Electric Po w r  Research Institute, 
Palo Alto, California 
The analytical approaches utilized for evaluating the acceptability of technological risk 
originate from analogies to financial cost-benefit risk analysis. These analogies appear 
generally valid for viewing risk from a societal basis, but are not applicable to individual 
risk assessments. Conflicts arising from these different views of risk assessment provide 
insights to the origins of individual, intuitive evaluations. Societal risk decisions made 
under conflict represent political compromises, and the resulting decision process creates 
substantial conflict costs. The pragmatic use of quantitative risk criteria (safety targets) 
may be useful in reducing these costs. 
'Reprinted with permission from Science, Voi. 208.1980, pp. 11 14-1 119. O AAAS, 1980. 
Technology creates many nsks Deter- 
mlnlng whrh nrkr are acceptable 8s an 
Important nat~onal Issue I t  pervades ma- 
jor recron of our economy In food pro- 
duct~on we fsce decls~ons about pestl- 
cldes and preurvallves, Vansponatlon 
nskr PTC ~ncre~rlngly re~ la led.  and a 
centnl Issue In energy policy 1s the con- 
uoveny over the nsks from power 
plants Regardless of whether the ren- 
ousncss of technolo~cal nsk 1s only now 
b e ~ w  nxopn~zed, or, alternatively. that 
the preofcupatlon wlth nsk and re&- 
uons 1s an overreacuon. It 1s clear that 
the cost to xxlety of the confllct over 
accepting technololpcal nsks 1s great 
Thew costs stem from the anxlety suf- 
fered by those who are dlsmayed by the 
confl~ctlng lnformarlon about [hex nsks. 
and from the Ilt~gat~on, m ~ s p k c d  Invest- 
ment, retrofits, and costly delays thar re- 
sult from ~ndustry's lnablllty to predict 
the acceptance of nsk by the publlc 
h s k  assessment IS p w l n g  In Impor- 
a c e  as a system des~lpr tool The final 
conhgurauon of all technical systems IS 
the outcome of a common des~lpr x- 
quence The first task of a system des~gn- 
er 1s the development of a workable b u -  
IC concept The second m k  IS rcduclng 
the vulnerab~llty of the system to fallures 
of component parts. lncludlng human 
pMlClpantS The final Iask IS balanclng 
the benefits and nsks of the new system. 
scanlng wlth the lnternallzed economlc 
costs The external effects have rarely 
bcen analyzed, and I[ IS only ln recent 
decades that we have become deeply 
~oncerned w~ th  th~s d10icult but Impor- 
rant pan of the des~gn process 
Rlsks created by technlcal systems 
anse c~ther from routine external effects 
cons~dercd acceptable at the ume of de 
SIP. or from abnormal condlt~ons that 
arc not pan of the baslc des~gn concept 
and I ~ S  nonnal operatton Most a b n o m  
events usually lmpalr or stop the open- 
[Ion of the technlcal system, and may 
threaten the operators The usual ex- 
t e d  effect 1s the loss of operat~ond maXlmze benefits' G ~ P  Profess- 
benefits to the usen of the output The es -OC from anarchy 10 dlccatonhlp I n  
ma Internal conrequences of falures most of the lndustnal world, we enJoy a 
am borne by the operating lnstitutlon m*lum between there. but the pmers-  
The tlmely d ~ f i s ~ o n  wlthln the Insutu. es for declslon-maklng have themselves 
tlon of lnformat~on about such falures b c ~ m c  ontenllouf Issues 
usually sumulates rap~d modlficatlons to Social costs include ~ n ~ s b l e s .  and
reduce the ratlo of falure costs to bene- the querllon lmmedlately evident IS what 
fib Lcss hquently a falure results rn costs am Included and how arc they 
effecu outs~de the ~nsututlonal bound. ~ e l 9 h d  I t  1s obvious that d we have a 
ary, crearlng a public risk-and a polen- declslon Paess. and ~f we know how to 
tral cost.to the public These external dek rm ln  costs to the ~nd~vldual. we still 
cosb KC usually dlOic~~t to evaluate, have a problem with the full d~xlosure of 
and here the ~nformat~onal mechanism all h e  costs What Is full dis- 
for system mod~ficat~on IS usually cum- C~Osurcv Do we Include the opt~ons for 
benome and slow ~n recent years such risk management as  pa^ of full 
m o d ~ f i ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~  have bee, made because disclosure that IS, the cost of the alter- 
of an lncrcaslng public concern over the nauves for m a w m g  the nskv Does 11 In- 
Inherent nsks and costs mslng from pre- clude all Present events future events. 
v~ously acceptable external effects, both h e  people who get the benefits and the 
ofcar~onal and routine For these ma. F O P *  Who bear the costs" We have geo- 
sons, the lmponance of nsk as a deslw P P ~ K  dlstnbutlons, tlme d~stnbut~ons. 
cntenon IS lncreastng demograph~c d~stnbut~ons-all of these 
The basr tnrlsms about risk a 1 n ~ I ~ d ~ d  by the term full d~sclosure 
dy rccolprrzed h o t .  everyone knows Where do we draw the boundmes' 
thar nsk taklng 1s an accepted pan of life Declslons am not made by ~nst~ tu-  
Llvlng can be fun, but II 1s also dan- "0"s. the declslon process ~nvolves 
gerous (lust how dangerous can bc dim- people The 8ovemment typsally works 
cult to measure) Second everyone re. through agenCleS and committees. so 
acts differently to nsks taken voluntmly In fact, It 1s a few people In the 
aw to nsks mat are Imposed oy some asencles and a few people on the com- 
outsde p u p  Thlrd, decls~ons Imposing mlttees who really dec~de what happens 
nsks on us KC bang made all the tlme How do we allocate the respons~bll~ty 
This results In the founh truism a cm-  and the costs of bad decls~ons' How do 
fllct 1s lnhmnt when a group Imposes a We functionally connect authority re- 
nsk on others Hlstoncally, such con- spons~bll~ty or outcomes, and costs? 
fllcts have bcen resolved by compro- Aher we establish the soflal costs 
mlse, but rarely to everyone s sat~sfac- now do we set out pnontlesq How do we 
[Ion detenn~ne the relat~ve ments of vanous 
I t  IS, therefore. charactenstlc of the outcomes' That IS a sub~ect for a sepa- 
functtonlng of an organued soclety that rate study because. of course, value 
conflicts anse from the balanclng of pub  SYstems depend on culture. background. 
Ilc benefits and involuntary nsks to the economlc status and all kinds of psycho- 
lndlv~dual Because such confl~ct IS un- logsal facton 
avoldabk our problem 1s how to manage P ~ R  of the problem In nsk assessment 
and rnlnlmlze 11 comes from confus~ons that anx dunng 
How should group declsmn processes dlscusslons of the sub~ect-confus~ons 
opeme to mlnlmlze soclal costs and about rcallty, analysis, and lnd~v~dual 
prceptlons. Reality 1s WM has hap 
pened or what will happen. Anslysls is a 
process bued on co~~ectcd dm. anec- 
QLsl ures. and statistics. any of whlch 
may or m y  not be correct; and. b a d  
on these. we invent simplified models to 
predict M outcome. Thc result, of 
coune. is a LprsC uncertainty in the pre- 
dictions. 
Whal 1s the intuitive prcept~on of the 
lndividuala involved? Involuntary risks 
YC p e ~ v e d  flerently by mdividuals. 
Thcu -ions may be far from real- 
ity. So. in discussing public acceptance 
of risk. we have to distinguish between 
the uncertain reality of what may occur. 
the uncertain d y s i s  of predicting it. 
and the variable perception ofits poten- 
tial. Simi*r conksions exlst. in- 
cidcnmlly. over WCLI costs and social 
h f l t s ,  which are also involved. As M 
illusmtion. who in the y u r  19a) could 
have predicted the social cosu and bsnc 
fits of the automobile? 
Finally, people's perceptions of proba- 
bilities arc frequently in gross error. Thc 
accldent at Three Mile Island proved 
vcry linle about probabilities of such 
events. Thc inadequacy d such single 
events for providing probability numbsn 
can be explaned d y t i c d y .  but the po- 
litical response and the public per- 
ccptlons are often b a d  on singie 
events. So even i f  a profeumnal -up 
develop analytic answen, it hiu di0i- 
culty p e n d i n g  the public to accept 
them. 
Recognizing all thex diL%cult~~s. ~tis 
nevenhekss Imponant to explore the 
subject of nsk management in order to 
Improve the quality of decis~on-mak~ng. 
A questcon lmpllc~t In the unn accept- 
able nsk 1s accepmble to whom? Cer- 
mnly congress~od approval of any 
method for making nsk-benefit decls~ons 
esrabl~shes 11s legtt~mscy. but a publlc 
consensus IS needed to susmn 11s u x  
Defining ths consensus IS dlmcult be- 
uuse there are tcchnobgtes that are fa- 
vored by a mqlonty, or at least by a plu- 
rallty, but are oppoaed by extremely 
moovalcd lndlvduals and groups (forex- 
ampk. thosc who fight water Ruondat~on 
and nuclear power) Becauv of our ex- 
pnence w ~ t h  other pol~t~cal issues In 
whrh slmllar d~v~s~ons  f publlc oplnlon 
occur (abon~on, gun control). we know 
that we should not be opt~m~st~c over the 
prospests that a regulatory approach can 
neutdue thew controvenles Problems 
such i~-* rhex rase Issues. such as the 
definlt~on of majonty Venus m~nonty 
I".l"dY.l 
Thc debate over the relative mcntr of 
these appmaches generally focuxa on 
/(t'"'l the elIects of lncomplelc lnformat~on 
(onutlcd and uncewn  naks, benefits. 1 /' and values), neglect of d~stnbuoonal ef- 
-6 fects. and other erron of sunpl~fieat~on i 
: ,*CJ. I t  1s not our lntent to rcvlew the ments of these methods as commonly pracoced. 
that has been done elsewhere (24) 
P,OU.,l,?, .I I.l*h 
~ i .  I. vuue ,y1rcm for rirk. 
righu and the scope and limit of due pro- 
cess. that uc well kyond  those n o d -  
ly asrociued with nsk m ~ m c n t .  
Co-ss has not defined "accept- 
abk" risk levels. except for the few c u -  
es in which a zero risk appmach w u  
mandpced. Far more frequently ( I ) .  Con- 
gress delegates responsibility for judging 
risk r ccpub i l ~ t y  to regulatory rpncies 
with the criteria that protection be 
vided @nst "unreasonable" nsks. The 
methods by which these agencies inter- 
pret "rrwnableness" range from a for- 
mrl analysis of risk. benefits. and alter- 
natives to purely subjective evaluations. 
The attraction of analytcc methods 
(con-benefit analysis, decision analysis) 
is their capac~ty to make explicit the as- 
sumpbons. value judgments, and criteria 
u x d  for making a decis~on. The analybc 
approaches are cons~dered lolpcally 
sound and sufficiently flexible to accept 
any value system. Given a specific set of 
values and cntena. a cost-benefit analy- 
sis could ideally lndccate the decis~ons 
that would k t  balance technological 
risk and benefit (assum~np that both tan- 
gtble and intangible costs and benefits 
uc included). But In reality it is diflicult 
to m e w  group values, and at best the 
analytic methods can only be used to 
reach a rough approxlmatlon of the s o  
clal cost and bsnefits that chPrPctenzc a 
decision. 
&cause of our use of the urm risk as 
tk probability of either financial or 
physiul h a w .  we may tend to uncriti- 
cally allow the use of premises about the 
acceptance of the risk to "life and limb" 
(7) to be bued on an analogy to financial 
risk taking. 
F m  the socieLsl viewpoint, the pre- 
sumpoon that risk equals cost may be 
valid in most cases. For e m p l e ,  the 
u n t  of the risk of death is sometimes cal- 
culated as being equal to the discounted 
net earnings of those killed. l l u s  meth- 
od. now out o f  favor, operates iu if the 
loss of l ivm were equivalent to tk 
breakdown of pmductive machines. 
Similarly. the value iusigned to resil- 
ience (8) leads to a desire to avoid cata- 
strophic accidents that parallels the 
strategy in which investments arc diver- 
s i k d  in order to limit losses under ad- 
verse conditions. Perhaps recognizing 
the dimrences between these two types 
of risk. Zeckhauser (9 )  argued that, on a 
per fatality basis. the social cost of mul- 
tiple-fatality acc~dents is lower than that 
of a single fatality because fewer survi- 
von arc dected. For example, the s 
cial cost of the loss of a city or a family IS 
less than that of an equivalent number of 
independent, dlspened fatalioes. Al- 
though the barn for th~s argument is a p  
parent. i t  IS also ~ncomplete. For ex- 
mlple. i t  ignores the value placed on the 
cont~nuplion of a famlly Ilne: the impor- 
m c e  of this value 1s evident In the draR 
deferment that was Oven to sole surviv- 
ing sons. Similarly. Wilson (10) noted. 
FI#. 2. Compnron of  
p m z v e d  nsk vlrh 
actual nrk [Coumsy 
or lhc hmncsn p,y- 
cholo& 4ssocla- 
Uonl 
5null acclaenls lhrouglwul the world h l l  
.bout 2 mlllaon people each year, or 4 b~ll~on 
people In 7JXXl ycm T~IIS as 'acceptable ' In 
~ht unw that salety w ~ l l  contmue lo exlsr. 
10au bulb contrndly replace t k  dcalhs 
But d P SI~& rc~dent were to kdl 4 bdlwn 
people. tha~ IS. t k  populu~on of the whde 
world, vxlscy r& mc recover Thrs wwld 
bs unuceptable even d 11 only h.ppd once 
In 2000 y o n ~  
Anolher example In which the ability 
to generalize from financial cost-benefit 
analysis has been questioned is when 
physical risks are distributed across 
time. Arrow (1 I )  argued thal thew risks 
should be ueated ar other costs. and d i s  
counted accordingly; other analysts o f  
the issue have questioned the validity of 
this appmafh, and looked for al terwive 
methods for pidance on how to judge 
equity in intergcnentiod risk Wade-offs 
(12). 
Although the above analogy may be 
valid for the collective view ofthc cost of  
risk. 11 may not apply to the intuitive 
evaluation of  risk. As Fig. I illustrates. 
the individual and societal evaluations of  
nsk arc quite different (8) .  In  the societal 
view. the presumption of a linear relation 
between nsk and the cost of  that risk 
may be quite val~d. But as Howard (13) 
po~nted out, the individual evaluation of  
that cost is necessarily nonlinear, and 
becomes lnfin~te as the probability a p  
pmachcs unlty 
The u x  of an expected value or ex- 
pected uttlity model IS based on the 
premlse that expected cost is simply the 
product of the probability of an outcome 
and the evaluat~on of that outcome. But 
In the individual's view of the risk of 
death. thls is not val~d, for this product is 
very large or infinite. 
It is often presumed that the lndlv~dual 
evaluat~on of the cost of risk is linear 
over a probabll~ty range of interest (9. 
131. but there 1s little hrm ev~dence to 
supwn any hypothes~s about the shape 
of th~s curve. as far as we know. Under 
the common conventions of risk analy- 
sls. ~ h c  slope of the curves in Fig. I IS 
referred to as the value of life. The politi- 
clans' old 3a.u that life 1s of  ~nf in~te value 
can be reconciled ~f thls refers to the in- 
dlv~dual evaluat~on of one's own life. 
Th~s vlewpolnt IS not ~nconsistent with 
the assbgnment of finite costs ro risks: i t  
1s the appllcat~on of an expected value 
model thal IS Inappropriate for this eval- 
uatlon 
A recond drawback wlth the appli- 
cation o i  expected value to lndiv~dual 
nsk eraluat~on stems from the tendeny 
by analysts to seek to accommodate dif- 
ferences of opin~on entirely within the 
assignment of utility 114). This is because 
in most decision or cost-benefit analyses. 
the probability estimates are cons~dered 
roughly valid because they arc baKd on 
availabk data. engineering models (such 
as fault trees). and expen op~nion. But in  
a study of public attitudes about nuclear 
power, rhe bulk of the disag~eement war 
found to be due to dl&rent beliefs about 
accident probability (IJ). Although it 
may be perfectly valid to base public pol- 
icy on expen esomates and data. the at- 
tempt to reconcile differences in the as- 
slpnment of  costs and values is mis- 
directed if, in fact, the controversy over 
uchnoloplcal risk is due to diverpent be- 
liefs about probability. 
Rkk hsmsment 
We now consider the lmplicat~ons of 
the premlsc that risk acceptance is ulti- 
mately inseparable from the psychology 
of risk perception and evaltiat~on. A cor- 
ollary to this premlse is the assumpt~on 
that when the results of intu~t~ve risk as- 
sessments differ significantly from those 
of the analytical methods. conflict fol- 
lows. 
I t  seems clear that intuitive and quan- 
tiutlve nsk-benefit assessments can pro- 
duce quite different results, even given 
the capacity of the analytical approaches 
to accommodate complex values relating 
to different risk attributes. The dif- 
ferences of opinion over probability as- 
c~gnments arc not lirnlted to those risks 
for whlch data are not available. many 
people intuitively fear travel by airplane 
more than by automob~lc. yet aviat~on is 
safer. Explanat~ons of this effect focus 
on the degree of lndiv~dual control over 
nsk 116), the conditional probability of 
survival given an acc~dent. and the cata- 
strophrc nature of alrpiane acc~dents 
(17). 
The difficulty that anses from these 
daerences In a,sessmenr stems from the 
dual rneanlng o i  ac:eptablc nsk. The an- 
alyt~cal ~ c t l o d c  help re~ulalors et srnn- 
dnrd. rna! !mo!lcltlv dehns : : ~ e o : i ? ! ~  
nsk But the lntulrlve lndlv~dual assess- 
ments of acceptabll~ty can ovemle these 
decls~ons through the pol~ucal process 
The repeal of the x a t  belt Interlock r e w  
lat~on and recent congressional actlon to 
prevent a ban on saccharin are cases In 
wh rh  public o p ~ n ~ o n  resulted In a poltcy 
chanw. 
Given the role of  individual judfiments 
of(physiul) risk and benefit in determin- 
Ing the political accepfability of  specific 
technologies. i t  ieems particularly valu- 
able to try to understand intudlve risk- 
benAt analysis. Effons to develop this 
undersllndinfi were made by Starr (8. 
18. 19). whox approach war bared on a 
study of historically accepted risk (re- 
vealed preferences) and by Fischhoff rr 
a/. (17) and Slovic er a/. (20). whose 
appmach was usually based on risk- 
taking behavior ar determined by ques- 
tionnaire (expressed preferences). An 
additional source of information is the 
study by Lawless (21) of many con- 
troversies over technology. I f  we assume 
that many of these controvers~es arose 
because of intuitive estimaur of unrea- 
sonably high nsk (not true in all the cares 
described; some cases, such as the tha- 
lidomide tragedy. were due to late identi- 
fication of a risk), then the common char- 
acteristics of risk and benefit m these 
controversies may indicate imponant 
factors in the intuit~ve risk process. Law- 
less d ~ d  this, and his findings confirm 
those of other studies in ~dcntlfying cata- 
suophic potent181 and lack of  lndiv~dual 
control over nsk as "facton that influ- 
ence the lmpact of the threat." 
Undnrt.nding the Intultlve FVocew 
There IS an attraction to try to develop 
an undersunding of intultlve risk-benefit 
decisions by constructing palallelm to the 
analytical methods. Thls approach leads 
to a model of  intuit~ve dec~s~on-mhng In 
whch subjective judgmen~s of the proba- 
bllity and consequence of undesirable 
outcomes are somehow comblned to 
produce a perce~ved risk: parallel judg- 
ments provide a perceived benefit: the 
two arc then compared to prov~de in- 
tultive judgment of acceptability . - 
This model IS qulte broad: 11 does not 
speclfy the intultlve procedures for arnv- 
Ing at either perceived r~sk or benefit. or 
for the~r comparison. Even so, the avail- 
able ev~dence suggests that this model 
mav be incorrect. First. studies o i  ~ n -  
lullire decis~on-rnak~ng In genera, (not 
l~rn~red or applicable to physlcal risks 
alone]. have identified numerous decl- 
sion-makiw rules that do not follow the 
model described above (22). Second. 
there is evidence to indicate that benefits 
arc m t  in tu~ t~ve ly  evduated indepen- 
dently from risks. 
I n  the survey o f  subjective nsk and 
benefit by Fischhoffrr a/. (IT). perceived 
nsk and perceived beneflt were negative- 
ly  c o m h k d ,  due principally to the sub- 
jective evaluation o f  a number o f  things 
as high in risk and low in benefit (hand- 
guns, cigucttes, motorcycles, alcoholic 
b e v e v s .  nuclear power). When sub- 
jects were asked to judge " t k  socially 
acceptable level o f  risk." thow who first 
took the beneflts into consideration con- 
s i s ~ n t l y  reported higher levels o f  ac- 
ceptability than did subjects who fint 
evaluated risk, w h ~ c h  reinforces the view 
that risks and benefits arc not evaluated 
independently 
Despite the limitations of the per- 
ceived risk-perceived benefit view o f  de- 
ciding risk acceptability. we know o f  no 
better way to attempt to understand the 
intuitive processes for nsk decisions. 
Suppon for this approach stems from the 
fact that the acceptability of a risk has 
been found to increax with increasing 
benefit both by Starr (18) and Fischhoff 
(IT). 
Little work has been done to charac- 
tenze the perceived benefits o f  tech- 
nologxal activities Starr (18) found a 
correlation between nsk and "benefit 
awareness." which he described as a 
cmde measure of public awareness of so- 
cial benefits This measure was based on 
the relative level o f  adveniring. the per- 
centage o f  the population involved in the 
activity. and a subjective judgment o f  the 
usefulness o f  the activity The survey by 
Fischhoffrr a1 (17) included a SU~J~CIIVC 
ranking o f  benefits, but nuattempts were 
made to relate perceived benefit w ~ t h  an) 
charsftenstics of that benefit 
By far the most studied and best un- 
der~tood component of intuitive nsk- 
benefit analysis is nsk perception and 
evaluation There is excellent literature 
on the subjective estimation o f  probabili- 
ty (23) 
One aspect of [he interpretation o f  
probabilitv that has been noted repeat- 
edly 1s the Intuitive handllng o f  very low 
probabilities 4s Mishan (71 noted One 
chance in 50.000 of winning 3 lortery or 
of having one s house Burned down 
- 
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ury expw.ue. : I r 
seems a better chance, or greater nsk. 
than it actually is." The tame obwrva- 
tion was made by Selvidge (24). Lich- 
tenstein rr a/. (2J) found sim~lar esults 
(Fig. Z) w k n  t k y  asked people l o  oli- 
mate the number o f  fatalities from specif- 
ic causes annually in the United States: 
"The full range o f  perceived nsk is only 
about IO.MK) while the corresponding ac- 
tual r a n p  is closer to 1.000.000." Simi- 
lar results were found in another survey 
i n  w h r h  risk was ranked subjectively 
(IT). 
The influence o f  this perception is im- 
portant when we recall that the expected 
value or expected utility model calcu- 
lares that a change i n  event probability 
by a factor o f  1000 produces a change in 
expected value or utility by a like 
amount. I f  the probability is perceived as 
having changed by a much smaller 
amount, then it would not be surprising 
to find that an intuitive evaluation o f  nsk 
is less sensitive to probability changes. 
This can be extremely i m p o m t  for low- 
probability, high-consequence risks, be 
cause probabilities lying below an in- 
ruiuvely understandable range may be 
overestimated. 
We postulate that this is only true to a 
polnt (see Fig. 3). Although we selected 
t h e x  scales judgmentally. their chief 
purpose IS to illustrate that. at some low 
level o f  probability. the intuitive Inter- 
pretation goes from "low" or "unlikely" 
to "negll@bleV or "impossible." This 
hypothesis can be used to explain behav- 
ior regarding seat belt use and perhaps 
smoking. I n  a study o f  seat belt use. 
Slovic rr 01. (26) noted that i f  the deci- 
sion to wear seat belts is approached op 
a per tnp basis. "we might expect that 
many motonsts would find it ~ m t i o n a l  to 
bear the costs (however slight) of buck- 
ling up in return for pan~a l  protection 
against an ovewhelmingly unlikely dcci- 
dent.' They observed that "change of 
perspective, towards consideration o f  
nsks faced dunng a lifetime of dnving. 
may ~ncrcase the perce~ved probabililies 
of Injury and death and. lherefore. In- 
duce more people to wear >ea[ belts 
Such differing perspectives may tngger 
much o f  the conflict and m u t d  Frustra- 
l lon between publ~c officials and motor- 
ists. each believing (with some justice) 
that their analysis o f  the situation is cor- 
rect." Similarly. Jacobson (27) re femd 
to carcinogenic "chemicals which pose 
minuscule h a n d s  to individuals, but 
significant hazards to the population or a 
whole.'' This last point suppons our 
premise that much conflict over tech- 
nologeal risk is due to differences be- 
tween intuitive and analytical risk-bene- 
fit analyses. I f  the hypothesis that per- 
ceived probability is effectively zero for 
some risks is valid, then the perceived 
risk o f  a shon automobile trip without 
scat belts or o f  one cigarette may be zc- 
ro. 
This nonlinearity in probability per- 
ception indicates that even romething 
apparently as basic as the unit o f  ex- 
posure used to evaluate nsk can be in- 
fluential. I n  his analysis. Starr (18) com- 
mented. "The hour-of-exposure unit was 
chosen because it was deemed more 
closely related to an individual's in- 
tuitive process in choosing an activity 
than a year o f  exposure would be." 
Accepting. at least tentarively. the re- 
lation between perceived and actual 
probability (Fig. 3). we can see a basis 
for the controversy over catastrophic 
risks. As mentioned above. highson- 
sequence. low-probability nsks arc o f  
panicular concern i f  their probabilities 
are overestimated subjectively. But 
when pan of the public believes the 
probability is low, and another pan be- 
lieves i t  to be negligible. thew beliefs 
iead to radically different evaluations. 
This may be the case with nuclear power 
and other nsks o f  this type. and may be a 
key reason for the controversies over 
these risks. 
R i  Diaributed over Time 
Given the apparent nonlineanties in 
nsk evaluation depending on the unit of 
measurement. i t  5eems reasonable to 
look for other perceptual factors related 
to the units in which nsks are expressed. 
A number of disonctions can be cons~d- 
e d :  nsks can be immediate or delayed. 
cumulative or ephemeral, and can a c t  
future generations or our own or both. 
There is little evidence to indicate how 
thcx  factors arc handled. Fuchs U8) 
cited evidence that individual discount 
rates for financial and physical risk are 
positively correlated. But the fact re- 
nuns [ha  benefits and risk may be dis- 
counted at different rates. For decisions 
with very long-term implications, the usc 
of a vanable discount rate. declining 
with time. may more accurately r ekc t  
the value Oven to future risks and bene- 
fits than a constant discount rate UP). 
This is an arca that seems panlcularly 
worthy of  attention. for many risk con- 
trovenics arc about risks thal M per- 
sistent or cumulative, such as carcine 
gem. 
&cause of the work to defim the fac- 
t on  influencing perceived risk, it is now 
porsible to anticipate the kinds of risk 
likely to prnente controversy. CaIa- 
strophic potential and lack of individual 
conuol. panicularly once an accident oc- 
cun  or a nsk IS identified, arc apparently 
the most lmponaat risk chancuristics. 
Whcn the uncertainty associated with 
risks is prrot. daln concerning the uncer- 
tainty not forthcoming, and expen opin- 
Ion apparrntly divided, apprehension by 
the public is understandable. Hacfele 
00) tenncd these risks hypothetical, and 
described nuclear power as the "path- 
finder" for these risks. Certainly there 
are many nsks with the charactenstics 
described above (for example. toxic 
chemicals and recombinant DNA re- 
search). Whether decisions can be made 
about [hex  risks without the high degree 
of conuoveny and the resulting high so. 
cial cost assoc~ated with the nuclear de- 
bate remains to be sen. 
In  May 1979. the Advisory Comm~ttcc 
on R-r Safeguards (ACRS) rccom- 
mended "that cons~deratmn be given 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRCI to the esrablashmcnt of quan- 
utatlve safety goals for overall safety of 
nuclear power reactors" U l ) .  The ACRS 
funher recommended that "Congress be 
asked to express its views on the suit- 
abality of  such goals and criteria in rela- 
tion to other relevant aspects of our tech- 
nolo@ society. . . ." A samilar sug- 
gestion, accompanied by proposed cri- 
ten& was made by Fanner 02) In 1967. 
the cntena were expressed by a curve 
relpung acceptable acc~dent frequency 
wtth acc~dent magnitude Subsequent 
proposed cntena for acceptable nsks. 
not necessarily I~mited to nuclear power. 
have been made by Sum (18). Bowen 
03). Rowe 04). Okrent and Wh~pple 
UJ). Wilson (36). and Comar (37) Cur- 
rendy effons are under way wathln the 
NRC, the ACRS, and elsewhere tp de- 
velop qrrant~tat~ve cntena for nsk ac- 
ceptance and to cons~der the many 1s- 
sues msed by th~s approach 
Incmdvea to Develop Quantitative 
The dissatisfaction with cumnt  regu- 
latory systems for risk m~agcment  pro- 
vides impetus to develop m w  methods. 
Thooret~cally. quantitative criteria for 
acceptability would resolve many specif- 
ic criticisms. One criticism stems from 
the fact that in several cnws, a zero-risk 
@ has been established. This denies 
the concept of  a trade-off between m k  
and benefit. and ignores the diWculty or 
impossibility of  revhing zero risk. Fur- 
ther, improvements in technology have 
permined identification and estimation 
of risk at levels far below thosc that were 
poss~ble when specific zero-nsk laws 
were pused; risks we m~ght consider 
ncplisibk arc not treated in  the regula- 
tory process differently from much high- 
er risks. As Hutt (388) argued. 
Unul qu~m recently. a m n s t  food safety pol- 
ICY w u  wdely thouphl to be an sch~evhble 
posl It nr now clew thsl k t  Ir l ~en l l y  am- 
pmnMe U, el~mlnatc d l  cmm-ns ham our 
food Moreover, many of the subsumes 
wh~ch pac a potenttd nst arc pan of lonp- 
vccplcd components of foal, ud my nt- 
temp to pmhbbir thew use would ruse the 
morl xnow queluons bolh of pncuullty In 
amplernmuoon and of ,ndivkdd k c  cholce 
lo the mvtctpl~sc 
A suggested way of handling this prob- 
lem would be to set a level below wh~ch 
risks would be ignored. prov~ded some 
benefit were associated with the nsk. 
This low level would serve as a quan- 
titative standsrd for acceptability of  the 
risk. 
A second cnticism of regulatory a p  
propches is that decisions arc often made 
arbitrarily. Such a charge IS not surpris- 
Ing consdering that several regulatory 
agencies have a mandate to protect the 
publr from "unreasonable" risk. w~th- 
out congrcss~onal gu~dance on how to 
judge reasonableness. The objections arc 
enhanced when regulators are believed 
to be overly accommodating or hontlle to 
the regulated ~ndustry. Ceninly,  one 
way to reduce the influence of bias and 
arbitrariness is to institute a numerical 
definition of "reasonable." Rrhaps the 
tlme required for risk dec~sions would al- 
so be reduced by thc availability of clear. 
relatively simple criteria. 
Often. regulatory authorities specify 
the technology for meeting risk tarpts. 
mhc r  than the tugets themselves. The 
drawback of this approach is h t  there 
arc no incentives to develop more efi- 
cient methods of controlling risk. The es- 
tablishmen! of risk targets alone could 
stimulate the development of  a variety of 
creative methods for risk control. 
Finally. another cnticism of current 
risk managemect is [ h a  the effon re- 
qu~red to conuol risk (as measured by 
the cost per life saved) varies consid- 
erably from one risk to another: this 
wastes both lives and money (9). Assum- 
ing that the total funds allocated for risk 
reduction could be transfemd frcely be- 
tween different risk reduct~on opponuni- 
tles (which is certainly not always pos- 
sible), the mdimum number of lives that 
could be saved nat~onally is found when 
the m a r p a l  cost of  saving a life is uni- 
form among the opportunities. Thus the 
comparative marginal cost-effectiveness 
of each opponunity for saving lives 
would become the guiding principle in  
the allocation of  resources. and the value 
of life would be implicit in the total na- 
tional allocation o f  funds. There would. 
of counc, need to be a national alloca- 
[Ion of resources to such "life-saving" 
endeavors. but as with military budgets. 
a common-sense consensus judgment is 
likely to be as reliable as any analytic 
formula. 
Appllcatiau for Rkk CriIerla 
One of the pitfalls in trylng to develop 
regulatory approaches for managrng risk 
is the desire to use the same method to 
tackle a number of  different risks. There 
arc different types of risk decisions. and 
no single regulatory method u m s  appli- 
cable to all of them. 
The use of cost-effect~veness criteria 
serves u an example. This Issue arises 
when. a priori, the technology is found 
acceptable but the specific operating 
polnt is left to be decided. An example of 
thls type of decision 1s the determination 
of  allowable levels of a pollutant in auto- 
mobile exhaust. I n  thrs case the issue in- 
volved is not the relative risk and benefit 
of  transponation, nor the selection of a 
transponatlon technology lautomobile 
versus mass transit). For this simplified 
type of decision the only issue IS the mar- 
ginal Irade-offbetwcen rhe soclal cost of 
the risk and the cost of controlling it. For 
[hex  cases, two klndr of quantitative 
cntena can be considered: the first is the 
standard for judgng cost-effcctivcness 
dcscribd above. There is nothing new in  
this approach: it is simply con-benefit 
analysis in which,thc metric for judging 
the vrial cost of  risk has been specifled. 
The second quantirat~vc riterion is more 
ptagmatic: it is a lower risk l im~t  below 
which no regulatory action would be 
taken. This could be useful In allocating 
a regulator's tlmc and would help pre- 
vent the h a l y  visible cpvs in which the 
nuisance aspects of  regulation are in- 
tu~t~vely greater than the benefits of  that 
regulnllon. 
The next level ofdidlculty in risk dccl- 
slons is the choice of  the best method for 
obtaining a specilk benefit. I n  these cac- 
es the bencflts need not be analyzed. it is 
presumed thpr the bencflts arc sum- 
ciently gmpr to justify m y  of m v c d  al- 
temives .  For example. in t k  often 
debates over the selection of  en- 
ergy production technologies. it i 8  pnc r -  
d y  assumed thu. under any proposed 
policy. energy services will be provided 
(such services include conservation). 
For this decision, the dominant issues 
arc the costs and risks associated with 
each alternative. The dilRculty in making 
thehex choices is often due to the qualira- 
uvely dissimilar character of  the risks 
(for example, air pollution risks from 
coal mining and burning versus nuclear 
reactor accident nsks). I t  is difficult to 
see a role for quantirative criteria m mak- 
Ing comparisons of the type needed. One 
could establish a maxlmum permissible 
risk level that would serve to screen out 
exccsnvely risky altcrnat~ves. but the 
selcctlon of a technology generally de- 
pends on some aggregation, either ex- 
pl~citly or implic~tly, of  the components 
of the social cost of  each alternative. 
hsumably.  aRer one altcmrt~ve is se- 
lecud. tk decision is reduced to the de- 
tcrminat~on of the preferred operating 
point dlrussed above. 
A complete risk-benefit decision re- 
quires that the relauvc social cost of the 
nsk be compared w ~ t h  the acsoc~ated 
benefit. A pragmatic appl~catmn of quan- 
titative cr ikna for these c w s  was sup- 
psted by S t m  119) and by Stam er 01 
(8) .  and is ~l lustntcd In Fig. 4. This risk- 
benefit curve reveals the commonly prc- 
posed chPracteristics for nsk criteria: a 
lower l tm~t for concern about risk (in this 
cau. the n a t u r a l - h d s  monality rate). 
an upper l im~t  for accepmbility (set by 
rhc average disease rate). and provlsion 
for risk-benefit tnde-off between these 
118111. 
We should not overestimate the capac- 
~ t y  of slmple criteria. such as those illus- 
trated In Fig. 4. to reduce nsk conflict 
costs. Many, i f  not most, risk estimates 
include signdcant judgmental inputs. 
There are oRcn substant~al dis- 
agreements over risk estimates. the 
methods used to arrive at risk estimates. 
Md the competency, inugiity, and moti- 
vation of the cxperts providing sub- 
jective risk otimaus. What is needed for 
the npplicat~on of quanlilative criteria for 
risk acceptance is a standard o f  proof for 
determining whether the criteria havc 
been met. Although many diaersnt ap 
prafhes to this Issue have been recom- 
mended (including peer revww. scien- 
tific cows. and quantitatlvc methods for 
resolving differences between experts). 
the ultimate responsibility focjudging the 
competency of nsk analysis still resides 
with the regulatory agency responsible 
for mme&ng the specific nsk. 
Anslytical approaches to decide risk- 
benefit issues ideally come closer to 
maximizing net social benefits than any 
other appmuh. The usefulness of thew 
methods in nuking assumptionr and val- 
u o  explicit justifies their application. 
But a necessay condition for applying 
their results to specific decisions is a sp 
cial consensus on the relative benefits 
and costs of the proposed actlons. For 
specific types of risk. in which intuitive 
evaluat~ons of risk and benefit contradict 
analyt~cal evaluations, the necessary 
consensus may not develop. but rather a 
conflict requiring political resolution is 
l~kcly to result. 
When the conflict a r ixs  from a dis- 
agreement over the level of risk rather 
than the value assigned to that risk. ef- 
Ions 10 reduce the cost ofconflict by in- 
corporatlng values into an expected util- 
ity approach will be unsuccessful. Quan- 
litatlve risk criteria appear quite attrac- 
tive in this respect, because the key to 
the acceprabil~ty of a technology under 
the propoxd method is the level of nsk. 
Assuming that the estimated nsk became 
the cenval point in the debate, the publlc 
might havc more confidence in  the requ- 
Ivory systems ~f thelr concern were dl- 
m t l y  addressed. 
We m significant value in trying to 
understand the lntultlvc nsk-benefit p m  
ccss. The evaluation of  its outcome 
could reduce anxlety and cost i f  used as 
a tool in the design of techn~cal systems. 
This is already t k  case. as when we use 
more svlngenr criteria for nuclear power 
and commercial aviauon than for a more 
commonplace risk (39. 40). The balance 
between ~ndiv~dual nd group nsk-bene. 
fit dec~s~on methods is fundamental to 
the development oi nat~onal policlcs on 
nsk acceptance. I t  is customarily 
achieved through the poiit~cal pmccss. 
and is not amenable to quantituivc anal- 
ysis. 
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RlSK MANAGEMENT AND ACCEPTABLE RlSK CRITERIA 
Harry J. Otway 
Technology Assessment Sector, 
Joint Research Centre of the Commission of the European Communities, 
lspra, Italy 
Detlof von Winterfeldt 
Social Science Resamh Institute, 
Univem'ty of Southern California, Los Angeles 
Social opposition to technologies i s  not new. In recent years we have seen many examples, 
which include rural electrification, water fluoridation, supersonic air transport, contracep 
tive devices, nuclear weapons and nuclear power. Although opposition itself i s  not new, 
the reasons for i t  have differed from case to case, reflecting a complex mixture of concerns 
related t o  morals, religion, political ideologies, power, economics, physical safety and 
psychological well-being. Yet, oddly enough, today's debates about the acceptability of 
technologies are frequently treated as if they were based upon a single issue - that of 
risks to  public health and safety and to the environment. In  fact, risk has moved so much 
into the forefront that the complex problem of social acceptability is too often reduced 
to a mathematical-numerical problem of defining "acceptable risk". In this paradigm 
theoretical estimates which predict risk levels less than those specified by acceptable risk 
criteria would be considered to have met both necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
acceptability of the technology. This paper traces the emergence of the "acceptable risk" 
problem and reviews critically some of the technical and social science approaches that 
have been put forward to "solve" it. 
The Emergence of the "Acceptable Risk" Formulation 
Policy makers in regulatory agencies stand in the centre of the 
bargaining process in which acceptable r isks a r e  (usually implicitly) 
defined. Originally, regulators negotiated primari ly with the regulated 
industry to cor rec t  deficiencies in self- regulation. Standards, the 
most  common regulatory tool, were products of a consensus -forming 
process between government and industry experts; they tended to 
assume a more "scientific" character  through iterations with 
increasing experience of the new technology. 
The balance of this comfortable and functioning two-way 
power roktionmhip has been disturbed in the past decade by the 
intervention of new actors from public groups, such a s  environmental 
organisations, trirde aasociatioas, and labour unions. This 
intervention was, in part, triggered by the emergence of new risks 
with unprecedented consequences, the scale and complaxity of which 
severely Limited the t r s d i t i o ~ r l  engineering trial-and-e r r o r  approach 
to socially responsible design; in addition, enhanced access to news 
media coverage of disaaters, especially the dramatic visual impact 
of television. aerved to increase risk amireness and to provoke 
concenu about the effectiveness of regulations based upon expert 
consensus. One result of these concerns was that public interest 
groups began to educate themselves and to seek out independent 
expert advice. As a consequence, people were able to witness the 
public display of c o d i c t i a g  expert opinions, further undo rmining 
confidence in expert knowledge. 
As the public discourse now appeared to be focusing on risk, some 
of the technical community began to develop methods to make 
quantitative, probabilistic estimates of public r i s k  These technical 
estimates were reassuring to technical people because they tended 
to show that physical risks were low in comparison to the risks of 
ordinarp Life; however, this sense of rearsurance was not shared 
by representatives of many public groups who by then were well 
aware of their own stakes in technological decisions. Their continued 
iutervention in political and regulatory processes demonstrated that 
they were using their o m ,  sometimes not clearly articulated values 
and beliefs to judge the acceptability of technologies - values and 
beliefs which differed considerably from those of technical people in 
gove rnment and industry. 
Puzzled by these confusingly different values and beliefs, and 
their  perseverance in the face of "rational technical argument", 
demands were put fonvard by industry and others  for pre-determined 
cr i te r ia  by which the acceptability of r i sks  could be judged. Since 
technical experts a r e  prone to have a mathematical mentality and 
possess  analytical skills,  i t  i s  perhaps not surpris ing that they began 
to s ea rch  for quantitative r i sk  acceptance criteria''). A n  implicit 
assumption here  i s  that social  preferences can  be expressed in 
engineering t e r m s  and used in the regulatory process to reduce 
unce rtainty, ambiguity and delay - in ess  ence an  attempt to model 
social and political behaviours with the technical tools and the 
philosophy of the natural sciences. In the event. many technologies 
that numerical  acceptable r isk approaches indicated should be 
acceptable,  have encountered ser ious and continuing public opposition, 
suggesting that this modelling approach has been inadequate. 
Descriptive, Prescript ive,  and Normative Models 
Models of human behaviour can be descriptive o r  prescriptive. 
Descriptive models a r e  concerned with people's actual behaviour, 
and with the empir ical  relationships between their behaviour, beliefs, 
'2) and ~ l u e s ,  a s ,  for example, in Fishbein's attitude model . 
Prescript ive models,  in contrast,  deal  with the behaviours that 
should be displayed in orde r  to conform with axioms of rationality 
postulated by the modelle r. Some pr escriptive models contain 
descriptive elements, in the fonn  of empirically observed o r  expressed 
values and beliefs, and then prescribe behaviours on the basis  of 
consistency requirements; the implications of the la t te r  models a r e  
naturally most  relevant for those who sha re  the values and beliefs 
which have been assumed. Multiattribute utility mo-dels (38  4) a r e  
examples of the mixed descriptive -prescriptive (o r  "conditionally 
prescriptive1') type. 
The most radical prescriptive models have no dascriptave inputs, 
instead combining what the model builder believer to be "rational" 
vrlues and beliefs with axioms of "rational" behaviour. These models 
rubstitute "facts", o r  "objective probabilities", for people i beliefs, 
make assumptions about v r lws ,  and then apply maximization 
prinaples to derive optrmal solutions. h p l i c i t  in these models is 
the assumption that the s-e kind of ratiouality should hold for al l  
people, To distkrguish them from the conditionally prescriptive 
mode& we dll call them normative; most models of acceptable r isk 
a r e  normative. 
In a typical normative model of risk acceptance, consequences of 
technological risks a r e  characterized by quantitative summary 
measures (e. g. deaths, illnesses, injuries) and probability 
distributions over consequences a r e  constructed through estimation 
and simulation. Having arrived a t  a quantitative estimate of risk, 
some analysts then compare it with statistics reflecting society's 
experiencd of more familiar risks of technological o r  natural origin, 
assuming that physical rirk, a s  accepted in the past, provides 
rufficient information to judge the acceptability of a new technology 
today. These comparisons a r e  offered a s  a basis for judging the social 
acceptability of the new risk by placing it "in perspective" a s  a 
preliminary to "'embedding1 the problem into the normal conditions 
of Lif. . . . "(5). A recent proponent of the embedding method is 
Rothachild(6) r h o  suggested that an "index of risks" be established 
so  that an  informed public could find ". . . guidance a s  to when to flap 
and when not. " He proposed that the "fLapZt hreshold might be taken 
as  the current average annual chance o i  being killed in a road accident 
in the U. K., about 1 in 7500. 
There a r e  also some more sophisticated approaches to embedding. 
For  example, Starr  (78 8, suggested that new risks should be embedded, 
a s  a function of che benefit provided, between the relatively low 
average risk of death from natural hazards and the upper limit 
represented by tha average individual risk of death from diseases. 
okrent('), noting that "entire symposia a re  held on risk management 
without so much as  mentioning the subject of quantitative risk criteria..  It, 
advocated a "national approach1' to r isk management. suggesting that 
activities be categorised a s  I1essendal, beneficial, o r  periphe ral" 
with successively lower numerical levels of acceptable r i s k  He went 
o n t o  propose that tares be paid on the remrrillillg "residual risk" (if 
uninsurable) and the revenue redistributed in the form of health 
insurance o r  reduced tuces. 
Observing that people generally do not behave in accordance with 
such normative models technical experts sometimes attribute these 
differences to simple mispe rceptions, biases, or  even just plain 
deviousness on the part of non-scie xltific interest groups. But i t  i s  
just a s  easy for non-experts to argue the reverse, namely that 
normative modeb merely reflect the biased perceptions and interests 
of the model builders. Normative approaches to acceptable r isk have 
not contributed materially to understanding o r  resolving the continuing 
debates about technologies; in fact, they may have served to increase 
tensions a s  technical people accuse the public of fact-neglecting 
irrationality while the countercharge is made that the technical 
community is  trying to conceal selfish interests with esoteric and 
frivolous calculations. By denying differences, and by claiming a 
universal rationality, normative models of r isk acceptability ignore 
the value and belief issues which lie a t  the very heart of the debate. 
Descriptive models, and some prescriptive models, can offer 
approaches to understanding the beliefs and values which underlie 
judgments of acceptability (or  non-acceptability); in these models 
the attributes which people perceive as  characterising the acceptability 
judgment a r e  elicited so that judgments a re  defined in terms oi the 
variables that people find relevant to their own concerns. Note that 
these a r e  models of rational behaviour since most of us do behave 
rationally most of the time in the sense of acting in accordance with 
our ovm beliefs and values to achieve our own goals. The next two 
sections will discuss the nature of beliefs and mlues .  
Facts ,  Probabilities, and Beliefs 
Scientists like to s t r e s s  the factual basis  of their  knowledge but. 
increasingly, sc iedi f ic  statements must  be expressed in probabilistic 
te rms a s  suggested by ~ e i n b e r ~ ~ s ( ' O )  idea of t t t rans  -sciencent. F r o m  
tho standpoint of the sub jectivist s chool of probability (11,12,13) the 
oxpresaion of export judgments in probabilistic t e rms  is not distressing 
becauae probability i s  held to be a degree of belief in a n  event o r  
proporition whose truth has not yet  been ascertained, i. e., there i s  
no "correct" probability that resides somewhere "in reality". Thus, 
probabilities expressed by experts a r e  not fundamentalIy different 
f rom the beliefs held by non-experts. Sometimes, i t  is possible to 
verify the truth o r  falsity of a proposition to which a probability was 
once attached, such a s  yesterday 's forecast  of today 3 weather, but 
copfirmation of probabilistic statements necessary to judge the r i sks  
(5 )  of technologies is often impossible . 
These ideas of subjective probability and belief allow us to 
conceptualis a today 's engines ring "facts ", and even some scientific 
laws, as being strongly held beliefs shared by expert groups. 
~ o l a n ~ i ( ' * )  gives s e v e n 1  e-ples of once -accepted i tems of 
conventional scientitic wisdom which since have been discarded o r ,  
expressed in probabilistic te rms,  the subjective probability of these 
proporitions being true has changed dramatically. Although lay 
people5 beliefs may be a t  variance with the presently a n i l a b l e  
scientific evidence, it does not necessarily lessen  the strength of 
their  convictions or  make their beliefs appear any less  "factual" to 
them. Future historians, looking a t  some of today's scientific 
controversies, may find expert and lay beliefs to be more s imi lar  
than dissimilar.  
A number of experimental studies have explored the difference s 
between experts and Lay people in judging the probabilities of rare  
events. In one of them (I5 '  16), experts and Lay people were asked 
to r r t a  the risks of thirty technologies o r  activities for which the 
actual annual frequency of death could be identified through dataor 
probabilistic estimation techniques. Expert judgments of technological 
riska were closely associated with the best technical estimates of 
annual average o r  expected fatality rates, indicating that experts 
equate risk and fatality rates, and, perhaps more important, that 
they remembered these r r t e s  well - a s  would be expected of risk 
experts. 
In contrast, Lay peopleas risk judgments were only loosely 
associated e t h  technical risk estimates. This finding might, a t  first,  
suggest that Lay people a r e  ill-informed o r  biased when making risk 
j u d p e n t s ;  however, they were reasonably accurate when asked to 
make direct  judgments of annual average o r  expected fatality rates. 
For  example, the same group that judged nuclear power to be the 
riskiest technology, assigned it the lowest fatality estimate in an  
average year. Why do people's r isk judgments differ from expert 
judgments and from technical estimates of expected fatality rates ? 
One possibility is  that people &w the statistics, but that risk means 
something more to them than just fatalities, and that this meaaing 
may even change from one technology to the next. 
Severrl attitude studies(e. 71  9, Lend support to this, having 
shown that there a r e  risk attributes of psychological relevance, a s  
well a s  technology-related social and political attributes, that help 
account for diffe rences in attitudes, i. e .  differences in attitudes 
about risks o r  technologies a re  more than mere numerical disagree- 
ments about risk magnitude. For  example, differences were found in 
the beliefs of groups for and against nuclear technology as  to 
whether the technology leads to a reliance on technical experts; 
whether it will increase economic groarth; whether it will lead to 
Large centralised systems; and whether it will increase the power 
of big business. These beliefs a l l  concern social and economic 
matters which a r e  quite separate from risk in the narrow numerical 
Sense. 
Values and Preferences 
The normative, embedding model of acceptable r isk assumes that 
numerical representations of physical risks alone should be sufficient 
to judge the acceptability of technologies; however, the descriptive 
research just summarised suggests that beliefs about other attributes 
of a technology can strongly i d u e n c e  acceptance. It i s  not enough, 
though, to know what people believe these attributes to be, it is  a L o  
necessary to know if they value them positively o r  negatively. The 
attributes listed below have been found by researchers (17-30) to 
influence perceptiom of technologies and risks; they a r e  negatively 
valued by moat people, therefore the stronger the belief that the 
technology is  characterised by these attributes, the less likely people 
will be to accept it: 
- involuntaw exposure to the risk. as  opposed to risks taken a t  
one i own choice such a s  automobile travel. skiing, etc. ; 
- lack of personal control over the outcome of the r isk exposure, 
i. e., once in the risk situation, do your own skills o r  actions have 
any influence over the risk exposure. o r  a r e  you at  the mercy of 
chance o r  the skill of others (no control for an airplane passenger, 
considerable for a s k e r ) ;  
- uncertainty about the probabilities o r  consequences of exposure 
(do you h o w  what to expect, do the experts agree?);  
- lack of personal experience with the r i sk  ( fear  of the &own and 
perhaps even unknowable); 
- difficulty in conceptualising o r  imagining the r i sk  exposure (e .  g. , 
radiation cannot be perceived by the senses  and originates from 
processes which a r e  myster ious to the by-person) ;  
- delayed somatic eifects of present  r i sk  expoeure (&or appearing 
to escape unscathed, is the r e  still a possibility of Later damage, 
e. g., expoeure to carcinogens); 
- penetic .effects of present  r i sk  exposure ( threatens future generations); 
- infrequent, but catastrophic accidents (the image of 1000 d i sa s t e r  
victims is more  vivid than the abstract ion of a 1 in 10 miLlion 
probability); 
- the benefits a r e  not h i ~ h l y  visible (so why take the risk?); 
- the benefits go to others,  but the r i sk  to us (unfair to the r i sk  
bearers ) ;  
- accidents c a w e d  by human failure rather  than natural  causes ( a  
feature of modern technological catastrophe a s  opposed to natural 
d i sas te rs ) .  
But people i judgments of technologies a r e  not determined only by 
these negatively-valued, r isk-related at t r ibutes .  The studies 
cited above have a l so  identified a number of potential economic. social  
and political attributes of technologies that enter  into evaluations of 
acceptability. E the attributes listed below a r e  believed to charac ter i se  
the technology they could contribute ei ther  positively o r negatively 
to attitude, depending upon how they a r e  ~ l u e d  by the individual - 
often a question of personal and political philosophy: 
- provide a benefit corresponding to perceived needs; 
- increase the standard of living; 
- create new jobs; 
- facilitate economic grad 
- enhance national pres'tige and independence from foreignsuppliers; 
- c a u e  dependence upon small groups of technical elites; 
- requim str ict  physical security measures o r  special police powers; 
- increase the power of big business; 
- lead to centralisation of political and economic systems. 
The attributes on the foregoing lists a r e  only tppical and not 
intended to be a complete and generalisable set; in fact, they cannot 
be complete because the attributes that a r e  relevant to judgments of 
technology c a  be a n w g  that people have "learned" to associate 
with the technology. Items similar  to those above, plus some related 
to other aspects of growth and centralisation, formed the basis of a 
(31) national survey of the USA . which found substantial W e r e n c e s  in 
how vrrious social  groups evaluate thsse  attributes. 
Summary and C onc lusion 
W e  have argued that the r i sk  concept, although perhaps useful for 
a i n g  pure safety issues, i s  too narrow to help understand the social 
accepability of technologies and, in particular, that "acceptable risk" 
a s  a generalisable number o r  mathematical relationship cannot exist. 
Of course some personal judgments may be based mostly on the 
acceptability of r isk (e. g., Irr the water safe to drink?) but, even then, 
the judgment e l l  be M u e n c a d  by other factors such a s  benefits (How 
thirsty a r e  you?); voluntariness (Did you forget to bring water on an 
. outing o r  did the r isk situation a r i se  because indus t r i a l  activities 
have contaminated your home water supply ?); consequences (Is it a 
risk of getting sick o r  of dying?); delay (Does the water contain a 
poison o r  a carcinogen?); uncertainty (Do you know what the risk is  ? 
Do the experts know?); and so on. Judgments of acceptable risk seldom 
have meaning when treated a s  a numerical exercise remote from the 
decision context; i t  would actually seem rather odd to be able to 
conaider risks independent of source and context - why should 
people be indifferent a s  to how they die? 
Even an apparently straightforward decision to reduce o r  eliminate 
an existing risk that has been discovered to be "too high" i s  contea-  
dependent. As an extreme example, an  occupational r isk that might 
be unacceptable in peacetime might be found quite acceptable in a 
w u t i m e  defense industry; the same .qualitative differences can be 
obmemed between high and low phases of national economic cycles. 
This kind of decision can be compLicated by other non-technical 
hc to r s ;  there may be consumer groups quite willing to accept the r isk 
that a regulator finds high (e. g., the artificial sweetener debate) and 
the proapect of unemployment resulting from the regulation could 
trigger political interventions. Quite aside from this, the regulated 
group (and their risk experts) might disagree with the regulator about 
(33) the  r isk magnitude and the methodologies used to estimate it . 
At the low risk end of the regulatory problem a quantitative 
reshold r isk level has been visualised (e* g. below which 
regulatory action o r  review would not be required; however, i t  is  
not a t  all clear that satisfaction of this criterion would be sufficient 
to ensure social acceptability. A threshold criterion would s a c e  
only for an imaginary technology which possessed just tcao 
characteristics: provision of a necessary benefit a t  the cost of a 
low physical risk Because a number of quite independent cognitive 
dimensions can underlie judgments of acceptability, physical risks 
could in principle be essentially zero but the technology still  be 
judged unacceptable (and subject to opposition) for other perfectly 
valid social reasons. 
Inspibof our assertion that "acceptable risk", a s  such. cannot 
exist, psychologists have succeeded in measuring it in the context 
of pencil and paper survey s. How can this apparent discrepancy 
be q L i P e d 7  
The two main Lines of psychometric research on r isk  have been 
to measure attitudes toward the acceptability of risky technologies 
17-21) 
a s  a function of the underlying belief. and values('* g' , or  to 
scale perceived o r  accepbble risk directly (e. g. 15, 16,24,32) * by 
asking respondents to rate the riskr of various technologies o r  
activities and, if applicable, the k c t o r  by which they would have to 
b e  reduced in order  to be acceptable. Using the technical community's 
de5nition of the problam, i e. what levels of r isk a r e  people willing 
to accept, the direct scaling research has found replicable relationships 
amongst acceptability and perceptions of risk, fatalities and benefits, 
given similar respondent groups. Subjects asked to perform these 
tasks obviously try to maintain some order  and structure in their 
responses; however, even if they have expressed a clear and 
replicable preference, say, f o r  risk reduction we must remember 
that they have not been asked about the changes they would require 
with respect to other characteristics of the technology in order  to 
make i t  acceptable, e. g. its implications for the change o r  
entrenchment of social institutions. Further,  the r isk scaling 
approach necessarily ignores some e t a l l y  important real-world 
phenomena of social organisations such a s  the acquisition and use 
of power and questions of institutional legitimacy. Thus we have 
reservations a s  to how individual perceptions of mortality r isks 
can be generalired to teal-world definitions of the acceptability 
of technology policies which, in practice, emerge from complicated 
negotiations between special interest groups in a highly political 
At both the individual and societal levels risk embedding 
practitioners have reported finding behavioural "irrationalities" 
and "inconsistencies", a s  evidenced by the wide ~ r i a t i o n  in r i sk  
levela accepted ( o r  rejected) in connection with different activities. 
This does not seem so strange in view of the multi-dimensionality 
of r isk a d  the simple fact that the levels of r i sk  accepted o r  rejected 
in each activity result from separate and dissimilar  choice situations: 
e. g. , transportation r isks a r e  just part of the consequences of 
decisions about transportation alternatives which have considered 
a, number of salient at t r ibutes (e. g,, availability, cost, speed. 
comfort. convenience, safety); occupational r i sks  a r e  accepted a s  
a resul t  of decisions in which al ternate job opportunities have been 
compared over r number of characteris t ics  (e. g., pay, location, 
intrinsic interest. future. safety). In addition. each activity is  
regulated by a different agency with i t s  own regulatory style and 
o r g a n i s a t i o d  objectives so  that each r i sk  is also shaped by a 
different political bargaining process. Thus there i s  no reason to 
expect that the risica of a l l  societal activities (or technologies) should 
be  more  o r  less  the same - n o r  is  there any rational reason to try to 
change how people ttunk, behave and govern themselves in orde r  to 
make i t  so. 
But sometimes opposition to technologies may be caused by factors 
which go not only beyond risk. but also beyond the other  characteris t ics  
of the Positions pro and con some technologies have 
taken on the character  of ideological commitments. Fo r  example. 
thore pro seem to be experiencing visions of a f;ture shaped by 
expert knowledge; on the other hand. demands by opposition groups 
for  increased citizen participation in decision making(35' 36) s eem 
to reflect more  than a challenge to the "experts myth" o r  isolated 
instances of ailing institutions but, it has been suggested, a r e  a 
symptom of a deeper social disturbance - a growing disenchantment 
with the way representative democracy is  functioning (37, 38) 
The acceptance of risks is implicitly determined by the acceptance 
of technologies which, in  turn, depends upon the information people 
have been exposed to, what information they have chosen to believe, 
the values they hold, the social experiences to which they have had 
access ,  the dynamics of stakaholder groups, the vagaries  of the 
political process and the historical  moment in which i t  is all 
happening. We completely agree  that the r isks of technology a r e  r ea l  
and must  be eEcient ly  managed to provide public protection; but this 
ia not sufficient - the resolution of conflicts about technologies 
requires that they no longer be t reated as simple technical 
disagreements centering on the single i ssue  of acceptable risk. 
It is necessary to admit the relevancy of other, "softer" kind of 
information where the expertise is held by the paople whose Lives 
a r e  affected. 
The acceptable r isk formulation has provided increasingly 
elaborate and precise a n a r e r s  to the wrong question(39); future 
research  on the acceptability of technologies must  be linked to the 
c ritical que stions of institutions, participation and policy 
implementation, for  until sources of conflict have been addressed 
the decisions taken, no ma t t e r  how technically rational, may 
ultimately be only empty prescriptions lacking arrangements f o r  
(40 their realisation , 
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VALUE STRUCTURES UNDERLYING RISK ASSESSMENTS 
Patrick Humphreys 
Decision Analysis Unit, 
Brunei University, 
Uxbridge, England 
The paper deals with the psychological end of the "risk" field, looking not so much at 
uncertainty about potentially calamitous states of the world (and problems with the 
associated probability judgments), but rather at people's uncertainty about how to 
characterize the perceived disutility (or more precisely and also more generally, the regret 
associated with the downside) of risky consequences. It starts at the individual level and 
moves towards implications for political decision making where the views of groups with 
conflicting interpretations of risks must be taken into consideration. 
EVALUATION OF RISKS 
Keeney (1981) ,  i n  examining t h e  c a s e s  f o r  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  of  m o r t a l i t y  
r i s k s  from an o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  s t a t e s :  
"In  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  one f i n d s  t h a t  the  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of v a r i o u s  
r i s k s  a s  pe rce ived  by t h e  p u b l i c  seems t o  be dependent on many 
f a c t o r s .  Such f a c t o r s  i n c l u d e  whether  the  r i s k s  a r e  v o l u n t a r y  
o r  i n v o l u n t a r y ,  v h e t h e r  they a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  v i t h  c a t a s t r o p h i c  
a c c i d e n t s  o r  n o t ,  and vhethez t h e  r i s k s  r e s u l t  i n  irmnediate o r  
s l o v l y  caused f a t a l i t i e s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  
m a t t e r .  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  of r i s k s  needs t o  t ake  them i n t o  account .  
Hovever, i t  seems t h a t  i f  one i s  v i l l i n g  t o  u t i l i z e  a n  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
r e l a t i v e  v a l u e s  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  r i s k s  t o  themselves .  t h e  problem 
might be s i m p l i f i e d . "  
I n  t h i s  paper  I vould  l i k e  t o  d i s c u s s  some of the  i s s u e s  invo lved  i n  
such  a  ' s i m p l i f i c a t i o n '  of  t h e  problem. I n  do ing  s o ,  I w i l l  have l i t t l e  
t o  s a y  abou t  t h e  main concern  of t h o s e  approaching r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n  from 
a " t e c h n i c a l  approach'' ( a s  r e v i e v e d  by La th rop ,  1980) : f i n d i n g  a n  
a p p r o p r i a t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o v e r  f a t a l i t i e s ,  f o r  s p e c i f i c  ' c a u s e s '  of  r i s k .  
Keeney (1981) s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  n e g a t i v e  q u a l i t y  of d e a t h  i t s e l f  is ,  f o r  
most peop le ,  independent  of  t h e  cause .  Hovever, e x p e r i e n c e  of r i s k  i s  
a p r o p e r t y  of  t h e  l i v i n g  n o t  o f  t h e  dead (and i t  can a l s o  be argued t h a t  
peop le ,  n o t  p h y s i c a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  ' cause '  r i s k ) .  L inneroo th  (1979) has  
i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  u s i n g  l o s s  of v a l u e  ( a s  indexed through 
p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t y ,  e t c . )  consequent on premature  dea th  a s  an index  o f  
t h e  v a l u e  of  a  l i E e ,  and s o  d i s c u s s i o n  oE r i s k s  invo lv ing  f a t a l i t i e s  v i l l  
be focussed  h e r e  on t h e  e x p e c t a n c i e s  (and f e a r s )  induced i n  l i v i n g  be ings  
through a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of such f a t a l i t i e s  and. more 
impor tan t ,  a l l  t h a t  l e a d s  up t o  them, 2nd goes wi th  them i n  t h e  p e r s o n ' s  
mind. I t  is  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  such expec tanc ies  and f e a r s  which, i n  t h e  
f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  w i l l  determine t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of r i s k .  
PHLOGISTON THEORY OF RISK 
From t h i s  s t a n d p o i n t ,  one must imnedia te ly  d i spense  w i t h  what Watson 
(1981) has  c a l l e d  " the  p h l o g i s t o n  theory  of r i s k " ,  where r i s k  i s  seen  a s  
a  s i n g l e  subs tance  g iven  o f f  a t  a  r a t e  t o  be determined by r i s k  assessment  
s t u d i e s  a s  a  by-product  of a  p h y s i c a l  o r  b i o l o g i c a l  p rocess .  The p h l o g i s t o n  
theory  of r i s k  goes w i t h  t h e  ' t e c h n i c a l  approach' t o  r i s k ,  whereby r i s k  
management c o n s i s t s  of ( i )  determining an accep tab le  l e v e l ,  ( i i )  measuring 
the  amount of subs tance  f o r  an a c t i v i t y ,  and ( i i i )  r e j e c t i n g  an a c t i v i t y  of 
t o o  much subs tance .  The theory  i s  convenient  because i t  anchors ,  and 
c o n s t r a i n s  r i s k a s s e s s m e n t  t o  a n a l y s i s  of p h y s i c a l  o r  b i o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
of causes .  T h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of a  l e v e l  of r i s k  a s  some 
p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  (depending upon one ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  of r i s k )  over  out-  
comes o r  s i d e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  p rocess .  
There i s ,  however, no way one can  de te rmine  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h i s  f u n c t i o n  
wi thou t  making v a l u e  t r a d e o f f s  (Keeney. 1979, 1980) and i t  a l s o  has  no th ing  
t o  say  about  t h e  exper ience  of r i s k  i n  t h o s e  people  who do n o t  become 
f a t a l i t i e s .  Note a l s o  t h a t  t h e  problem cannot be so lved  by a t t empt ing  a  
s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e  mapping of p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  such a s  t h a t  a t tempted i n  
a  formal  way by Kahneman & Tversky (19791, o r  i n  a  d e s c r i p t i v e  way by 
S l o v i c ,  F i schhof f  & L i c h t e n s t e i n  (1979) ,  showing t h a t  people  underes t imate  
c e r t a i n  low p r o b a b i l i t y  e v e n t s  (when compared with f r e q u e n c i e s  i n  a c t u a r i a l  
t a b l e s ,  r a t h e r  than f r e q u e n c i e s  of r e p o r t i n g  i n  the  in format ion  p rov id ing  
media s e r v i n g  a s  t h e  d a t a  base f o r  t h e i r  judgements).  If r i s k  cannot be 
def ined  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  i t  e q u a l l y  cannot be 
def ined  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  any t rans format ion  of t h a t  func t ion .  
RISK AS UNCERTAINTY ABOUT STRUCTURE 
How, then  should we d e f i n e  r i s k ?  T h i s  i s  a  p e r e n n i a l  q u e s t i o n  i n  
t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and t h e r e  have been a  p l e t h o r a  of answers (Vlek 8 S t a l l e n ,  
1980, have counted over  30 d i f f e r e n t  ones) .  Most have t r i e d  t o  f i n d  a  
formula u s i n g  some mixture of  any o r  a l l  of p r o b a b i l i t y ,  value and u t i l i t y  
( p r o b a b i l i t y  of l o s s ,  s i z e  of  c r e d i b l e  l o s s .  expected l o s s ,  (semi-)variance 
of p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  over  consequence, f u n c t i o n  of expected va lue  
and v a r i a n c e  of consequences, and s o  on) .  A l l  of these  d e f i n i t i o n s  hold 
i n  some experimental  s i t u a t i o n s  but  none do i n  a l l  (Coombs & Bowen, 1971). 
A t  t h e  r i s k  of adding y e t  ano ther  d e f i n i t i o n  t o  t h e  l i s t ,  I would l i k e  
t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  wi th  a l l  these  d e s c r i p t i o n s  i s  t h a t  they 
e x p r e s s  t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  t r a n s l a t i o n  of t h e  consequences of h i s  o r  her  
exper ience  of r i s k s  i n t o  p r e f e r e n c e s  and measured wi th in  predef ined .  
bounded and coheren t  problem s t r u c t u r e s .  I n  doing t h i s  they f a i l  t o  
cap ture  t h e  exper ience  of r i s k  i t s e l f ,  which i s  represen ted  a t  ano ther  
l e v e  1. 
Experience of r i s k  can b e s t  be r e p r e s e n t e d ,  i n  my opin ion ,  a t  t h e  
l e v e l  where we examine t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  wi th in  which p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
and u t i l i t i e s  a r e  represen ted  (what Toda, 1976, c a l l e d  a  person ' s  Decision 
W i n g  System, o r  DMS). A t  t h i s  l e v e l ,  ' degree '  of r i s k  can be defined i n  
terms of  a  person ' s  u n c e r t a i n t y  about t h e  bounds of t h i s  s t r u c t u r e .  
One might t h i n k  t h a t  i n  t h e  s tandard  labora tory  b e t t i n g  experiment 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g  ' r i s k ' ,  t h e r e  is no u n c e r t a i n t y  about t h e  bounds of  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  w i t h i n  vh ich  r i s k  is  t o  be perceived.  A l l  p o s s i b l e  l i n k s  
between t h e  s u b j e c t 2  iunwdiate  a c t s  ( i . e . .  t o  choose an o p t i o n ,  t o  p l a c e  
a  b e t )  and ensuing outcomes a r e  def ined  i n  terms of  l i n k s  wi th  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
placed on them, and monetary va lues  a r e  assigned t o  a l l  outcomes a s  payof fs .  
The s u b j e c t ' s  e x p l o r a t i o n  of problem s t r u c t u r e  is u s u a l l y  assumed t o  be 
bounded by t h e  def ined  s e t  of outcomes which s e r v e  t o  d e f i n e  exhaus t ive ly  
f o r  him o r  her  the  p o s s i b l e  consequences of t h e  inmediate  a c t s  which may 
be taken. 
However, such an assumption ignores  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t y  of 
consequences s tems n o t  simply from monetary payof f ,  but  what comes a f t e r :  
t h e  p l e a s u r e  vh ich  can be ob ta ined  from the  purposes t o  v h i c h  ga ins  a r e  
p u t  o r  t h e  a n x i e t y  and embarrassment i n  f r o n t  of  a  b a d .  manager, o r  
approbat ion from a spouse,which'may be a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t r y i n g  t o  r a i s e  
funds t o  pay o f f  a  debt .  
From t h i s  i t  fo l lows  t h a t  u t i l i t i e s  a r e  n o t  f i x e d  t rans format ions  of 
change i n  v a l u e  from the s t a t u s  quo, even f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l .  
The degree  of u t i l i t y  a s s o c i a t e d  v i t h  a  consequence of an a c t  under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  depends on t h e  c h a i n s  of s i g n i f i c a t i o n  explored  i n  long- 
term memory ( P i t z ,  1981 ; Humphreys, Wooler i P h i l l i p s ,  1980) i n  con- 
c p e t u a l i z i n g  t h a t  consequence. For most non-pathological monetary 
gambling s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which people f i n d  themselves (whether i n  the 
psycholog ica l  l a b o r a t o r y  o r  i n  r e a l  l i f e ) ,  t h e r e  may be id iosyncracy ,  but 
l i t t l e  u n c e r t a i n t y .  One 'knows' how one would r a i s e  a  d e b t ,  t h a t  i s ,  
the i n f l u e n c e  diagram mapping the impact of f u t u r e  even ts  on consequences 
(Howard 6 Zlatheson, 1980) i s  bounded. 
When faced wi th  such s i t u a t i o n s  hab i tuees  tend t o  deny t h a t  they 
"are t a k i n g  much of a  r i s k " ,  t y p i c a l l y  r e t o r t i n g  t h a t  "I know what I 
am doing". The experience of r i s k  i s  suddenly magnified i n  cases  where 
a  person s a y s  "I j u s t  d o n ' t  know what I would do i f  (outcome A) occurs". 
Here the  f e a r  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  the  r i s k  taken i n  fol lowing a  course of  
a c t i o n  which i n c l u d e s  outcome A w i t h  non-zero p r o b a b i l i t y  has t o  do 
w i t h  what Bruner,Goodnow 6 Austin (1956) c a l l e d  " t e r r o r  i n  the f a c e  of 
the  uncanny". Negative u t i l i t i e s  w i t h i n  def ined  DMS s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  
bounded by complete 'worst  case '  s c e n a r i o s ,  but when a  person explor ing  
the  s t r u c t u r e  f i n d s  a  'gap' then t h e  nega t ive  u t i l i t i e s  a r e  unbounded, 
and cons iderab le  f e a r  can r e s u l t .  
BACKGROUND OF SAFETY 
T h i s  r e s u l t  i s  w e l l  known t o  c l i n i c i a n s .  Sandle r  6 Sandler  (1978) 
d i s c u s s i n g  the  development of o b j e c t i v e  r e l a t i o n s  and a f f e c t s ,  say: 
"... we have t o  add something extremely important .  The i n d i v i d u a l  
i s  c o n s t a n t l y  o b t a i n i n g  a  s p e c i a l  form of g r a t i f i c a t i o n  through h i s  
i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  h i s  environment and wi th  h i s  own s e l f ,  c o n s t a n t l y  
p rov id ing  himself w i t h  a  s o r t  of nutr iment  o r  a l i m e n t ,  something 
which i n  t h e  o b j e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  we can r e f e r  t o  a s  "aff i rmation".  
Through h i s  i n t e r a c t i o n  wi th  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  of  h i s  world,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  h i s  o b j e c t s ,  he g a i n s  a  v a r i e t y  of r e a s s u r i n g  f e e l i n g s .  
We pu t  fo rvard  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  need f o r  this 'nourishment'  f o r  
a f f i r m a t i o n  and reassurance ,  has  t o  be s a t i s f i e d  c o n s t a n t l y  i n  o r d e r  
t o  y i e l d  a  background of sa fe ty . ' '  
Here, I t h i n k ,  i s  t h e  c l u e  t o  why a  ' f a m i l i a r '  technology such a s  
coa l  mining i s  seen by many people (excluding those a c t u a l l y  involved i n  
t h e  p rocess )  a s  l e s s  unsafe than n u c l e a r  power, even though i t s  r i s k  
p r o f i l e ,  expressed a s  any p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  over  f a t a l i  t i e s  (except  
one h e a v i l y  b iased  a g a i n s t  extreme c a t a s t r o p h e  occurrence)  i s  much vorse .  
The ' s a f e t y '  which is being t a l k e d  about here  i s ,  i n  p a r t  a t  l e a s t ,  
S a n d l e r ' s  'background of s a f e t y ' ,  Coal mining d i s a s t e r s  a r e  n o t  
s imply ' f a m i l i a r ' ,  they  a r e  conceptua l ized  w i t h i n  bounded s t r u c t u r e s .  
There i s  u n c e r t a i n t y  about vhere the  nex t  one v i l l  occur ,  and who w i l l  
be a f f e c t e d  by i t ,  but  t h e  rescue  measures and s o  f o r t h  explored vhen 
t h i n k i n g  about "what w u l d  happen" g i v g l t h e  occurrence of t h i s  type  of 
d i s a s t e r  t end  t o  be f a m i l i a r ,  r a t h e r  than uncanny. 
Moreover, e x p l o r a t i o n s ' o f  consequences of c o a l  mining d i s a s t e r s  
( o r  of p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  p revent ion)  do not  u s u a l l y  l ead  people i n t o  
imagining a s s o c i a t e d  s o c i a l  changes where consequences a r e  no t  
represen ted  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  DMS. The s i t u a t i o n  is  'under c o n t r o l ' ,  
i n  t h a t  consequences can be explored  i n  a bounded way. ' G r a t i f i c a t i o n '  
i n  S a n d l e r ' s  sense  can be ga ined  from e x p l o r i n g  worst case  s c e n a r i o s ;  
t h i s  removes t h e  p o s s i b l e  of " t e r r o r  i n  t h e  f a c e  of t h e  uncanny" a s  a f t e r  
such an e x p l o r a t i o n  one can b e l i e v e  t h a t  one "knows t h e  worst  t h a t  can 
happen". 
When p u b l i c  e n q u i r i e s  on s i t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  f o r  high technology p l a n t s ,  
e t c . ,  limit t h e  scope of a t t r i b u t e s  on which evidence may be addressed t o  
p h y s i c a l  r i s k  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  of p r o  and a n t i  f u n c t i o n s  
t y p i c a l l y  remain i n t r a n s i g e n t  and po les  a p a r t  i n  the  face  of  evidence 
from r i s k  s t u d i e s .  T h i s  sugges t s  not  s o  much a f a i l u r e  t o  i n t e g r a t e  
in format ion  according t o  Bayes' theorem, but r a t h e r  t h a t  the  d i s p u t e  i s  
r e a l l y  on a d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l  (Edvards, 1981) .  For i n s t a n c e ,  Anna Cyorgy 
(1979). an a c t i v i s t  i n  s e v e r a l  a n t i - n u c l e a r  groups,  w r i t i n g  i n  h e r  
own book, "No Nukes", and thus  f r e e  of r e s t r i c t i o n s  concerning t h e  
a t t r i b u t e s  on which n u c l e a r  power may be conceptua l ized ,  vondered: 
"What kind of  s o c i e t y  do we van t  t o  l i v e  i n ?  Nuclear power i s  
such a  dangerous technology t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  s p e c i a l  methods of 
s o c i a l  c o n t r o l .  A l l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  f u e l  cyc le  must be monitored 
and guarded. i n c l u d i n g  t h e  guards themselves. No s e c u r i t y  
p recau t ion  i s  t o o  g r e a t .  Since t h e  dangers  of n u c l e a r  pover 
go on and on - given  plutonium's  h a l f  l i f e  of 24,000 y e a r s  - 
t h e  s e c u r i t y  needed f o r  a  s a f e  n u c l e a r  powered economy must be 
guaranteed f o r  y e a r s  t o  come. But how can a  s t a b l e  f u t u r e  be 
guaranteed - f o r e v e r ?  The prospec t  seems made t o  o r d e r  f o r  an 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n  system, depending f o r  i t s  s u r v i v a l  on what D r .  Alvin 
Weinberg, former head of t h e  Oak Ridge National  Labora tor ies  has 
c a l l e d  a  ' m i l i t a r y  pr iesthood' . ' '  (p.222) 
I n  t h i s  account ,  t h e  main t h r e a t  t o  s a f e t y  is not  due t o  i o n i z i n g  
r a d i a t i o n  but  due t o  t h e  l o s s  of freedom t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  vay one s t r u c t u r e s  
(and l i v e s )  one 's  own l i f e  due t o  measures taken t o  ensure  t h a t  such 
r a d i a t i o n  e x i s t s  a t  a  ' s a f e '  l e v e l .  The i s s u e s  involved i n  t h e  exper ience  
of r i s k  here  have n o t  t o  do v i t h  p h y s i c a l  p rocesses  bu t .  a s  po in ted  o u t  
by Otvay. Maurer 6 Thomas (1978). v i t h  concerns vhich go beyond technolog ies  
t o  t h e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  they  imply " inc lud ing  t h e  
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of s c a r c e  and v i t a l  resources ,  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  by over- large 
and impersonal b u r e a u c r a c i e s ,  and t h e  grov ing  dependence on t h e  s p e c i a l i z e d  
knowledge of t e c h n o c r a t i c  e l i t e s " .  
Note t h a t  v h i l e  v i t h i n  a  m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  ana ly s i s  of the 
va lue  of r i s k  t h i s  r e p r e se n t s  t he  need t o  inc lude  a  g r e a t e r  number of 
a t t r i b u t e  dimensions c ha r a c t e r i z i ng  these  i s sue s ,  t he  ana ly s i s  does no t  
end there .  There a r e  more fundamental problems. Here I v i l l  cons ider  
j u s t  a  feu ,  Lathrop and Linnerooth (1982) cons ider  many more. 
PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING STRUCTURE 
Jungermann (1980) descr ibed  the main va lue  of dec i s i on  a i d s  a t  t h e  
persona l  l e v e l  a s  ly ing  i n  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  a t  " c l a s s i fy ing ,  expanding and 
s t r u c t u r i n g  the  c l i e n t s '  perspec t ives  t o  he lp  them cope wi th ,  and maybe 
change r e a l i t y  r a t h e r  than i n  f i nd ing  t he  be s t  decision". However, 
d e c i s i on  a i d s  l i k e  MAUD4 (Humphreys 6 Wisudha, 1981) designed t o  he lp  
people formulate the s t r u c t u r e  they need t o  use i n  choosing between opt ions  
where the choice  is m u l t i a t t r i b u t e d  a r e  of only l im i t ed  use i n  a id ing  
t h e  e x p l o r a t i on  of value s t r u c t u r e s  underlying r i s k  assessments. 
Such a i d s  can he lp  t o  reduce unce r t a in ty  through reduc t ion  of goal  
confusion (liumphreys 6 McFadden, 1980), and provide b e t t e r  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
key a t t r i b u t e s  v i t h i n  t h a t  p a r t  of t he  problem which can be s t r uc tu r ed  
v i t h i n  t h e  i nd i v i d ua l ' s  DMS. Nevertheless ,  Kaflcaesque f a n t a s i e s  stelmning 
from the  b e l i e f  about l o s s  of c o n t r o l  of one's modus vivendi  t o  bureaucrac ies  
o r  s e c u r i t y  f o r c e s ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  t e l l  the  message of the imposs ib i l i t y  of 
d e f i n i ng  what l i e s  along t h e  s i gn i fy ing  cha ins  behind t he  nega t ive  po les  
of the  types  of  a t t r i b u t e s  Gyorgy and Otway e t  a1  s t r e s s .  Hence the  
e x t e n t  of the n e g a t i v i t y  of t h e i r  meaning cannot be f i xed ,  and so  no 
r e l a t i v e  s c a l i n g  (and t he r e fo r e  no t r adeo f f s )  i s  poss ib l e  wi th in  a  HAUT 
s r r u c t u r e  developed t o  cap ture  t he  experience of " r i sk iness"  assoc ia red  
wich t he  s i t u a t i o n s  and processes  t o  which the  f a n t a s i e s  r e l a t e .  
One way ou t  of t h i s  impasse i s  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  the  f e a r  assoc ia ted  
v i t h  'worst  case '  s c e n a r i o s  i n  many people faced  with new technolog ica l  
innova t ions  which r e s u l t  i n  vide-ranging change i n  l i f e s t y l e  through 
s o c i e t a l  s i d e  e f f e c t s  may, i n  f a c t ,  be due t o  t h e  l ack  of d e f i n i t i o n  of 
consequence8 of these  s i d e  e f f e c t s  and hence the  removal of t h e i r  back- 
ground of s a f e t y .  Attempts t o  r e s t r i c t  d i scuss ions  of the  s t r u c t u r e  of 
consequences of implementing a new technology t o  non-societal  ( i . e . ,  
p h y s i c a l )  dimensions makes m a t t e r s  worse. Otway, Maurer and Thomas 
(1978) s t a t e ,  "To expect  people ' s  a t t i t u d e s  tovard a new technology t o  
be p r i m a r i l y  determined by s t a t i s t i c a l  e s t i m a t e s  o f  phys ica l  s a f e t y  is a 
h i g h l y  s i m p l i f i e d ,  and i n c o r r e c t  model of  human thought p rocesses  - i t  
i m p l i e s  a degree of r a t i o n a l i t y  a s  t o  be i t s e l f  ' i r r a t i o n a l ' . "  The 
impos i t ion  of such ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  on p u b l i c  dena te  seems t o  throw t h e  
s t r u c t u r i n g  of  consequences on o t h e r  dimensions i n t o  t h e  realm of t h e  
unknown - s t u d i e d  by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s  under t h e  r u b r i c s  of ' taboo'  and 
' o c c u l t ' ,  v h e r e i n  p e h n m n a  excluded f r m  p u b l i c  deba te ,  r a t h e r  than 
be ing  n e u t r a l i z e d ,  a r e  experienced a s  having s p e c i a l  agency and po ten tcy  
( c . f . ,  Leach, 1962; Douglas, 1966). 
EXPLORING SCENARIOS 
It f o l l o v s  t h a t  e x p l o r a t i o n  of s c e n a r i o s  on a v ide  canvas is an 
e s s e n t i a l  f i r s t  s t e p .  The n o t i o n  of ' r i s k  percep t ion '  ignores  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  f e a r  which comes from awareness of l ack  of s a f e t y  
a s s o c i a t e d  with t h e  f a c t  t h a t  consequences a r e  no t  s t r u c t u r e d ,  and t h e  
n e g a t i v e  a f f e c t  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  (bounded) d i s u t i l i t y  of s t r u c t u r e d  
consequences. Moreover, such s c e n a r i o  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  help 
on ly  i f  i t  r e v e a l s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of s t r u c t u r i n g  consequences, through 
f i n d i n g  ways i n  which c o n t r o l  can be r e s t o r e d  t o  the  ind iv idua l .  Inc lud ing ,  
f o r  example, compensation payments f o r  people l i v i n g  near  a l o c a t i o n  chosen 
f o r  e i t i n g  a L i q u i f i e d  Energy Gas (LEG) p l a n t  i n  t h e  scenar io  r e s t o r e s  
a n o t i o n  of c o n t r o l  i n  one a s p e c t :  w i t h  a compensation payment, e i t h e r  
one uses  t h e  money t o  move away £ r a n  the  s i t e ,  or one s t a y s  p u t ,  knowing 
t h a t  one has decided t o ,  s o  one can g a i n  by spending t h e  money i n  p u r s u i t  
of some o t h e r  d e s i r e .  I n  t h i s  way, t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of LEG technology on 
one ' s  persona l  l i f e  s t y l e  can nov be perce ived  a s  being under one ' s  own 
c o n t r o l .  
However, compensation payments a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  i n  a l l a y i n g  f e a r s  
of those who s e e  t h e  l o r s  of c o n t r o l  i n  terms of s o c i a l  freedom (e.g.,  
" increased s e c u r i t y  l eads  t o  a p o l i c e  s t a t e " ) ,  r a t h e r  than l o s s  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  enjoyment of  l i f e .  For  them, such payments a r e  simply "an 
a t tempt  t o  buy o f f  t h e  opposi t ion".  
"BACKGROUND OF SAFETY" HAS DIFFERENT CONCOMMITANTS FOR DIFFERENT CROUPS 
The i d e a  of r i s k  a s  a t h r e a t  t o t h e  background of s a f e t y  can apply 
e q u a l l y ,  bu t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t o  bo th  s i d e s  i n  cases  where t h e r e  i s  a c o n f l i c t  
i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of nev technology. Von.Uinterfe1dt  6 Rios (1980) 
s t a t e :  
"Opinion p o l l s  and s o c i a l  surveys i n d i c a t e  t h a t  deeply rooted 
s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s  may u n d e r l i e  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  [between t h e  two 
r i d e s  i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  pover debate]. Ant i -nuc lear  groups and 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  o f t e n  o b j e c t  t o  a growth philosphy and f u r t h e r  
t h e  i d e a  t h a t  "small is beaut i fu l" .  Some a n t i - n u c l e a r  groups 
a l s o  favour p o l i t i c a l  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and s o c i a l i s t i c  views. 
Nuclear advocates  and advocates  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  development, on 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, o f t e n  favour  g r c u t h ,  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and t h e  b a s i c  
p r i n c i p l e s  of cap i t a l i sm."  ' 
One might add t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  group a l s o  s t r u c t u r e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of 
consequences ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e i r  v e r s i o n  of  worst  c a s e  s c e n a r i o s )  around t h e  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  of  such p r i n c i p l e s .  "Cen t ra l i zed  bureaucrac ies"  and t h e  
l i k e  hold no f e a r  f o r  those  who i d e n t i f y  wi th ,  o r  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  power 
w i t h i n  them. I n s t e a d  we f i n d  h e r e  what S joberg  (1980) c a l l e d  "Knowledge 
E l i t i s m "  which 
" b u i l d s  upon t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  knowledge i n  r i s k  q u e s t i o n s  
c a n  be found o n l y  w i t h i n  a  small group of  e x p e r t s ,  most ly  e x p e r t s  
i n  technology and t h e  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e s .  O b j e c t i v i t y  and i m p a r t i a l i t y  
i n  t h e i r  v iewpoint  i s  seldom o r  never  i n  doubt.  One c o n s i d e r s  
o n e s e l f  t o  be ' r a t i o n a l '  bu t  t h e  i d e a  about  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  t y p i c a l l y  
v e r y  s u p e r f i c i a l .  R e s i s t a n c e  i s  seen  a s  emotional  o r  i r r a t i o n a l ,  
a s  p o l i t i c a l l y  o r  cmmnercial'ly o p p o r t u n i s t i c .  R e s i s t a n c e  should be 
coun te red  by t r y i n g  t o  c r e a t e  a  f e e l i n g  of s a f e t y ,  o r  i f  t h a t  i s  n o t  
p o s s i b l e ,  by t r y i n g  t o  i s o l a t e  opponents from more u n c e r t a i n  o r  
i n d i f f e r e n t  groups by p o i n t i n g  o u t ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h e i r  
'complex' s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  v iewpoints .  The t y p i c a l  e lement  of 
t h i s  e l i t i s t  extreme a t t i t u d e  invo lved  t h u s  ' f o r g e t t i n g  t h a t  r i s k  
judgements a r e  i n  f a c t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  make, and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
t h a t  a r e  produced i n  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  shou ld  n o t  be taken too  l i t e r a l l y . "  
More than ' f o r g e t t i n g ' ,  accord ing  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h i s  
s y n o p s i s ,  t h i s  i s  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  of those  who cannot a f f o r d  t o  e x p l o r e  
1 I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  same d i s t i n c t i o n  does  n o t  hold t r u e  i n  
s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s .  Nuclear  power i s  n o t  simply " p a r t  of t h e  c a p a l i s t  
armoury", bu t  an i s s u e  t aken  up i n  p l a y i n g  ou t  c o n f l i c t s  concerning an 
even more f u n d m e n t a l  concep t ion  of r i s k s :  those  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
m a i n t a i n i n g  one ' s  unders tand ing  of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  one ' s  l i f e .  
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of the  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  what should be taken l i t e r a l l y  
i s  something o t h e r  than  r i s k  a n a l y s i s ,  a s  t h i s  would open up a r e a s  of 
t h e i r  DMS which a r e  n o t  s t r u c t u r e d ,  and so  t h r e a t e n  t h e i r  own background 
of s a f e t y  The r i s k s  of  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  a r e  thus  very d i f f e r e n t  f o r  t h e  
two s i d e s  whose c o n f l i c t  of views f i r s t  l e d  t o  t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  r i s k  a n a l y s i s .  
A LIMITED ROLE FOR MULTIAlTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS 
Never the less  l e t ' s  assume, o p t i m i s t i c a l l y ,  t h a t  one has been a b l e  t o  
work w i t h  groups concerned i n  a  r i s k s  deba te  and has explored t h e i r  concern 
v i t h i n  s c e n a r i o s  which have been found t o  be boun6ed. Also,  t h a t  one has 
i d e n t i f i e d  ( p o s s i b l y  v i t h  t h e  h e l p  of a  d e c i s i o n  a i d  l i k e  MAUD4) those 
a t t r i b u t e  dimensions which, v i t h i n  each group,  can s e r v e  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  
t h e  decomposition of t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  towards t h e  r i s k s  (reduced t o  d i s -  
u t i l i t i e s )  and b e n e f i t s  involved i n  cons ider ing  a l t e r n a t i v e  o p t i o n s  
i n c l u s i v e  of consequences and s ide-e f fec t s .  It may s t i l l  be q u i t e  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  model l ing t h e  d e c i s i o n  process  (o r  i n  t h e  more hazardous 
p l o y  of a t t empt ing  t o  p r e s c r i b e  t h e  'opt imal '  s o l u t i o n )  t o  use  a  composition 
r u l e  ( l i k e  MAU) der ived  from t h e  axioms of  i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l  choice.  
I n  our  own s t u d i e s  of  group d e c i s i o n  making where t h e r e  were c o n f l i c t s  
of i n t e r e s t s  among group members (Humphreys, 1978; Humphreys (L McFadden, 1980), 
we found t h a t  those  p r o t a g o n i s t s  who were a l s o  s k i l l e d  p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t i a t o r s  
had no wish t o  a s s e s s  t r a d e o f f  r a t i o s  between a t t r i b u t e s  v i t h i n  the  mul t i -  
a t t r i b u t e d  deccnupositions of  t h e  option-choice problems we had e l e c t e d  from 
them i n  o r d e r  t o  apply a  MAU composi t ion ru le .  For these  people,  s a l i e n c e s  
(va lue-wise  importances)  of a t t r i b u t e  dimensions were not  something t o  be 
e l i c i t e d  o r  n e g o t i a t e d  w i t h i n  the  groups under c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of e q u i t y .  
Rather ,  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  group deba te  was t o  t r y  t o  manipulate  
va lue-wise  importances of a t t r i b u t e  dimensions. This  u s u a l l y  involved 
arguing f o r  an inc reased  weight f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t r i b u t e  dimension (on 
which t h e  p r o j e c t  they wished t o  promote scored h igh ly)  a s  group p o l i c y  
i n  a s s e s s i n g  a11 proposed a l t e r n a t i v e s .  I n  subsequent group d e c i s i o n  
making, t h i s  provided the r a t i o n a l e  f o r  the  choice of one 's  ovn p r o j e c t .  
s i n c e  i t  scored s o  h i g h l y  on s o  important  a  dimension. Of course ,  t h i s  
l e f t  the  p r o t a g o n i s t  w i t h  t h e  problem of  j u s t i f y i n g  the e x p e r t i s e  t h a t  
gave him o r  h e r  t h e  l i c e n c e  t o  d i c t a t e  the  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  d e c i s i o n  making 
problem i n  t h e  f i r s t  place.  
This  i s  why some index devised from a p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  over  
f a t a l i t i e s  i s  l i a b l e  t o  be promoted a s  t h e  s o l e  s a l i e n t  a t t r i b u t e  dimension 
by adheren ts  t o  t h e  ' t e c h n i c a l  approachv t o  r i s k  es t imat ion .  I t  may w e l l  
be t h a t  such adherence stems no t  from a na ive  b e l i e f  i n  s c i e n t i s m ,  but  
r a t h e r  from the  d e s i r e  t o  promote a  p a r t i c u l a r  technology which has a  
good record  on f a t a l i t i e s ,  but  which i s  l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  on o t h e r  a t t r i b u t e s  
of p o t e n t i a l  i n t e r e s t  t o  o t h e r  s t a k e h o l d e r s  (e.g., degree of c e n t r a l i z e d  
c o n t r o l ,  long term hazards from waste products  of the  p rocess ) .  J u s t i f y i n g  
one 's  e x p e r t i s e  is l e s s  of a  problem g iven  t h e  genera l  acceptance of t h e  
" t e c h n i c a l  approach"; one s imply c i t e s  evidence provided by " t e c h n i c a l  
experts" .  s t r e s s i n g  i ts  " s c i e n t i f i c "  b a s i s  ( i e . ,  n o t  open t o  q u e s t i o n  by 
l a y  people ) .  
Edwards (1981) has  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  t rend  i n  psychological  research  t o  
develop experiments  designed t o  produce evidence of ' b i a s '  and incons i s tency  
i n  l a y  people ' s  reasoning  (e.g., Dawes, 1976) a s  providing f u e l  f o r  such 
j u s t i f i c a t o r y  a c t i v i t y ,  but  t h i s  does n o t  mean t h a t  without  such experiments 
t h e r e  would be no a t tempts  a t  manipulat ion and j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
under t h e  assumption made here  t h a t  such j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  
o f  p rov id ing  a  background of s a f e t y .  
However, i f  t h e  'background of  s a f e t y 1  could be provided f o r  pro- 
t a g o n i s t s  i n  r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n  deba tes  by e x p l o r i n g  s c e n a r i o s  and f i n d i o g  
t h e i r  bounds, s o  t h a t  t h e  need t o  manipulate  s a l i e n c e s  l o s e s  i ts  importance. 
i t  might then  be p o s s i b l e  t o  employ h i e r a r c h i c a l  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  
procedures .  These could s t r u c t u r e  a  s e t  o f  a t t r i b u t e s  encompassing a l l  
those given s a l i e n c e  by any p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  d e b a t e ,  wi th  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
p a r t i e s  be ing  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by d i f f e r e n t  a t t r i b u t e  weight ing schemes. 
T h i s  i s  not  a  new s u g g e s t i o n ,  t h e  technique has  been used,  f o r  example, 
by Campbell and Seaver  (1979) i n  wa te r  r e s o u r c e  p lann ing  and by von Winter- 
f e l d t  and Rios (1980) f o r  c o n f l i c t s  about n u c l e a r  s a f e t y .  I n  each  o f  t h e s e  
a p p l i c a t i o n s , t h o u g h ,  HAUT decomposi t ions were used t o  d i s p l a y  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between p r o t a g o n i s t  groups f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  of p lanners .  Campbell and 
Seaver  conducted i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  members o f  e i g h t  "cons t i tuenc ies" .  
e x p r e s s i n g  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  terms of t h e  weights  ass igned  t o  a  collrmon 
s e t  of c r i t e r i a  i n  a  s i n g l e  s t a g e  (non-h ie ra rch ica l )  decomposi t ion o f  t h e i r  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r o j e c t s  f o r  wa te r  resource  management. They 
r e p o r t  t h a t  " the  p l a n n e r s  who rece ived  t h i s  p re l iminary  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  
found t h e  g e n e r a l  model r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e i r  needs and thought it would probably 
be u s e f u l  i n  f u t u r e  wate r  d e c i s i o n s ,  i f  i t  were used w i t h  adequa te ly  
a c c u r a t e  data". Here t h e  model was used t o  provide suppor t  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
making of j u s t  one of t h e  s t a k e h o l d e r s .  
Von W i n t e r f e l d t  and Rios used h i e r a r c h i c a l  m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  
p rocedures ,  model l ing s e p a r a t e l y  each s t a k e h o l d e r  g roup ' s  e v a l u a t i o n  c r i t e r i a  
and each  group's  bes t  e s t i m a t e s  of the performance of the  op t ions  under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  ( a l t e r n a t i v e  energy genera t ion  s t r a t e g i e s ) .  They n o t e t h a t  
such a n a l y s i s  can be used " t o  i d e n t i f y  a r e a s  of agreement and disagreement 
.... t o  determine a d d i t i o n a l  information needs where c o n f l i c t  i s  about d a t a  
and e x p e r t i s e ;  t o  d i s c u s s  disagreements  about measurement d e f i n i t i o n s  (e.g., 
" f a t a l i t y  r i sks" )  and a t tempt  t o  r e s o l v e  them; t o  determine i f  inc rementa l  
change i n  supply a l t e r n a t i v e s  (e.g., remote s i t i n g )  can produce more 
accep tab le  so lu t ions" .  
Such a c t i v i t i e s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  guaran tee  consensus over  a c t i o n s  t o  
be taken,  o r  t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  When. a s  i n  von Winte r fe ld t  and Rios' 
s i t u a t i o n  one s t a k e h o l d e r  has  t h e  s o l e  execu t ive  power t o  make t h e  d e c i s i o n ,  
o t h e r  s t a k e h o l d e r s  v i l l  i n t e r p r e t  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  v i t h i n  t h e i r  own va lue  
s t r u c t u r e s .  I n  doing so ,  t h e y  may invent  nev s c e n a r i o s  which, i f  unbounded 
a t  any p o i n t ,  could t h r e a t e n  t h e i r  background of s a f e t y  a f r e s h  ("I j u s t  
d o n ' t  knov vhy they  chose t h a t  opt ion:  t h e r e  must be something s i n i s t e r  
about  this..."). I n  t h i s  vay ,  f e a r s  a s s o c i a t e d  v i t h  nev r i s k s  can be 
in t roduced  i n t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
I n  consu l tancy  work c a r r i e d  o u t  by the  Decision Analysis  Unit  a t  
Brunel involv ing  groups w i t h  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  v e  have used, v i t h  some 
success ,  an a l t e r n a t i v e  MAUT-based procedure aimed a t  p r e s e r v i n g  the  back- 
ground of s a f e t y  f o r  a l l  p r o t a g o n i s t s  i n  moving tovards  and i n t e r p r e t i n g  
a p a r t i c u l a r  cho ice  of op t ion .  Our procedure is s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of von 
Winte r fe ld t  and Rios i n  t h e  decomposition phase: f i r s t ,  s c e n a r i o s  a r e  
exp lored  among t h e  v a r i o u s  s takeholders .  C r i t e r i a  and concerns i d e n t i f i e d  
dur ing  t h e  e x p l o r a t i o n s  a r e  then modelled wi th in  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  MAUT-based 
s t r u c t u r e  cons t ruc ted  i n  d i r e c t  i n t e r a c t i o n  v i t h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of a l l  
1 groups of s takeholders  working toge ther  . Idea l l y ,  the  r e s u l t i n g  
s t r u c t u r e  should be ordered i n  such a way t h a t  major d i f f e r ences  betveen 
s takeholders  a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  modelled a t  higher l eve l s  v i t h i n  the  hierarchy.  
Usually,  i n  app l i ca t i ons  i n  MAUT , modelling s takeholder ' s  con f l i c t i ng  
ob j ec t i ve s  u i t h i n  a s i n g l e  s t r u c t u r e ,  d i f f e r ences  betveen objec t ives  a r e  
modelled by obta in ing  a s epa ra t e  s e t  of importance weights over a l l  c r i t e r i a  
i n  t he  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  each s takeholder  group, and then e i t h e r  ( i )  performing 
s epa ra t e  eva lua t ions  f o r  each group us ing  the  appropriate s e t  of weights, o r  
2 ( i i )  averaging the weights across  groups according t o  some a r b i t a r y  scheme . 
Our approach d i f f e r e d  from both of these i n  t h a t ,  s t a r t i n g  a t  the  
loves t  l e v e l  nodes i n  the h ie rarchy ,  s takeholders  a r e  i nv i t ed  t o  negot ia te  
a s i n g l e  s e t  of importance weights t o  be assigned t o  t he  branches meeting 
a t  each node. I n  the  arguments advanced i n  such negot ia t ions ,  s takeholders  
explore  t h e i r  own and o the r ' s  scenar ios  ( a s a  s takeholder  who d i f f e r s  u i t h  
you has t o  exp l a in  why he o r  she  wishes t o  discount  your concerns, r a the r  
than j u s t  ignore  them, and YOU, i n  arguing f o r  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  importance 
have t o  expla in  why i t  is  unsafe t o  d iscount  them). We have found tha t  
once p ro t agon i s t s  have discovered t h a t  i t  is poss ib l e  t o  nego t i a t e  r e l a t i v e  
weights a t  t he  lover  nodes of t he  s t r u c t u r e ,  they a r e  prepared t o  continue 
nego t i a t i ng  t he  more con t rove r s i a l  r e l a t i v e  weights a t  the higher nodes 
We have found t h a t  t h i s  can be achieved i t h o u t  moving i n t o  an 
adversary s i t u a t i o n  providing t h a t  s takeholders  f e e l  t h a t  a l l  the 
concerns t h a t  they v i s h  t o  be addressed a r e  included i n  the  s t r u c t u r e  
(understanding t h a t  o the r  s takeholders  may v ish  t o  put  d i f f e r e n t  weights 
on these  concerns, o r  even discount  them e n t i r e l y ) .  The important 
po in t  i s  t h a t  a l l  s takeholders  acknovledge the ex is tence  of each o t h e r ' s  
concerns. 
2 Campbell and Seaver d i s cus s  what these  schemes might be. There i s  
no way of chosing a scheme on the b a s i s  of i t s  op t imal i ty ,  e q u i t a b i l i t y  
o r  r a t i o n a l i t y  i n  any absolu te  sense. 
I in the tree . 
The result is a complete "compromise" set of veights that may be 
used by consensus in chosing betveen alternative options. It does not 
mean that any option so chosen will be preferred by all (or even a 
majority) of stakeholders, since the "compromise" structure vill not 
replicate any of the value structures vhich vould guide individual 
stakeholder's idealized choices. What it does ensure is that (i) the 
basis for the decision is understood by all stakeholders before it is 
taken, and (ii) structuring of consequences on any area of concern is not 
confined to the realm of the occult. Hence any background of safety 
established at the outset of the analysis can be preserved. 
However, this achievement also emphasizesthe procedure's limitation 
to successful applications where parties to the decision do not have 
uncertainties about ares of the DWS vhich threaten their background of 
safety. In other cases the use of 9 overall composition rule is 
inappropriate, although partial compositions may be achieved in 'non- 
threatening' areas of the hierarchy. Ability to explore the properties 
of the decomposed, or semi-decomposed, structure then becomes the first 
priority for a decision aid. 
A less serious limitation, but one vhich is very important to 
recognize, stems from the fact that the ability to 'fix the meaning' of 
poles of an attribute dimension, so that scaling of options may be 
I 
For details of a practical application of this procedure, see 
Humphreys, Larichev 6 Vari, 1982. 
accomplished, r e s t s  on the  a b i l i t y  t o  s e t  bounds on the  chains of 
s i g n i f i c a t i o n  vhich se rve  t o  de f i ne  t he  meaning of  the po les  f o r  the 
a s s e s s o r .  While t h i s  i s  q u i t e  a  reasonable t a sk  f o r  an i nd iv idua l  
(provid ing  he i s  c l e a r  about h i s  g o a l ) ,  the r e s u l t i n g  cha rac t e r i z a t i on  
of the  ' f i xe d '  meaning of an  a t t r i b u t e  dimension w i l l  depend on vhat  i t  
s i g n i f i e s  t o  the  i nd i v i d ua l  w i t h in  the  bounds s e t  ( ~ e r k e l e ~ .  198:l). 
Much of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s a l i ence  accorded t o  dimensions by 
d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s  v i t h i n  a  r i s k  debate may be due t o  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  
of s i g n i f i c a t i o n  being l inked  t o  po l e s  def ined  wi th in  t he  dec i s i on  
a n a l y s i s  by t h e  same name f o r  a l l  groups' r a t i n g s  (e.g., ' p ranotes  
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of resources ' ) .  The l i n g u i s t i c  r ep r e sen t a t i on  i s  shared 
a c r o s s  groups,  the  meaning i s  not .  
Acknowledging these  l i m i t a t i o n s  should be a  s t a r t i n g  po in t  no t  a  
r e c i p e  f o r  r e t r e a t  s i n c e  v h i l e ,  a s  Kunreuther (1980) po in t s  ou t ,  i n  most 
deba tes  on nev technology s takeholders  have unequal pover and so  dec i s i ons  
can be forced  by t he  s takeholder  v i t h  t he  g r e a t e s t  pover i n  the  sho r t  run, 
the  long-term consequence of t h i s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be counterproductive s i nce  
" p o l i t i c a l l y ,  exc lus ion  may breed anger  a s  we l l  a s  ignorance. 
C i t i z e n s  i n  a  democrat ic  so c i e ty  w i l l  eventua l ly  i n t e r f e r e  v i t h  
d e c i s i on s  i n  vhich they do not  f e e l  represented.  When l ay  people 
do f o r c e  t h e i r  way i n t o  hazard dec i s i ons ,  the  vehemence and 
t e c h n i c a l  n a i v e t e  of t h e i r  response may leave the pa id  
p ro f e s s i on a l s  agash, r e i n fo r c ing  susp ic ions  about the  ' s t u p i d i t y  
of the  publ ic ' .  By avoiding these  c o n f l i c t s ,  e a r l y  pub l i c  
involvement may lead  t o  d e c i s i ons  t h a t  t ake  longer  t o  make, but 
a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  s t ick ."  (Fischhoff  e t  a1 , 1981) 
This has been the motivation behind my attempt i n  t h i s  paper t o  
examine what i s  involved a t  an experiential  l e v e l  i n  such public 
involvement, and how i t  might be explored under the goal of reaching 
dec is ions  which are more l ike ly  to s t i c k .  
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PART I l l  
MEASURING RISK 

' T H E  PUBLIC" VS. ' T H E  EXPERTS": 
PERCEIVED VS. ACTUAL DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT RISKS' 
Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein 
Decision Research, A Branch of Perceptronics, 
120 1 Oak Street, Eugene, Oregon 9740 1, USA 
I t  i s  obvious that some members of the public and some members of the community of 
technical experts disagree about the risks of nuclear power. It i s  less obvious why they 
disagree. Since the source of a disagreement has important implications for how a demo- 
cratic society might bring about its resolution, there may be a strong temptation to fall 
back on politically convenient explanations (e.g., the public i s  stupid; the experts have 
tunnel vision). The paper attempts to characterize the full range of possible and probable 
sources of disagreement, finding them to be rather more diverse and complicated than is  
often acknowledged. On the basis of this analysis, it offers some suggestions for how 
conflict resolution may be accomplished and where it i s  superfluous. 
'Paper prepared for a session on 'The  Analysis of Perceived vs. Actual Risks: Nuclear Power Plants - 
a U.S. Perspective", First Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis, at National Academy 
of Sciences, Washington, D.C., June 1-3, 1981. 
A recent  public opinion aumey (Earr ia ,  1980) reported th. following 
thr.. r e a u l t s :  
a. Among four  "leadership groups" (top corporate executives,  
inv.stors/laPders, Congressional repr.sentatives and f ede ra l  regula tors) ,  
96-981 of a l l  r.spond.nts agraed with the  statement "even in a r e a  in 
which th. a c t u a l  l e v e l  of r i n k  m y  have decreasad fn th. pas t  20 y a u s .  
our soc ie ty  is significantly more aware of r i sk ."  
b. Betwean 87% a d  91% of thou. four  laaderahip groups f e l t  that  
"the mod of tha  country regarding r isk"  will have a substant+al o r  
m d a r a t e  impact "on i n v e s m t  dacisions-that is, tha  a l loca t ion  of 
c a p i t a l  in our soc ie ty  in th. decade ahead." (The remainder believed 
that it would have a minirpll impact, no impact a t  a l l .  o r  were not sure . )  
c. No such consensus was found. hawaver, when these  groups were 
asked about the  appropriateness of t h i s  concern about r i s k .  A majority of 
the  top corporate  executives and a p l u r a l i t y  of lenders  believed that 
"American soc ie ty  is overly s e n s i t i v e  t o  risk." vhereaa a l a r g e  majority 
of Congressional representa t ives  and fede ra l  regula tors  believed t h a t  
"we ar. becoming more avare  of r i s k  and taking r e a l i s  t i c  precautions ." 
A s w l e  of the  public endorsed the  l a t t e r  statement over the foramr by 
78% - 15%. 
In s-ry, there  is great  agre-t t h a t  r i s k  decis ions  w i l l  have 
a major r o l e  in shaping our soc ie ty ' s  fu tu res  and that those decisions 
w i l l ,  in turn. be shaped by public perceptiona of r i sk .  There is, 
harever,  much disagreement about the appropriateness of those percep- 
t ions .  Sorne bel ieve  the  public t o  be v i se ;  o thers  do not. These contrary 
b e l i e f s  imply ra the r  d i f f a r e n t  r o l e s  f o r  public involvemsnt in r i s k  manage- 
nrant. As a r e s u l t ,  the  way in which t h i s  disagreement is resolved v i l l  
a f f e c t  not only the  f a t e  of p a r t i c u l a r  technologies, but  a l s o  tha  f a t e  
of our soc ie ty  and its s o c i a l  organization.  
The views about r i s k  perceptions given by t h e  respondents t o  t h i s  
p o l l ,  lllce those offered by other comenta to r s  on t h e  c o n t w o r a r y  scene, 
a r e ,  a t  bes t ,  based an intense, but unsystematic obsarvation. A t  worst, 
they represent  attempt6 t o  b ias  the  p o l i t i c a l  process by promulgating 
self-sarving be l i e fa .  Such happena, f o r  example, vhen one c l a i m  that 
people a r e  so  poorly informed (and uneducable) t h a t  they r a q d r e  pater- 
n a l h t i c  i ~ t i t u t i o n e  t o  defend tham o r  t h a t  they would ba b e t t e r  off  
s u r r d a r i n g  soma of t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  t o  technical  marts. It 
a160 happem, a t  tha  other  extrem, vhan one c l a i m  that people a r e  so 
v e l l  i n f o d  (and offered such freedom of choice) t h a t  they can fend 
f o r  themselves in t he  marketplace and need no gwcrnmantal protection.  
Lib speculations about chemical reactions, speculation6 about 
human nature  need t o  be d i sc ip l ined  by fac t .  To t h a t  end, various inves- 
t i g a t o r s  have been studyFng how and how v e l l  people th ink  about r i s k s .  
Although the  r e s u l t s  of t h a t  research a r e  not d e f i n i t i v e  a s  y e t ,  they 
do c l e a r l y  ind ica te  t h a t  a c a r e f u l  diagnosis is needed vhenever "the 
public" arid "the experts" appear t o  disagree.  It is seldom adequate 
t o  a t t r i b u t e  all such discrepancies a s  r e f l e c t i n g  publ ic  m i s p e r c e p t i o ~ .  
From a f a c t u a l  perspective,  t h a t  assumption Fs o f t e n  vrong; from a s o c i e t a l  
perspactive,  it Fs general ly  corrosive by encouraging d i s respec t  between 
the  p a r t i e s  involved. When the ava i l ab le  research da ta  do not allw one 
t o  make a confident diagnosis,  a sounder assumption is t h a t  the re  is some 
mathod in anyone's apparent madness. The present essay suggests some 
ways t o  f ind  t h a t  mthod.  Spec i f i ca l ly ,  i t  o f f e r s  six reasons vhy d is -  
agreemeats between the  public and the  exper ts  need no t  be in t e rp re t ed  a s  
c l a shes  between a c t u a l  and perceived r i s k s .  1 
Reason 1: The Dis t inc t ion  Between 
"Actual" and "Perceived" r i s k s  Is Misconceived 
Although the re  a r e  a c t u a l  risks, nobody knovs vhat  thay a r e .  All 
t h a t  anyone does h o w  about r islcs can be c l a s s i f i e d  as perceptions.  
Those a s s o r t i o m  t h a t  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  c a l l e d  "ac tua l  risks" (or  " fac ts"  
o r  "objec t ive  information") i nev i t ab ly  conta in  sow element of judgment 
on the  p a r t  of the  s c i e n t i s t s  vho produce them.2 That element is most 
m i n i m a l  vhen judgment FB needed only  t o  assess t he  competence of a part icu- 
lar study conducted wi th in  a n  e s t ab l i shed  p a r a d i p .  It grows a s  one needs 
t o  i n t e g r a t e  r r e u l t e  from d ive r se  studies.  o r  t o  ex t r apo la t e  r e s u l t s  from 
a domain in vhich thay a r e  r e a d i l y  obta lnabla  t o  another  domain i n  vhich 
they a r e  r e a l l y  needed (a.g.. from animal s t u d i e s  t o  human e f f e c t s ) .  
Judgment becomes a l l  vhen the re  a r e  no ( c red ib l e )  a v a i l a b l e  da t a ,  y e t  a 
po l i cy  dec i s ion  r equ i r e s  t h a t  same assessment of a p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t  be 
mpda . 
The exper t  op in iom t h a t  comprise the  s c i e n t i f i c  l i t e r a t u r e  a r e  
t y p i c a l l y  considered t o  be "objective" in two senses ,  ne i the r  of which 
can ever ba achieved abso lu te ly  and ne i the r  of which is the  exclus ive  
province of t echn ica l  exper ts .  One maaning of o b j e c t i v i t y  is reproduci- 
b f i i t y :  one expe r t  should be a b l e  t o  repeat  ano the r ' s  s tudy,  review 
a n c t h e r ' s  pro tocol ,  reanalyze ano the r ' s  da ta ,  o r  recap ano the r ' s  l i t e r a -  
t u r e  srlmmsrp and reach the  same conclusione about t he  size of an e f f e c t .  
Clear ly ,  aa the  r o l e  of jud-t increases  in any of these  opera t ions .  
t h e  r e s u l t s  become increas ingly  subjec t ive .  Typically,  one vould expect 
reproducibf i i ty  t o  decrease (and s u b j e c t i v i t y  t o  increase)  t o  the  ex ten t  
t h a t  a problem a t t r a c t s  s c i e n t i s t s  v i t h  d ive r se  t r a i n i n g  o r  t o  the  
ex tan t  tha t  the  f i e l d  ent rus ted  v i t h  a problem has ye t  to reach 8 consensus 
on b a s i c  i s sues  of methodology. 
The second sense of "objec t iv i ty"  means inumdty  t o  any inf luence  
by value  cons idera t ions .  b e ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of d a t a  should not  be 
biased by one's  p o l i t i c a l  viws o r  pecuniary i n t e r e s t s .  Applied sc iences  
n a t u r a l l y  have developad g rea t  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  such problems and a r a  ab le  
t o  invoke some pena l t i e s  f o r  de tec ted  v io l a t ions .  There is, hovever, 
l i t t l e  possibility of "regulating" the vays in which values  inf luence  
o t h e r  ac t s .  such a s  one's choice of t op ic s  t o  study o r  ignore. Some of 
these  choices might be s o c i a l l y  sanctioned,  i n  the sense t h a t  one ' s  values 
a r e  widely shared (e.g., deciding t o  s tudy cancer because it is an  impor- 
t a n t  problem); o the r  choicea might be more personal  (8.g.. n o t  studying 
an i s s u e  b e c a u e  one ' s  employer does no t  wish t o  have a troublesome 
d a t a  base crea ted  on tha t  topic) .  Although a c o d t m a n t  t o  separa t ing  
i s s u e s  of f a c t  from issuas  of va lue  is a fundamentd a spec t  of i n t e l l e c t u a l  
hygiene, a complete separa t ion  is never poss ib l e  (Bazalon. 1979; Fisch- 
hoff e t  al., in press ;   jobe erg, 1979). 
A t  times, t h i s  separa t ion  is not even desired-that happens vhen 
expe r t s  a r e  asked f o r  (or volunteer)  t h e i r  v i evs  on how r i s k s  should be 
managed. Because they mir questione of f a c t  and value ,  such views might 
be b e t t e r  thought of a s  the opinions of exper ts  r a t h e r  than a s  expert  
opin ions ,  a term t h a t  should be reserved f o r  expressions of subs t an t ive  
expe r t i s e .  Often t h e  reasons f o r  e l i c i t i n g  such opinions a r e  obscure. 
It vould seem a s  though members of the  publ ic  a r e  the  exper ts  vhen it 
comes t o  s t r i k i n g  the appropr ia te  t r adeof f s  between cos t s ,  r i s k s ,  and 
b e n e f i t s .  That expe r t i s e  is b e s t  tapped by surveys,  hear ings ,  and 
p o l i t i c a l  campaigns (Hammond & Adelman, 1976: Mazur, 1981). 
Of course,  t he re  is no al l-purpose publ ic  any more than the re  a r e  
al l-purpose exper ts .  The i d e a l  exper t  on a matter  of f a c t  has s tudied  
that p u t i c u l u  isaue and F. capable of rendering a properly qual i f ied 
opinion in a form useful  t o  decision malcars. Using the  same c r i t e r i a  
fo r  se lec t ing  value erpar ta  might lead me t o  pbilosophers, po l i t i c i ans .  
paychologists. sociologis ts ,  clergy, intervenors,  pundits,  shareholders. 
o r  bystanders. depending upon how those c r i t e r i a  ve re  in terpreted.  Thus. 
one muot amk. ''in what sauae," vh~hanever someone says. "upart" or  "public" 
(Schnrlburg, 1980; Thompson, 1980). W e  v i U  we  part" In tha ruuic-  
t i v e  s a m e  and "public" o r  "hypeupla" to  r e f e r  to.every onn dLse. including 
s d m t t t r  in th& pr iva te  l ives .  
W o n  2: Laypeople and & p e r t o  
Are TIUdng Different Langurgea 
h p l i c i t  r i a k  analyses u a  a f a i r l y  new addi t ion t o  the reper to i re  
of inteLlectual antarpr ises .  & a result, the  r i s k  exper ts  a r e  only 
beg in~dng  t o  reach coruensus on tesminology and methodology. Their corn- 
- 
mmicatioru t o  the  public are only beginning t o  u p r e s a  aome coherent 
perspect ive  and t o  halp the  public s o r t  out  the  v a r i e t y  of meanings t h a t  
"risk" could have (Crouch 6 Wilson, 1981). Experimental s tud ies  (Slovic. 
Piachhoff, and LFchtanatain, 1979; 1980) have indicated t h a t  vhen u p e r t  
r i s k  assessors a r e  aslcad t o  asseas  the "risk" of a technology on an unde- 
f ined scale, thay tend t o  respond v i t h  numbers tha t  approximate the number 
of recorded o r  estimated f a t a l i t i e s  in a typ ica l  year. When asked t o  
e s t i ~ n n t e  "average year f a t a l i t i e s , "  laypeople produce f a i r l y  similar 
numbers. Whan asked t o  asseas "risk," hwever ,  laypeople produce qu i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  r e s p o ~ s e s .  These estimates seem t o  be an amalgam of t h e i r  
average year f a t a l i t y  jud-ts, along v i t h  t h e i r  appra i sa l  of other 
features ,  such a s  a technology's catas t rophic  po ten t i a l  o r  the equity 
vith which ifs risks a r e  dis t r ibuted.  These catas t rophic  po ten t i a l  
judgments match thoae of the experts in some cases, but d i f f e r  in 
ochers (e.8.. nuclear pover). 
Oo s-tic grounds, words can mesn vhatever a population group 
van t s  them t o  mean, a s  long a s  t h a t  usage ia cons i s t en t  and does not  
obscure b p o r t a n t  substant ive  di f ferences .  On policy grounds, the choice 
of a d e f i n i t i o n  is a p o l i t i c a l  question regarding vhat a soc ie ty  should 
be concerned about vhui dealing vfth "risk." Whether ve  a t t a c h  spec ia l  
importance t o  po ten t in l  ca tas t rophic  losses  of Life  o r  convert such 
1oss.s t o  expected annual f a t a l i t i e s  (1.e.. by multiplpFng th. po tan t i a l  
l o s s  by i ts  annual probab t l i ty  of occurrence) and add them t o  the  rou t ine  
t o l l  l a  a value question-aa w u l d  be a decis ion t o  veight  those  rou t ine  
l o s s u  equal ly  r a the r  than giving added veight  t o  losses  among the  young 
(or .mong the  non-beneficiaries from a technology). 
For o ther  concepts that recur  in r i s k  discussiooa,  the  question of 
vhat  they do o r  should mcan ia coneidsrably murkier. It is of ten  argued, 
f o r  exaiuple, t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  standards of str ingeucy should apply t o  
vo lun ta r i ly  and involuntar t ly  incurred r isb  (e.g., S t a r r ,  1969). Heuce, 
fo r  example, ski ing could (o r  should) l eg i t ima te ly  be a more hazardous 
e n t e r p r i s e  than l i v i n g  belaw a major dam. Although the re  is general  
agreement among exper ts  and laypeople about the  voluntar iness  of food 
preservat ives  and ski ing,  o ther  technologies a r e  more problematic (Fisch- 
hoff a t  a l . ,  1978; SlovLc e t  a l . ,  1980). We have found considerable 
disagreement wi thin  expert  and l ay  groups in t h e i r  r a t i n g s  of the  volun- 
t a r i n e s s  of technologies such a s  p resc r ip t ion  a n t i b i o t i c s ,  colmnercial 
av ia t ion ,  hand guns and home appliances.  These disagreemeats may r e f l e c t  
d i f f e rences  In t he  reference groups considered; fo r  example, use of 
coamercial av la t ion  may be voluntary f o r  vacat ioners ,  but involuntary 
fo r  c e r t a i n  business people and s c i e n t i s t s .  O r  they may r e f l e c t  disagree- 
ments about the nature  of soc ie ty  o r  the  meaning of the  term. For example, 
each decis ion to  r i d e  In a c a r  may be vo lun ta r i ly  undertaken and may, i n  
pr inc ip le ,  be foregone ( i . e . ,  by not t r ave l ing  o r  by using an a l t euna t ive  
mode of t ranspor ta t ion) ;  but in a modern i n d u s t r i a l  socie ty ,  these a l t e r -  
nat ives  may be somewhat f i c t i t i o u e .  Indeed, i n  soma s o c i a l  and profcs- 
s i o u a l  s e t s ,  the decis ion t o  ski may have an involuntary aspect. Even 
if o m  makas a c l a a r l y  v o l i t i o n a l  decision, soma of tha r i s k s  t h a t  one 
aasumss voluntarf ly  may be ind i rec t ly  and Involuntar i ly  imposed on one's 
family or  the socie ty  tha t  rrmst pick up tha piecaa (e.g., pay f o r  hospital-  
i z a t i o n  dua to  s U g  accidents).  
Such d e f i n i t i o n a l  problems a r e  not  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  subject ive  terms 
such an voluntary. Even a technical  term such an "exposure" may be 
conaansudly defined f o r  scnm hazarda (e.g., medical x rays) but not  f o r  
o thers  (e.g., handguns). In such cases, the disagreements within q e r t  
and l ay  groups may ba a s  l a rge  a s  those between them. For debate t o  pro- 
ceed, one needs sorns generally accepted d e f i n i t i o n  f o r  aach important term- 
or  at  l a a s t  a good translating dictionary.  For debate t o  be useful,  one 
needs an e x p l i c i t  analysis  of vhather each concept, s o  defined, m a h  
a sens ib le  bas i s  f o r  policy.  Once they have been repeated o f ten  enough, 
ideas  such as the  importance of voluntariness o r  catas t rophic  po ten t i a l  
tend t o  assume a l i f e  of t h e i r  own. It does not go without saying t h a t  
socie ty  should s e t  a double standard on the bas i s  of voluntariness o r  
catas t rophic  po ten t i a l ,  hwever they a r e  defined. 
Reason 3: Laypeople and Experts 
Are Solving Different Problems 
Many debates tu rn  on vhethar the r i s k  associated with a pa r t i cu la r  
configuration of a technology Fs acceptable. Rasearch (Slovic, Fischhoff, 
& Lichtenstein,  1981) has found subs tan t i a l  disagreesnents not only betveen 
people belonging t o  d i f f e r e n t  population groups, but a l s o  v i t h i n  groups 
vhen the question is posed in d i f f e r e n t  vays. Although these disagreements 
may be in te rp re ted  aa r e f l e c t i n g  conf l ic ted s o c i a l  values o r  confused 
individual  values,  c lose r  -tion suggests t h a t  tho a c c e p t a b l c r i s k  
question i t s e l f  may be poorly f o d a t e d .  
To ba precise ,  one doas not accept r i sks .  One accepts optione t h a t  
e n t a i l  solpa l e v e l  of r i s k  m u g  t h e i r  consaquances. Whenever the  decision- 
making process has considered benef i t s  o r  o ther  (non-risk) cos t s ,  t he  
m e t  accaptable option need not be the  one with the  l e a s t  r iek .  Lndeed, 
one might choose (o r  accept) tha option v i t h  t h e  highest  r i s k  i f  i t  had 
rnough compensating benef i ts .  The a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of an option depends 
upon its f u l l  s a t  of re levant  pos i t ive  and negat ive  conrraquencee (Fisch- 
hoff a t  al., Ln press) .  
Ln t h i s  l i g h t ,  the  term "accaptable r i sk"  I s  F l l d e f i n e d ,  without 
speci fying the  opt ions  and consequences t o  ba considered. Once options 
and consequences a r e  mpecif i ed ,  "acceptable r isk"  mlght ba used t o  denote 
the  r i s k  associa ted v i t h  the w e t  acceptable a l t e rna t ive .  When using t h a t  
designation,  i t  may be quf te  d i f f i c u l t  t o  remember hov context dependent 
it in. Tnat is, people may disagree about the "acceptabi l i ty  of r i sks"  
not  only because they disagrea on hov t o  evaluate  the  consequences ( i . e . ,  
they have d i f f e r e n t  values) ,  but a l so  because they disagree  about what 
consequences and opt ions  a r e  t o  be considered. 
A number of vell-known policy debates might be specula t ively  a t t r i b u t e d ,  
a t  l e a s t  in p a r t ,  t o  d i f f e r i n g  conceptions of what t h e  s e t  of poss ible  
options is. For example, the r i s k s  (or poss ible  r i s k s )  of saccharin may 
look unacceptable vhen compared v i t h  che r i s k s  of ( t h e  option of) l i f e  
v i thout  sweeteners. They may, hovever, seem more pa la tab le  vhen the only 
a l t e r n a t i v e  opt ion considered is another sveetener t h a t  appears to  be 
more cos t ly  and more risky. Or, nuclear pover may seem acceptable vhen 
compared with a l t e r n a t i v e  sources of generating e l e c t r i c i t y  (with t h e i r  
r i s k s  and c o s t s ) ,  but not so acceptable vhen aggressive conservation is 
addad t o  the  option sa t .  Technical people from the nuclear Fndustrp'seem 
t o  p re fe r  the oarrwer daf in i t ions  of the  p rob leq  parhaps becarua 
they l ike  the  l i g h t  i t  cos t s  on t h e i r  energy source, parhaps bacausa they 
prefer  t o  concautrate on the kinds of solutions most within t h e i r  do-in 
of u p e r t t s a .  Citizens involved in enargy debates may f o a l  themselves 
l a s s  o a r r w l y  b o d ;  they may a l s o  be more comfortable with solut ions  such 
a s  consanration t h a t  require  t h e i r  kind of exper t isa  (Biclrarstaffe 6 
Pearcm, 1980). 
People who agree about the  fircts and share.conmon v a l u a  
may s U  dleagree about . tha  accep tab i l i ty  of risb because 
they have d i f f e r a n t  notions about which of those values a r e  re levant  t o  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  decis ion problem. W p a r t i e s  may think that equity is a good 
thing in general without a l s o  agreeing t h a t  energy pol icy is t h e  proper 
arena f o r  resolving iocqui t ies .  For emuuplo, s w  may f e e l  t h a t  both those 
new inequ i t i e s  cawed by a technology and those old ones epdemlc t o  a 
soc ie ty  a r e  bas t  handled separate ly  (e.g.. through the  cour ts  o r  with incomes 
po l i c ias )  . 
Thru, when laypeople and u p a r t s  d isagree  about the acceptability 
of a r i s k ,  one must always consider the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  they a r e  addressing 
d i f f e r e n t  problems, with d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  o r  a d i f f e r e n t  
s a t  of re levant  consaquences. bssumlng tha t  each group has a f u l l  under- 
standing of the  implications of its favord .p rob lem def in i t ion ,  the choice 
betveen d e f i n i t i o n s  is a p o l i t i c a l  question. When the publ ic ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  
is  adopted in whole o r  in par t ,  then t h i s  aspact of public perceptions 
has been a c c d a t e d  in the decision-making process without any spec i f i c '  
component of t h a t  process being labeled as such (Sta l len,  1980). 
Reaaon 4: Debates over Substance 
May Dimguise Battlu over Form-arrd Vice Versa 
In most p o l i t i c a l  a rema ,  the  conclwion of one b a t t l e  o f t en  s e t s  
soma of tha  initial c o n d i t i o ~  of its eucceaaor. Insofar  as r i s k  manage- 
m n t  decimimeareshaping the  economic and p o l l t i c a l  fu tu re  of a country, 
they a r e  too inrportant t o  be l e f t  t o  r i s k  managers ( w e ,  1980). When 
people from outs ide  the r i s k  co-ity enter  i n t o  r i s k  b a t t l e s ,  they may 
t r y  t o  master the  technical  d e t a i l s ,  o r  they may concentrate on m n i t o r i n g  
a d  a h p i n g  the  r i s k  management procasa i t s e l f .  The l a t t e r  s t r a tegy  may 
ucploi t  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  axpertime and keep them from being outclassed (or  
mialead) on technical i a a e a .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e i r  concern about the  magni- 
tude of a rimk may energa in the  form of carping about tha vay it is 
studied. Thcy may be quick t o  c r i t i c i z e  any r i s k  assessment t h a t  does 
not have such features  as aager peer reviev, ready acknowledgement of un- 
ce r ta in ty ,  or. e a s i l y  access ible  documentation. Eva i f  those features  a r e  
consonant with good research, s c i e n t i s t s  may resent  being to ld  by laypeople 
hov t o  conduct t h e i r  bruinass even -re thaa they resent  being told  by 
novicea w h a t  various r i s k s  r e a l l y  are.  
Lay a c t i v i s t s '  c r i t i q u e s  of the  r i s k  asaessmont process may be no 
l e s s  i r r i t a t i n g ,  but somewhat l e s s  r ead i ly  ignored, vhan they focus on the  
vay i n  vhich s c i e n t i s t s '  agendas a r e  s e t .  As veteran protagonists i n  
hazard -nagement s t ruggles  know, vi thout  s c i e n t i f i c  information, it may 
be hard t o  arouse and sus ta in  concern about an i ssue,  t o  a l l a y  inappro- 
p r i a t e  fea r s ,  o r  t o  achieve enough c e r t a i n t y  t o  j u s t i f y  any act ion.  How- 
ever,  information is, by and l a rge ,  created only i f  someone has a (pro- 
f e s s i o ~ a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  or  economic) use fo r  it. Thus, v e  may knov something 
only i f  someone i n  a posit ion to  decide f e e l s  that it is ~ r C h  awing. 
Doam (1978) proposal t h ~ t  lack of i n t a r e s t  in the f a t e  of workers is 
rasponsibla f o r  tho lack of rosearch on tho risks of uranimu mining; Neym~~n 
(1979) wondered whether tho s p e c i a l  concern avrr r ad ia t ion  hazards ham 
r e s t r i c t e d  tho study of c h d c r l  cardnogene; C-nor (1979) accuaed o i l  
intuasts of preventing tho rosearch t h a t  could as tpb l i sh  so la r  p w a r  as 
a e b l o  energy option. I n  soma s i t u r t i o n s ,  howledge is so  specia l ized 
that all ra lovant  axparts may be in t ha  employ of a tochnologp's p r m t o r a ,  
luving no o m  compata~ t  t o  discovar troublesoma f a c t s  (Gdble ,  1978). 
Whothu tho cause ia fads  o r  f inances,  f a i l u r e  t o  study p a r t i c u l a r  topics  
can t hvo t t  p u t i c u l u  p u t i o s  and may lead tham t o  i q u g n  the sc ien tFf ic  
procans . 
A t  tho o the r  ext ra ,  dobatos about p o l i t i c a l  processan may undorlie 
d b p u t a n  that a r e  oetenaibly about s c i e n t i f i c  f ac t s .  Aa mantioned e a r l i e r ,  
tha d o f i n i t i o n  of an a c c e p t a b l e r i s k  problem circumscribes the e a t  of re le-  
vant f a c t s ,  consequences and options. This agenda s e t t i n g  is often so  
p w u f u l  t h n t  a decis ion haa o f f e c t i v d y  b a a  d e  once tha d e f i n i t i o n  
a s a t .  Indeed, tho off ic i .1  d e f i n i t i o n  of a problem may precluda ona 
from & a c i n g  one's  point  of viev in a balanced faahion. Consider, f o r  
axample, an Fndivldual who ia opposed t o  increased energy consumption but 
only askad about which energy source t o  adopt. The -err t o  these  
n a r r o w  quantiona provida a de  fac to  anawer t o  the broader question of 
growth. Such an individual  may have l i t t l e  choice but t o  f i g h t  d i r t y ,  
engaging in u n c o n s t ~ c t i v e  c r i t i c i sm,  poking holes in ~ n a l y s a e  supporting 
o the r  p o s i t i o m ~ ,  o r  r id icu l ing  opponents who adhere t o  the  nure n a r r w  
de f in i t ion .  This apparently i r r a t i o n a l  b e b e o r  can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  the 
r a t i o n a l  pursu i t  of o f f i c i a l l y  unreasonable object ives .  
Another source of da l ibe ra te ly  unreasonable behavior a r i s e s  vhen 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  in technology debates a r e  in i t  f o r  the  f i g h t .  Hany approaches 
t o  determining acceptable-risk l e v e l s  (e.g., cost-benefit  analyses) make 
the pol i t ical - ideological  asrumption t h a t  our society  F. s u f f i c i e n t l y  
coheriva and ccmmcm-goaled tha t  i ts  problems can be tasolved by remaon 
a d  without stuggle. Although such a "gat on with bushtars" o r ien ta t ion  
will be pleasing to  many, i t  d l  not s a t i s f y  all. For those who do 
not believe tha t  society ia in a fine-tuning s tage,  a technique t h a t  f a u s  
to  w b F l i z e  public cooaciournass and Fmrolvement has l i t t l e  t o  recrnmend 
it. Their s t ra tegy  may Involve a calculated a t t ack  on what thay in te rpre t  
an narravly defined ra t iona l i ty .  
A variant  on t h i s  theme occurs when par t i c ipan ts  w i l l  accept any 
process u long as i t  does not lsad t o  a decbion.  Delay, par re ,  may 
be the  goal of those vho wish t o  praseme soma s t a t u s  quo. These may 
include enviromwntalista who do not vant a project  t o  be begun o r  indus- 
trialists who do not vant it t o  be regulated. An ef fac t iva  way of thvarting 
p rac t ica l  decisions i s t o  h i s t  on the highest standards of s c i e n t i f i c  r igor .  
Reason 5: Laypeople and Experts 
Disagree about What Is Feasible 
Laypeople a r e  of ten berated f o r  misdirecting t h e i r  e f f o r t s  when they 
choose r i s k  issues  on which to  focus t h e i r  energies. However, a more 
ca re fu l  diagnosis can of ten suggest a number of defensible s t r a t e g i e s  
for  s e t t i n g  p r i o r i t i e s .  For example, Zentner (1979) c r i t i c i z e s  the public 
because i t s  r a t e  of concern about cancer (as measured by newspaper coverage) 
F. increasing f a s t e r  than the cancer ra te .  One reasouable arplaaation 
f o r  t h i s  pat tern is that  people may believe chat too l i t t l e  concern has 
been given to cancer Fn the past (e.g., our concern f o r  acute hazards 
like t r a f f i c  sa fe ty  and infect ious  disease allowed cancer to creep up 
on us). A second is tha t  people may r e a l i z e  tha t  some forms of cancer 
a r e  the  only atajor causes of death whose r a t e s  a re  increasing. 
Systematic obsarvation and questioning a r a ,  of course,  needed t o  tall 
vhether thesa  r p e c u h t i o n a  a r e  accura te  (and whather t h e  assumption of 
r a t i o n a l i t y  holds in this p a r t i c u l a r  case).  F a h e  p o s i t i v e s  in  divining 
peopla 's  underlying r a t i o n a l i t y  can be as daleterioucl as f a l s e  negatives.  
Erromously  assuming that they undarstand an Fasua m y  deny them a needed 
education; erroneously asaumlng that they do no t  understand may deny 
thrm a naeded hearing. Pending syst-tic s tud ies ,  thesa  e r r o r  r a t e s  
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  da tamined  l n r g d y  by t h e  r a t i o P r l i e t  o r  e w t i o n a l i s t  
c a s t  of one 's  eew of human natura.  
In l i e u  of d a t a  about s p e c i f i c  cases,  perhaps the most reasonable 
g u m r a l  assumption Fa that paopla 'r  inveammat in probl- ia da tamined  
by t h a i r  f a d i n g s  of personal ef f icacy.  That Fa, they do not g a t  Frnrolved 
unles8 thay f a d  t h a t  t b y  can make a d i f f e ranca ,  p e r s o d l y  o r  coLLectively. 
In t h i s  l i g h t ,  t h e i r  decFaiorramking process Fa dominated by a concern 
t h a t  is known t o  dominate o ther  psychological  processes:  perceived fee l ings  
of c o n t r o l  (Seligman, 1975). be a r e s u l t ,  people vill d d i b e r a t e l y  ignore  
amjor problmna if they s e e  no p o s s i b i l i t y  of a f f e c t i v e  ac t ion ;  some 
reasone vhy they might r e j e c t  a change of "misplaced p r i o r i t i e s "  vhen they 
neglect  a h a r d  t h a t  poaes a l a r g e  r i s k :  
(a) Tha hazard is needed and has no s u b s t i t u t e s ;  
(b) The hazard is needed and has only r i s k i e r  s u b s t i t u t e s ;  
(c) No feao ib le  s c i e n t i f i c  study can y i e l d  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  c l e a r  and 
h c o n t r o v e t t i b l e  signal t o  l eg i t ima te  ac t ion;  
(d) The hazard is d i s t r i b u t e d  na tu ra l ly ,  hence cannot be control led;  
(e)  No one e l s e  is worried about the  r i s k  i n  quest ion,  hence, no one 
w i l l  heed messages of danger o r  be re l ieved by evidence of s a f e t y ;  
( f )  No one is empowered t o  o r  a b l e  t o  a c t  on t h e  b a s i s  of evidence 
about r i s k .  
Thus, tho p r o b l m  tha t  a c t i v e l y  concern pooplo need no t  be those 
whose reso lu t ion  they f e e l  should rank highest  on soc ie ty ' s  p r i o r i t i e s .  
For uample ,  one may aclrnovledge t h a t  the  expected deaths from automobile 
accidents  w a r  the  next century a r e  f a r  g rea te r  than those expected from 
nuclaar p w e r ,  ye t  st i l l  be a c t i v e  only in f igh t ing  nuclear p w e r  out of 
the  conviction that "Hore, I can make a d i f ference.  This  indust ry  is on 
tha  ropes now. It's *ortaut t o  move i n  f o r  the  k i l l  before i t  becomas 
am i n d i s p ~ i b l o  to  America socie ty  a s  automobfik t ranspor ta t ion."  
Where the  p r i o r i t i e s  of exports and laypeople d i f f e r ,  i t  moy a n t  
r e f l e c t  disagreements about tho s i z e  of risks, but d i f f e r i a g  opinions 
on what can be dona about them. At times, t h e  technical  knovledge o r  can-do 
perspect ive  of tho exper ts  may lead them t o  s e a  a broader range of f e a s i b l e  
ac t ions .  At o ther  times, faypeople moy f e e l  that they can exercise  the  
p o l i t i c a l  c l o u t  needed t o  m o b  some opt ions  happen, whereas the  exper ts  
f e e l  constrained t o  doing what they a r e  paid for .  I n  s t i l l  other  cases. 
both groups may be s i l e n t  about very Large p rob lem because they s e e  no 
optione. That might be the -st c h a r i t a b l e  explanation of the  r e l a t i v e  
s i l e n c e  of s c i e n t i s t s  and c i t i z e n s  regarding the  t h r e a t  of nuclear war. 
Reason 6: Laypeople and Experts 
See the  Facts Different ly  
There a r e ,  of course, s i t u a t i o n s  in which disputes  between laypeople 
a d  exper ts  cannot be  traced t o  disagreements about objectivity, terminology, 
problem def in i t iooe ,  process or  f e a s i b i l i t y .  Having eliminated those 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  one may assume the  tvo groups r e a l l y  do see  the  f ac t s  of 
the  matter d i f f e ren t ly .  Given t h a t  laypeople and exper ts  a r e  ta lk ing about 
the  same thing,  it may be useful  to d i s t ingu i sh  between two s i tua t iooe :  
those in vhfch laypeople have no source of information other  than the 
exper ts ,  and those in which they do have such sources. The reasonableness 
of diaagresmarto and t he  a t tendant  policy implications look q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
In  each c u e .  
Hov might Laypeople hove no aourca of information other  than the  
exper ts ,  yet  coma t o  a00 the f a c t a  d i f f e r e n t l y ?  Ona vay l a  f o r  the  
exper ts '  uuaoage not  t o  ge t  through I n t a c t ,  perhapa bacause: (a) the 
a p e r t a  o r e  unconcarnd about d i sae r inn t ing  t h e i r  knawladga o r  hea i t an t  
t o  do s o  b a a s u e  of ita t m t a t i v e  nature;  (b) only a biased por t ion of the  
exper ts '  i n f o r m t i o n  geta out ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  v b n  the  s a l a c t i o n  hns bean 
influauced by thoae i n t e r e a t d  in c rea t ing  a p a r t i c u h r  impraseion; 
(c) tho =soage get.  garblad in transmiasion, perhapa due t o  ill-informed 
o r  a u r r a t i o l u l l a t  joumalbta; (d) th. m s s a g e  ge t s  garblad .upon reception,  
a i t h e r  because it wan poorly expl ica ted o r  because t h e  r ec ip ien t s  lacked 
tho t echn ica l  b u i s  f o r  uudars tud ing  i t  (Friedman, 1981; Eanley, 1980; 
Nelkin, 1971) . 3 
A second vay of goIng a s t r a y  is t o  mis in te rp re t  no t  the  subatance, 
but tha process of science. For v l e ,  unlcsa an  observer has reason 
t o  bal leva  otharvlse ,  i t  might seem s e n s i b l e  t o  t h a t  the  w u n t  
of s c i e n t i f i c  a t t e n t i o n  paid t o  a r i s k  Fe a good measure of its importance. 
Science can, however, be -re complicated than that, vlth researchers  going 
vhere the  contracts ,  l h e l l g h t ,  b lue  ribbon panals,  o r  ju icy controversies 
a re .  In t h a t  l i g h t  (and in hindsight) ,  sc ience may have done a disaerrrice 
t o  public understanding by the excessive a t t e n t i o n  i t  paid t o  saccharin. 
A sac& aspact  of the s c i e n t i f i c  process t h a t  mny cauee confusion Is its 
f requent ly  d i spu ta t ious  nature. It may be a l l  too easy f o r  obaemers  t o  
f e e l  tha t  "Ff the  exper ts  c a n ' t  agree, my guess mny be as good as t he i r s "  
(Elandler, 1980). O r ,  they may f e e l  j u s t i f i e d  In pickiag the expert  of 
t h e i r  choice,  perhaps on spariourigrounds, such as asser t iveness ,  eloquence, 
o r  p o l i t i c a l  views. Lndeed, we suspect that i t  is seldom the  case  t h a t  
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of l a y  opinions on an Issue  doas not  w e r l a p  a t  l e a a t  a 
por t ion of the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of a r p e r t  opinions. A t  the  o the r  axtreme. 
laypeople m ~ y  be baff led  by the v e i l  of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  
o f t e n  c a s t  o v u  t h e i r  w r k .  All too o f t en ,  audiencw may be w e d  more 
by tvo-fisted debators (angar t o  m h  d e f i n i t i v e  statements)  than by 
two-handed s c i e n t i s  ts (saying "on the  one hand X, b u t  on the  o the r  hand 
Y," in an e f f o r t  t o  achieve balance).  
In arch of the re  casea,  t h e  dsundar r t ami ing  is excusable, i n  the 
Sanaa chat it nead not  r n f l e c t  poorly on t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  of the  publ ic  
o r  on iu a b i l i t y  t o  govern i t s e l f .  It, however, would seam hard t o  
j u s t i f y  u i n g  the  publ ic ' s  view of the  f a c t s  Fnatsod of o r  in add i t ion  
t o  the eapar t s '  view. A =re reasonable s t r a t e g y  w u l d  seem t o  be 
at tumpts a t  education. Thwe attampts would be d is t inguished from attempts 
a t  propaganda by allowing f o r  two-way commnication, that  is, by being 
open t o  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  even vhen laypeople appear misinformed, 
they m y  s t i l l  have some defens ible  reason f o r  see ing th ings  d i f f e r e n t l y  
than do the -arts. 
For laypeople t o  d i s a g r ~  reasonably, they w u l d  have t o  have some 
independent source  of knowledge. What might t h a t  be? One p o s s i b i l i t y  
i e  that they have a b e t t e r  overview on s c i e n t i f i c  debates  than do the  
a c t i v e  pa r t i c ipan t s .  Laypeople m y  s e e  t h e  f u l l  range of exper t  opinions 
and h e s i t a t i o n s ,  bmnme t o  the temptations o r  pressures  t h a t  a c t u a l  deba- 
t o r s  might f e d  t o  f a l l  i n t o  one camp and t o  d i s c r e d i t  skep t i c s '  opinions. 
In  add i t ion ,  laypeople may not f e e l  bound by the  gene ra l ly  accepted assump- 
t i o n s  about the  na tu re  of the  vor ld  and t he  v a l i d i t y  of methodologies t h a t  
every d i s c i p l i n e  adopts in order  t o  go about i ts  business.  They m y  have 
been around long enough t o  note t h a t  many of t h e  conf ident  s c i e n t i f i c  b e l i e f s  of 
yesterday a r e  coPfidently r e j ec ted  today (Frankel, 1974). Such l a y  skep- 
t i c l am would suggest  expanding the confidence intervals around the  
exper t s '  bes t  guess a t  t he  s i z e  of t h e  r i s k s .  
Final ly ,  thera  a r a  s i t u a t i o n s  in vhich the public,  aa a ruult of 
i ts  l i f a  e x p u i a n c u ,  i. privy t o  information that hu ucapad  tha exper ts  
(Brokanaha, War~en, 6 Wemat. 1980). To taka th ree  -1u: (1) The 
I h c K a u i e  Valey P i p a l h a  (or Bergu)  Inquiry discovared that aat ivea  of 
rhe  f a r  w r t h  lmmw thingn about the  r i s k a  c r a t e d  by ica-pack movamnt 
and mu-bad scouring th t  ware tmhovn t o  the  p ipe l ine ' s  plnnnrrs 
(Gamble. 1978). (2) Post-occidurt analyses of t -  r m u l  that the  oper- 
a t o r s  of at chi nu ware ~ u e  of problem that t he  d e s i g n u s  of thosa 
mnchhas had miasad (Shuidon, 1980). (3) S c i u r t i r t s  may shy m y  from 
studying behavioral  o r  psychological e f f e c t s  (8.g.. dizzyness, teaaion) 
that a r e  hard t o  mamare, y e t  s t i l l  are q u i t e  apparant t o  the  individuals  
who s u f f u  from than. In such cases, l a y  pucep t iono  of r i s k  should 
influanca the a x p u t s '  r i s k  u t h t e s .  
Conclusion 
There are many raabloee f o r  laypeople and exper ts  t o  disagree.  These 
include misunderstanding, mlscommmication, and misinformation. Discerning 
rhe c a w a s  u n d u l y i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  disagreement requiran a combination of 
(a) ca re fu l  thought, t o  c l a r i f y  j u s t  w h a t  Fe being ta lked about and 
vhather agreement is possible  given rho disputants '  d i f f e r i n g  fr-s of 
reference,  a d  (b) ca re fu l  research.to c l a r i f y  j u t  what it i. t h a t  the  
various p a r t i e s  lmw and believe.  Once the  s i t u a t i o n  has been c l a r i f i e d ,  
rho underlying problem can be diagnosed aa c a u i n g  f o r  a scientific. 
educational,  emmantic, o r  p o l i t i c a l  solution.  
The m a t  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o e e  w i l l  be those in which the  pa r t i c i -  
pants cannot agree on vhat the problem Fe (and have no recourse t o  an 
Fne t i tu t ion  t h a t  vFll resolve  the  question by a r b i t r a t i o n  or by f i a t ) ,  
and those in vhich education is cal led  fo r ,  ye t  f a i l s  ( a f t e r  same reasonable, 
d i l i g e n t  e f f o r t ) .  Policy makers then face  the  hard choice e i t h i r  of going 
a g a i n s t  t h e i r  own b e t t a r  judgment by us ing  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  assessment of r i s k  
( i n  vhich they do no t  be l i eve )  o r  of going a g a i n s t  t h e  pub l i c ' s  f e e l i n g s  
by imposing p o l i c i e e  t h a t  will be  d i s l i ked .  Such p o l i c i e s  m y  sean  over ly  
c a u t i o w  (e.g., nmorcyc le  h e h t  laws--to so- people) o r  i n 8 u f f i c i m t l y  
caut ioua  (e.g.,  nuclear  pwer-to some people). When f e a r s  are ignored. 
t h e  r e s u l t  can  be stress o r  psychoeomatic e f f e c t s ,  vhich can  be as real 
Fn t h e i r  impact a s  they a r e  i l l u s o r y  in t h e i r  source.  When s t r o n g  pub l i c  
opinion8 a r e  ignored,  t he  result can be h o s t i l i t y ,  m i s t r u s t ,  a d  a l i ena t ion .  
S ince  a s o c i e t y  does -re than  manage rislce, t h e  po l i cy  maker must consider 
whether t h e  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  t o  be  gained by opt imiz ing  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of 
resources in a p a r t i c u l a r  dec i s ion  is  g r e a t e r  than the s o c i a l  c o s t s  of 
ove r r id ing  a concerned public.  A pess imi s t i c  v i e v  on "going wi th  t h e  
public' '  might argue t h a t  "it only encourages t h e  fo rces  of i r r a t i o n a l i t y  
(Fnd i r ec t ly  g iv ing  credence t o  a s t ro logy ,  supe r s t i t i on ,  and t h e  l i k e )  ." 
An o p t i m i s t i c  view might be t h a t  r i s k  ques t ions  a r e  going t o  be v l t h  us 
f o r  a long time. For a s o c i e t y  t o  d e a l  v i t h  them v i s e l y ,  it must l e a r n  
about t h e i r  s u b t l e t i e s .  inc luding  h w  appearances can be deceiving.  One 
way of l e a r n i n g  is by t r i a l  and e r r o r .  Often, t h e  expe r t s  v i l l  be a b l e  t o  
say  "ve t o l d  you so .  It would have been b e t t e r  t o  l i s t e n  t o  us." In 
o t h e r  cases .  they may be surpr ised .  Learning is  p o s s i b l e  a s  long a s  some 
b a s i c  r e spec t  remains between teacher  and pupil .  That  r e spec t  may be one 
of a s o c i e t y ' s  greatest assets. 
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Ipul1.r u r p o s i t i o ~ e  of the  research upon which this sumnary is based may be 
found i n  sources such M Fischhoff, Slovic,  6 Lichtenatcin (1980; 1981). 
Grsan (1981). Slovic,  Fischhof f .  6 Lichtenste in  (1980). Vlek 6 Sta l l en  
(1980), and Warner 6 Sla te r  (1981). 
%om this perspective,  t h e  t i t l e  of t h i s  conference. "The Analysis of 
Actual vs.  Parceived &k." is a misnomer. A more accurate ,  and more 
cl-y t i t l e ,  would be "The Analysis of Risks a s  Perceived by Ranking 
S c i e n t i s t s  wi thin  Their Field  of Expertise vs. a s  Perceived by Anybody 
Else. " 
%or example. Lord b t h s c h i l d  (1978) has noted t h a t  the BBC does not  l i k e  
t o  t rouble  its l i s t e n e r s  v i t h  the confidence i n t e r v a l s  surrounding 
technical  ee t b n t e s  . 

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RISK: 
T H E  ASSESSMENT OF THREAT A N D  CONTROL' 
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TNO-Apeldoorn, The Netherlands 
A. Tomas 
Universiry of Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
From a psychological point of view the assessment of risks associated with technologies 
is often a complex process. This paper discusses two models for studying how individuals 
judge the risk associated with being exposed to particular hazards. The following ques- 
tions are specifically addressed by these approaches: How do individuals represent the risk 
activity? Are there systematic biases involved? The analysis of data shows that individuals 
are not so much concerned with estimating uncertainty parameters of a physical or mate- 
rial system as they are with estimating the uncertainty involved in their exposure to the 
threat and in opportunities to influence or control this exposure. 
'Paper prepared for the International School of Technological Risk Assessment, Erice-Sicily, 20-31 
May 1981. Reprinted by permission o f  the copyright holders: Sijthoff 81 Noordhoff Publishers, Alphen 
aan den Rijn. The Netherlands. This paper reports major parts of the theoretical foundation of an 
ongoing extensive indepth study of people's reaction t o  technological threat. This study is sponsored 
by the Dutch Ministry o f  Health and Environmental Hygiene. Ministry of Social Affairs, TNO and 
the Openbear Lichaam Rijnmond. We benefited greatly by discussing our ideas with Roel Meertens, 
Peter Stringer, Pieter Defares and Charles Vlek, who all made extensive comments on an earlier draft. 
"Technologica l  hazards a r e  b i g  business", H a r r i s s ,  Hohenemser & Kates 
(1978) conclude.  Compared t o  such ma jo r  s e c t o r s  o f  n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t s  as 
s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  programs, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and n a t i o n a l  defense. t e c h n o l o g i c -  
a l  hazards and t h e i r  management r e q u i r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  l a r g e  amounts o f  
money. Tu l  l e r  (1978) es t imated  the  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  and damage c o s t s  due t o  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  hazards t o  be 98,O - 180,o b i l l i o n s  o f  $ i n  US f i s c a l  year  
1974. H a r r i s s  e t  a l .  (1978) c o n v i n c i n g l y  argue t h a t  the hazards o f  tech-  
no logy  have i n  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s  rep laced  n a t u r a l  hazards o f  f l o o d s ,  
p e s t i l e n c e  and d isease  (see Tab le  1 ) .  
I f  f o r  no o t h e r  reasons, t h e  expend i tu res  and losses  due t o  technology 
a r e  d e s e r v i n g  the  a t t e n t i o n  they  a r e  r e c e i v i n g .  E s p e c i a l l y  f rom the  s i d e  
o f  government and i n d u s t r y  t h e r e  i s  an u r g e n t  need f o r  a  b e t t e r  s c i e n t i f i c  
understanding o f  s a f e t y  problems o f  complex t e c h n o l o g i c a l  systems. 
L e t  us assume t h a t  such a  s c i e n t i f i c  i n t e r e s t  
o f f e r s  the  most a p p r o p r i a t e  approach t o  model - and so c o n t r o l  - t e c h n o l o g i c -  
a l  u n c e r t a i n t y .  Our i n t e r e s t  i n  r i s k  assessment then concerns two d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e l s  o f  d e c i s i o n  making about technology:  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  and persona l  cho ice .  
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a. Nature and  t=hnologv are lath i m o l i u l r d  i n  m a i l  hazards. The  d iv is ion 1ha1 is made here 
is made b y  the p r i n c ~ o a l  c n u u l  aprnt. h i c k .  panicu lar ly  l o r  natura l  haaarda, can  usually M 
;drnrnficd unamb iguou~ lv .  
6. Cont;tcs o f  gmohysica l  avenn  I l loods. d r w g h t .  tropical cyclonrs, e l n h q u a k * ~  and soil 
nos ion l :  o r g a ~ i s m %  m a t  a t o c k  crop,. f o rn t s .  l i r n t g c k :  and b e l a r i a  and v l m ~ e s  wh ich  in fect  
humans. I n  e e  U.S. m e  social c o n  o f  each o f  fhaae lources is roughly  raual .  
c Basrd o n  0 broad de f i n i t i on  o f  t u h n o l o g i a l  causation. *a d i u u u e d  i n  the text. 
d. Social costs inc lude p r o m  brrugc, 10s- o f  p roduc t i v i f y  f r o m  i l lncrs o r  d u r h ,  and zh* 
cos:s o f  con t ro l  ad ius rmanu  f o r  provenzing damage. m i t l m t i n p  conupuencns.  o r  J ~ a r i n g  losur .  
a E~.ciudes c n i m a t a ~  o f  p r o d u c t i v i w  lo ts  b y  ill-. d i u b l n m r n t .  o r  danth. 
I. N o  rysternatic ~ t u d y  o f  t r c h m l o p i o l  h a u r d s  in dr .e lop ingcountr ic r  Is k n o w n  to us. but 
m r spec t  t hem t o  approach o r  a x c m d  U.S. I a e l s  i n  heavi ly u r b n i z d  r r r u .  
Table 1 .  Comparat ive hazard sources i n  U.S. and deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s  
(source:  H a r r i s s  e t  a l .  1978) .  
As p s y c h o l o g i s t ,  we f e e l  more competent i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  l a t t e r  
and leave the  area o f  c o l l e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  making about technology t o  
o t h e r d i s c i p l  i n e s  I i k e  po l  i c y  sc ience,  s o c i o l o g y ,  and w e l f a r e  economy1) 
However, i n  as f a r  as p o l i t i c i a n s  and e x p e r t s  too  a r e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n  
makers, o u r  paper may w e l l  c o n t a i n  r e l e v a n t  d a t a  t o  t h e i r  way o f  express-  
i n g  p re fe rences  and hand l ing  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k s .  As S l o v i c ,  F ischho f f  & 
L i c h t e n s t e i n  (1976) noted,  p o l i c y  makers when asked t o  "weigh t h e  b e n e f i t s  
a g a i n s t  t h e  r i skc" 
" o f t e n  have h i g h l y  s o p h i s t ~ c a t e d  methods a t  t h e i r  d i s p o s a l  f o r  ga ther -  
i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  about  problems o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s o l u t i o n s .  
When i t  comes t o  making d e c i s i o n s ,  however, they  t y p i c a l l y  f a l l  back 
upon t h e  technique which has been r e l i e d  upon s i n c e  a n t i q u i t y - i n t u i t i o n .  
1 )  I t  appears t o  us t h a t  t h i s  area o f  e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  processes 
i s  much i n  need o f  sys temat i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  For one t h i n g ,  i t  would be 
impor tan t  t o  s tudy  how qua1 i t a t  i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  (e.g.  Wynne, 1980) c o u l d  
b e n e f i t  from formal mathemat ica l  a n a l y s i s  o f  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  mechanisms. 
One c e n t r a l  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  bo th  approaches seem t o  reach i n  common i s  
t h a t  s o c i a l  cho ice  processes shou ld 'essen t  i a l  l y  be about a1 t e r n a t i v e  o p t i o n s .  
I n  t h e i r  remarkable e f f o r t  t o  c r i t i c a l l y  rev iew e x i s t i n g  s o c i a l  cho ice  
mechani sms concern ing  the quest  ion  "how s a f e  i s  safe enough" ( I  i k e  r e -  
vea led  p re fe rence ,  c o s t  b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s ) ,  F i s c h h o f f  e t  a l . .  (1980) conclude:  
"Acceptable r i s k  problems a re  d e c i s i o n  problems, t h a t  i s ,  they r e q u i r e  a  
cho ice  between a1 t e r n a t  ives" ( i  i )  . Bezembinder & Van Acker (1979) from 
t h e i r  p o i n t  o f  v iew suggest t h a t  " the  e v a l u a t i o n  u n d e r l y i n g  i n t r a n s i t i v e  
c h o i c e  and the  a l l e a e d  i n t e r ~ e r s o n a l  i n c o m ~ a r a b i l  i t v  o f  u t i l  i t v  come t o -  
~ - 
g e t h e r  i n  c a l l i n g  f o r  a  n o t i b n  o f  preferen;e i n  whi;h t h e  basi; o b j e c t  
o f  e v a l u a t i o n  i s  a  p a i r  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  r a t h e r  than a  s i n g l e  a l t e r n a t i v e " ,  
Temphas i s  o u r s ) .  
198 
The q u a l i t y  o f  t h e i r  i n t u i t i o n s  s e t s  an upper l i m i t  on the  q u a l i t y  o f  
t h e  e n t i r e  dec is ion -mak ing  process and, perhaps, the  q u a l i t y  o f  ou r  
l i v e s .  There i s  an u rgen t  need t o  l i n k  t h e  s tudy o f  man's judgmental 
and dec is ionmak ing  c a p a b i l i t i e s  t o  the  making o f  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  a f f e c t  
t h e  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  o f  t h e  p u b l i c " .  
I n  summary, i n  t h i s  paper we w i l l  concen t ra te  on how i n d i v i d u a l  persons 
eva lua te  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k s .  To us, t h i s  means s t u d y i n g  how they judge 
an a t t r i b u t e  ( i . e . ,  r i s k )  o f  an a c t i v i t y  ( i . e . ,  exposure t o  hazard) .  The 
impor tant  ques t ions  a re :  How does t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r i s k y  ac- 
t i v i t y  look  l i k e ?  O r ,  how have they c o n s t r u c t e d  an image o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
r i s k ?  Are t h e r e  sys temat i c  b i a s e s  i n v o l v e d ?  I n  t h e  nex t  s e c t i o n  we w i l l  
d i s c u s s  two models t h a t  have r e c e n t l y  been proposed t o  f a c i l i t a t e  an answer 
t o  such ques t ions .  
1 . I  . MODELS OF "RISK PERCEPT1 ON" 
V lek  & S t a l l e n  (1980) have a t tempted  t o  develop an o r d e r i n g  o f  aspec ts  o f  r i s k  
vrhich i s  meaningfu l  f rom a  d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t i c  p o i n t  o f  view. F i g u r e  1 shows 
how they have decomposed t h e  concept o f  accep tab le  r i s k  and how i t s  a n a l y t i c -  
a1 components r e l a t e .  
1 
PERSONAL XNOVLSDCO A 
F i g u r e  1 .  R a t i o n a l  o r d e r i n g  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  aspects  o f  r i s k .  (Source: V lek 
& S t a l l e n ,  1980). 
These a u t h o r s  argue t h a t  p a t t e r n s  o f  pe rsona l  r i s k  exper ience  (see bot tom 
f i g u r e  1 )  may be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
r i s k y  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n s ,  such as o n e ' s  r e l a t i v e  freedom o f  cho ice  o f  
exposure t o  hazard, the  c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  o f  d e c i s i o n  consequences and t h e  
type o f  need t h a t  i s  e i t h e r  f u l f i l l e d  o r  f r u s t r a t e d  by t h e  p o s s i b l e  con- 
sequences o f  t h e  exposure. Host aspects  o f  r i s k  t h a t  have been d iscussed i n  
t h e  r e c e n t  l i t e r a t u r e  on personal  r i ~ k  assessment can be subsumed under one 
o f  t h e i r  conceptual  c a t e g o r i e s .  For example, Rowe's " f o u r  most s i g n i f i c a n t  
f a c t o r s "  ( 1 9 7 7 , ~ .  119): a. v o l u n t a r i n e s s ,  b. c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y ,  c.  d i s -  
c o u n t i n g  i n  t ime,  and d. d i s c o u n t i n g  i n  space, a r e  regarded as composed 
o f  elements 1-4, 5-8, 9-10 and 11-12 r e s p e c t i v e l y  (see f i g u r e  1 ) .  
F i g u r e  1  i s  c l e a r l y  based on t h e  assumption o f  man as a  r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n  
maker who weighs a l l  t h e  r i s k s  and b e n e f i t s ,  i n t e g r a t e s  them, compares 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  and chooses the  one w i t h  t h e  maximum n e t  b e n e f i t .  The f a c t  
t h a t  most d e c i s i o n s  bear upon i l l d e f i n e d  problems, however, has l e d  Vlek 6 
S t a l l e n  t o  propose a  r a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  l e s s  g l o b a l ,  l e s s  a b s t r a c t  
and l e s s  fo rma l -  v a r i a b l e s .  T h e i r  conceptual  model has t h e  advantage o f  
p r o v i d i n g  a  framework f o r  o r d e r i n g  many s t u d i e s  on  personal  r i s k  assessment. 
Moreover, i t  may f u n c t i o n  as a  conceptual  b r i d g e  between, on t h e  one hand, 
the q u a n t i t a t i v e  approach o f  most r i s k  a n a l y s t s  who combine p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
w i t h  losses  i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  l e v e l s  o f  r i s k s ,  and, on t h e  o t h g r  hand, psycho- 
l o g i s t s  who want t o  show t h a t  people n e c e s s a r i l y  use v a r i o u s  h e u r i s t i c s  i n  
e s t i m a t i n g  how much r i s k  i s  invo lved  i n  some a c t i v i t y .  
For s t u d y i n g  t h e  dynamics o f  such l a t t e r  d e c i s i o n  making Tomas 6 S t a l l e n  
( 1 9 8 1 )  have proposed t o  use a model t h a t  g i v e s  more c r e d i t  t o  the f u n c t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between v a r i o u s  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  processes t h a t  med ia te  between 
the u n c e r t a i n  ( t e c h n o l o g i c a l )  environment and behav io r .  F i g u r e  2 shows 
the b a s i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e i r  process-model. I t  a r e  the  i n t e r n a l  processes 
o f  a p p r a i s a l  and cop ing  t h a t  de te rmine  how a  person w i l l  r e a c t  t o  t h r e a t -  
en ing  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  u n c e r t a i n t y .  Th is  r e a c t i o n  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  pass ive  
response, i t  may o f t e n  as w e l l  be seen as an a c t i v e  process o f  s t r u c t u r i n g  
ones environment so as t o  make i t  more compat ib le  w i t h  ones needs. 
1 
threat 
F i g u r e  2: General model o f  person/environment r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
T h i s  more e x p l i c i t  emphasis on t h e  o f t e n  need-based o r  m o t i v a t i o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  peoples e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h r e a t  (and t h e i r  behav io ra l  response) ,  
may be seen as a  second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e i r  model. I n  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  
environments as percep tua l  t a r g e t s ,  l t t e l s o n  (1973) has asser ted  t h a t  " t h e  
f i r s t  response t o  the  environment i s  a f f e c t i v e .  The d i r e c t  emot ional  impact 
o f  the s i t u a t i o n ,  perhaps l a r g e l y  a g l o b a l  response t o  the  ambiance, v e r y  
g e n e r a l l y  governs the  d i r e c t i o n s  taken by subsequent r e l a t i o n s ,  w i t h  t h e  
environment. I t  se ts  the  m o t i v a t i o n a l  tone and d e l i m i t s  the  k inds  o f  ex- 
per iences  one expects  and seeks" (p .  1 6 ) .  Most contemporary p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
studies of personal risk assessment underestimate this role of affective 
or emotional processes in assessing the risk o f  exposure to the hazardous 
envi ronment2). This is somewhat surprising, because most peoples response 
to technological risks seems t o  be more in terms ( I )  o f  "feelings of (in)- 
security" than in terms o f  "(in)sufficiently elaborated cognitive represent- 
ations". From the first point o f  view one major area o f  psychological theory 
which seems to be very relevant to such feelings is the literature of stress 
and coping. The following elaboration o f  our general model may both serve 
a s  a short introduction to o n e  dominant approach within this area and show 
its relevance for studying how people react to (technological) threat. 
In this latter respect it primarily has a heuristic function, like the 
aforementioned conceptual model of Vlek & Stallen. 
1.2. THREAT, STRESS AND BEHAVIOR 
One o f  the most influential programs of psychological stress research is 
the work done by Richard Lazarus and his associates ( ~ a z a r u s ,  1966; 1976; 
1980). Typical o f  Lazarus' approach is his view o n  stress a s  an intermediary 
variable between the stressor and behavior. In 1966 he defines stress a s  
"a psychological condition involving the anticipation on the part o f  the 
organism of his inability to cope with some future stimulus". In his more 
recent work he stressed the interactive character o f  it: "Stress occurs 
when there are demands on the person which tax o n  ( . . . )  his adjustive 
resources" (Lazarus. 1976, p. 47). 
2) Many people fear the possible consequences of complex modern technologies. 
Those w h o  support the technological status quo often call this response 
too emotional and - therefore - irrational. Stallen ( 1980; see also Wynne, 
19801, has argued that such a derogation of opposition can be seen a s  
based upon an ideological generalization of the applicability o f  the domi- 
nant scientific notion o f  rationality to all kinds of human decisions. 
This, o f  course, is not what we mean by emotional: it is affect, value 
but not a s  opposed to fact. 
Thus, b o t h  the emphasis on the  ready availability o f  cop ing  resources and 
some ( f u t u r e )  s t i m u l u s a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  s t r e s s  t o  occur :  
a. the  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  c a l l e d  upon t o  respond under c i rcumstances i n  wh ich  
he has no adequate response a v a i l a b l e ,  and 
b. t h e  consequences o f  n o t  responding a r e  impor tan t  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  
A  f i n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Lazarus '  v i e w  on s t r e s s  as w e l l  as on cop ing  i s  
h i s  c o g n i t i v e  o r i e n t a t i o n .  
W i t h  respec t  t o  t h i s  l a t t e r  emphasis on  c o g n i t i o n ,  we take  a  
s l l g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n .  Lazarus '  v iews s t r e s s  as  t r a n s a c t i o n a l  between 
t h e  person and envi ronment  (see Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer C Lazarus, i n  p r e s s ) ,  
and n o t  - a t  l e a s t  n o t  c l e a r l y  - as t r a n s a c t i o n a l  between i n t e r n a l  c o g n i t i v e  
and emot iona l  s t a t e s .  T h i s  may f o r e c l o s e  see ing  s t r e s s  as p o s s i b l y  aroused 
by changes i n  t h e  person 's  emotions o r  h i s  m o t i v a t i o n a l  system. H i s  l demand^'^ 
indeed can e a s i l y  be i n t e r p r e t e d  as  e x c l u s i " e l y  c o g n i t i v e  demands. As ide 
from t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  p o i n t  o f  view, however, Lazarus '  model s u f f i c i e n t -  
l y s u i t s t h e  problems t h a t  we must address o u r s e l v e s  t o .  To a  l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  
t h e  t h r e a t e n i n g  s t i m u l i  i n  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  assessment a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be f u t u r e  
expected e f f e c t s  o f  p resen t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  developments. Often i t  i s  a  r a t h e r  
d i s t a n t  f u t u r e  ( I  i k e  i n  t h e  case o f  de layed  envi ronmenta l  e f f e c t s ) .  I t  i s  
hard t o  see how such s t i m u l i  cou ld  genera te  s t r e s s  w i t h o u t  a  s u b j e c t  who 
b e l i e v e s  them t o  t a k e  p lace .  T h i s  focus  on s t r e s s  as r e l a t e d  t o  i n  some 
sense o r d i n a r y  every  day exposure and o f t e n  c h r o n i c  t h r e a t ,  i s  a l s o  c l o s e  
t o  Lazarus '  c u r r e n t  research i n t e r e s t s  (see Kanner e t  a l . ,  i n  press;  Folkman 
& Lazarus. i n  p r e s s ) .  Far t o o  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  has been g i v e n  t o  t h e  ways 
most people cope w i t h  s t r e s s f u l  even ts  i n  t h e i r  day t o  day l i v e s ,  i . e .  when 
n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  extreme c i rcumstances l i k e  tornadoes, parachute jumping, 
d o c t o r a l  examina t ions  o r  s p i n a l  s u r g e r i e s .  I n  our  o p i n i o n ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
t h r e a t  has inc reas ing1  y  become a  "normal" c o n d i t i o n  o f  o u r  l i f e .  
I n  theory  the processes t h a t  mediate between the  t h r e a t e n i n g  environment 
and the response can be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i n t o  two c l a s s e s :  a p p r a i s a l  and 
cop ing  (see f i g u r e  2 ) .  These two k i n d s  o f  i n t e r n a l  processes can be d i s -  
t i n g u i s h e d  i n  most models w i t h i n  the  s t r e s s  l i t e r a t u r e .  However, i n  a  
temporal sense hi t h  a p p r a i s a l  preceding the  coping) a  sharp d i s t i n c t  i o n  i s  
o f t e n  hard t o  m a k e , p a r t i c u l a r l y  when t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  f a c i n g  acu te  t h r e a t  
( c f .  e.g., Krohne, 1978). I n  genera l ,  the  processes t h a t  w i l l  be descr ibed  
b e l o w w i 1 I  o p e r a t e a t  degenerate l e v e l s  i n  c a s e s k h a e t h r e a t  i s  a c u t e a s  compared t o  
c h r o n i c  and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  h y p e r v i g i l a n t  i ns tead  o f  v i g i l a n t  ( c f .  J a n i s  
6 nann, 1977). 
Folkman & Lazarus ( i n  press)  d e f i n e  a p p r a i s a l  as " the  c o g n i t i v e  process 
through which an event  i s  eva lua ted  w i t h  respec t  t o  what i s  a t  s take  
( p r i m a r y  a p p r a i s a l )  and coping resources and o p t  ions (secondary a p p r a i s a l ) " .  
The p r i m a r y  a p p r a i s a l  process i s  seen as based on the  assessment o f  two 
elements: 
1. t h e  t h r e a t e n i n g  even t ;  
2. the  p o s s i b l e  s t a t e  o f  n o t  hav ing reached pursued g o a l s ,  and o f  hav ing  
l o s t  o n e ' s  s takes a t  t h e  same t ime.  
Because o f  i t s  embeddedness i n  the  s u b j e c t ' s  e n t i r e  m o t i v a t i o n a l  and goal  
s t r u c t u r e .  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h i s  l a t t e r  s t a t e  a l r e a d y  e n t a i l s  an i m p l i c i t  
a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  cop ing  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  'The more impor tan t  the g o a l s  
o r  the  l a r g e r  the  s takes,  the  more d i f f i c u l t  i t  w i l l  be t o  s u b s t i t u t e  them 
f o r  o t h e r  g o a l s  and, consequen t l y ,  the more the  s u b j e c t  w i l l  f e e l  f o r c e d  
t o  look  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  ways o f  f u l l f i l l i n g  h i s  needs. Thus, the q u e s t i o n s  
t h a t  always l u r k  behind the assessment o f  t h r e a t  a r e :  i s  t h e r e  a n y t h i n g  I  
should do t o  reduce t h e  t h r e a t ?  And: do I f e e l  t h a t  I  have o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  t h r e a t ?  The answer t o  these ques t ions  i s  the  r e s u l t  o f  the  
secondary a p p r a i s a l .  

I n  f i g u r e  3 we have shown how the  v a r i o u s  aspects  o f  the a p p r a i s a l  and 
coping processess can be represen ted3 ' .  Some consequence o f  the exposure 
o f  the  person t o  a  g i v e n  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  environment c a l l e d  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
s t i m u l u s ,  i s  s e l e c t i v e l y  perce ived  (box 1 )  as a  t h r e a t 4 ) .  Th is  s e l e c t i o n  
mechanism i s  dependent upon the  genera l  psycho log ica l  s t a t e  o f  t h e  person. 
For example, p r e j u d i c e s  (source  I )  o r  f e a r  (source 11)  may b i a s  t h e  p e r -  
c e p t i o n .  The c o g n i t i v e  resource p r i m a r i l y  c o n t a i n s  a l l  knowledge t h a t  the  
person has ready a t  hand o r  can r e t r i e v e  f rom memory. I t  i s  b o t h  f a c t u a l  
knowledge l i k e  base r a t e s  and s u b j e c t i v e  knowing l i k e  scenar ios  o r  s c r i p t s .  
T h i s  a l l  can be geared t o  t h e  assessment o f  the  t h r e a t e n i n g  event .  Examples 
a r e  s p e c i f i c  i n fe rences  t h a t  can be made about what t o  expect  f rom t h e  
t h r e a t ,  o r  a t t r i b u t i o n s  about what caused o r  who i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
event .  Under a f f e c t i v e  processes we subsume t h e  emot ional  involvement i n  
t h e  th rea tened  s i t u a t i o n ,  commitment t o  p a s t  behav io r  and the  l i k e .  The 
r e l e v a n t  e v a l u a t i o n s  o r  a f f e c t s  a r e  drawn from the  a f f e c t i v e  resource.  T h i s  
we cons ider  t o  be the  v a l u e  base f o r  d i r e c t i n g  behav io r .  M o t i v a t i o n a l  con- 
s t r u c t s  l i k e  l e v e l  o f  se l f -es teem and c o n f o r m i t y  a r e  t o  be represented i n  
t h i s  resource.  A l though  a f f e c t i v e  r e a c t i o n s  can occur  w i t h o u t  e x t e n s i v e  
c o g n i t i v e  encoding, and i t  even can be argued t h a t  a f f e c t  and c o g n i t i o n  a r e  
under t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  separate and p a r t i a l l y  independent systems (Zajonc,  
19801, p a r t i c u l a r l y  when the  t h r e a t e n i n g  event  i s  c o g n i t i v e l y  complex and 
a f f e c t i v e l y  ambig ious (as i s  l i k e l y  w i t h  most t e c h n o l o g i c a l  t h r e a t ) ,  t h e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  c o g n i t i v e  and a f f e c t i v e  processes w i l l  g a i n  fundamental 
importance. 
3 )  The symbols o f  t h i s  f i g u r e  a re  taken f rom system dynamics i n  an a t tempt  
t o  s t i m u l a t e  our  t h i n k i n g  about the  d  namics o f  personal  r i s k  assess- 
ment. They u s u a l l y  symbol ize r a t e s  ( ) l e v e l s  (a ) ,  i n f i n i t i v e l y  
la rge  ( r e )  sources ( a ) , aux i  1 i a r y  v a r i a b l e s  ( 0 ) and in format  i o n  o r  
energy f l o w s  ( ) .  
4 )  We do n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  between a t t e n t i o n  and p e r c e p t i o n  because i t  i s  no 
longer  as c l e a r  as i t  once was (see ~ e e l e  6 Trarnnel l -Nei l I ,  1978) . 
I n  l i n e  w i t h  Lazarus '  d e f i n i t i o n  we d e f i n e  s t r e s s  as f o l l o w s :  i t  i s  t h e  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t a t e  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  who exper iences t h r e a t  i n  h i s  en- 
v i ronment  i n  such a  way t h a t  the  demand on him t h a t  f o l l o w  f rom t h e  t h r e a t  
a r e  i n  c o n f l i c t .  F e e l i n g s  o f  i n s e c u r i t y  w i t h  respec t  t o  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  o r  
i n d u s t r i a l  developments a r e  so regarded as one s p e c i f i c  form o f  s t r e s s .  
The n o t i o n  o f  demand i n  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  s t r e s s ,  o r  t h e  n o t i o n s  o f  some- 
t h i n g  "at  s take"  and o f  "opt ions"  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a p p r a i s a l  by F o l k -  
man and Lazarus, a l l  r e f e r  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s t r e s s  a r i s e s  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  goa l  d i r e c t e d  and mot i va t ion -based  behav io r .  I t  I s  t h e  v e r y  re levance  
o f  the  t h r e a t e n i n g  event  t o  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  n o t  a t t a i n i n g  one 's  g o a l s a n d  
n o t  s a t i s f y i n g  o n e ' s  needs t h a t  makes t h e  event  t h r e a t e n i n g .  Thus, a t  the  
same t ime,  any t h r e a t e n i n g  event  does genera te  two h y p o t h e t i c a l  f u t u r e  
s t a t e s :  one w i t h  and one w i t h o u t  t h e  a c t i v i t y .  I n  f i g u r e  4 we have g r a p h i c -  
a l l y  rep resen ted  t h i s  argument. 
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F i g u r e  4 :  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  a p p r a i s a l  process l e a d i n g  t o  s t r e s s .  
I n  c o g n i t i v e  terms, t h e  t h r e a t  i s  represented by way o f  p o s s i b l e  f u t u r e  
consequences o f  the th rea tened  a c t i v i t y :  t h e  a c t i v i t y  w i l l  (+ ACT.) o r  w i l l  
n o t  ( -  ACT.) have led  t o  the  in tended outcomes. As the a c t i v i t y  has been 
d i r e c t e d  t o  s p e c i f i c  goa ls ,  and ( q u i t e  a  l o t  o f )  personal  energy has been 
inves ted  i n  i t ,  one w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be m o t i v a t e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  the a c t i v i t y .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  t h r e a t e n i n g  event  c a l l s  f o r  a  change o r  m d i f i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  a c t i v i t y .  So the  i n d i v i d u a l  faces two m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  demands f o r  
f u t u r e  behav io r .  
As such i t  a r e  demands f o r  c o n t r o l  o f  b e h a v i o r a l  outcomes. Whether t h e  
o p t i o n  "change" can be r e a l i z e d  o r  n o t  w i l l ,  o f  course,  depend on a v a i l a b l e  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  do so. On t h e  one hand, t h i s  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  ( re )sources  
t h a t  can be used t o  under take  a  new o r  safeguarded a c t i v i t y .  
On the o t h e r  hand i t  r e q u i r e s  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  w e l l  d e f i n e d  t h r e a t  t o  know 
e x a c t l y  how the  a c t i v i t y  should be changed. From a  r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n  
t h e o r e t i c  p o i n t  o f  v iew one would l i k e  the  person t o  have i n f o r m a t i o n  
about t h e  r e l e v a n t  l e v e l s  o f  a l l  the  v a r i a b l e s  o f  V lek  & S t a l l e n ' s  model 
(see f i g u r e  1 ) .  Both types o f  i n fo rmat  i o n  - concern ing  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
t h r e a t  and t h e  n a t u r e  o f  the a v a i l a b l e  resources - t o g e t h e r  d e f i n e  whether 
the  two m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  demands make f o r  a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c o n f l i c t .  T h i s  
c o n f l i c t  we c a l l  s t r e s s .  
There a r e a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  may oppose an easy change, and which 
5  w i l l  f o s t e r  s t r e s s  o r  aggrevate the c o n f l i c t  . 
1 .  The t h r e a t  c o u l d  a p p l y  t o  o t h e r  ( s u b s t i t u t e )  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  t h a t  case 
i t  i s  hard t o  respond t o  the  t h r e a t  by changing t h e  a c t i v i t y ,  assuming 
t h a t  one does n o t  a l t e r  o n e ' s  goa ls .  Again a  c o n f l i c t  e x i s t s .  
2. I t  c o u l d  be t h a t  the  threatened a c t i v i t y  i s  d i r e c t e d  a t  o r  c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  
t o  c e n t r a l  va lues .  These i t  w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  f o r g o ,  so a  c o n f l i c t  
a r i s e s .  
3. One may ( f e e l )  hav ing  t o o  l i m i t e d  c a p a c i t i e s  f o r  choosing between t h e  
two c l a i m s  t o  f u t u r e  behavior .  
Examples o f  t h e  l a t t e r  c o n d i t i o n  a r e  when s t r e s s o r s  l i k e  n o i s e  impose e x t r a  
demands on  t h e  a t t e n t i o n a l  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t .  Hereby, r e s e r v e  capac i -  
t y  w i l l  be occup ied  t h a t  o t h e r w i s e  cou ld  have been used t o  h e l p  r e s o l v i n g  
t h e  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  two c l a i m s  f o r  f u t u r e  a c t l o n . T h e  s t r e s s f u l l n e s s o f  t h e  
5) Note the  s i m i l a r i t i e s  o f  these c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  con- 
d i t i o n s  f o r  a  d e c i s i o n  problem t o  occur :  "A d e c i s i o n  problem occurs  
when a  d e c i s i o n  maker (a )  n o t i c e s  a  d isc repancy  between an e x i s t i n g  
s t a t e  and a  d e s i r e d  s t a t e ,  (b) has the m o t i v a t i o n ,  as we1 l as ( c )  the  
p o t e n t i a l  t o  reduce t h i s  descrepancy, whereby (d)  t h e r e  i s  more than 
one p o s s i b l e  course o f  a c t i o n  which may n o t  be immediate ly  a v a i l a b l e ,  
(e)  t h e  implementat ion o f  a  course o f  a c t i o n  demands an i r r e v e r s i b l e  
a1 l o c a t i o n  o f  h i s  resources,  and ( f )  the  u t i l i t i e s  ( o f  the  conse- 
quences) a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  each c h o i c e - a l t e r n a t i v e  a r e  p a r t l y  o r  e n t i r e -  
l y  u n c e r t a i n " ,  ( V l e k  & Wagenaar, 19791, p. 257). 
second condition, f o r  example, i s  e v i d e n t  f rom research  i n d i c a t i n g  the need 
f o r  endur ing  s o c i a l  suppor t  i novercoming  f a m i l y  c r i s e s .  The knowledge t h a t  
most food has a r t i f i c i a l  a d d i t i v e s  o r  the  f e a r  t h a t  a t  many o t h e r  a l -  
t e r n a t i v e  p laces  f o r  s e t t l e m e n t  the  s o i l  w i l l  be p o l l u t e d  by chemical 
waste, w i l l  p e n e t r a t e  f e e l i n g s  o f  i n s e c u r i t y  w i t h  respec t  t o  one 's  l i v i n g  
c o n d i t i o n .  As such i t  e x e m p l i f i e s  t h e  f i r s t  o f  t h e  a f o r e  mentioned t h r e e  
c o n d i t i o n s .  
Wi th  c o n t i n u o u s l y  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  s t r e s s  one w i l l  g e t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  o r  
p h y s i c a l l y  i n j u r e d .  One t h e r e f o r e  has t o  cope w i t h  t h e  s t r e s s .  Folkman 
& Lazarus ( i n  press)  d e f i n e  cop ing  as " the c o g n i t i v e  and behav io ra l  e f f o r t s  
t o  master ,  t o l e r a t e  o r  reduce e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l  demands and c o n f l i c t s  
between themvt6).  They con t inue :  "Such cop ing  e f f o r t s  se rve  two main f u n c t i o n s :  
t h e  management o r  a l t e r a t i o n  o f  the  person-environment r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  i s  
the  source o f  s t r e s s  (. ..) and the  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  s t r e s s f u l  emotions ( .  . . ) I6. 
The f i r s t  t y p e  o f  cop ing  they  c a l l  p r o b l e m  focused coping,  the  second emotion 
focused cop ing .  I n  most c i rcumstances o f  no-acute t h r e a t  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  
can o n l y  be g radua l .  There a r e  p r a c t i c a l l y  no s o c i a l  phenomena t h a t  do n o t  
i m p l i c a t e  a f f e c t  i n  some impor tan t  way.and p robab ly  v e r y  few p e r c e p t i o n s  
and c o g n i t i o n s  i n  everyday l i f e  a r e  n o t  "hot". Consequently problem focused 
coping w i l l  most o f t e n  have a s i g n i f i c a n t  emot ional  o r  a f f e c t i v e  component 
as w e l l .  However, as Zajonc (1980) n o t e s ,  " A f f e c t  i s  always a companion t o  
thought  whereas t h e  converse i s  n o t  t r u e "  (p .  154) .  P a r t i c u l a r -  
l y  when t h r e a t  i s  acu te  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  problem focused coping i s  
6 )  Sometimes t h e  e n t i r e  i n t e r n a l  process i s  l a b e l l e d  as cop ing ,  some- 
t imes o n l y  the  p o s i t i v e ,  h e a l t h f u l  way o f  responding t o  s t r e s s  i s  
c a l l e d  coping.  
For reasons o f  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  we use two separate terms, coping and 
a c t i n g ,  where o t h e r s ,  e.g. Folkman & Lazarus ( i n  p r e s s ) ,  use one, 
i . e .  coping.  
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e n t i r e l y  dominated by emotion focused coping. 
Since i n  our terms coping e s s e n t i a l l y  involves the reappraisal  o f  the 
threatening person-environment r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  i t  has the same components 
as the appra isa l  process. Because o f  i t s  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  f u t u r e  opt ions ,  
the components a re  labe l led :  c o g n i t i v e  s imula t ion  and a f f e c t i v e  a n t i -  
c i p a t i o n  (see f i g u r e  3 ) .  
I n  coping w i t h  s t ress  one cou ld  seek t o  reduce the s t ress  by 
1. exp lor ing  one's opportunities f o r  a l t e r i n g  the th reaten ing environment, 
2. looking f o r  ways t o  move away from the s i t u a t i o n ,  
3. reappra is ing  the th rea t .  
As f i g u r e  3 shows, the person w i l l  gene ra l l y  search f o r  new o r  add i t i ona l  
informat ion i n  h i s  environment before he decides what t o  do. Essent ia l  i s  
the order ing  o f  the issues and accompanying choices, i .e .  the s t ra tegy  o f  
the coping process. Janis & Mann (1977) have argued t h a t  c e r t a i n  quest ions 
do not  come up a t  a l l  be fore  c e r t a i n  o thers  are addressed. 
The person gene ra l l y  w i l l  f i r s t  exp lore  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  cont inue the  
present a c t i v i t y  i n  a  s l i g h t l y  modi f ied  (protected) way. I n  t h i s  way the 
person t r i e s  t o  achieve the  same goals w i t h  e s s e n t i a l l y  the same means. When 
there i s  no acceptable way t o  cont inue the present a c t i v i t y  w i t h  precaut ion,  
he i s  forced t o  search f o r  a l t e r n a v i t e s .  He w i l l  do so on l y  when he f e e l s  
conf ident  i n  f i n d i n g  an acceptable so lu t i on .  I f  the person a l so  cannot 
imaglne a  r e a l i s t i c  and acceptable o p t i o n  (consider ing one 's  own and o ther  
ava i l ab le  resources), and i t  i s  a i so  not  poss ib le  t o  fo rget  about the a c t i -  
v i t y  i t s e l f ,  there w i l l  be a  tendency t o  deny the necess i ty  o f  making a  
decis ion.  This may happen through a  v a r i e t y  o f  defense mechanisms. There 
are three main defensive s t ra teg ies :  
Type A:  proc ras t i na t i on .  
Type 8: s h i f t i n g  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
Type C :  b o i s t e r i n g  o f  the leas t  avers ive a l t e r n a t i v e .  
A postponement o f  the dec is ion  ( t ype  A) i s  poss ib le  when one th inks  tha t  
the  r i s k s  o f  doing so are not too ser lous.  This w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  be accom- 
panied by a  (temporary) lack o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  the issue. 
Type B  means a  den ia l  o f  one's own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and lay ing  the dec is ion  
i n t o  someone e l s e ' s  hands. As an example o f  t h i s  one might t h i n k  o f  the 
genera l ly  observed tendency w i t h i n  the p u b l i c  t o  b e l i e f  t ha t  the author- 
i t i e s  should ac t  t o  m i t i g a t e  the consequences o f  a  na tu ra l  d i sas te r .  As we 
w i l l  show l a t e r ,  t h i s  type o f  defense sometimes goes toghether w i t h  a  s h i f t  
i n  locus o f  causa l i t y .  F i n a l l y ,  one might b h l s t e r  the  i n t e n t l o n  t o  cont inue 
the threatened a c t i v i t y  by exaggerating i t s  p o s i t i v e  consequences and/or 
minimiz ing the negat ive  (Type c ) ~ ) .  This may be f a c i l i t a t e d  by a  se lec t i ve  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  the th reaten ing environment. F igure  3 shows t h i s  mechanism 
by the  arrow from the coping back i to  the a t t e n t i o n  ra te .  
A l l  th ree forms o f  defensive avoidance a re  at tempts t o  escape from the 
dec is iona l  c o n f l i c t  which i s  t yp i ca l  o f  a  cond i t i on  o f  (h igh)  s t ress :  one 
cannot a f f o r d  t o  change and one cannot a f f o r d  not  t o  change. However, these 
k inds  o f  c o n f l i c t  r eso lu t i ons  are  character ized by a  h igh  l eve l  o f  vu lner -  
a b i l i t y  t o  unant ic ipa ted challenges. Only when there  i s  enough t ime t o  
work out  a l l  op t ions  and enough confidence t o  f i n d  an acceptable so lu t i on  
one engages i n  what we c a l l  r a t i o n a l  searching behavior. I t  i s  on l y  t o  t h i s  
k ind  o f  searching processes tha t  one could apply Janis & Mann's procedural 
c r i t e r i a  f o r  a  h igh  q u a l i t y  dec is ion  (Jan is  & Mann, 1977), o r  the 9  stages 
f o r  the  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  a  poor ly  s t ruc tured dec is ion  problem ( ~ l e k  & Wage- 
naar, 1979). 
7) This divergence o f  consequences i s  a  general e f f ec t  w i t h  a l l  prospect ive 
choices tha t  have important consequences (and, thus, a re  more o r  less 
s t r e s s f u l  i n  i t s e l f ) .  Only when eva luat ions  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  opt ions  i n -  
vo lve  p u b l i c  comnitment t o  the  f i n a l  choice,  eva luat ions  converge (see 
Brownstein, Ostrove L M i l l s ,  1979). 
F i n a l l y ,  any a c t i o n  means a  change i n  t h e  env i ronment .  One norma l l y  would 
l i k e  t o  know whether t h e  a c t i o n  has r e s u l t e d  i n  a  s u b j e c t i v e l y  s a f e ( r )  
s i t u a t i o n .  I n  Fi.gure 3 t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  l e a r n  from o n e ' s  own behav io r  
i s  represented by connec t ing  t h e  a p p r a i s a l  o f  t h e  t h r e a t  i n  the  new 
s i t u a t i o n  ( p o r t  cho ice )  (box 5) t o  t h e  r e a p p r a i s a l  o f  t h e  t h r e a t  which one 
- p r i o r  t o  c h o i c e  - had expected (box 3 ) .  
2. PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF TECHNOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
To what e x t e n t  do t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  t h a t  deal  w i t h  n a t u r a l  
and/or t e c h n o l o g i c a l  hazards suppor t  the  f o r e g o i n g  analyses and where do 
they  f i t  i n t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  p o s t u l a t e d  model? U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
t h e r e  a r e  n o t  many s t u d i e s  d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  t o p i c ,  even w i t h  
l e n i e n t  c r i t e r i a .  For example, o n l y  about  10 s t u d i e s  can be se lec ted  f rom 
Rowels (1977) r e f e r e n c e  1 i s t  t h a t  p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  area o f  i n t e r e s t .  O f  these,  
o n l y  5 (2%!)  deal  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i t h  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  t h r e a t .  Presumably, t h i s  
r a t e  t r u l y  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  s t u d y i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  r i s k -  
genera t ing  system on p e o p l e ' s  j u d g m e n t s , - a t t i t u d e s  and behav io r  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  
t o  the  e f f o r t s  spent on s t u d y i n g  t h e  r i s k - g e n e r a t i n g  system i t s e l f  ( r i s k  
8) e s t i m a t i o n ) .  A t  bes t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  has o n l y  s l i g h t l y  improved s i n c e  . 
Techno log ica l  hazards a r e  s t i l l  no b i g  bus iness f o r  
s o c i a l  Thus, i t  does n o t  s u r p r i s e  t o  see t h a t  
8) I f  so, i t  w u l d  be p r i m a r i l y  because o f  an enormous growht o f  i n t e r e s t  
i n  n u c l e a r  power. 
9) Soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  a r e  a l s o  no b i g  bus iness y e t  f o r  technology.  F i s c h h o f f  
e t  a l .  (1980) s t a t e  t h a t  "Given t h e  enormous stakes r i d i n g  on accep t -  
a b l e - r i s k  d e c i s i o n s ,  o u r  investment  i n  research  seems v e r y  sma l l .  Con- 
s i d e r i n g  the  c o s t  o f  a  d a y ' s  d e l a y  i n  r e t u r n i n g  a  n u c l e a r  f a c i l i t y  t o  
s e r v i c e  o r  i n  approv ing  a  p i p e l  i n e  proposal  , a  research  p r o j e c t  t h a t  
o f f e r e d  a  0.1 chance o f  r e s p o n s i b l y  shor ten ing  t h e  dec is ion-making 
p e r i o d  w u l d  hav: an enormous expected r e t u r n  on investment .  S i m i l a r  
ba rga ins  would be found i n  s t u d i e s  t h a t  m igh t  improve p u b l i c  i n v o l v e -  
ment i n  p r o j e c t  p l a n n i n g  (so  as t o  a v o i d  m i d - c o n s t r u c t i o n  s u r p r i s e s ) ,  
i d e n t i f y  g e n e r i c  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  new chemicals  (so as t o  reduce t e s t i n g  
c o s t s ) ,  decrease t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  drug l i cens ing  (so  as t o  encourage 
i n n o v a t i v e  research and development),  o r  i n f o r m  workers about o c c u p a t i o n a l  
r i s k s  (so  as t o  enable them t o  make b e t t e r  d e c i s i o n s  on t h e i r  own b e h a l f ) .  
Such research  c o u l d  be a  good p l a c e  t o  i n v e s t  s o c i e t y ' s  v e n t u r e  c a p i t a l " .  
the relatively few empirical i nves t i ga t i ons  o f  how people deal w i t h  an 
uncer ta in  techno log ica l  environment a re  not  embedded I n  a  comnon la rger  
t heo re t i ca l  framework. For tunate ly ,  ou ts ide  the s p e c i f i c  scope o f  techno- 
logy there a re  i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t s  o f  fundamental research which we be- 
l i e v e  a re  h i g h l y  re levant  t o  our top ic .  I n  the next sec t ion  we w i l l  discuss 
both types o f  s tud ies  i n  as fa r  as they can be grouped under the comnon 
denominator o f  the  assessment o f  t h rea t  ( sec t i on  2.1.) and the assessment 
o f  con t ro l  ( sec t i on  2.2.). Studies tha t  e x p l i c i t l y  address themselves t o  
ways o f  coping and a c t i n g  w i l l  be discussed elsewhere (Tomas C Sta l l en ,  
1981). 
2.1. THE ASSESSMENT OF THREAT 
Wi th in  the  soc ia l  sciences technological  r i s k  assessment has mainly been 
studied from the p o i n t  o f  view o f  the psycho log i s t l o )  (e.g., S lov ic  C 
L ich tens te in ,  1980; Green C Brown, 1980; Vlek C Sta l l en ,  i n  presd"). The l a s t  
authors s tud ied how inhab i tan ts  o f  a  heav i l y  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  area (Rot te r -  
dam) judge the  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  and the r i sk iness  o f  var ious  r i s k y  a c t i -  
v i t i e s ,  as d i ve rse  as "smoking i n  bed before  sleeping", " landing l i q u i f i e d  
natura l  gas" and " rece iv ing  f u l l  anaesthesia before a  medical operation". 
They concluded tha t  subjects base t h e i r  judgment o f  acceptable r i s k  p r i m a r i l y  
on the  be l ieved personal necessi ty o f  the a c t i v i t y .  According t o  the  authors. 
"necessity" o f  t h e  a c t i v i t y  der ives  from the need f o r  i t s  associated 
benef i ts .  As a  secondary dimension, judgments about " a c c e p t i b i l i t y "  seem 
t o  be based upon the assessment o f  the "scale o f  product  ion and/or 
10) Even when s tay ing  w i t h i n  the area o f  psychology there i s  s t i l l  more 
t o  r i s k  assessment than merely r i s k  percept ion,  as f i g u r e  3 shows. 
However, r i s k  assessment i s  o f t e n  designated as " r i s k  percept ion1' .  The 
Society f o r  Risk Analysis,  f o r  example, has organized a t  her f i r s t  
annual meeting a "Workshop on the  Analysis o f  Real versus Perceived 
Risks". 
11) Soc io log is ts ,  f o r  example. seem t o  concentrate more on natura l  hazards 
( c f .  n i l e t l ,  1980). 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s  and o f  p o t e n t i a l  a c c i d e n t s .  
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F i g u r e  6. Two d imensional  s t i m u l u s  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  based on a n a l y s i s  o f  
rank o r d e r s . o f  accep tab le  r i s k s .  Arrows represen t  average 
judgments f o r  each o f  4 groups l i v i n g  a t  v a r y i n g  d i s t a n c e s  
from t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  area. (source:  V lek  6 S t a l l e n ,  i n  p r e s s ) .  
F i g u r e  6 shows these two ma jo r  conceptual  dimensions as t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  
(= pr imary  dim.) and v e r t i c a l  a x i s  (=  secondary d im.)  r e s p e c t i v e l y  o f  a  
two d imensional  space. The v e c t o r s  i n d i c a t e  group averages i n  t h e  weighing 
o f  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  bo th  dimensions t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  judgment o f  
acceptabi 1 i t y12) .  Average group rank order o f  the 26 s t  imul i according 
t o  a c c e p t i b l l i t y  can be found by p r o j e c t i n g  the s t imu lus  p o i n t s  o f  f i g u r e  
6  onto  the respect ive  (extended) vectors.  C lear ly ,  these r e s u l t s  show 
that  persons l i v i n g  c lose r  t o  the  indust ry  tend t o  consider the  7 " large- 
scale" a c t i v i t i e s  ( a l l  l y i n g  i n  the upper h a l f  o f  f i g u r e  6) as r e l a t i v e l y  
more acceptable than persons l i v i n g  f a r t h e r  away from the indust ry .  
A  poss ib le  exp lanat ion  f o r  t h i s  may be tha t  the former group (0-2 km) 
judges the  bene f i t s  t ha t  accrue t o  them and/or t o  soc ie ty  i n  general t o  
be greater .  We can t e s t  f o r  t h i s  hypothesis, as Vlek 6 S t a l l e n  a l s o  
analysed judgments about the benef i ts  o f  the a c t i v i t y .  The dimenslonal 
s t ruc tu re  recovered was v i r t u a l l y  i den t i ca l  t o  F igure  6. However, i n  t h i s  
two dimensional c o g n i t i v e  space o f  I 1 b e n e f i c i a l i t y  o f  r i s k y  a c t i v i t i e s "  no 
such d i f f e rences  between distance-groups i n  weighing the  two dimensions 
as shown i n  F igure  6  were found. Because Vlek 6 S t a l l e n  a l so  d i d  not  f i n d  
any such group s p e c i f i c  d i f f e rences  i n  the  judgments o f  r i sk iness  (see 
below), the  fo l l ow ing  exp lanat ion  can be put f o r th .  When confronted w i t h  
the d i f f i c u l t  quest ion whether they be l i eve  the r i s k s  a re  acceptable o r  
not ,  those sub jec ts  who i n  f a c t  a re  most exposed t o  the  large-scale i n d u s t r i a l  
r i s k s  b o l s t e r  t h e i r  judgment by exaggerating the bene f i t s  associated w i t h  
those a c t i v i t i e s .  
The c o g n i t i v e  map of the  r i s k i n e s s  o f  the  var ious  a c t i v i t i e s ,  as const ruc t -  
ed by Vlek b S t a l l e n ,  i s  represented. in Figure 7. I t  shows t h a t  sub jec ts  
probably base t h e i r  judgments o f  r i s k i n e s s  o f  an a c t i v i t y  p r i m a r i l y  on i t s  
leve l  o f  ca tas t roph i c  p o t e n t i a l  (= hor i zon ta l  ax i s )  and, secondary, upon 
the degree towh ich  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  provided by i n s t i t u t i o n a l  means (- v e r t i c a l  
a x i s ) .  V l e k E S t a l l e n  l abe l l ed  the l a t t e r  dimension "degreeof organized safety l1,  
12) The ana l ys i s  used i s  based upon a  po in t -vec tor  un fo ld ing  model f o r  
i n t e r p r e t i n g  the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the observat ions (rank order da ta) .  
I T  
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Figure 7. Two dimensional st imulus con f i gu ra t i on  based on ana lys is  of 
rank orders o f  r i sk iness .  Arrows represent average judgments 
f o r  each o f  7 groups o f  persons i n  the extend t o  which they 
f e e l  insecure w i t h  respect t o  i n d u s t r i a l  r isks.(Source:  Vlek 
6 Sta l  len, i n  press). 
w i t h  p o s i t i v e  values on the Y-axis i n d i c a t i n g  a h igh  degree o f  organized 
safety. However, as they have suggested, an a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
may be i n  terms o f  personal a v o i d a b i l i t y  as t h i s  too i s  i n  c lose agree- 
ment w i t h  t h e i r  data. Their  data a l s o  a l l ow  f o r  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  terms 
o f  " i m a g i n a b i l i t y  o f  negat ive consequences". As can be seen from f i gu re  7, 
persons h igh  i n  f ee l i ngs  o f  i nsecu r i t y  w i t h  respect t o  i n d u s t r i a l  r i s k s ,  
base t h e i r  judgments o f  r i s k i n e s s  almost e x l u s i v e l y  upon the degree o f  
ca tas t roph i c  p o t e n t i a l .  
Regarding the  c o g n i t i v e  determinants o f  judgments about r i s k s ,  S lov i c  e t  a t .  
(1980) have repor ted  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s .  Wi th  a  d i f f e r e n t  se t  
o f  r i s k - s t i m u l  i and a  d i f f e r e n t  technique of ana lys is13)  . they i n t e r p r e t e d  
t h e i r  two dimensions as: 
1. dread, 1.e. ca tas t roph i c ,  hard t o  prevent,  f a t a l  e t c . ,  and 
2. fami l iar i ty ,  i.e. o b s e r v a b i l i t y ,  knowledge, .Imnediacy o f  consequences. 
S lov i c  e t  a l .  (1980) d i d  t r y  t o  f u r t h e r  d e f i n e  the prLc ise  nature  o f  t h e i r  
"dread-factor". Resul ts o f  a  small exp lo ra to ry  study l ed  them t o  put  f o r t h  
t he  f o l l o w i n g  exp lanat ion :  "An acc ident  t h a t  takes many l i v e s  may have 
l i t t l e  o r  no impact on perceived r i s k  i f  i t  occurs as p a r t  o f  a  f a m i l i a r ,  
we l l  understood and s e l f - 1  imi  t i n g  process". I n  con t ras t ,  a  small acc ident  
may g r e a t l y  enhance perceived r i s k  and t r i g g e r  s t rong c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
because i t  may s igna l  e i t h e r  a  poss ib le  breakdown i n  sa fe t y  c o n t r o l  systems 
o r  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the  mishap might  p r o l i f e r a t e .  Thus, t he  number o f  
people k i l l e d  may be r e l a t i v e l y  unimportant  i n  determining the  degree o f  
dread o r  ca tas t roph i c  p o t e n t i a l  o f  r i s k y  a c t i v i t i e s .  
However, the  vas t  m a j o r i t y  o f  research e f f o r t s  i n  techn ica l  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  i s  
devoted. to the c a l c u l a t i o n o f  numerical e s t i m a t e s o f  probable f a t a l i t i e s  which 
i n  most cases a r e  de r i ved  from f i g u r e s  o f  r e l a t i v e  frequencies. W i th in  t he  
techn i ca l  comnunity, such es t imates  a r e  gene ra l l y  regarded as t o  prov ide  
the r a t i o n a l  measure o f  r i s k .  The quest ion  t h a t  immediately ar ises,  i s  
-
how we l l  represented a r e  such r e l a t i v e  f requencies i n  layman's mind? Using 
1 3 )  The major d i f ferences are tha t  S lov ic  C . S .  1 .  d i d  not  formulate a l l  t h e i r  
s t i m u l i  as s p e c i f i c  r i s k y  a c t i v i t i e s  but  as g loba l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  techn ica l  
systems o f  devices; 2. they subjected t h e i r  data t o  a  type o f  ex terna l  
analysis.  Considering the number o f  var iab les  f o r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
s t imu l i ,  t h i s  i s  a  ra the r  vulnerable procedure. 
d i f f e r e n t  samples o f  causes o f  dea th  a n d a p p r o a c h i n g d i f f e r e n t  groups o f  
people, L i c h t e n s t e i n ,  S l o v i c ,  F i s c h h o f f ,  Layman & Combs (1978). Green & 
Brown (1980) and S t a l l e n  & Vlek  (Note 1) a l l  r e p o r t  h i g h l y  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s :  
o v e r e s t i m a t i o n  o f  low f requenc ies  and u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n  o f  h i g h  f requenc ies .  
Moreover, t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  S t a l l e n  & Vlek  show (see f i g u r e  8 )  t h a t  t h e  
e l i c i t a t i o n  o f  l i k e  es t imates  f rom e x p e r t s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  
o r  r i s k  r e g u l a t i o n  shows e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same b ias .  As a p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  
o f  t h e  genera l  f i n d i n g ,  L i c h t e n s t e i n  e t  a l .  suggest t h a t  people make use 
o f  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  h e u r i s t i c  (Tversky 6 Kahneman, 1974): assessment o f  
f requency o r  . p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  based on  t h e  number and ease w i t h  wh ich  i n -  
s tances come t o  mind. As t h e  number r e c a l l e d  per  c a t e g o r y  (= cause o f  death)  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  independent o f  t h e  t o t a l  number w i t h i n  t h a t  ca tegory ,  a  
14) f l a t t e n i n g  o f  responses i s  l i k e l y  t o  occur .  . 
I f ,  as S l o v i c  e t  a l .  (1980) seem t o  suggest,  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  exper ienced 
as t h r e a t  depending upon i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  f u t u r e  be- 
h a v i o r ,  and i f  t h e  number o f  f a t a l i t i e s  due t o  an a c c i d e n t  i s  n o t  seen as 
a  ma jo r  de te rminan t  o f  judged ser iousness o f  a c c i d e n t s ,  t h e n  i t  i s  wor tb -  
w h i l e  t o  e x p l o r e  i n  more d e t a i l  what i s  known about  p e o p l e ' s  a b i l i t i e s  i n  
p r e d i c t i n g  f u t u r e  and e x p l a i n i n g  p r e s e n t ( o r  p a s t )  th rea t .We w i l l  d i s c u s s  these  
a b i  l i t  i e s  under t h e  heads " f o r e s i g h t "  and " h i n d s i g h t s "  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
14) Arguments j u s t i f y i n g  t h e  l o g a r i t h m i c  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  response 
a r e  g i v e n  by b o t h  Green & Brown (1980) and S t a l  l e n  & Vlek  ( ~ o t e  1 ) .  
F i g u r e  8. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between r e g i s t r a t e d  f requency and s u b j e c t i v e l y  
es t imated  f requency f o r  13 causes o f  death.  
1. Poison ing  a s  caused by s p r a y i n g  7. Drowning 
o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c r o p s  8. F i r e  i n  house o r  b u i l d i n g  
2 .  Heart  d i sease  9. F a u l t y  a n a e s t h e t i c a l  t rea tment  
3. D o - i t - y o u r s e l f  repai rment  o f  
e l e c t r i c a l  w i r i n g  and 10.  L i g h t n i n g  
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  1 1 .  Car a c c i d e n t  
4. M o t o r b i c y c l e  a c c i d e n t  12.  C o l l i s i o n  w i t h  t r a i n  on 
5.  Murder w i t h  gun o r  bomb c r o s s i n g  
6. Pedes t r ian  a c c i d e n t  i n  t r a f f i c  13. A l e a k i n g  gas p i p e  a t  home 
Most work on p r e d i c t i o n  has t y p i c a l l y  been done i n  areas c a l l e d  human 
i n f o r m a t i o n  p rocess ing  and judgment under c o n d i t i o n s  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  o r  
r i s k  (here  s h o r t l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  as judgment) .  I t  g e n e r a l l y  r e v e a l s  people 
t o  be q u i t e  i n e p t  a t  a l l  bu t  t h e  s i m p l e s t  i n f e r e n t i a l  t a s k s  - and some- 
t imes even a t  them - F i s c h h o f f  (1976) w r i t e s .  The f o l l o w i n g  examples a r e  
taken fran t h e  s p e c i f i c  f i e l d  o f  hazard research  and may i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  
f i n d i n g .  
I n  an a lmost  c l a s s i c a l  s tudy,  Kates (1962; see a l s o  Bur ton  G Kates, 1964) 
found t h a t  f l o o d p l a i n  d w e l l e r s  mis judged t h e  p r o b b ! + i l i s t i c  n a t u r e  o f  
renewed f l o o d i n g  o f  t h e i r  r e s i d e n t i a l  areas.  Many viewed f l o o d s  as r e p e t i t i v e  
and even c y c l i c a l  phenomena, t h u s  r e p l a c i n g  randomness by a de te rmina te  
o r d e r  i n  na tu re .  Another comnon v iew among r e s i d e n t s  was t h a t  the  occur rence  
o f  severe f l o o d  i n  one year was seen as  making i t  u n l i k e l y  t o  have ano ther  
severe f l o o d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  year .  Such b iases  resemble t h e  b e t t e r  known 
gamblers f a l l a c y .  They may be caused t y  t h e  use o f  s i m p l i f y i n g  judgmental 
s t r a t e g i e s  ( h e u r i s t i c s ) .  For example, when g i v e n  ev idence r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  case (=  f l o o d i n g )  peop le  c o n s i s t e n t l y  ignore  base r a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
thus g i v i n g  t o o  much we igh t  t o  t h e  v i v i d  ev idence a t  t h e  expense o f  ade- 
q u a t e l y  a d j u s t i n g  e a r l i e r  s t o r e d  s t a t i s t i c s .  However, as we w i l l  argue below, 
an a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  Ka tes '  f i n d i n g  may be g i v e n  i n  more e x p l i c i t  
m o t i v a t i o n a l  terms. 
Wi th  respec t  t o  u n c e r t a i n  about  (consequences o f )  f u t u r e  even ts ,  Monat , 
A v e r i l l  & Lazarus (1972) made the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between e v e n t - u n c e r t a i n t y  
and t e m p o r a l - u n c e r t a i n t y .  The former a p p l i e s  t o  cases where one knows 
when an a c c i d e n t  may happen b u t  n o t  whether i t  a c t u a l  l y wi  l l happen o r  n o t .  
Temporal u n c e r t a i n t y  e x i s t s  i f  i t  i s  o n l y  unknown when a t h r e a t e n i n g  event  
may f i n d  p l a c e  (and n o t  whether i t  w i l l  occur  o r  n o t ) . T h e i r  exper iment  - ex- 
pos ing s u b j e c t s  t o  t h e  t h r e a t e n i n g  
event ,  i . e .  a  p a i n f u l  e l e c t r i c a l  shock - suggests  t h a t  temporal u n c e r t a i n t y  
i s  exper ienced as the  more t h r e a t e n i n g  o f  t h e  two types  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y .  
As t ime wore on, s u b j e c t s  under t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  tempor'al uncer ta , in ty  en- 
gaged i n  a v o i d a n c e - l i k e  a c t i v i t i e s  l i k e  a t t e n t i o n  d i v e r s i o n .  A l though t h e  
a u t h o r s  w r o t e  "To da te ,  we know o f  no l i t e r a t u r e  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  assess i n t r a -  
p s y c h i c  cop ing  s t r a t e g i e s  employed under c o n d i t i o n s  o f  temporal u n c e r t a i n t y "  
  ona at e t  a l . ,  1972, p. 238), as a  m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  t h e  s t u d i e s  i n  n a t u r a l  
hazard management a t  t h e  Department o f  Geography U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Chicago may 
be seen as  d e a l i n g  w i t h  such s t r a t e g i e s .  The judgmental s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  
t h e  f l o o d  p l a i n  r e s i d e n t s  i n  Ka tes l  s tudy  used, f o r  example, j u s t  had t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  making o r d e r  o u t  o f  d i s o r d e r ,  the reby  d e p i c t i n g  t h e  f u t u r e  as 
more c o n t r o l l a b l e  than  I n  f a c t  i t  i s .  We w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h i s  m o t i v e  i n  more 
d e t a i l  f u r t h e r  on  i n  s e c t i o n  2.2.. 
Another  example i n  s t u d y i n g  human judgment i s  i t s  i n s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  v a r y i n g  
sample s i z e  when e s t i m a t i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  parameters. P a r t i c u l a r l y  when i n -  
f o r m a t i o n  about  sample b i a s  i s  p a l l i d  and i n f o r m a t i o n  about  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  sample 7s v i v i d ,  people make unwarranted g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  from samples 
t o  p o p u l a t i o n s  (see e.g. H a m i l l ,  Decamp Wi lson  6 N i s b e t t ,  1980). Not o n l y  
l a y  peop le  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  such b i a s i n g  i n f o r m a t  i o n  processes. Several s t u d i e s  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  such mispercep t ions  a l s o  o p e r a t e  among e x p e r t s  l i k e  psychome- 
t r i c i a n s ,  w e l l  t r a i n e d  s t a t i s t i c i a n s  o r  peop le  when making d e c i s i o n s  w i t h  
g r a v e  s o c i a l  consequences (see e.g. Goldberg, 1968; Tversky 6 Kahneman, 
1974; S l o v i c  e t  a l . ,  1976). 
A l though  peoples p r o b a b i l i t y  es t imates  a p p a r e n t l y  v i o l a t e  b a s i c  laws o f  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h e o r y ,  people tend t o  v iew such laws as r a t i o n a l  when they 
a r e  ques t ioned  about  t h e i r  e s t i m a t i o n  competence o r  when asked t o  r e t r o s p e c t  
o n t o  t h e i r  own judgmenta l  processes. Under these c o n d i t i o n s ,  they  exaggerate 
t h e i r  own i n f o r m a t i o n  p rocess ing  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .  For example, they under-  
e s t i m a t e  t h e i r  a c t u a l  r e l i a n c e  on o n l y  a  few ma jo r  v a r i a b l e s  o r  t h e i r  use 
o f  h e u r i s t i c s  i n  performing canp l ica ted m u l t i v a r i a t e  judgments (Shepard, 
1964; S lov ic  & L ich tenste in ,  1971). 
N i sbe t t  & Borgida (1975) have suggested tha t  perhaps on l y  when we have 
ra ther  we l l  rehearsed schemata f o r  dea l ing  w i t h  c e r t a i n  types o f  abs t rac t ,  
data sumnary informat ion,  we process in format ion  i n  a  fashion tha t  the 
s c i e n t i s t  would descr ibe as r a t i o n a l .  This may be p a r t i c u l a r l y  re levant  
g iven the gene ra l l y  low frequency o f  most na tu ra l  and technological  hazards 
w i t h i n  the human l i f e t i m e .  Here, in format ion  a t  a  h igher leve l  than the  
i nd i v i dua l  cases hard ly  e x i s t s  and, i f  on ly  f o r  t h i s  reason, i t  w i l l  be 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the  i nd i v i dua l  t o  f a l l  back on such schemata. Thus, i t  would 
appear r a t i o n a l  t o  see people r e l y  more heav i l y  on o ther  resources i n  t r y i n g  
to,come t o  g r i p  w i t h  both  pas t  and f u t u r e  events l i k e  technological  hazards. 
"H I  NDS I  GUT" 
----------- 
Results of labora tory  s tud ies  suggest t h a t  people process in format ion  about 
past events i n  such a  way as t o  sys temat ica l ly  reduce i t s  perceived sur-  
pr is ingness.  T e l l i n g  people t h a t  an event has occurred has been shown t o  
increase t h e i r  sub jec t i ve  p r o b a b i l i t y  t ha t  i t  was going t o  happen (Fisch- 
ho f f ,  1975). Subjects, t o l d  the c o r r e c t  s o l u t i o n  t o  e a r l i e r  problems (1.ike 
the answer t o  almanac type questions, inadmissib le evidence i n  cou r t  o r  
deb r i e f i ng  in format ion  a f t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a  psychological  experiment) 
overestimated how much they a c t u a l l y  knew before being t o l d  (F ischhof f ,  
1977). Walster (1967) reported tha t  when confronted w i t h  news o f  an accident ,  
people tended t o  exaggerate i n  re t rospect  i t s  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ,  and more so 
w i t h  moreser ' iousaccidents.  This knew- i t -a l l -a long e f f e c t  appears t o  be 
ra the r  robust :  debiasing i n s t r u c t i o n s  do not  produce increased adjustment 
nor do they reduce b ias .  These f i nd ings  a l s o  shed some l i g h t  on important 
soc ia l  aspects o f  the  dynamics o f  appra isa l .  I f ,  by exaggerating the  p r e d i c t -  
a b i l i t y  o f  the  past, people underestimate how much they whould l ea rn  from 
i t ,  they w i l l  f i n d  i t  even more d i f f i c u l t  t o  reconst ruc t  the unce r ta in t i es  
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t ha t  a c t u a l l y  have faced others.  As an example, they may be very i n -  
sens i t i ve  fo r  the  unce r ta in t i es  t ha t  r i sk - regu la to rs  have t o  face. Thus, 
when confronted i n  such a  soc ia l  context  w i t h  "unexpected" accidents,  people 
may ac t  on the  bas is  o f  a  "they-could-have-known-it-al l" b e l i e f .  At t h e i r  
t u r n  t he  dec i s ion  makers w i l l  come t o  f ea r  such over react ing  and, f o r  
example, a re  l l k e l y  t o  develop an even more reserved a t t i t u d e  w i t h  respect 
t o  e a r l y  in forming the p u b l i c  about impending d i sas te rs .  
A  s i m i l a r  e f f e c t  has been reported i n  s tudy ing  people?.^ response t o  the  
cance l l a t i on  o f  threatening alarms. B tezn i t z  (1976) observed lower ing heart  
ra tes ,  s k i n  conductances as we l l  as d imin ish ing b e l i e f s  i n  the  th rea t ,  i n  
short  a  gene ra l l y  lower l eve l  o f  emergency preparat ion,  when sub jec ts  were 
exposed t o  new alarms a f t e r  t h e i r  f i r s t  exposure t o  a  f a l s e  alarm. Brezn i tz  
h i n t s  a t  an I -knew- i t -a l l -a long - explanat ion o f  t h e  FAE (- False Alarm 
~ f f e c t )  when the  suggests t h a t  "on the  sub jec t i ve  l eve l ,  people (. ..) might 
be p a r t i c u l a r l y  d is turbed t o  d iscover t h a t  i t  was a l l  unnecessary - t h a t ,  i n  
f a c t ,  they made f o o l s  o f  themselves" (p. 131 ; emphasis ours). Here, Brezn i tz  
too seems t o  assume t h a t  h i s  respondents reacted i n  a  ra the r  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  
way t o  the  c a n c e l l a t i o n  and, by imp l i ca t i on ,  t o  the alarm. I n  h inds ight ,  
they may have come t o  view the  alarm as s igna l i ng  "almost c e r t a i n l y  nothing 
t o  happen". C l e a r l y  then, a  second s i m i l a r  a larm w i l l  not  be as much f e a r f u l .  
To B rezn i t z ,  the c r e d i b i l i t y  loss o f  the source o f  the  th reaten ing inform- 
a t i o n  i s  FAE's c h i e f  feature.  I n  our op in ion ,  however, i t  may be but  one 
o f  t he  a  p o s t e r i o r i  arguments t h a t  support people 's expecta t ion .o f  whether 
o r  no t  a  new alarm w i l l  ma te r i a l i ze .  
2 .2 .  THE ASSESSMENT OF CONTROL 
"Perceived Choice" and "Perceived Control"  a re  major themes o f  modern 
psychology (see, e.g., Harvey, 1976; Per lmutter  6 Monty, 1980). I n  
sect ion 1.2. we have argued tha t  they are  a l so  essen t i a l  aspects o f  the 
not ion  "stress". I n  Figure 4 (see p. 11) we have t r i e d  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  
t ha t  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  psychological  ( re)sources 
tha t  determines whether the percept ion  o f  a  th reaten ing event w i l l  make 
fo r  a  psychological  c o n f l i c t .  When the  two demands f o r  f u t u r e  behavior 
a re  c o n f l i c t i n g ,  the  i nd i v i dua l  experiences s t ress .  I n  h i s  review o f  ex- 
per imental research on personal c o n t r o l  over impending harm Aver i  1 1  (1973) 
shows tha t  when subjects are g iven oppo r tun i t i es  f o r  c o n t r o l ,  decreased 
s t ress  reac t ions  have gene ra l l h  been observed i n  comparison t o  cond i t ions  
where no such con t ro l  was poss ib le .  Thus, one would expect tha t  any attempt 
t o  resolve tha t  c o n f l i c t  by persona l ly  resuming con t ro l  over outcomes o f  
own behavior w i l l  (more o r  less  e f f e c t i v e l y )  reduce the  s t ress .  
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I n  sec t ion  2.1. we have a l ready g iven examples o f  t he  need t o  con t ro l  
f u tu re  outcomes, v i z .  the  very ac t  o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  (through inferences 
etc.)  t he  th reaten ing event. Th is  m t i v a t  ion o f  responding t o  t h rea t  can 
be c a l l e d  c o g n i t i v e  con t ro l .  To have explained events apparent ly  b u i l d s  
up t o  the  selfpirnage o f  being knowledgeable and, as such, i f s a t i s f i e s  
the need t o  be i n  con t ro l  o f  one's environment, t o  know what. Paradox- 
i c a l l y ,  the  h inds igh t  experiments i nd i ca te  t ha t  t h i s  very f e e l i n g  t h a t  we 
have made sense out  o f  an event may be a  good guarantee tha t  we w i l l  not 
improve our f o res igh t  o r  p r e d i c t i v e  e f f i c a c y -  The r o l e  o f  cogn i t i ve  con t ro l  
i n  facing th rea ts  i s  emphasized i n  Jordan's (1968) speculat ions about 
behavior under r i s k .  Using Lewinls terminology, he argued tha t  whether 
locomotion from one mental reg ion t o  another w i l l  take place or  not  depends 
on the c e r t a i n t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  those regions. These are:  
1 .  knowing whether negat ive events might occur t o  which I do not wish 
t o  be exposed when being I n  t ha t  region,  and 
2. knowing whether I can avoid undesirable consequences o f  such an event 
might i t  s t i l l  occur.  
I f  a reg ion has both  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  the subject  can move w i t h  psychologic- 
a l  c e r t a i n t y  even though not  a l l  the  consequences o f  h i s  a c t  w i l l  be known. 
"A l l  he has t o  know I s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  unwanted outcomes a re  excluded. When 
c e r t a i n t y  e x i s t s ,  t he  tak ing  o f  r i s k s  and o f  chances becomes e x c i t i n g ,  
otherwi  s t  threatening1*, ( ~ o r d a n ,  1968, p. 135). Burgers b Ark in  (1980). f o r  
example, repo r t  t h a t  those subjects who could not  p r e d i c t  t he  onset and who 
knew tha t  they cou ld  no t  con t ro l  the  te rminat ion  o f  loud noise,  f e l t  s ig -  
n i f i c a n t l y  more depressed i n  so lv ing  problems than those who could e i t h e r  
con t ro l  o r  p r e d i c t ,  o r  could do both. 
O f  i n t e r e s t  t o  the  study o f  c o g n i t i v e  con t ro l  i n  determining the 
l eve l  o f  s t ress  I s  the assessment o f  warning s igna ls .  Experiments w i t h  
both humans and animals have gene ra l l y  found tha t  a warning s igna l  by i t -  
s e l f  has l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on the  experience o f  s t ress .  One o f  t he  reasons 
seems t o  be t h a t  warning s igna l s  o f t e n  do not  p rov ide  s u f f i c i e n t  inform- 
a t i o n  regarding the onset o f  the  d i r e c t  t h rea t .  As a r e s u l t ,  subjects 
must remain v i g i l a n t  and responsive t o  a l l  cues i n  t h e i r  environment. Be- 
cause the  meaning o f  a warning s igna l  i s  so imparted t o  cues i n  f a c t  not  
associated w i t h  the  th rea t ,  the  s t ress fu lness  o f  the e n t i r e  environment 
may have been increased. Thus, one would expect t o  see people s t r i v e  f o r  
temporal c e r t a i n t y .  Indeed, t h i s  preference has been observed when sub jec ts  
were presented w i t h  r e l a t i v e l y  simple s t i m u l i  l i k e  e l e c t r i c  shocks ( c f .  
Honat e t  a ] . ,  1972) o r  bu rs t s  o f  loud noise. The mere knowledge o f  the 
cond i t ions  f o r  a t h rea t  t o  m a t e r i a l i z e  even makes sub jec ts  se lec t  h igher 
l e v e l s  o f  shock than when such informat ion  i s  not  g iven (Bowers, 1968). 
On the bas is  o f  a review o f  experimental research, A v e r i l l  ( 1973 )  con- 
cluded tha t  s t ress  i s  p r i m r l l y  a f unc t i on  of the meaning o f  the con t ro l  
response f o r  the i nd i v i dua l  and not  j u s t  o f  i t s  e f fec t iveness i n  prevent ing 
o r  m i t i g a t i n g  the impact o f  a p o t e n t i a l l y  harmful st imulus.  I f  t h i s  holds,  
b e l i e v i n g  one has meaningful con t ro l  may s t i l l  r e s u l t  i n  i n e f f e c t i v e  
behavior. Weinstein (1980) ,  f o r  example, discussed var ious  studies which 
i nd i ca te  t ha t  people are gene ra l l y  u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  o p t i m i s t i c  about the  
fu tu re .  For a range o f  p o s l t i v e  and negat ive  events he examined the  con- 
d l t i o n s  under which such o p t i m i s t i c  b iases occur. 
Among others,  the fo l l ow ing  hypotheses r e l a t i n g  t o  t he  r o l e  o f  perceived 
con t ro l  were supported: The greater  t h e  perceived c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  o f  a 
negat ive event, the  greater  the tendency f o r  people t o  be l i eve  tha t  t h e i r  
own chances f o r  not  being hanned a re  b e t t e r  than average; a l s o  the greater  
the  perceived c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  o f  a p o s i t i v e  event, the  greater  t he  tendency 
f o r  people t o  be l i eve  tha t  t h e i r  own chances a re  greater  than average. 
Weinstein suggests the fo l l ow ing  exp lanat ion  f o r  t h i s  e f f e c t .  I f  an event 
i s  perceived t o  be c o n t r o l l a b l e ,  i t  s i g n i f i e s  t ha t  people be l i eve  there  
Are steps one can take t o  increase the l i k e l i h o o d  o f  a desired outcome. 
Assuming i n  a d d i t i o n  tha t  people can more e a s i l y  b r i n g  t o  mind t h e i r  own 
ac t i ons  than the  ac t ions  o f  others,  people are  l i k e l y  t o  conclude tha t  
desired outcomes are  more l i k e l y  t o  happen t o  them than t o  others. 
I n  sumnary, avai  l a b l e  evidence suggests, t h a t  compared t o  behavioral con t ro l  
the need t o  reduce the uncer ta in ty ,  which o f t e n  accmpanies such con t ro l ,  
i s  the  more potent  determinant o f  s t ress .  The general preference f o r  c l e a r  
expectancies,however inaccurate, s t e m s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  adapt ion and t o  
reduce long term s t ress  even though they may i n i t i a l l y  lead t o  increased 
r e a c t i v i t y .  
I f  the quest ion were put  t o  most people, there  are  good reasons t o  expect 
that  they would p r e f e r  t o  have a choice among a l t e r n a t i v e s  ra the r  than t o  
have decisions made f o r  than ( c f .  B r e h ,  1972). Yet, as Averi l l (1973) 
notes, soc ia l  comnentators from Hobbes f o  F r m  have emphasized man's 
w i l l i ngness  t o  r e l i n g u i s h  such c o n t r o l ,  t o  "escape from freedom". I n  t h i s  
and the  f o l l o w i n g  paragraphs we w i l l  devote our a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h i s  paradoxical  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between dec is iona l  con t ro l  and s t ress .  Our s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  w i l l  
be K e l l y ' s  (1955) fundamental observat ion tha t  a man c o n t r o l s  h i s  des t i ny  
" t o  the ex tent  t ha t  he can develop a const ruc t ion  system w i t h  which he 
i d e n t l f i e s  h imse l f  and which i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  comprehensive t o  subsume the 
wor ld around him. I f  he i s  unable t o  i d e n t i f y  h imsel f  w i t h  t h i s  system [ . . . I  
but he can experience no personal cont ro l " .  
K e l l y ' s  above statement leads us t o  expect t ha t  the i nd i v i dua l  must be ab le  
t o  agree w i t h  the degree o f  s t r u c t u r i n g  tha t  e x i s t s .  On the one hand, as 
Kaufmann (1971) has emphasized, t h i s  requ i res  us t o  look a t  the  environment- 
a l  determinants o f  personal c o n t r o l :  the i nd i v i dua l  can on l y  develop a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  coherent cons t ruc t i on  system i f  h i s  ( s o c i a l )  environment i s  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s tab le .  On the o the r  hand, i t  suggests the importance o f  per-  
ceived congru i ty  between i nd i v i dua l  b e l i e f  systems and behavioral  c o n t r a i n t s  
i n  determining the  experience o f  c o n t r o l  and, consequently, o f  choice. 
Sane evidence f o r  t h i s  i s  t o  be found i n  an experiment by Lewis 6 Blanchard 
(1971), who reported tha t  st ronger i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  a r o l e  leads t o  the 
experience o f  g reater  dec is iona l  con t ro l .  I f  subjects are  placed i n  complete- 
l y  novel o r  uns t ruc tured se t t i ngs ,  i . e . ,  when behavior i s  no t  constra ined 
by s i tuat ion-bound cues, they w i l l  genera l ly  experience considerable s t ress .  
The relevance o f  cong ru i t y  between, on the one hand, expectat ions o r  b e l i e f s  
and, on the  o the r  hand, ex terna l  cond i t i ons  f o r  behavioral  c o n t r o l  i s  a l soev iden t  
from s tud ies  o f  the "i l lus ion:  o f  cont ro l " .  According t o  Langer ( 1 9 7 5 ) ~  an 
i l l u s i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  i s  an expectancy o f  a  persona l  success p r o b a b i l i t y  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  h i g h e r  than  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  would war ren t .  
Langer found t h a t  people who had been a l lowed t o  draw t h e i r  l o t t e r y - t i c k e t  
themselves were o n l y  w i l l i n g  t o  s e l l  t h e i r  t i c k e t  a t  a  p r i c e  which was 
c o n s i d e r a b l y  h i g h e r  than  o f  those people who had s i m p l y  been g i v e n  a t i c k e t .  
Uortman (1975) conducted an experiment i n  which she asked c rapshoo te rs  
e i t h e r  b e f o r e  o r  a f t e r  they  had thrown t h e  d i c e  t o  b e t  on the  number o f  
eyes they  were t o  throw and had thrown, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The r e s u l t s  s t r o n g l y  
supported h e r  hypo thes is :  those p l a y e r s  .wo "caused" t h e i r  own outcome and 
knew beforehand what they  hoped t o  a t t a i n ,  p e r c e i v e d  themselves t o  have 
more c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  outcome, more c h o i c e  about  which outcome they  rece ived ,  
and more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e i r  outcome than p l a y e r s  i n  t h e  remain ing con- 
d i t i o n s .  Wortman argues t h a t  o n l y  i f  people know what they  hope t o  a t t a i n ,  
can they  e x e r t  c o n t r o l .  I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  l a n g e r l s  r e s u l t s  a r e  s i m i l a r l y  
mediated by her  s u b j e c t s  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a t t e m p t s  t o  e x e r t  c o n t r o l .  
Related t o  t h e  concept  o f  r o l e - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  comnitment, 
which has been d e f i n e d  as  "p ledging o r  b i n d i n g  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  t o  an a c t "  
( ~ i e s l e r ,  1971). I t  means t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i d e n t i f i e s  w i t h  h i s  a c t i o n  
o r ,  i n  o t h e r  words, b e l i e f s  t h a t  he a c t s  on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  proper  a p p r a i s a l  
o f  b o t h  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  demands o r  c o n s t r a i n t s .  As such, he b e l i e v e s  
h i s  a p p r a i s a l  i s  causal  o f  h i s  a c t i o n .  Exper iments have indeed suppor ted 
the  idea t h a t  a t t r i b u t i o n o f  s e l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  an a c t  i nc reases  com- 
mitment t o  t h a t  a c t  (see, e.g., Mayer, Duval & Hensly-Duval,  1980). One 
major v a r i a b l e  t h a t  i n f l u e n c e s  t h i s  a t t r i b u t i o n a l  process and, consequent ly ,  
determines commitment, i s  pe rce ived  choice.  I t  presumably does so, Mayer 
e t  a l .  argue, p r i m a r i l y  by a f f e c t i n g  t h e  s a l i e n c e  o f  t h e  s e l f  as a p l a u s i b l e  
cause. Harvey (1976) has sumrnar i zed  how some v a r i a b l e s  i n f l u e n c e  perce ived  
choice (see Table 2 )  15) 
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Table 2:.Some determinants o f  perceived choice w i t h  t h e i r  respect ive 
d i r e c t i o n  o f  in f luence.  (Source: Harvey, 1976, p. 90) .  
I n  sumnary, we may perce ive  personal c o n t r o l  i f  we in tend a  c e r t a i n  ou t -  
come, i f  personal choice i s  s a l i e n t  t o  us, and, because o f  h inds ight  e f f e c t s ,  
perhaps most ly  so i f the intended outcome i n  f a c t  occurs. I n  re t rospect ,  
the percept ion o f  such ( i l l u s o r y )  c o n t r o l  may lead v i a  the a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  
c a u s a l i t y  t o  s e l f ,  t o  camnit ourselves t o  the a c t .  Thus, comnitrnent imp l ies  
the percept ion  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the ac t .  The major e f f e c t  o f  comnit- 
ment i s  t o  make tha t  ac t  r e s i s t a n t  t o  change. 
I n  a  f i n a l  paragraph, we w i l l  e labora te  the conceptual r e i a t i o n s h i p  between 
causa l i t y  o f  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  an accident .  These va r i ab les  - of ten  
confounded - may be important i n  e x p l a i n i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l  reac t ions  t o  
( techno log ica l )  th reat .  
15) O f  these the  l a t t e r  two in f luences seem t o  r e f l e c t  se l f - se rv ing  
tendencies, whereas the  o the r  determinants r e f l e c t  main ly  inform- 
at ion-processing and perceptual  tendencies. 
ACCIDENT CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCIDENTS 
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I n  the  fo rego ing  s e c t i o n s  we have t r i e d  t o  argue t h a t  t h e  answer t o  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  "do I f e e l  t h a t  I have o p p o r t u n i t l e s  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  t h r e a t ? '  
(see p. 8 ) ,  i s  an impor tan t  de te rminan t  o f  s t r e s s  o r  f e e l  ings o f  i n -  
s e c u r i t y .  These o p p o r t u n i t i e s  were supposed t o  be b o t h  c o g n i t i v e  and 
a f f e c t i v e  i n  k i n d ,  a s l i l l u s t r a t e d  by f i g u r e  4 .  They concern ways t o  under- 
stand one 's  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  env i ronment ,  t o  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  a n x i e t y ,  t o  
s t r u c t u r e  vague f e e l  l ngs  a;~d be1 i e f s  f o r  a  dec is ion ,  t o  g e t  compensation 
f rom a  person o r  i n d u s t r y  a t  f a u l t ,  o r  t o  p r o v i d e  a  sense o f  i d e n t i t y .  
A l l  such f u n c t i o n s  a r e  s p e c i f i c  types o f  c o n t r o l  and serve  a  common goa l  
which c o u l d  be c a l l e d  systems - maintenance: i t  a r e  "ways o f  keeping one- 
s e l f  g o i n g  i n  a d i f f i c u l t  and u n p r e d i c t a b l e  wor ld"  ( F i s c h h o f f ,  1976 ) .  
As such, t h e  assessment o f  a  t h r e a t e n i n g  event  i s  v e r y  much an a c t i v e  
process. O f  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  process o f  how people appra ise  t h r e a t -  
en ing  even ts  l i k e  i n d u s t r i a l  a larms and emiss ion o f  p o l l u t a n t s  i s  t h e  a rea  
o f  research  on a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  an a c c i d e n t .  T h i s  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  as t h e  assignment o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  m i g h t  be c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  t a k e  a c t i o n  o r  demanding i t  f rom o t h e r s .  
The ma jo r  impetus t o  t h e  research  on a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  an 
a c c i d e n t  i s  a  p r o v o c a t i v e  s tudy  by Wa ls te r  (1966). She p resen ted  s u b j e c t s  
w i t h  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  an a c c i d e n t  i n  which some a c t  o f  a  s t i m u l u s  person 
( p e r p e t r a t o r )  l e d  t o  harm t o  some o t h e r  person ( v i c t i m ) .  Her experiment 
demonstrated t h a t  outcome s e v e r i t y  determined t h e  amount o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
ass igned t o  t h e  p e r p e t r a t o r .  Wa ls te r  e x p l a i n e d  t h i s  e f f e c t  by reasoning 
t h a t  her  s u b j e c t s  had a t t r i b u t e d  more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  s e r i o u s  a c c i d e n t  
t o  p r o t e c t  themselves from the idea t h a t  t h e i r  l i v e s  t o o  c o u l d  be a f f e c t e d  
by such u n f o r t u n a t e  even ts .  To b e l i e v e  i n  chance happenings would be t o o  
t h r e a t e n i n g .  T h i s  "defensive a t t r i b u t i o n  hypo thes is "  has s i n c e  s t i m u l a t e d  
a  l a r g e  number o f  s t u d i e s .  Desp i te  i t s  con t inued  p o p u l a r i t y ,  however, 
t h e r e  has been observed a  w r r i s m e  unevenness i n  g rowth  o f  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  
and conceptual  development (see, e.g.,  F i s c h h o f f ,  1976; Fincham & Jaspars. 
1980). 
I n  an e a r l i e r  c r i t i c a l  rev iew o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  n o t i o n s  and e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s ,  
Vidmar & C r i n k l a w  (1974) had a l r e a d y  p o i n t e d  a t  t h e  absence o f  "any 
r a t i o n a l e  t h a t  p r e d i c t s  whose f a t e  s u b j e c t s  w i l l  i d e n t i f y  w i t h  when b o t h  
a  p e r p e t r a t o r  and v i c t i m  a r e  i n v o l v e d  i n  an a c c i d e n t "  (p. 114) .  One p o s s i b l e  
answer has been suggested by P r y o r  & K r i s s  (1977): w i t h  t h e  f a t e  o f  t h e  
s u b j e c t  who i s  most s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  p e r c e i v e r .  I f  i t  i s  t h e  v i c t i m  w i t h  whom 
one I d e n t i f i e s ,  t h e  p e r p e t r a t o r  w i l l  have t h e  most d i s s i m i l a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
Because o f  t h e i r  s a l i e n c y  they  w i l l  g i v e  r i s e  t o  t h e  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y  
t o  t h i s  a c t .  I f  the p e r c e i v e r  i d e n t i f i e s  more w i t h  t h e  p e r p e t r a t o r - r o l e ,  
he may a t t r i b u t e  causal  i t y  t o  env i ronmenta l  f a c t o r s  (chance) .  Indeed e x p e r i -  
menta l  r e s u l t s  (shaver ,  1970; C r i n k l a w  & Vidmar, 1971) i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
more s i m i l a r  t h e  s u b j e c t  and t h e  s t i m u l u s  persor? a re ,  t h e  l e s s  i s  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  ass igned f o r  t h e  mishap. However, t h i s  o n l y  appeared t r u e  
when t h e  f i r s t  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  o r i e n t a t i o n s  was p resen t  16) 
T h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  p e r c e i v e r  has t o  be p r i m a r i l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  what 
t h e  observed s i t u a t i o n  means a f f e c t i v e l y  t o  him (value-maintenance s e t ) .  
When h i s  o r i e n t a t i o n  i s  causa l -gene t i c ,  i . e .  he i s  p r i m a r i l y  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  what t h e  s o c i a l ,  p h y s i c a l  e t c .  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  b e h a v i o r / a c t  a re ,  o r  
s i t u a t i o n - m a t c h i n g ,  i .e .  h i s  main concern i s  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  behavior  
o f  the  s t i m u l u s  person as i t  r e l a t e s  t o  norms a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n ,  
no d i f f e r e n t i a l  assignment o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  v a r y i n g  s i m i l a r i t y  was found. 
16)The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n t o  these t h r e e  p e r c e p t u a l  s e t s  was o r i g i n a l l y  
developed by Jones & Th ibau t  i n  t h e i r  a n a l y s i s  o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  
pe rcep t  ion .  
In conducting one of the few experiments that has not at the outset 
confounded the above three inferential sets, Chaikin t Darley (1973) 
found that with a value-maintenance set: 
1 .  In general, less responsibility is attrlbuted to change (= environmental 
factor) when the consequences of the accident become more serious. 
2. Perpetrator-like perceivers attribute responsibility to environmental 
factors (like chance; but they also derogated the victim!) more so than 
do those subjects who have to respond as are they victims. 
3. This latter group attribute to the =extent the cause of both the 
minor and the serious accident to the perpetrator, that is to say they 
hold him equal l y responsible for both accidents. 
To some extent, these results confirm a general finding of the attribution 
research. called "the fundamental attribution error" (see e.g. Harvey, 
lckes 6 Kidd, 1976/1978). By this we mean thatpeople - particularly when 
observing somebody else's instead of one's own behavior - are inclined to 
overattribute causality to personal factors like disposit.ions, and under- 
estimate the impact of situational or environmental factors. One possible 
explanation of this bias is given in Gestalt-tenns of Figure: Background. 
To the victim-like perceiver, the perpetrator is Figure, thus salient; to. 
the perpetrator-like perceiver, the environment is Figure. 
However, this theory would at least need one extra premisse to explain the 
differential impact of varying seriousness on attribution by perpetrator- 
l ike versus victims-l ike perceivers (see Chaikin 6 Darley's 2nd and 3rd 
finding). As already mentioned, perpetrator-like subjects may make defensive 
attributions to avoid that they in such situation would be blamed for their 
"careless" act. Such defensive avoidance behavior is more likely to occur 
with more serious accidents. Apparently, a similar reasoning cannot be 
applied to victim-like subjects (the more threatening the situation is 
appraised by v i c t i m - l i k e  subjects,  the more they may want t o  p ro tec t  
themselves from the knowledge tha t  they too could be a t  the mercy o f  
such an event) .  Vidmar & Crinklaw (1974) there fore  suggest t ha t  on l y  
when sub jec ts  f e e l  a  perpet ra tor  ought t o  have foreseen the consequences 
o f  h i s  behavior they assign more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a  ser ious ra ther  
than a  minor outcome o f  h i s  ac t17) .  Presumably, t h e i r  v i c t i m - l i k e  subjects 
d i d  not  f e e l  t h a t  way ( t h e i r  data indeed showed tha t  they considered the 
pe rpe t ra to r  equa l l y  ca re fu l  I n  both cond i t i ons ) .  The f a c t  t h a t  they hold 
the  pe rpe t ra to r  responsible f o r  h i s  ac t .  no mat ter  how ser ious i t s  con- 
sequences are, may be based on t h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  yet  he could have done 
otherwise. The judgment t ha t  i s  being made i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  sanct ioning 
judgment, not  an explanatory judgment, and a l s o  not  - as i t  i s  f o r  perpe- 
t r a t o r - l i k e  subjects - a judgment based on a  value-maintenance set .  
Hamilton (1980) argues t h a t  the  use o f  such a  mora l - lega l  dec i s i on  r u l e  f o r  
a t r r i b u t i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  instead o f  f o r  example, app ly ing  the s c i e n t i f i c  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  co -va r i a t i on  may a l s o  prov ide  an a l t e r n a t i v e  explanat ion o f  
the  "fundamental a t t r i  b l ~ t  ion error" .  
Fincham & Jaspars (1980) too have stressed the importance o f  the d i s t i n c t i o n  
between causal and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Holding someone r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  by 
demanding tha t  he rebut  an accusat ion does not exp la in  h i s  ac t ions  but 
simply i nd i ca tes  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  punishment o r  compensation (p. 104). I t  i s  
not  s imply t h a t  people use a  no t i on  o f  c a u s a l i t y  d i f f e r e n t  from the one 
advanced i n  general a t t r i b u t i o n  theory.  However, i n  a t t r i b u t i o n  theor ies  
the causal quest ions involved deal w i t h  the r e l a t i o n  between i n ten t i on /  
17) Th is  i s  one o f  He ider 's  f i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  assoc ia t ing  behavioral  
outcomes w i t h  i nd i v i dua l s :  1. g loba l  assoc ia t i on  (= mere coincidence),  
2. extended comnission ( -  outcomes not foreseeable) ,  3 .  careless com- 
mission (= outcomes c w l d  have been foreseen),  4. purposive commission 
(= outcomes foreseen), 5 .  j u s t i f i e d  comnission ( =  outcomes intended, 
l see  Shaw & Sulzer,  1964). 
d i s p o s i t i o n  and behavior (ac tor -ac t  cha in ) ,  whereas I n  assigning 
r e s p o n r i b l l i t y  t h e c e n t r a l  r e l a t i o n  i s  between act  and outcome. Many 
c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  research r e s u l t s  stem from the concept- 
ual  confusion about c a u s a l i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and from d i f f e rences  
regarding the  pa r t  o f  the actor-act-outcome cha in  t h a t  i s  g iven a t t e n t i o n  to .  
3.  CONCLUDING REMARK 
From a psychological  p o i n t  o f  view f o r  bo th  layman and p o l i t i c i a n  a l i k e  
technological  r i s k  assessment - i .8 .  the  assessment o f  avers ive conse- 
quences due t o  a c e r t a i n  degree o f  exposure t o  p o t e n t i a l l y  harmful events - 
most o f t e n  i s  a complex process18). I n  t h i s  paper we have t r i e d  t o  g i v e  
some idea o f  how people assess th reaten ing events and how judgmental, 
a t r r i b u t i o n a l  and mo t i va t i ona l  processes together lead t o  a ( in termediary)  
response t o  t h r e a t .  Th is  we c a l l e d  s t ress  o r  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i t h  respect t o  
our research i n t e r e s t ,  f ee l i ngs  o f  i n s e c u r i t y  concerning technological  
a c t i v i t i e s .  One f requent ly  ra ised argument i n  the debate about "how safe 
i s  safe enough?'' i s  t h a t  there  e x i s t s  a gap between the fac tua l ,  a c t u a r i a l  
o r  o b j e c t i v e  r i s k s  and the way i n  which the  p u b l i c  perceives the  r i s k s  o f  
technology, the so c a l l e d  sub jec t i ve  r i s k s .  With the foregoing ana l ys i s  we 
hope t o  have convincing1 y shown tha t  there  i s  no (psycho-) l o g i c  according 
t o  which peoples assessment o f  technological  sa fe t y  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  re-  
la ted  t o  (can be pred ic ted from) observed r e l a t i v e  frequencies o r  s t a t i s t i c -  
a l l y  ca l cu la ted  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  negat ive  consequences o f  the  technology 
concerned. Even d is regard ing the  f a c t  t h a t  f o r  most a c t i v i t i e s  on l y  human 
death i s  the  best def ined and q u a n t i f i a b l e  o f  a l l  hazard consequences and 
impacts t o  the ecosystem are a t  best d i f f i c u l t  t o  judge ( H a r r i s  e t  a l . .  1978, 
p. 9 ) ,  the i nd i v i dua l  i s  not so much concerned w i t h  es t imat ing  unce r ta in t y  
18) Neither one should c la im  the exc lus ive  use o f  the a d j e c t i v e  r a t i o n a l  
t o  charac ter ize  h i s  own r i s k  assessment. R a t i o n a l i t y  i s  a q u a l i t y  o f  
con f l  i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  along the  1 ines o f  p respec i f  ied ru les  f o r  'the 
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  one's a n a l y t i c  and syn the t i c  resources i n  dea l i ng  w i t h  
the var ious  aspects o f  what one perceives as a problem (see e.g.. Simon, 
1978). Decis ion ana lys is ,  f o r  example, o f f e r s  d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a .  
f o r  eva luat ing  such a1 locat  ion o f  resources than psychoanalysis. 
Thus, one should be very ca re fu l  c a l l i n g  someone e l s e ' s  response t o  
r i s k  " i r r a t i o n a l " .  
parameters o f  a  phys i ca l  o r  m a t e r i a l  system as he i s  w i t h  es t ima t i ng  
the  u n c e r t a i n t y  invo lved  i n  h i s  exposure t o  t he  t h rea ten ing  event and 
i n  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  i n f l uence  o r  c o n t r o l  h i s  exposure. S t a t i s t i c s  a r e  
o n l y  m a r g i n a l l y  r e l evan t  t o  s p e c i f i c  c i rcumstances.  
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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR 
HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 
Lester 0. Lave 
The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, DC 
A review of the methods for and limitations of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is 
undettaken along with the analysis of four major and two minor case studies where this 
technique played a role in recent regulatory decisions and subsequent litigation: photo- 
chemical oxidants, benzene, coke ovens, ionizing radiation, chlorobenzilate, and food 
additives. Each case study attempts to evaluate the (government) agency's assessment of 
health risks, to determine how good a risk assessment has been done (when relevant), and 
examines the role of the assessment in the regulatory decision. 
I n  che p a s t  d e c a d e ,  Congress  c r e a t e d  many a g e n c i e s  t o  r e g u l a t e  
h e a l t h  and s a f e t y .  T h e s e  a g e n c i e s  h a v e  p romulga ted  myr iad  r e g u l a t i o n s  
which have  h e l p e d  t o  d e c r e a s e  r i s k ,  b u t  h a v e  a l s o  h e l p e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  
b u r e a u c r a c y ,  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  c o s t s ,  and l i t i g a t i o n ,  and s lowed  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e s .  However, p u b l i c  demands f o r  i n c r e a s e d  h e a l t h  
and s a f e t y  remain  h i g h ;  t h e  g o a l s  w i l l  n o t  and s h o u l d  n o t  d i s a p p e a r .  
The i s s u e  a t  hand i s  t o  t r a n s l a t e  t h e s e  d e s i r e s  i n t o  w o r k a b l e  g o a l s  and  
t h e n  t o  a t t a i n  t h e s e  g o a l s  e f f i c i e n t l y .  
Lmproving r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  w i l l  n o t  b e  s i m p l e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
i n h e r e n t  m i s t r u s t ,  s c i e n t i f i c  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  and c o m p l e x i t y  o f  a d e c i s i o n  
r e ~ a r d i n g  b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  o f  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s .  I n d e e d ,  
r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  have  been  t r e a c e d  f a r  t o o  c a s u a l l y  t o  d a t e ,  v i t h  
g u e s s e s  b e i n g  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  o b s e r v a b l e  f a c t s  and  l i t i g a t i o n  b e i n g  
u s e d  t o o  o f t e n  a s  a d e v i c e  f o r  d e l a y  o r  t h e  forum f o r  c l a r i f y i n g  
s c i e n t i f i c  i s s u e s .  Even minor  improvements  i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  o f  
t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  migh t  have  saved  s o c i e t y  b i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s ,  
which i s  many t i me s  vh a t  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  knowledge would have c o s t .  
C a re fu l  review of  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  ev idence  and performance of 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  assessment  (QRA) have a  c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  i n t e l l i g e n t  
r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s .  Regula t ion  wi thout  t h e s e  e lements  i s  uninformed,  
a r b i t r a r y ,  and i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  w i th s t and  l i t i g a t i o n ,  i nduce  c o o p e r a t i o n  
from t h ose  being r e g u l a t e d  o r  produce t h e  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t s  . S c i e n t i f i c  
a n a l y s i s  h a s  n o t  been emphasized i n  most rulemaking;  r a t h e r ,  o f  
i n c r e a s i n g  dominance has  been t h e  c y n i c a l  v iew that r e g u l a t i o n  i s  power 
p o l i t i c s ,  wi th  t h e  w i nn e i s  imposing t h e i r  w i l l  on t h e  l o s e r s .  A change  
i n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  should  n o t  be used t o  ex tend  t h i s  cynic i sm;  r a t h e r  
government must d e mo ns t r a t e  t h a t  soc i e ty ' s  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  g o a l s  c an  
be r e c o nc i l e d  w i t h  a  h e a l t h y  i n d u s t r i a l  economy and can  be implemented 
e f f i c i e n t l y ,  making t h e  g r e a t e s t  use  of  s c i e n t i f i c  d a t a  and a n a l y s i s .  
QRA i s  n o t  a  panacea;  indeed  i t  has  played a t  b e s t  a  secondary  
r o l e  i n  most r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  t o  d a t e .  A pr imary  l i m i t a t i o n  i s  
t h a t  i t  examines o n l y  what c a n b e  measured and q u a n t i f i e d ,  n e g l e c t i n g  
o t h e r  a s p e c t s .  T h i s  l i m i t a t i o n  i s  more s e v e r e  i n  p r a c t i c e  s i n c e  
s c i e n t i s t s  tend t o  f oc us  on  a s p e c t s  which a r e  most e a s i l y  measured,  t o  
t h e  n e g l e c t  o f  more d i f f i c u l t  a r e a s .  Both d e c i s i o n  makers and 
s c i e n t i s t s  must keep t h e  g o a l s  and g e n e r a l  p i c t u r e  i n  mind i f  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  is n o t  t o  be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d  o r  be  t o o  narrow t o  be u s e f u l .  
De sp i t e  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  no l o g i c a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  QRA. 
QTW i s  t h e  o n l y  s y s t e m a t i c  t o o l  f o r  a n a l y s i s  o f  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  r i s k .  
The a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  QrW i s  gu e s s ing  t h e  magnitude of r i s k  o r  i gno r ing  
t h e  l e v e l  of r i s k ,  bo th  of which a r e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  where d e c i s i o n s  
i n v o l v e  hundred of l i v e s  and b i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s .  S t r i v i n g  f o r  z e ro  
r i s k  i s  nonsense.  
The ca se  s t u d i e s  provide  d a t a  on t he  proceos  of a n a l y s i s  and 
e v a l u a t i o n  used i n  each  c a s e .  S u f f i c i e n t  d a t a  were a v a i l a b l e  i n  a l l  
s i x  c a s e s  f o r  some p a r t y  t o  c a r r y  a  QRA. While no a n a l y s i s  reached a  
unique answer o r  would g a r n e r  unanimous s u p p o r t ,  a l l  provided impor t an t  
i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  p roce s s .  Cu r r en t  i nadequac i e s  i n  d a t a  and 
a n a l y s i s  w i l l  be r e p a i r e d  on ly  when QRA occup i e s  a  more c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  
d e c i s i o n  making. Any i n s t i t u t i o n  w i l l  f ocus  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  on t h e  a r e a s  
most c r u c i a l  t o  i t s  d e c i s i o n s ;  s i n c e  QRA occupied  a  secondary  r o l e  o r  
was ou t  of t h e  d e c i s i o n  p roce s s  comp le t e ly ,  f und ing  has been withdrawn 
from c o l l e c t i o n  of s c i e n t i f i c  d a t a  and a n a l y s i s .  The mind s e t  o f  t h e  
agency,  and many of  t h e  s t a t u t e s ,  must be changed t o  emphasize t h e  
s c i e n t i f i c  f ounda t i on  of t h e  i s s u e s .  
Many s c i e n t i s t s  and v o t e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  
a r e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  should  be ,  based i n  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t  w i th  v a l u e  
c o n f l i c t s  r e so lved  by s o c i e t y  th rough Congress.  Yet ,  many s c i e n t i s t s  
s l i d e  t h e i r  pe r sona l  v a l u e s  i n t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  a n a l y s i s .  B l a t a n t  
i n t r u s i o n  comes when "prudent"  assumpt ions ,  r a t h e r  than  b e s t  judgments ,  
a r e  i nco rpo ra t ed  i n t o  t h e s e  a n a l y s e s .  The r e s u l t i n g  e s t i m a t e s  and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  c o n t a i n  s o  many h idden  assumpt ions  t h a t  o f t e n  t h e y  
p r o v ide  no u s e f u l  i n fo rma t ion .  S c i e n t i s t s  shou ld  produce o b j e c t i v e  o r  
b e s t  judgment a n a l y s e s  i n  do ing  s c i e n t i f i c  work; w h i l e  they  a r e  f r e e ,  
and indeed encouraged ,  t o  lobby  f o r  t h e i r  pe r sona l  p o l i c y  v a l u e s ,  they  
should  s e p a r a t e  v a l u e s  from f a c t s  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e .  
345 
Perhaps t h e  most s u r p r i s i n g  d i s c o v e r y  o f  t h e  c a s e  s t u d y  a n a l y s e s  
was t h a t  t h e  a g e n c i e s  o f t e n  f a i l e d  t o  engage i n  a c a r e f u l ,  s y s t e m a t i c  
r e v i e w  o f  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  s c i e n t i f i c  e v i d e n c e .  Perhaps  b e c a u s e  t h e y  d i d  
n o t  have e x p e r t  s t a f f ,  a g e n c i e s  o f t e n  seemed c o n t e n t  w i t h  t h e  a u t h o r ' s  
summary and c o n c l u s i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t r o u b l i n g  t o  examine t h e  method, 
s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  and c o r r o b o r a t i n g  e v i d e n c e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  what 
c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e .  Confounding t h i s  s l o p p i n e s s  was t h e  
tendency  t o  r e g a r d  t h e  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  a s  a  document t h a t  must be made t o  
s u p p o r t  a n  agency d e c i s i o n ,  even  i f  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  w a s  r e a c h e d  by 
p o l i t i c a l  judgment. R a t h e r  t h a n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  most 
p r o b a b l e  e s t i m a t e  o f  r i s k  and t h e  r a n g e  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  agency  r i s k  
a s s e s s m e n t s  g e n e r a l l y  were s t r u c t u r e d  t o  be  a r b i t r a r i l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e .  
The t y p e  o f  c a r e f u l  rev iew and QRA a d v o c a t e d  need no t  be t i m e  
consuming o r  e x p e n s i v e .  The f o u r  major  c a s e  s t u d i e s  were c a r r i e d  o u t  
by f o u r  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s ,  two i n  l a w  and two i n  e n g i n e e r i n g .  Each had 
a c c e s s  t o  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  l i t e r a t u r e  and t o  s e n i o r  s c i e n t i s t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
t h o s e  i n  t h e  agency.  Each agency  r o u t i n e l y  d e v o t e s  much more 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  e f f o r t  t o  i t s  s t u d i e s .  
The emphasis  on  QU i s  n o t  meant t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e r e  i s  some r u l e  
f o r  d e c i s i o n  making which a n t i s e p t i c a l l y  c o n v e r t s  s c i e n t i f i c  d a t a  i n t o  
f i n i s h e d  r e g u l a t i o n s .  The s c i e n t i f i c  a n a l y s i s  c o n t a i n s  many 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  which r e q u i r e  e d u c a t e d  judgment i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  p a r t i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e .  P o l i t i c a l  judgments a r e  r e q u i r e d  a s  w e l l .  The 
o b j e c t i v e  of  QRA i s  n o t  t o  e l i m i n a t e  judgment, bu t  t o  in form i t .  
No one should  be under t h e  i l l u s i o n  t h t  QRA h a s  a  p ro  i n d u s t r y  
b i a s .  I n  c l a r i f y i n g  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  ev idence  and i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  
r e s u l t  v i l l  no t  be t o  i n s u l a t e  i n d u s t r y  from r e g u l a t i o n s ,  but  t h e r e  
should  b e ' f e v e r  i nadqua t e  o r  e x c e s s i v e l y  c o s t l y  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
f e v e r  neg l ec t ed  a r e a s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  r e g u l a t i o n .  
The s t r e s s  on  c a r e f u l  rev iew and on q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  a s se s smen t  
b r i n g s  v i t h  i t  a n c i l l a r y  b e n e f i t s .  T h i s  more a n a l y t i c ,  l e s s  f r e n e t i c  
approach  v i l l  r a i s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  c o n v e n t i o n a l  r e g u l a t i o n ,  some of 
which might  be improvements o r  a t  l e a s t  o f f e r  i n s i g h t s  f o r  improvement. 
Thought fu l  a n a l y s i s  c l a r i f i e s  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  d e c i s i o n s ,  h e l p s  
a c h i e v e  g o a l s  a t  lower c o s t ,  i d e n t i f i e s  and e l i m i n a t e s  bad 
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and g e n e r a l l y  emphasizes t h e  f a c t  t h a t  n o t  a l l  g o a l s  can  
be ach ieved .  Indeed ,  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  agency must be a l lowed and 
encouraged t o  r e cogn i ze  c o n f l i c t s  among g o a l s  e x p l i c i t l y  i f  i t  i s  t o  be 
s u c c e s s f u l  i n  a ch i ev ing  i ts  miss ion .  Ana ly s i s  i s  needed t o  i d e n t i f y  
h i g h  r i s k  groups  and t o  s e t  p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  a c t i o n .  Perhaps most 
i m p o r t an t  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  made i n  a  v o r l d  expe r i enc ing  
r a p i d  change i n  s o c i a l  g o a l s ,  i n  economic s t r u c t u r e ,  and i n  s c i e n c e  and 
technology .  A h a l f  decade  o r  more i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  and 
e s t a b l i s h  a r e g u l a t i o n ;  a  similar d e l a y  o c c u r s  i n  implementing t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n .  Ca re fu l  thought  and good s c i e n c e  a r e  impor t an t  i n p u t s  t o  
e f f e c t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n ,  o r  even r e g u l a t i o n  t h a t  f o c u s e s  on t h e  c o r r e c t  
a r e a s .  
The c a s e s  r evea l ed  a  l a c k  of  communication be tveen  t h e  
p r o f e s s i o n a l s  i n  t h e  agenc i e s  and t h e i r  c o u n t e r p a r t s  i n  t h e  r e g u l a t e d  
companies. These p r o f e s s i o n a l s  need n o t ,  and i n  t h i s  s e t t i n g  should 
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n o t ,  d i s c u s s  p o l i c y ;  however, they  c a n  c l a r i f y  me'thods and r e s u l t s  and 
e x p l o r e  common t e c h n i c a l  problems. The g o a l  of bo th  groups  should  be 
t h e  r e e o l u t i o n  of most s c i e n t i f i c  i s s u e s  w i th  accu racy  and a  mini~oum of 
c o n f l i c t  . 
The major  c a s e  s t u d i e s  i d e n t i f i e d  a  need f o r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of 
t h e  g o a l s  of t h e  agency and i t s  l e g i s l a t i o n .  For example, i n s t r u c t i n g  
OSHA t o  enhance t h e  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  of  workers  i s  t oo  g e n e r a l  a  g o a l  
t o  be of h e l p .  H e a l t h  o r  s a f e t y ?  Which workers  i n  which i n d u s t r i e s ?  
How s a f e ?  C l a r i f y i n g  t h e s e  g o a l s  gene ra t ed  major  d e b a t e  and o f t e n  l e d  
t o  l i t i n a t i o n .  The g o a l s  a r e  b e s t  c l a r i f i e d  by Congress.  which i s  
e l e c t e d  f o r  t h i s  purpose.  
While t h e r e  a r e  i mpo r t a n t  problems i n  c u r r e n t  agency r e g u l a t i o n  
of h e a l t h  and s a f e t y ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  need no t  r e q u i r e  e i t h e r  y e a r s  of  
w a i t i n g  o r  new l e g i s l a t i o n .  While bo th  might  h e l p ,  t h e r e  is much t h a t  
c a n  be done  i n  t h e  s h o r t  term t o  improve t h e  p roce s s  w i th  e x i s t i n g  
r e s o u r c e s .  C a re fu l  rev iew of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  ev idence  and QRA a r e  
i m p o r t a n t  components of t h e  s o l u t i o n .  
I. The P o t e n t i a l  Role of Risk  Assessment i n  S o c i a l  Regu l a t i on  
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Along v i t h  o t h e r  developed n a t i o n s ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  
e x h i b i t e d  i n c r e a s i n g  concern  f o r  risks a f f e c t i n g  h e a l t h .  While t h e r e  
i s  evidence  t h a t  t h e  magnitude o f  t h e s e  r i s k s  h a s  d e c l i n e d  over  t ime  
w i t h i n  t h e  n a t i o n ,  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  t h r e a t  ha s  changed.  Risks f r o u  
i n f e c t i o u s  d i s e a s e s  and d i s a b l i n g  a c c i d e n t s  have been reduced 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  o r ,  i n  some c a s e s ,  e l i m i n a t e d .  They have been r ep l aced  
by f e a r s  of  ch ron i c  d i s e a s e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  of  c a n c e r ,  a l t hough  t h e r e  i s  
l i t t l e  ev idence  t h a t  t h e s e  risks have been i n c r e a s i n g  ( a f t e r  a d j u s t i n g  
f o r  a g e ) ,  e x c e p t  f o r  l ung  cance r  due predominant ly  t o  c i g a r e t t e  
smoking. 
T h i s  widespread concern  f o r  lower ing  risks t o  h e a l t h  r e s u l t e d  i n  
major  new l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t h e  1970s and v i t h  more s t r i n g e n t  s t a n d a r d s  
f o r  a c t i v i t i e s  a l r e a d y  r e g u l a t e d  ( f o r  example,  miners'  exposure  t o  c o a l  
d u s t ) .  T h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  can  be d i v i d e d  i n t o  t vo  b a s i c  t ypes .  The 
f i r s t  r e q u i r e s  t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  t o  lower  risks from a  subs t ance  
i d e n t i f i e d  a s  a  c a r c inogen  o r  more g e n e r a l l y ,  a s  t o x i c ,  t o  z e ro  o r  
n e g l i g i b l e  l e v e l s  wi thout  concern  f o r  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  c o s t s ;  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  is  t h e  o n l y  c o n s t r a i n t .  The second r e q u i r e s  
t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  t o  ba l ance  some measure of  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  s o c i e t y  from 
lower ing  r i s k  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o s t s  t o  s o c i e t y  of t h a t  a c t i o n .  I have 
.shorn e l s e v h e r e  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  f ramevork i s  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  (Lave,  
1981) .  I n  e ach  r e g u l a t o r y  a c t i o n  t h e r e  is a t  l e a s t  a n  i m p l i c i t  
v e i g h t i n g  of c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s ;  t he  second cype o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  d i f f e r s  
from t h e  f i r s t  by  making t h e  ba l anc ing  e x p l i c i t  -- and by c l a r i f y i n g  
who i s  t o  ba l ance  vha t .  
Whether t h e  b a l a n c i n g  is  i m p l i c i t  o r  e x p l i c i t ,  a  c r u c i a l  p i e c e  
of  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  t h e  magnitude o f  r i s k  and how a l t e r n a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n s  
v i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  r i s k .  Without  ba ing  a b l e  t o  measure risks 
q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  and t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  proposed s t a n d a r d s ,  
r e g u l a t i o n  i s  reduced t o  g u e s s e s  a s  t o  what i s  a  p r u d e n t  judgment; 
t h e s e  g u e s s e s  g e n e r a t e  v a l u e  c o n f l i c t s  between t h o s e  o p t i n g  f o r  g r e a t e r  
s a f e t y .  and a r e  t h u s  w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  l e s s  consumpt ion ,  a n d . t h a i r  
o p p o s i t e s .  Without e s t i m a t e s  o f  r i s k ,  g u e s s e s  and v a l u e  judgments a r e  
t h e  o n l y  d e v i c e  f o r  s e t t i n g  s t a n d a r d s ,  and t h e  i n h e r e n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
v a l u e s  i n e v i t a b l y  l e a d  t o  maximal conf  l i c t .  
The c o n c e p t u a l  s t e p s  i n  d i s c o v e r i n g  and r e g u l a t i n g  r i s k s  a r e  
shown i n  F i g u r e  1. The d a t a  needed t o  s u p p o r t  e a c h  d e c i s i o n  a r e  shovn 
i n  t h e  l e f t  hand column w h i l e  t h e  r i g h t  hand column shows t h e  judgments 
o r  e x p e r t  o p i n i o n s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  e a c h  s t a g e .  The p r o c e s s  c a n n o t  b e g i n  
u n t i l  t h e r e  is  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a  p o s s i b l e  h a z a r d .  
S c i e n t i f i c  e v i d e n c e  is  u s u a l l y  t h e  p r imary  i n p u t  i n  d e c i d i n g  i f  
t h e  p o s s i b l e  hazard  is worth f u r t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  Those 
v a r r a n t i n g  f u r t h e r  a t t e n t i o n  must be  s u b j e c t ,  a t  l e a s t  i n f e r e n t i a l l y ,  
t o  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t .  Data a r e  needed on e x p o s u r e  p a t t e r n s  and a  
judgment i s  needed about  whether  t h e  o b s e r v e d  a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  c a u s a l ,  o r  
s i m p l y  a  s p u r i o u s  c o r r e l a t i o n .  I f  t h e  r i s k  a p p e a r s  t o  w a r r a n t  some 
a c t i o n ,  t h e  n e x t  s t e p  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  range  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  from complete  r e l i a n c e  o n  t h e  market  p l a c e ,  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  
and d i s s e m i n a t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a s s e s s i n g  e f f l u e n t  f e e s ,  o r  p romulga t ing  
f o r m a l  r e g u l a t i o n s .  I n  d e v e l o p i n g  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  
d e v e l o p  i n f o r m a t i o n  on i n c e n t i v e s  t o  c u r r e n t l y  employed workers ,  t h o s e  
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seeking  jobs ,  companies, a s  wel l  a s  t h e i r  c u r r e n t  l e v e l  of in format ion .  
These a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  then  ana lyzed  v i a  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  i n  an  
a t t emp t  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  consequences of  each  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  terms of  
v a r i o u s  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  and c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s .  A 
r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n  must then  be made auong t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  based on 
t h e  i n fo rma t ion  and judgments concern ing  t h e  impor tance  o f  unquan t i f  l e d  
e f f e c t s .  As a  v i r t u a l  c e r t a i n t y ,  we can  then  expec t  t o  s e e  l e g a l  o r  
p o l i t i c a l  c h a l l e n g e s ,  i n f l uenced  by p r i v a t e  judgments about  t h e  c o s t s  
of  l i t i g a t i o n  and t h e  va lue  and p r o b a b i l i t y  of  s u c c e s s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  o f  
a ch i ev ing  d e l a y ,  of  a  cha l l enge .  A l a r g e  s t e p  i n  hazard  management i s  
i n  implementing and e n f o r c i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n ;  s u r p r i s i n g l y  l i t t l e  
r e s e a r c h  h a s  been done t o  c l a r i f y  t h i s  s t e p ,  a l t hough  t h e r e  i s  ev idence  
t h a t  many r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  modified s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  The 
f i n a l  s t a g e  i s  moni tor ing  t o  ensu re  compliance.  The r e g u l a t o r y  agency 
must e v a l u a t e  t he  change i n  exposure  and change i n  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  t o  
ensu re  t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  i s  accompl ish ing  i t s  g o a l  and t h a t  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  was c o r r e c t .  
The f low sho rn  i n  t h e  t a b l e  p r o g r e s s e s  from t o p  t o  bo t ton  i n  a  
m u l t i s t a g e ,  bu t  o r d e r l y  f a sh ion .  Regula tory  p roces se s  a r e  anyth ing  but  
o r d e r l y ,  however, s i n c e  a  f a c t  o r  judgment a t  one s t a g e  can  cause  t h e  
process  t o  begin  ove r  a g a i n ,  s e t  i t  back s e v e r a l  s t a g e s ,  o r  s t a l l  i t  
i n d e f i n i t e l y .  I m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  f i g u r e  i s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  a t  each  s t a g e  t o  
s t o p  i f  t h e  judgment i s  made t h a t  t h e  hazard  is  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  wa r r an t  
proceding o r  t h e  c o s t  i s  too  h igh  t o  j u s t i f y  a c t i o n  (assuming t h e  
s t a t u t e  permi ts  t h i s  d e c i s i o n ) .  
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The focus of t h i s  p r o j e c t  has  been the  f i r s t  two s t a g e s ,  hazard  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and r i s k  assessment .  The c a s e  s t u d i e s a t t e m p t e d  t o  be 
more comple te ,  a l t h ou gh  t h e  focus  was s t i l l  on t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e s .  It i s  
e v i d e n t  that t h e  e n t i r e  p roc e s s  of  r e g u l a t i n g  risks i s  d i f f i c u l t .  Many 
s c i e n t i s t s  a rgue  t h a t  knowledge i s  so  rud imentary  t h a t  t h i s  p roce s s  i s ,  
and can on l y  be ,  a  judgmental  one i n  which t h e  media,  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n ,  
and r e a l  o r  imagined d i s a s t e r s ,  such a s  o c c u p a t i o n a l  exposure  t o  v i n y l  
c h l o r i d e  and p u b l i c  exposure  t o  t o x i c  was t e s  a t  Love Canal ,  a l l  p l ay  
r o l e s .  
C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  major u n c e r t a i n i t i e s ,  a s  e l a b o r a t e d  below. 
However, t h e r e  a r e  powerful  r e a sons  f o r  no t  s u r r e n d e r i n g  t o  ad hoc 
d e c i s i o n  making. P a s t  r e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o v e r s i e s  and i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  as 
w e l l  a s  a  growing m i s t r u s t  o f  government, have  l e d  t o  low con f idence  i n  
c u r r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  R e gu l a t i ons  i nvo lv ing  hundreds  o f .  l i v e s  and 
b i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s  should  n o t  be based on a r b i t r a r y  gues se s  i n  which 
p o l i t i c s  r a t h e r  t h a n  s c i e n c e  ha s  t h e  primary r o l e .  No one  i s  s u r p r i s e d  
a t  v a l u e  c o n f l i c t s ,  bu t  o f t e n  t h e s e  a r e  c loaked  i n  s p u r i o u s  
d i sagreement  about  t h e  s c i e n c e .  Value c o n f l i c t s  and s c i e n t i f i c  
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  w i l l  p e r s i s t ,  b u t  s c i e n t i f i c  i s s u e s  must be s e p a r a t e d  
from s o c i a l  v a l u e s  a s  c l e a r l y  as p o s s i b l e .  A r u l e  making procedure  i s  
a  t e r r i b l e  p l a c e  t o  a t t e mp t  t o  r e s o l v e  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n f l i c t s ;  t h e s e  a r e  
b e s t  r e so l v e d  - and perhaps can  o n l y  be r e so lved  -- i n  s c i e n t i f i c  
forums which v a l u e  c o n f l i c t s  a r e  exc luded .  
Common se n se  t e l l s  us  t h a t  some subs t ances  a r e  more t o x i c  than  
o t h e r s ,  t h a t  some a r e  more u s e f u l  than  o t h e r s ,  and t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  must 
t a k e  account  of t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s .  Without a  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  f o r  
measuring r i s k  and u s e f u l n e s s ,  we a r e  plunged i n t o  d i s ag reemen t s  among 
opposing e x p e r t s  t h a t  c on fuse  r a t h e r  t han  e n l i g h t e n ,  and c loud  r a t h e r  
than  c l a r i f y  t h e  i s s u e s .  
11. The Methods of QRA f o r  Hea l t h  Hazards 
- 
Few s c i e n t i s t s  would d i s a g r e e  i n  p r i n c i p l e  w i t h  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
v a l u e  of q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  e s t i m a t e s .  However, some would a rgue  t h a t  
QRA i s  i mp oss i b l e  a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a t e  of knowledge, s i n c e  we a r e  
i g n o r a n t  about  many of t h e  un de r ly ing  b iomedica l  mechanisms i n v o l v i n g  
h e a l t h  ha z a rd s  and must make c r u d e  g u e s s e s  a t  e ach  s t a g e  of t h e  
a n a l y s i s .  Doing a  QRA r e q u i r e s  knowing (1) t h e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  from 
exposure ,  ( 2 )  t h e  dose-response r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  ( 3 )  t h e  popu l a t i on  a t  
r i s k ,  ( 4 )  t he  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  dose s  o f  t h e  t o x i c  s u b s t a n c e  t h a t  a r e  
r e c e i v e d ,  and ( 5 )  exposure t o  and t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  confounding 
s u b s t a n c e s .  For  each  i t e m ,  t h e r e  a r e  major  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  bo th  
c o n c e p t u a l l y  and e m p i r i c a l l y .  However, d e s p i t e  i t s  shor tcomings ,  QRA 
p r o v ide s  u s e f u l  i n p u t s  t o  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n  making. Indeed ,  QRA i s  a  
n e c e s sa ry  f i r s t  s t e p  t o  s y s t e m a t i c  t h i n k i n g  about  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s .  
A new chemica l  might  c a use  any number of  h e a l t h  problems,  
i n c l u d i n g  c a n c e r s ,  c h r o n i c  d i s e a s e ,  a c u t e  d i s e a s e ,  g e n e t i c  change,  and 
b i r t h  d e f e c t s .  A p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t  i n  a n  an imal  b ioa s say  could  be due t o  
a s t a t i s t i c a l  f l u k e  o r  some f a i l u r e  i n  method; a  n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t  could  
i n d i c a t e  no hazard  o r  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  i n c i d e n c e  of d i s e a s e  was t o o  
s m a l l  t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t  under t he  t e s t  c o n d i t i o n s .  Highly t o x i c  
s u b s t a n c e s  can  be d i s c o ve re d  e a s i l y ,  bu t  a sma l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t he  
i n c i d e n c e  of a  c h ron i c  d i s e a s e  i s  ex t r eme ly  d i f f i c u l t ,  o f t e n  
i m p o s s i b l e ,  t o  d e t e c t .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  n e i t h e r  an imal  b i o a s s a y s  nor  
e p i d e ~ i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  a r e  powerful  u n l e s s  t h e y  a r e  t e s t i n g  s p e c i f i c  
hypotheses  a b o u t  e f f e c t s ,  f o r  example,  t h a t  v i n y l  c h l o r i d e  c a u s e s  l i v e r  
c a n c e r .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  s u b s t a n c e  c a n n o t  be proven t o  be  s a f e ;  t e s t i n g  
c a n  o n l y  i n d i c a t e  whether exposure  t o  a  s u b s t a n c e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  some e f f e c t .  T h u s ,  t e s t i n g  a  new s u b s t a n c e  
i s  p a i n s t a k i n g ,  e x p e n s i v e ,  and of  t e n  i n c o n c l u s i v e .  
The i n a b i l i t y  t o  show t h a t  a  s u b s t a n c e  i s  s a f e ,  b u t  r a t h e r  o n l y  
t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  harmful  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t t i n g s ,  l e a d s  t o  a  
c o n f u s i o n  of t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  s c i e n c e  and of r e s u l t i n g  p o l i c y .  
P o l i c y  makers c a n  no t  conc lude  t h a t  a  s u b s t a n c e  i s  s a f e  because  i t  
f a i l e d  t o  c a u s e  s i g n i f i c a n t  problems i n  o n e  t e s t  o r  t h a t  i s  u n s a f e  
because  one s i g n i f i c a n t  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t  was found.  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
i n s t e a d  of p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  d a t a  and d i r e c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  s c i e n t i s t s  
o f t e n  g i v e  p o l i c y  a d v i c e  by i n t e r p r e t i n g  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  
a s  more i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  s i g n i f i c a n t  n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s .  T h i s  muddles t h e  
s c i e n t i f i c  e v i d e n c e  and i t s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  O c c a s i o n a l l y ,  a c t u a l  
m i s s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  made o f  what was found ,  b u t  more g e n e r a l l y  t h e  
r e s u l t s  a r e  s t a t e d  i n  a  f a s h i o n  which makes i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  n e a r l y  
i m p o s s i b l e .  
The i n h e r e n t  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  n o t  be ing  a b l e  t o  p rove  a  s u b s t a n c e  
i s  s a f e  i s  confounded by t h e  expense and t ime r e q u i r e d  f o r  each  t e s t  
and t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  i n t e r p r e t i n g  r e s u l t s .  For example, t h e  Ames 
t e s t  is q u i c k  and i n e x p e n s i v e ,  bu t  i ts  r e s u l t s  a r e  g i v e n  l i t t l e  w e i g h t ;  
an imal  b i o a s s a y s  t a k e  more than  one y e a r  f o r  c h r o n i c  s t u d i e s  and a r e  
e a s i l y  marred by d e f e c t s  i n  d e s i g n  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ;  e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  
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s t u d i e s  a r e  time consuming, e xpens ive ,  and i n e v i t a b l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  
Even t he  q u a l i t a t i v e  c on c l u s i on  t h a t  a  s u b s t a n c e  i s  c a r c i n o g e n i c  i s  
u s u a l l y  d i s p u t e d .  However, QRA r e q u i r e s  a n  e s t i m a t e  of t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between r i s k  and r e sponse ,  t h e  dose-response 
c u r v e .  
The dose-response r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  i n e s c a p a b l y  t i e d  t o  t h e  
mechanisms by vh i c h  t h e  sub s t a nce  c a u s e s  damage. However, t h e  
mechanisms a r e  a lmos t  e n t i r e l y  unknown vhich  means t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
b a s i s  f o r  choos ing  among a l a r g e  number of a l t e r n a t i v e  f u n c t i o n a l  f o m s  
i n  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  e s t i m a t i o n .  Of t en ,  t h e r e  are l a r g e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
e s t i m a t e d  r i s k  depending on vh i ch  of  s e v e r a l ,  e q u a l l y  p l a u s i b l e ,  
dose-response c u rv e s  a r e  used.  Usua l l y ,  a  p rocedure  i s  choosen t h a t  
g i v e s  h i g h  e s t i m a t e s  of damage, o r  perhaps  t h e  h i g h e s t  e s t i m a t e d  damage 
( v o r s t  c a s e ) .  Such a  method f o r  d e a l i n g  v i t h  u n c e r t a i n t y  s u p p r e s s e s  
i n f o r m a t i o n  and papers  over  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n s  conce rn ing  vha t  
s u b s t a n c e s  should  be r e g u l a t e d  f i r s t  and a t  v h a t  l e v e l  s t a n d a r d s  should  
be s e t .  Oc c a s i o na l l y ,  assuming t h e  wors t  c a s e  i s  t h e  b e s t  d e c i s i o n ;  
more g e n e r a l l y ,  a  c a r e f u l  examina t ion  of what i s  known and t h e  c o s t s  o f  
being wrong prompt a  l e s s  ex t reme assumpt ion .  
For q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  a s se s smen t ,  we must knov hov many people  
a r e  exposed t o  a  sub s t a n c e  and t h e  dose  each  r e c e i v e s .  Gene ra l l y ,  
t h e r e  is o n l y  g r o s s  i n fo rma t i on  conce rn ing  vho i s  exposed and l i t t l e  
more than  gu e s se s  concern ing  t h e  dose .  T h i s  i n fo rma t ion  i s  n o t  
c o n c e p t u a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  g a t h e r  no r  does  i t  g e n e r a l l y  r e q u i r e  
e l a b o r a t e ,  compl ica ted  methods. However, i t  doe s  r e q u i r e  p a i n s t a k i n g ,  
o f t e n  c o s t l y  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n .  
For ep idemio log i ca l  s t u d i e s ,  and even f o r  animal  b ioa s says ,  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a s u b s t a n c e  i s  confounded by t h e  
p r e s e nce  of o t h e r  eubs tances .  For  exarnple, t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  
c y c l a ma te s  a r e  c a r c i n o g e n i c  may have been due t o  j o i n t  f e ed ing  of 
cyc lamates  and s a c c h a r i n  i n  t h e  an imal  exper iments .  For  l a b o r a t o r y  
e x p e r imen t s ,  much of  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  c an  be e l i m i n a t e d  by going  t o  
e l a b o r a t e  l e n g t h s  t o  p u r i f y  a i r ,  food,  and wa t e r ,  and t o  keep t h e  
a n i m a l s  i n  a  s t e r i l e  environment .  However, t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s t e r i l e  
c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h o s e  f a c i n g  humans. Such 
a r t i f i c i a l i t y  c an  l e a d  t o  ove r  o r  unde re s t ima t i ng  r i s k s  i f ,  f o r  
example, t h e  s t e r i l e  c o n d i t i o n s  p r even t  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  of  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  
r e s i s t e n c e  t o  d i s e a s e  o r  t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  su r round ings  cause  an ima l s  t o  
be more s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  t h e  subs t ance .  Ep idemio log i ca l  s t u d i e s  a r e  
f i l l e d  w i t h  confounding f a c t o r s  and i t  i s  imposs ib l e  t o  c o n t r o l  f o r  a l l  
such  f a c t o r s .  Thus,  ep idemio log i ca l  s t u d i e s  a r e  i n v a r i a b l y  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  ( a l ong  w i th  o t h e r  methods) .  
No one  should  unde re s t ima t e  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
of  QRA. The s e t  o f  methods d i s c u s s e d  h e r e  p rov ide s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l ,  
g e n e r a l l y  ambiguous r e s u l t s .  At b e s t ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be a  l a r g e  amount o f  
u n c e r t a i n t y  sur rounding  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  of r i s k .  I n  
p r a c t i c e ,  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  much g r e a t e r  because  c r i t i c a l  experiment8 were 
n o t  done ,  c r u c i a l  i n fo rma t ion  on t he  p o p u l a t i o n  a t  r i s k  and dose  a r e  
m i s s i ng ,  o r  because an  animal  b ioa s say  was marred by a  f l aw  i n  
e x p e r imen t a l  d e s i g n  o r  an ep idemio log i ca l  s t udy  was marred by f a i l u r e  
t o  c o l l e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  r ega rd ing  a  c r i t i c a l  v a r i a b l e  such a s  c i g a r e t t e  
smoking h a b i t s .  
Uhi la  most of t he  d i f f i c u l t i e s  c i t e d  above stem from the  c u r r e n t  
r t a t e  of b iomadica l  knowledge, many r e s u l t  from s loppy  r e s e a r c h  o r  
i n a d e q ua t e  a n a l y s i s .  F l a w  i n  expe r imen t a l  d e s i g n  can  be found be fo r e  
h a l f  a  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  a r e  i n v e s t e d  i n  a n  an imal  b ioa s say .  However, 
t h e  t a s k  of t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  de t e rmine  what c a n  be concluded d e s p i t e  
t h e  weaknesses i n  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a .  
The r i s k  assessment  i s  of  l i t t l e  u s e ,  o r  even of  no u s e ,  u n l e s s  
a t t e n t i o n  i s  g i v e n  t o  t h e  s o u r c e s  of u n c e r t a i n t y  and t h e  e f f e c t s  e ach  
have on t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e s t i m a t e s .  Each s o u r c e  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  must be 
s p e c i f i e d  and r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  f i n a l  e s t i m a t e s .  For  example,  when t h e  
f u n c t i o n a l  form of t h e  dose-response r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  unknova, 
r e a s o n a b l e  h igh  and low e s t i m a t e s  must be c a l c u l a t e d  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  a  
b e e t  g u e s s  e s t i m a t e  and t h i s  range  of  e s t i m a t e s  c a r r i e d  th rough t h e  
a n a l y s i s .  Of t e n ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  range  w i l l  be s o  l a r g e  t h a t  u n c e r t a i n t y  
dominates  and QRA i s  of  no d i r e c t  h e l p ,  even  though i t  i s  of  immense 
h e l p  i n  s o r t i n g  o u t  t h e  i s s u e s  and s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  Where t h e  
i s s u e  is i n h e r e n t  randomness, such  a s  t h e  g e n e t i c  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of t h e  
p o p u l a t i on  t o  a  s u b s t a n c e ,  h i g h  and low e s t i m a t e s  can  be c a r r i e d  
th rough t h e  a n a l y s i s .  Where t h e  i s s u e  i s  some q u e s t i o n  of f a c t ,  such  
a s  whether  t h e  sub s t a n c e  c a use s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  k lnd  of c a n c e r ,  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  can  c a r r y  th rough t v i n  c a l c u l a t i o n s  shoving t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
of each  assumption.  
All of t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  must be d e s c r i b e d  and d i s p l a y e d  i n  t h e  
f i n a l  e s t i m a t e s  of r i s k .  By doing  t h i s ,  d e c i s i o n  makers can  d e c i d e  how 
prudent  they  w u l d  l i k e  t o  be .  Fur thermore ,  t h i s  p rocedure  i d e n t i f i e s  
t h e  most impor tan t  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  p rov id ing  a f ocus  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  
and i n d i c a t i n g  how new r e s u l t s  can be i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  e x i s t i n g  
ev idence .  
Although t h e  a r r a y  of  d i f f i c u l t i e s  is  fo rmidab l e ,  many can  be 
avoided by b e t t e r  exper imenta l  d e s i ~ n  and a n a l y s i s .  It is no t  e v i d e n t  
t h a t  a  marked i n c r e a s e  i n  r e s e a r c h  funds  would be r e q u i r e d ,  s i n c e  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  c u r r e n t  expend i tu r e s  could  be enhanced. Improvements 
i n  method o f f e r  t h e  hope of  q u i c k e r ,  cheaper  r e s u l t s .  
The formidable  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  QRA q u a l i f y  t h e  r e s u l t s  bu t  do 
not  r e j e c t  i t s  use .  Whatever t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  QRA w i l l  be used u n t i l  
i t  is r ep l aced  by something b e t t e r .  The appea l  of QRA is n o t  i t s  e a s e  
of  use o r  t h e  t i g h t n e s s  and a e s t h e t i c  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  a b s t r a c t  
mathmematics. Ra the r ,  QRA is  used because t h e r e  i s  no o t h e r  t o o l  
c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  t h a t  can  produce t h e  i n fo rma t ion  neces sa ry  f o r  
i n t e l l i g e n t  r e g u l a t i o n .  
111. Case S t u d i e s  
S ix  r e c e n t  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s  were s t u d i e d .  The fou r  major 
ones  examined r i s k  assessments  of  photochemical  o x i d a n t s ,  benzene,  coke 
oven emiss ions ,  and i o n i z i n g  r a d i a t i o n ;  t h r e e  l e s s  e x t e n s i v e  c a s e  
s t u d i e s  examined t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  of  food a d d i t i v e s  and r e g u l a t i o n  of  t h e  
p e s t i c i d e  c h l o r o b e n z i l a t e .  These c a s e  s t u d i e s  a r e  formidable  n o t  o n l y  
i n  bulk ,  but  a l s o  i n  t e c h n i c a l  complexity;  t hey  i n v o l v e  s c i e n t i f i c  
r e s u l t s  and judgments on t he  f r o n t i e r s  of  c ance r  r e s e a r c h ,  s t a t i s t i c s ,  
epidemiology,  t ox i co logy ,  a tmospher ic  chemis t ry  and phys i c s ,  
pharmacology, and human f a c t o r s .  
A c e n t r a l  f a c t  i n  r e g u l a t i n g  r i s k s  of t o x i c  subs t ances  i s  t h e  
i n c r e d i b l e  a b i l i t y  t o  measure minute amounts of  such  s u b s t a n c e s .  
O f t e n ,  one  p a r t  per  b i l l i o n  c a n  be r e l i a b l y  d e t e c t e d ,  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
f i n d i n g  one person  i n  a  coun t ry  f o u r  t imes  a s  populous a s  t h e  United 
S t a t e s .  We can  d e t e c t  s u b s t a n c e s  a t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  where w e  have no 
i d e a  whether exposure  would have any a d v e r s e  consequences.  Thus ,  
r e g u l a t o r s  m u s t  c o n f r o n t  t he  d e c i s i o n  o f  what l e v e l s  o f  s u b s t a n c e s  such  
a s  a r s e n i c  o r  d i o x i n  we choose t o  pe rmi t .  
The r e a d e r  of t h e s e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  c anno t  e s c a p e  t h e  impre s s ion  
t h a t  each  of  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n e  i e  comp l i ca t ed ,  i n v o l v i n g  
q u e s t i o n s  a t  o r  beyond t h e  c u r r e n t  f r o n t i e r s  o f  s c i e n c e ;  e a c h  i n v o l v e s  
a r e a s  where measurement i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  t h e o r y  i s  i n comple t e ,  and 
judgment i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  answering many, i f  n o t  mos t ,  of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  
q u e s t i o n s .  I n  many c a s e s ,  t h e  pe r ce ived  i n a b i l i t y  of s c i e n t i s t s  t o  
answer a l l  q u e s t i o n s  h a s  l e d  t o  a  f e e l i n g  t h a t  s c i e n c e  w i l l  p rov ide  
none of  t h e  answers ,  that answers  c an  come o n l y  from y e t  more c a r e f u l  
e x e g e s i s  of t h e  s t a t u t e s  and l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y ,  from sampling p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n  and the  media,  o r  from p o l i t i c a l  compromise. Yet ,  i n  e ach  of  
t h e  c a s e s ,  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  g e n e r a l l y  and t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r i s k  a s se s smen t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  p layed  a  c r u c i a l  r o l e  i n  shaping  t h e  
r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n ,  i t s  speed  of imp lemen ta t i on ,  o r  i t s  form a s  
a c t u a l l y  implemented. Unfo r tuna t e ly ,  i n  some c a s e s ,  t h e  agency 
s e l e c t e d  i t s  p o l i c y  and made i t s  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n  v i t h o u t  t h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ;  a  f r e q u e n t  r e s u l t  va s  e i t h e r  a n  
embarrass ing  change i n  p o l i c y  o r  a  s t anda rd  vaca ted  by t h e  c o u r t s .  
Probably  t h e  agency vould have progressed  f a s t e r  tovard  i t s  g o a l  i f  i t  
had put more r e s o u r c e s  I n t o  t h e  s c i e n t i  Eic  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and r i s k  
a s s e s s m e n t .  More i n f o r m a t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  would l i k e l y  have:  ( a )  made 
t h e  h e a r i n g s  smoother  and s p a r e d  a l l  p a r t i e s  t h e  embarassment  o f  
r e v e a l i n g  major  f l a w s  i n  t h e  agency  p r o p o s a l s ,  ( b )  avo ided  r e y r o p o s a l s ,  
( c )  r e s u l t e d ,  p resumably ,  i n  more s e n s i b l e  s t a n d a r d s  t h a t ,  t o g e t h e r  
v i t h  t h e  b e t t e r  s c i e n t i f i c  s u p p o r t ,  might  have  c o n v i n c e d  companies  and 
p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  n o t  t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  c a u s e d  t h e  
c o u r t s  t o  s u s t a i n  t h e  agency r e g u l a t i o n  i f  i t  were c h a l l e n g e d ,  r e s u l t e d  
i n  t h o s e  r e g u l a t e d  implementing t h e  s t a n d a r d s  more q u i c k l y ,  and 
prov ided  p r o t e c t i o n  from r i s k  a t  a n  e a r l i e r  d a t e .  While  many of  t h e s e  
s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  p r e s u m p t i o n s ,  some c a n  b e  documented.  I f  a n  agency  c a n  
p o s i t i o n  i t s e l f  s o  t h a t  i t  i s  l e f t  w i t h  c o n f l i c t s  i n  v a l u e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
c o n f l i c t s  i n  s c i e n c e ,  i t  is  more l i k e l y  t o  p r e v a i l .  
Pho tochemica l  O x i d a n t s  
Perhaps  t h e  most s t r i k i n g  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  pho tochemica l  o x i d a n t  
c a s e  s t u d y  i s  t h e  p a u c i t y  o f  e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  r e s e a r c h  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  t h i s  p o l l u t a n t  on h e a l t h .  Only a  h a n d f u l  of small c l i n i c a l  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  and e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  have  been  p u b l i s h e d  s i n c e  
t h e  s t a n d a r d  was i n i t i a l l y  set i n  1971. It i s  n a t u r a l  t h a t  a n  agency  
f i n d s  i t s e l f  o n  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  when i t  i s  f o r c e d  t o  r e l y  o n  o l d e r  
s t u d i e s  vhose f l a w s  have  been  r e c o g n i z e d  f o r  more t h a n  a decade .  
I n i t i a l  f e a r s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a c u t e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  o f  ozone were 
n o t  borne  o u t  by tile newer s t u d i e s .  Consequen t ly ,  EPA proposed a  
s l i g h t  r e l a x a t i o n  of t h e  s t a n d a r d .  While some e v i d e n c e  had been 
g a t h e r e d  on a c u t e  r e a c t i o n s  t o  ozone among both h e a l t h y  and a s t h m a t i c  
v o l u n t e e r s ,  t h e r e  v a s  v i r t u a l l y  no human e v i d e n c e  on long  term 
e x p o s u r e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  e f f e c t s  on  c h r o n i c  d i s e a s e ,  on  t h e  
d e v e l o p i n g  lung  i n  c h i l d r e n ,  and l i t t l e  r e s e a r c h  on  p o s s i b l e  c y t o g e n i c  
e f f e c t s .  The e v i d e n c e  o n  a c u t e  e f f e c t s  d o e s  n o t  p r o v i d e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  a  s t a n d a r d  w i t h i n  a  f a c t o r  o f  two o r  t h r e e  o f  t h e  1971 s t a n d a r d .  
Thus,  t h e  new e v i d e n c e  seems un i form i n  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  ozone was much 
less of a  t h r e a t  t h a n  had been f e a r e d  i n  1971, b u t  d o e s  n o t  e x p l o r e  a l l  
b i o l o g i c a l  e f f e c t s  o f  concern .  Even v i t h  a l m o s t  a  d e c a d e  o f  l e a d  time, 
EPA f a i l e d  t o  answer q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  remained unanswered a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  
t h e  i n i t i a l  ruletsaking.  Although EPA i n i t i a t e d  some r e s e a r c h  i n  1976, 
when i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  t h e y  would be  r q u i r e d  by Congress  t o  rev iew a l l  
a i r  p o l l u t i o n  s t a n d a r d s ,  t h e  s t u d i e s  were n o t  d e s i g n e d  t o  answer t h e  
c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n s .  
A  second  p o i n t  i s  t h e  s l o p p i n e s s  o f  EPA's e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  e a c h  
s t u d y .  The agency r e l i e d  upon t h e  au thor ' s  summary and c o n c l u s i o n s ,  
w i t h o u t  i n q u i r i n g  whether  t h e  methods,  a n a l y s i s ,  and c o r r o b o r a t i n g  
s t u d i e s  v e r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u p p o r t  them. S c i e n t i f i c  rev iew a c c e p t s  
r e s u l t s  o n l y  when t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  methods a r e  worthy o f  c o n f i d e n c e  and 
t h e r e  is c o r r o b o r a t i v e  e v i d e n c e .  Many o f  t h e  s t u d i e s  had major  f l a w s  
i n  a p p a r a t u s  d e s i g n  and u s e ,  measurement o f  l e v e l s ,  and t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  ozone  v i t h  o t h e r  p o l l u t a n t s ;  s u c h  f l a w s  
d e s t r o y  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  r e s u l t s .  A  c a r e f u l  rev iew o f  e a c h  s t u d y  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  i d e n t i f y  what c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  p roven ,  which a r e  
good c o n j e c t u r e s ,  and which a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  be  t r u e .  
A t h i r d  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  the  s c i e n t i f i c  a n a l y s i s  and r i s k  
assessment  seem t o  have been des igned  t o  suppor t  a  s t anda rd  a r r i v e d  a t  
by o t h e r  means r a t h e r  than  t o  answer t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  what s t anda rd  b e s t  
f u l f i l l s  t he  l e g i s l a t i v e  requi rement .  Thus,  t he  s c i e n t i f i c  a n a l y s i s  
had a t  most a  secondary r o l e  i n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t anda rd .  
The f o u r t h  p o i n t  s tems from t h e  t h i r d .  I n  groping  f o r  
suppor t i ng  ev idence ,  EPA c i t e d  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  a  h i g h l y  p r e l imina ry  
e x p l o r a t i o n .  Amidst a t t a c k s  on  u s ing  t h i s  s t u d y ,  t h e  e x p e r t s  whose 
o p i n i o a s  were used disavowed EPA's use of  t h e  s t u d y ;  t h e  agency was 
fo r ced  t o  back o f f  and c l a im  t h a t  i t  had never been r e l i e d  upon. While 
t h e  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y t i c  approach used i n  t h i s  s t u d y  is  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  one 
and worthy of t h e  f u r t h e r  e x p l o r a t i o n  i t  i s  r e c e i v i n g ,  no p re l imina ry ,  
e x p l o r a t i v e  s t udy  should be used a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  suppor t i ng  a major 
r e g u l a t i o n .  
The f i f t h  p o i n t  f ocuses  on what c o n s t i t u t e s  a n  adve r se  h e a l t h  
e f f e c t  and how f a r  s o c i e t y  should  go t o  avoid  i t .  The new s t u d i e s  
concerned a c u t e  r e s p i r a t o r y  problems exper ienced  under phys i ca l  s t r e a s  
due t o  heavy e x e r c i s e ,  which were r eve r sed  qu i ck ly  a f t e r  t h e  experiment  
was concluded.  S ince  people u s u a l l y  can  choose t o  e x e r t  themselves 
l e s s  and t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  exposure a r e  r e v e r s i b l e ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  need 
t o  set a  s t anda rd  more s t r i n g e n t  t han  t h e  l e v e l  a t  which s t r e s s  was 
exper ienced  under moderate e x e r c i s e .  I f ,  however, s t r e s s  occu r s  a t  
lower c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  f o r  more s e n s i t i v e  people  o r  i s  no t  r e v e r s i b l e  f o r  
some people ,  then  more s t r i n g e n t  s t a n d a r d s  might be warranted .  The 
exper iments  shed no l i g h t  on t h e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  I f  e f f e c t s  on 
ch ron i c  d i s e a s e  o r  on t h e  developing lung occur  a t  lower 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  reason f o r  a  more s t r i n g e n t  s t a n d a r d ,  but  
a g a i n  t h e r e  is  no evidence.  One reading  of t h e  r e s e a r c h  publ i shed  
s i n c e  1971 i s  t h a t  i t  a l l a y s  some of  t h e  e a r l i e r  f e a r s ,  but  i s  l a r g e l y  
i r r e l e v a n t  t o  answering t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  q u e s t i o n  about whether ambient 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  of photochemical o x i d a n t s  produce c h r o n i c  ill h e a l t h .  
Thus,  d e c i s i o n  makers o u s t  choose how much s a f e t y  t o  b u i l d  i n t o  c u r r e n t  
r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  view of c u r r e n t  u n c e r t a i n t y  about  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  and the  
c o s t  of s t r i n g e n t  s tandards .  
The s i x t h  p o i n t  is  t h a t  most of t h e  ep idemio log ica l  s t u d i e s ,  and 
many of t he  c l i n i c a l  s t u d i e s ,  a r e  marred by n o t  account ing  f o r  t h e  
presence  of ocher  air  p o l l u t a n t s .  I f  t h e s e  o t h e r  p o l l u t a n t s  a r e  t he  
t r u e  cause ,  o r  even a  p a r t i a l  o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  cause  o f  any  observed 
e f f e c t s ,  ozone is being blamed i n c o r r e c t l y .  There  i s  some sugges t ion  
of a  p o s i t i v e  i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t  (synergism) betveen ozone and s u l f u r  
ox ides ,  but  t he  evidence  is  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  
T h i s  po in t  i s  a s u b t l e  one because e l e v a t e d  l e v e l s  of ozone a r e  
n e a r l y  always a s s o c i a t e d  with e l e v a t e d  l e v e l s  of o t h e r  p o l l u t a n t s .  I f  
t h e  exper iments  had been done v i t h  p o l l u t a n t s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  pure 
ozone, they  might have d e t e c t e d  e f f e c t s  a t  l o v e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  of  
ozone.  Thus, i n  a t t empt ing  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a  s i n g l e  p o l l u t a n t ,  
t h e  exper iments  probably tended t o  u n d e r s t a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  ozone. An 
impor tant  synergism among p o l l u t a n t s  a rgues  f o r  j o i n t  s t anda rds ,  r a t h e r  
than  an i n d i v i d u a l  ozone s t anda rd .  The po in t  is  n o t  t o  f i n d  an excuse 
f o r  exonera t ing  ozone, but  r a t h e r  t o  l e a r n  t h e  source  of  any  h e a l t h  
problem so  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  can  focus on the  p r e c i s e  problem and des ign  
a  s t r a t e g y  which m i t i g a t e s  e f f e c t s  a t  l e a s t  c o s t .  
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The s even th  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  EPA p rocedu re s  d i d  not l e a d  t o  a  f u l l  
and e x p l i c i t  d i s c u s s i o n  of b i o l o g i c a l  mechanisms and a n a l o g i e s  by which 
photochemical  o x i d a n t s  might  harm h e a l t h .  The f o c u s  was on ev idence  
r ega rd ing  somat ic  damage. I n s o f a r  a s  t h e r e  is e v i d e n c e  conce rn ing  
p h y s i o l o g i c a l  mechanisms, a i r  chemis t ry  and p h y s i c s ,  o r  animal  
b ioa s says  t h a t  would h e l p  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  c u r r e n t  c l i n i c a l  
and ep idemio log i ca l  s t u d i e s ,  a  forum should  be provided  f o r  d i s p l a y i n g  
t h i s  ev idence  and d i s c u s s i n g  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  
The f i n a l  p o i n t  i s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  s a f e t y  s o c i e t y  d e s i r e s  t o  
i n c o r p o r a t e  i n  r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s .  I n  e a c h  c a s e  t h e r e  remains  some 
r e s i d u a l  r i s k  t h a t  adve r se  e f f e c t s  c o u l d  be much g r e a t e r  t han  t h o s e  
e s t i m a t e d .  Reasonable people  w i l l  d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  judgments conce rn ing  
how much s a f e t y  t o  b u i l d  i n t o  t h e  s t a n d a r d .  However, t h e s e  
d i s ag reemen t s  must be made e x p l i c i t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  h idden  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  
judgments conce rn ing  r i s k .  
Benzene 
The fo r ego ing  s e t  o f  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  a p p l i e s  t o  many of  t h e  
o t h e r  c a s e  s t u d i e s  and t hus  t h e i r  summaries w i l l  be more b r i e f .  For  
benzene ,  OSHA t ook  a s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  
a s se s smen t  cou ld  n o t  be done,  o r  a t  l e a s t  cou ld  n o t  be done w i th  
s u f f i c i e n t  con f idence  t o  wa r r an t  t h e  e f f o r t .  T h i s  p o s i t i o n  was t aken  
i n  s p i t e  of a n a l y s e s  produced by EPA and Richard Wilson. Having 
n e i t h e r  d r a m a t i c  ep idemio log i ca l  ev idence  n o r  a  r i s k  a s s e s smen t ,  OSHA 
was unable  t o  show t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t a n d a r d  p e r s i t t e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
r i s k  t o  h e a l t h .  T h i s  l e d  t he  Supreme Court  t o  v a c a t e  t h e  agency's 
s t a n d a r d .  Apparen t ly ,  t h e  agency f e a r e d  t h a t  a QRA would expose t h e  
s t a n d a r d  t o  c o u r t  c h a l l e n g e s  and i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of  i t  b e i n g  
r e v e r s e d .  However, t h e  Supreme Court ' s  o p i n i o n s  seem t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
i t  was aware  o f  t h e  i n h e r e n t  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  such  a n  a n a l y s i s  and  
would g i v e  a n  agency d e f e r e n c e  t o  encourage  g r e a t e r  e f f o r t  t o  g e t  a t  
t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t s .  1 
The benzene c a s e  is  c o m p l i c a t e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  were o f  poor  q u a l i t y  becauee t h e r e  a r e  few d a t a  
rn t h e  d o s e  r e c e i v e d  by v o r k e r s .  The e x c e s s  l eukemia  i n  workers  c o u l d  
have been caused by e x p o s u r e  t o  benzene o f  l e s s  t h a n  100  o r  o f  w e l l  
o v e r  100 p a r t s  p e r  m i l l i o n .  The l e v e l  of  e x p o s u r e  o f  t h e s e  v o r k e r s  
makes a l a r g e  d i f f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  dose- response  c u r v e s  and t h e  
i m p l i e d  r i s k  a t  10 p a r t s  p e r  m i l l i o n .  While  problems v i t h  t h e  
e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  a r e  t o  be e x p e c t e d ,  i t  i s  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  no 
an imal  b i o a s s a y  h a s  managed t o  produce leukemia  from benzene e x p o s u r e s .  
Thus ,  o n e  c a n n o t  have  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  r i s k s  t o  humane. 
The e x c l u s i v e  a t t e n t i o n  g i v e n  t o  l eukemia  by t h e  agency  seems t o  
i g n o r e  b e t t e r  e v i d e n c e  a e  t o  benzene l e v e l s  t h a t  c a u s e  o t h e r  blood 
d i s o r d e r s .  B e t t e r  e s t i m a t e s  of  r i s k  c a n  be d e r i v e d  f o r  blood d i s o r d e r s  
and a s t a n d a r d  f o r  t h e s e  s e t  w i t h  g r e a t e r  c o n f i d e n c e .  Presumably,  a 
s t a n d a r d  p r e v e n t i n g  blood d i s o r d e r s  would a l s o  p r e v e n t  l eukemia .  
1. The Supreme Court  e x p l i c i t l y  d e c i d e d  n o t  t o  r u l e  on t h e  
Cour t  of Appeals '  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  b e n e f i t s  and r i s k s  had t o  be  roughly  
commensurate. A r u l i n g  on t h i s  i s s u e  c o u l d  emerge f o r  t h e  c o t t o n  d u s t  
c a s e  being heard  t h i s  term.  
The benzene ca se  is a  c l a s s i c  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h e  c o s t  of be ing  
unprepared .  Three  yea r s  a f  t o r  promulgat ing t h e  s t a n d a r d ,  OSIU v a s  
r e v e r s ed .  Agency morale and c r e d i b i l t i t y  were  i n j u r e d  and t h r e e  y e a r s  
have been l o s t  i f  t h e  10 ppm s t a n d a r d  i s  n o t  cons ide r ed  adequa t e .  More 
c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  i n i t i a l l y  cou ld  have produced a  b e t t e r  r e g u l a t i o n  a s  
v e l l  a s  ev idence  t h a t  would have l e d  t o  t h e  s t a n d a r d  be ing  s u s t a i n e d  o r  
shoved t he  e x i s t i n g  e t anda rd  t o  be  adequa t e .  T h i s  c a s e  shovs  t h e  
u n f o r t u n a t e  consequences of a  d e c i s i o n  t o  ba se  a  s t a n d a r d  on p o l i t i c a l  
g rounds  v i t h o u t  c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  suppo r t  f o r  such  
d e c i s i o n s .  
Coke Ovens 
OSIU's r e g u l a t i o n  of exposure  t o  coke oven emlsblions was a  more 
d r a m a t i c  c a s e  t h a n  benzene s i n c e  a n  American ep idemio log i ca l  s t u d y  
shoved t o p s i d e  coke oven v o r k e r s  t o  be  a t  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  r i s k  of lung  
c a n c e r .  The h e a l t h  problem v a s  e v i d e n t ,  b u t  t h e  i s s u e  was how much 
e x p o su re  had t o  be dec r ea sed  i n  o r d e r  t o  e l i m i n a t e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  r educe ,  
t h e  exce s s  r i s k .  
I n  t h i s  c a s e  a g a i n ,  t h e  ep idemiology  gene ra t ed  d i s p u t e  s i n c e  a  
s t u d y  of B r i t i s h  coke  oven vo rke r s  found no exces s  r i s k .  Hovever, a  
c a r e f u l  comparison of t h e  two s t u d i e s  showed t h e  American one t o  be  
s u p e r i o r  and i t s  c o n c l u s i o n s  more v o r t h y  of  con f idence .  Y e t ,  a s  v i t h  
benzene,  i t  was n e a r l y  imposs ib l e  t o  g e t  e x a c t  c o r r o b o r a t i o n  from 
animal  d a t a  because coke emiss ion  s u b s t a n c e s  cannot  be produced i n  
l a b o r a t o r y  i n h a l a t i o n  chambers. Animal s t u d i e s  had t o  r e l y  on t e s t i n g  
c o n s t i t u e n t s  of t h e  emi t t ed  mix tu r e  bu t  d i d  f i n d  t h e s e  m a t e r i a l s  t o  be 
h i g h l y  c a r c i n o g e n i c .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e s e  c o n s t i t u e n t s  v e r e  known t o  be 
c a r c i n o g e n i c  i n  humans. The s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  f o r  c o n c l u d i n g  t h a t  coke 
oven e m i s s i o n s  a r e  c a r c i n o g e n i c  a t  c u r r e n t  l e v e l s  v a s  s t r o n g e r  t h a n  f o r  
benzene and i t  v a s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  c u r r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  e x p o s u r e  t o  coke oven 
e m i s s i o n s  posed an a p p r e c i a b l e  r i s k  t o  workers .  
The g r e a t e s t  s o u r c e  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  coke  oven c a s e  v a s  t h e  
dose- response  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  p a r  t i c u l a r l y  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  t o  v h a t  
l e v e l  of e x p o s u r e  vould  produce l i t t l e  o r  no e x c e s s  r i s k .  The dose  
t h a t  v o r k e r s  r e c e i v e d  v a s  n o t  known w i t h  a c c u r a c y ,  n o r  was t h e r e  
e v i d e n c e  c o n c e r n i n g  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s ,  . such  a s  c i g a r e t t e  smoking. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  l a g  between vhen t h e  d o s e  was r e c e i v e d  and when l u n g  
c a n c e r  was d e t e c t e d  wae e x t r e m e l y  i m p o r t a n t  i n  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  h e a l t h  
r i s k s  of  l o v e r  d o s e s .  Although n o t  t o t a l l y  c l e a r ,  t h e  e v i d e n c e  was 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e t a i l e d  t h a t  o n e  c o u l d  q u a n t i f y  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
v a r i o u s  a s s u m p t i o n s  about  e x p o s u r e ,  c i g a r e t t e  smoking, t h e  l a t e n c y  
p e r i o d ,  and t h e  form of t h e  dose- response  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Although t h e r e  
i s  remain ing  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  comple te  t h a t  
one c a n  e x p l o r e  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  e a c h  a s s u m p t i o n  and i d e n t i f y  t h e  
p l a c e  where a d d i t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h  c o u l d  make t h e  g r e a t e s t  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  
I o n i z i n g  R a d i a t i o n  
R e g u l a t i o n  o f  e x p o s u r e s  of  t h e  g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  i o n i z i n g  
r a d i a t i o n  from t h e  n u c l e a r  f u e l  c y c l e  i s  t h e  most t h o r o u g h l y  r e s e a r c h e d  
o f  t h e  a r e a s  s t u d i e d .  Large amounts have been s p e n t  t o  l e a r n  t h e  
e f f e c t s  of  e x p o s u r e  t o  i o n i z i n g  r a d i a t i o n  and a  good d e a l  i s  knovn 
a b o u t  t h e  dose- response  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  r a d i a t i o n ,  a t  
l e a s t  a t  moderate  and h igh  l e v e l s  of exposure .  However, f o r  long term 
e x p o su re  t o  ve ry  low l e v e l s  o f  r a d i a t i o n ,  l i t t l e  i s  known, and l i t t l e  
c a n  be deduced from ep idemio log i ca l  s t u d i e s .  I f  t h e  answers  e x i s t ,  
t h e y  must come from unde r s t and ing  t h e  mechanisms by which low d o s e s  o f  
r a d i a t i o n  produce cance r  o r  o t h e r  e f  f e c e s .  
The c a s e  s t u d y  shove a  v a s t  e f f o r t  a t  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  
r a d i o n u c l i d e  emiss ions  a t  e ach  s t a g e  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  f u e l  c y c l e ,  t o  
f o l l o w  t h e  emi t t ed  r a d i o n u c l i d e s  th rough t h e  environment  t o  human 
exposure .  and t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  r a d i a t i o n  exposure  l e v e l s  and 
h e a l t h  e f f e c t s .  While i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  conce ive  o f  a more comple te  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  i t  i e  a l s o  e v i d e n t  t h a t  no i n v e s t i g a t i o n  cou ld  
c o n c e ivab ly  p rov ide  p r e c i s e  answers t o  a l l  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s .  Any 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w i l l  be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a r e a s  where d a t a  cou ld  be more 
colnplete and a d d i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  cou ld  be  done. Presumably,  t h e  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  should  be s topped  a t  t h e  p o i n t  where a d d i t i o n a l  d a t a  
c o l l e c t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  a d d s  o n l y  a n o t h e r  d i g i t ,  p o s s i b l y  of s p u r i o u s  
a c c u r acy ,  t o  the  c a l c u l a t i o n .  
Following such  a  c a r e f u l  i n v e e t i g a t i o n ,  i t  i s  d i s h e a r t e n i n g  t o  
s e e  that t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  g o a l s  were set so  a r b i t r a r i l y .  Numbers were 
p u l l e d  o u t  o f  t h e  a i r  i n  d e f i n i n g  t h e  a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l  of exposure  and 
t h e  r e q u i r e d  s a f e t y  f a c t o r .  While I would n o t  want t o  q u a r r e l  w i t h  t h e  
numbers chosen ,  I canno t  h e l p  n o t i n g  t h a t  t hey  cou ld  e a s i l y  have v a r i e d  
by a  f a c t o r  of f l v e  o r  t e n ,  based on t he  d a t a .  S ince ,  a t  t h e  end of  
t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n ,  s m a l l  changes i n  t h e s e  numbers produce l a r g e  e f f e c t s ,  
a  mechanism is needed f o r  f e ed ing  back t h e  f i n a l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t i o n .  Somewhat a r b i t r a r y  i n i t i a l  g o a l s  must be matched 
v i t h  t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s ;  where a  change i n  t h e  assumpt ions  would have  
no d i s c e r n i b l e  e f f e c t  on h e a l t h ,  bu t  a  l a r g e  e f f e c t  on  c o s t s ,  t h e y  
should  be modif ied .  
The l e v e l  o f  e f f o r t  expended i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  a n a l y s i s  f o r  
i o n i z i n g  r a d i a t i o n  i s  s o  g r e a t  t h a t  i t  is  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  examine vha t  
was ga ined  from t h e  p ro c e s s .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  e v i d e n t  that t h e  a n a l y s i s  
d o e s  p i np o i n t  f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  v e r e  c a u s i n g  more popu l a t i on  exposure  and 
show hov t h a t  e xp osu re  c ou l d  be a v e r t c ?  r e l a t i v e l y  i n e x p e n s i v e l y .  
Thus ,  v h i l e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  d oe s  c o n t r i b u t e ,  i t  o f t e n  g e t s  bogged dovn i n  
u s e l e s s  d e t a i l ,  a s  i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  pa thvays  of s econda ry  impor tance .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  c a n no t  p rov ide  f u l l  and complete a n s v e r s ;  a n  
e lement  of judgment i s  r e q u i r e d .  The purpose  of  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  
a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  and i s o l a t e  t h o s e  a r e a s  vhe re  judgment i s  
needed and t o  e n s u r e  that t h e  r e s u l t  i s  informed judgment. 
I m p l i c a t i o n s  
A f e u  c o n c l u s i o n s  from t h e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  a r e  v o r t h  r e p e a t i n g .  I n  
none of t h e  c a s e s  v a s  t h e  r i s k  a s se s smen t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  comple te  t h a t  i t  
c o u l d  have provided an  a u t oma t i c  mechanism f o r  making d e c i s i o n s .  I n  
each  c a s e  t h e r e  was l a r g e  s c i e n t i f i c  u n c e r t a i n t y  and need f o r  informed 
judgment. QRA i s  n o t  a  panacea f o r  c u r r e n t  r e g u l a t o r y  problems,  b u t  i t  
c a n  be a  h e l p f u l  t o o l  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  improvement of t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  
d e c i s i o n  making p ro c e s s .  
Emphasizing QRA would have pushed each  agency away f r o u  
f r e n e t i c ,  c r i s i s  o r i e n t e d  a c t i o n  i n t o  behav io r  more a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t he  
l o n g  term impor tance  of  each  r i s k .  Worker and g e n e r a l  popu l a t i on  r i s k s  
could  have been lowered more qu i ck ly  ( i f  warrented)  by a  more 
t hough t fu l  approach t h a t  developed t h e  r i s k  and c o s t  i n fo rma t ion  and 
at tempted t o  convince  r a t h e r  t han  immediately t r y i n g  t o  compel. 
While rulemaking hea r ings  gene ra t ed  u s e f u l  i n fo rma t ion ,  t h e  
a d v e r s a r i a l  n a t u r e  tended t o  obscu re  l e g i t i m a t e  c r i t i c i s m s ,  s u g g e s t i o n s  
f o r  change,  and t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  d i f f e r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  v iewpoin ts .  
The process  would have proceeded more q u i c k l y  and smoothly had an 
i n i t i a l  a t tempt  been made, i n  a  nonadve r sa r i a l  s e t t i n g ,  t o  d i s c o v e r  
a r e a s  of s c i e n t i f i c  agreement and t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  r anges  of  and r ea sons  
f o r  d isagreement .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  would have been h e l p f u l  t o  t h e  
p roces s  t o  have had communication between e x p e r t s  i n  t h e  academic,  
b u s i n e s s ,  and government communities. 
I n  t h e  f o u r  major c a s e  s t u d i e s ,  t h e  q u a l i t y  of i n fo rma t ion  
supp l i ed  t o  r e g u l a t o r s ,  and presumably t h e  r e s u l t i n g  r e g u l a t o r y  
d e c i s i o n s ,  would have been improved markedly by b e t t e r  a n a l y s i s .  
Desp i t e  t he  ambiguous g o a l s  provided by Congress and t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
and g e n e r a l l y  poor  q u a l i t y  of  biomedical  ev idence ,  QRA could  have 
improved e s t i m a t e s  of  t h e  r i s k s  and could  have helped t he  agency t o  
de s ign  b e t t e r  s t anda rds .  The c a s e  s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b e t t e r  
s c i e n t i f i c  s t u d i e s  and more p r e c i s e  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of  g o a l s  by Congress 
vould be i n v a l u a b l e .  
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Any attempt t o  establish such criteria is part of an evaluation process and thus necessarily 
subjective. The presentation will review some of the methods which are being applied, 
will elaborate in more detail on a modified costeffectiveness approach which was devel- 
oped by the joint IAEA/I IASA risk assessment project, and will review current trends in 
safety-related decisions which try to neglect public perception of risks. 
'Partly published in: F. Niehaus: Developing criteria to compare the safety of energy systems,Ange- 
wandte Systemenelyse. Vol. l (4) .  pp. 149-157, Verlag TOV Rheinland Koln, 1980, 
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I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  of a b s o l u t e  c r i t e r i a  which would d e f i n e  a c c e p t -  
a b l e  l e v e l s  of r i s k  s u c h  e v a l u a t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  c a n  be based on 
p u t t i n g  r i s k s  of  a  s p e c i f i c  t echnology  i n t o  p e r s p e c t i v e  w i t h  o t h e r  
n a t u r a l  o r  man-made r i s k s .  E a r l y  s t u d i e s  ( 1 )  i n  t h i s  a r e a  t r i e d  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  c r i t e r i a  f o r  a c c e p t a b l e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l s  of  r i s k  based on  
r i s k / b e n e f  i t  r e l a t i o n s  o b t a i n e d  f o r  v a r i o u s  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and a c  t i v -  
i t i e s .  I t  was conc luded  t h a t  depending on  t h e  b e n e f i t s  such  l e v e l s  
should  r a n g e  between t h e  r i s k s  of dy ing  from n a t u r a l  h a z a r d s  and 
d i s e a s e s .  
L a t e r  s t u d i e s ,  a n a l y s i n g  h y p o t h e t i c a l  low p r o b a b i l i t y  a c c i d e n t s  
of  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t s ,  e v a l u a t e d  t h e  o b t a i n e d  c u m u l a t i v e  prob- 
a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  a c c i d e n t s  i n v o l v i n g  m u l t i p l e  f a t a l i t i e s  by 
comparing them t o  t h o s e  d e r i v e d  f o r  o t h e r  n a t u r a l  o r  man-caused 
e v e n t s  ( 2 ) .  R e c e n t l y ,  it  has been proposed t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  s a f e t y  
g o a l  f o r  n u c l e a r  power no t  t o  exceed 1 X  of t h e  t o t a l  r i s k s  of  a l l  
man-caused e v e n t s  ( 3 ) .  
Whereas t h e s e  s t u d i e s  g i v e  a  good i n d i c a t i o n  o f  whether  t h e  
r i s k s  from a  p a r t i c u l a r  t echnology  a r e  w i t h i n  a  r a n g e  a c c e p t e d  f o r  
o t h e r  t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  some s t u d i e s  have p o i n t e d  ou t  that t h e  p u b l i c  
does  n o t  p e r c e i v e  t h e s e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and t h e i r  r i s k s  i n  accordance  
w i t h  t h e s e  r e s u l t s .  
F i schhof f  e t  a l .  ( 4 )  a n a l y s e d  t h e  a c c e p t a b l e  r i s k  and t h e  per -  
c e i v e d  r i s k s  and b e n e f i t s  f o r  30 a c t i v i t i e s  and technolog!es  a s  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by a  s e t  of n ine  d e s c r i p t i v e  r i s k - r e l a t e d  a t t r i b u t e s .  
They found t h a t  t he  c o r r e l a t i o n  between a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l s  of r i s k  
and t h e  perce ived  b e n e f i t s  was low, and that t h e  n ine  d e s c r i p t i v e  
a t t r i b u t e s  could be reduced t o  two b a s i c  d imens ions  of r i s k .  One 
dimension was a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  "new, i n v o l u n t a r y ,  h igh ly  techno- 
l o g i c a l  i t ems ,  which have de layed  consequences f o r  masses of  
people" .  The second dimension was d e s c r i b e d  a s  be ing  " a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  e v e n t s  whose consequences a r e  c e r t a i n  t o  be f a t a l  ( o f t e n  f o r  
l a r g e  numbers of people)  should something go  wrong". The v a r i o u s  
a c t i v i t i e s  and t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r e  wide ly  s c a t t e r e d  i n  t h e  p l ane  de- 
f i n e d  by t he se  two f a c t o r s ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  t o  d i r e c t l y  
compare t h e  r i s k s  of very  d i f f e r e n t  t e chno log i e s .  
Fagnani (5 )  used a  ques t ionnai re -based  approach assuming t h a t  
the  concern  abou t  n u c l e a r  power and o t h e r  i s s u e s  of deba t e  have t o  
be viewed i n  a  more g e n e r a l  c o n t e x t .  Theref o r e ,  opponents  and pro- 
ponents  have been ana ly sed  w i t h  regard  t o  t h e i r  s o c i a l ,  ph i l o -  
s o p h i c a l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s .  I t  was found t h a t  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  
of t h e  p u b l i c  towards v a r i o u s  t e c h n o l o g i e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  nuc l ea r  energy 
and s o l a r  power, d i d  not  h igh ly  c o r r e l a t e  w i t h  t hose  g e n e r a l  t o p i c s  
of deba t e  i n  France.  
I t  i s  because of t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h a t  r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  of 
r i s k  have concen t r a t ed  on comparing t echno log i e s  which s e rve  the  
same purpose.  Here a n  a t t emp t  is made t o  p r e sen t  an  account  of t he  
r i s k s  of e l e c t r i c i t y  product ion  systems by i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e i r  t o t a l  
f u e l  c y c l e  ( 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 ) .  The purpose of such s t u d i e s  i s  t h r e e f o l d :  
- t o  demonstrate t h a t  a l l  energy c a r r f e r s ,  i . e . ,  f o s s i l ,  
nuc l ea r  and renewable sou rces ,  i nvo lve  r i s k s  t o  man and h i s  
environment, and t o  put  t he  r i s k s  of p a r t i c u l a r  techno- 
l o g i e s  i n t o  pe r spec t ive  wi th  t hose  systems se rv ing  the  same 
purpose,  namely t h e  product  i o n  of energy,  
- t o  de t enn ine  c r i t e r i a  f o r  a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l s  of r i s k s ,  and 
- t o  apply  knowledge and expe r i ence  i n  s a f e t y  accumulated i n  
one a r e a  t o  s i m i l a r  problems i n  o t h e r  a r eas .  
T h i s  paper w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  c r i t e r i a  and l i m i t a t i o n s  of such 
comparisons, and w i l l  p lace  emphasis o n  cos t - e f f ec t ivenes s  cons ide r -  
a t i o n s .  I f  t h e  r e sou rces  which s o c i e t y  can  spend o n  s a f e t y  a r e  
l i m i t e d ,  t hey  should be spent  most c o a t - e f f e c t i v e l y ,  i . e . ,  i n  t hose  
a r e a s  where t h e  l a r g e s t  r i s k  r educ t ion  can  be achieved wi th  t h e  same 
amount of inves tments .  I t  is a l s o  poin ted  o u t  t h a t  a  p r a c t i c a l  
l i m i t  t o  r i s k  r educ t ion  does  e x i s t ,  because exces s ive  expend i tu re s  
w i l l  a c t u a l l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r i s k  t o  s o c i e t y .  S ince  most of t he se  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  based on expected va lues ,  t h e  f i n a l  p a r t  of the  
paper w i l l  review c u r r e n t  t r e n d s  i n  s a f e t y - r e l a t e d  d e c i s i o n s  which 
t r y  t o  r e f l e c t  p u b l i c  pe rcep t ion  of  r i s k s .  
COMPARISON OF RISKS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 
Based on ep idemio log i ca l  s t u d i e s  and on a tmospher ic  d i s p e r s i o n  
models, Hamilton (11 )  has  e s t ima ted  t h e  t o t a l  r i s k s  from energy  pro- 
d u c t i o n  i n  t he  U.S. i n  1975. The number of p l a n t s  have been norm- 
a l i s e d  t o  t he  e q u i v a l e n t  s i z e  of 1000 MW ( e l '  The e s t i m a t e s  g iven  
i n  Table  1 i n c l u d e  t he  t o t a l  f u e l  c y c l e  and o c c u p a t i o n a l  and pub l i c  
e f f e c t s .  I t  should  be noted t h a t  l a r g e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  remain, which 
i s  demonstrated by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  g iven  number 
of t o t a l  e s t ima ted  d e a t h s  i s  about  one o r d e r  of magnitude h ighe r  
t han  t h e  lower e s t i m a t e .  
It  i s  r e v e a l i n g  t o  compare such e s t i m a t e s  w i th  a c c i d e n t  s t a -  
t i s t i c s  of o t h e r  sou rce s  of r i s k  w i t h i n  s o c i e t y .  Table  2 g i v e s  some 
d a t a  f o r  t he  U.S. f o r  t h e  t ime pe r iod  from 1967 t o  1970,  which do 
no t  change d r a s t i c a l l y  from one yea r  t o  t h e  n e x t .  Comparing Table 1 
and Table  2 i t  can  be seen  t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  d e a t h s  caused by e l e c -  
t r i c i t y  product ion  would f a l l  between those  caused by "Poisoning" 
and "Fa l l s " .  They a r e  d e f i n i t e l y  much lower than  t h e  d e a t h s  caused 
by Motor Vehic les  and would t h u s  not  be o u t  of p ropo r t i on  w i th  o t h e r  
r i s k s .  
As mentioned above,  t h i s  type  of comparison should  only  be 
viewed wi th  c a u t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  v a r i o u s  causes  of d e a t h  do not  have 
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much i n  common; a l s o  t h e  number of f a t a l i t i e s  c l e a r l y  depends on t h e  
number of f a c i l i t i e s  a v a i l a b l e .  I n  o r d e r  t o  avoid  t h e s e  problems 
t he  fo l l owing  comparison c o n s i d e r s  e n e r g y  p roduc t i on  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
which a r e  s i m i l a r  i n  t h a t  they  produce e l e c t r i c i t y  i n  c e n t r a l i s e d  
systems.  A s  a  common b a s i s  f o r  t h e  comparison t h e  p roduc t i on  of 
1 GWa(e) h a s  been de f i ned .  
F ive  t e c h n o l o g i e s  have been chosen  f o r  this s t u d y  which has  been 
d e s c r i b e d  i n  more d e t a i l  i n  ( 9 ) .  
Coal 
The a n a l y s i s  i s  based on  d a t a  from t h e  U.S. where, i n  1975, 55% 
of t h e  c o a l  was produced i n  s u r f a c e  mines and 45% by deep  mining. 
On t h e  ave r age ,  t h e  c o a l  i s  t r a n s p o r t e d  f o r  500 km. 65% by r a i l '  21% 
by t r u c k  and 13% by barge.  The 2  x 700 MJe p l a n t  is assumed t o  
o p e r a t e  on  a  l oad  f a c t o r  of 71% w i t h  38% e f f i c i e n c y .  F lue  g a s  de- 
s u l f u r i s a t i o n  i s  cons ide r ed  t o  be e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a  0.5% s u l f u r  con- 
t e n t  i n  c o a l .  P u b l i c  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  a r e  based on a  s t a c k  h e i g h t  of 
6 305 m and c o n s i d e r  a n  average  popu l a t i on  of 2.2 x 1 0  people  
w i t h i n  a  d t s t a n c e  of  80 km. 
O i l  
A p l a n t  of s i m i l a r  s i z e  and o p e r a t i n g  pa r ame te r s ,  f u e l l e d  by 
r e s i d u a l  o i l ,  i s  used. The s u l f u r  c o n t e n t  i s  assumed t o  be 0.2%. 
The f u e l  i s  . t r an spo r t ed  by t anke r .  
The SO2 emis s ions  a r e  assumed t o  be 24 t/(;Wa ( e ) '  T h i s  may 
b e c o m p a r e d t o t h e 3 1 , 0 0 0 t / G W a  e s t i m a t e d f o r c o a l v i t h 0 . 5 $ :  ( e )  
s u l f u r .  The g a s  i s  t r a n s p o r t e d  by p i p e l i n e s  and d a t a  on p i p e l i n e  
a c c i d e n t s  have been a l l o c a t e d  acco rd ing ly .  
LWR 
R e s u l t s  a r e  based on a  1350 MW(e) l i g h t - v a t e r  r e a c t o r  o p e r a t i n g  
a t  a  load f a c t o r  of 0.74 assuming 33% e f f i c i e n c y .  The f u e l  c y c l e  
c o n s i d e r s  r ep roce s s ing .  Hea l th  e f f e c t s  of s t o r a g e  of n u c l e a r  was te  
a r e  assumed t o  be c l o s e  t o  z e r o  and a r e  no t  cons ide r ed .  Regarding 
f u e l  r equ i r emen t s  and economic i m p l i c a t i o n s  no c r e d i t  i s  g i v e n  f o r  
t h e  recovered  plutonium. 
STEC 
For s o l a r  t he rma l  e l e c t r i c  conve r s ion  sys tems,  100  MW ( e )  
(peak)  p l a n t s  a r e  cons idered  w i t h  6 hours  rock  and o i l  s t o r a g e ,  
ope ra t i ng  a t  a  54X c a p a c i t y  f a c t o r .  Thus, 18.5 p l a n t s  a r e  needed t o  
supply  1 GWa /yea r .  No back-up sys tems have been cons ide red .  ( e l  
Based on  most f avou rab l e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  South-Western d e s e r t  of 
2  t h e  U..S. wi th  a n  average  annual  i n s o l a t i o n  of  8  kWh/m x day, each  
100 MW p l a n t  would c o n s i s t  of 28,600 h e l i o s t a t s  wi th  30.4 m 2 ( e )  
2  
su r f ace .  I n  t o t a l ,  e ach  p l a n t  would cove r  3.5 km of land .  
A l l  p l a n t s  a r e  assumed t o  have a  l i f e t i m e  of  30 y e a r s .  
The e s t ima ted  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  of  t h e s e  sys tems a r e  summarised i n  
Table  3. I n  o r d e r  t o  s t r e s s  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  involved  and t o  p o i n t  
ou t  n a t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  t h e  range of  v a l u e s  which can  be found i n  
t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  a l s o  g iven .  The d a t a  have been kept  s e p a r a t e  f o r  
occupa t iona l  and pub l i c  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  and f o r  a c c i d e n t a l  d e a t h ,  
a c c i d e n t a l  i n j u r i e s  and f a t a l  d i s e a s e s .  Because of i n s u f f i c i e n t  
d a t a  base ,  d i s e a s e s  which l ead  t o  temporary o r  permanent d i s -  
a b i l i t i e s  were not  cons idered .  It should  be mentioned t h a t  per- 
manent d i s a b i l i t i e s  among coa l -mine r s  a r e  probably about  a  f a c t o r  of 
10 h igher  than  t h e  number of d e a t h s  l i s t e d  i n  Table  3. 
- - 
' ( ~ M Y  OT x 9 ~ ~ 8 )  (a)eM3 T 30 A ~ d d n s  U o ~ 3  SaseasTp pue squapTooe ~ o x ~  sqoajsg : E  37gQJ, 6 
6T'O 26'0-020'0 6P'O-Kb'O 
O1'O-OZO'O 81'0-C1 '0 
9100'0 S11'0-8000'0 9000'0 
191'0 19'0-C00'0 t'O-8Z'O 
CO'O 
920'0 
8'2 b.9-000'0 01  '0  
LL'Z b.9-800'0 LGO'O 
xpnas IU *ma~a.aTq 1 au * ~ n a * a a a r ~  3 ; r ~  o ~ n a o a o ~ ~ q  
r r r e o r ~ a  m e a  * D V W  WODTJJY ( l a  UT) *OTJ~FUI  W ~ Q T ~ W  
P-5-  9 -c  Z T  '7. 
26'0 96'0 
T6'0-OC0'0 ZTO'O 
K6.T LOST 
ZS'Z- LL'O TZO'O 
9T'O SSO'O 
CZ'O 03'0-LO0'0 LT '0  
ZK'O - 550'0 
ZKO'O 20'0-CTO'O VK0'0 
C00'0 S10'0-9200'0 200'0 
160'0 15'0-110'0 b60'0 
0 ' 1  6P'O- LO'O - OC'O 
10'0  - 6CO'O 
CO'O CSO'O-210'0 ZKO'O 
08 '1  OCO'O-320'0 20'0 
00'0 O'O-9t0'0 21'0 
0'2 9'C- 00'0 tG.0 
10'0 - bS0'0 
OG'O ZSO'O-C1O'O CK0'0 
0 '1  9'1- 00'0 B90'0 
b0.0 L'T-LZO'O LUC'O 
L ' 9  2.9-  bS'O 01.1- IIO'K 
1.0 - 550'0 
O0'0 90'0-tT0'0 9 10'0 
G O - z  LOT-CLO'O IOC 'O-I<C*O 
99'C TL'Z- 5t .0  CL'O- 99 '0  
OOEZL-OCCOT 0 3 : ~  
0997. OSCC 
OOCB-OCT OC 
OBLL-0665 07.9) 
OOCZ-OC9 Z 8 
0 0 ~ ~ - 0 0 6  06: 
061 OLf T -0CZ OLS 
06T - SCZ 
8 OVT-Ob OP1 
T LO-C L 
TL OQIT-OBT 061 
O K  OOSC-OTt 0021: 
31  - OK2 
6s OKK-09 0b1 
9C6 CGK-bb 001 
f ) 00TC-00Z OLL1 
0 1  OZSL-OtS OOSC 
91  - OtZ 
6s TLT-OS OCT 
9C6 OSL-CS OLb 
T P 0039-Or) OP9Z 
OCTL 0lIOCI~~fl791 MVP-OOLO 
26 - OPZ 
10 0nb t-11s I c 12 
OGST OW-GT onn-OIL 
O ~ V S  0?611-0801 060~-ozoc 
smzot 
u o n r ~ . ~ d o  1vuuo~  
Oh0103~ iJIU3GUOJ 
> U P T ~  >an l3cuo~  
'>VW >rodsuei,~ 
Atddns K ~ T X ~ I W  
1W.U3lU YYiOS 
SIV- 
uolaan~>suoj  
UOT2t.ladO K N O N  
a iodsuvr~  
*ao~ordau Y l a w  
-
an7 
GIVZO.4 
uol>anl>suoj 
uol>Ql0d0 K W O N  
a iodsuar~  
Alddns ~ a n j  
- 
sm 
mm 
u o ~ a ~ n ~ a a u o j  
u o ~ a ~ r o d o  IMON 
axodsurl& 
A~ddns 1% 
1 x 0  
SlYm 
u o ~ a ~ n l > v ~ o 3  
U O T ~ Q ~ J ~ O  1-ON 
> r o d s u o ~ ~  
Alddns - land 
no3 
E 
a 0 
u 
II a 
a Y 
m d 
I Y  
0 
2 
4 a 
Y  
b 
4 2 
E 
B a 
8 ; 
Y O  
C LI 
u - 
5! * 
0 a
+I 
: 2 
15 t: 
E 
r 
C 
4 
- i? 
a 
O J  
4 Q Y  Y  
¶ Q 
c. - 
C 4 
r r l  
Y C  0 
3 
8 + I  
4 2 3  
€ 
4 
I 
0 
- 1  
d d  
I 8  
n c c  
2 6  
m YI
N ?  
n o  
I 1  
(o 
0 
n o  
,id 
0, 
i 
m rl
d 
0 
ci 
% Y( 
d 
m c 
- 
I 
0  
0 w C
A O  
1o 
0 
V) d  I 
r 
i 
n  
n 
I 
I-. 
4 
m 
i 
V) 4
d 
0 
- 
I 
- "7 
6 
~n 
C 
b 
u 
0 
C 
I 
S: .n 
5 3 
+I I s  g 
d 
a @  $ 3  
a h 0  u 
' O  z 
. :rg-  
K o a 
elr:nd 
d a 
, $ 4  g 
a u  a u  
a h 0  2 
a 0 Y) 44 * 
* * n  
d C E I l  
a o o u c  
. z lo ;se  
0 r M
I 
Q 
d 
r 
n 
YI.0 S d  
I 1  
n 
0 H e  
i d  
0, 
s 
o 
0 
o 
X 
n 
- m  
r(d 00
$0; 
n n m 
:a 
00 
Y I O  
$ &  
1-0 O 0
r( -I 
C 
0 * 
4 I 
Z 
In 
G 
I 
A 
A 
m 4
8 
8 
o  
9 
n 
Y 
3 44 $ 
a d  
2 g 0 9  
UI a 4  Y 
- z s z  
m a 4 s . c  
s l r ; ~ ~  
n 0
9 
v, 
8 
0 
v, 
n 
o 
0 
n 
a O 
k 3 . 3  
" :. 
s"r8: 
a 3- 5 4 c a ,  
so.,, 
31::re 
n 
d  
n o -  
d o n  $ 9 9  
n 
d o n  
883 
666 
C. 
n n  
o n  
w 
?!fm 
O"O 8 K  
d d  
2 
0 
- A e  
0 
0' 
w 
8 
d 
n 0
g 
a 
r~ 
m C 
>. Y~~ C 
. p ; g ;  J 
\O n
-P 
2 
6 
9 
N 4
: 
8 
0 
d 
\1 0
o  
d 
n 0 
6 
rn 
s n  
n  
o 
" 
: 
d 
c 
r 
" 
"o 
6 
w 
A 
o 
m 
9 
n 0
i 
n 
4 
Ir 
- 
0 
u 
0 
9 
0 
n 
? 
0  
C v
d 
P 
8 
* 
d 
I 
W 
0 
m 
7 
n 
g 
n d 4
P 
z-r&.: 
u u u a  
+ a o , s  = 4 Y u c 0  
Ei 
4 4 "  ur l  O ! * Y I n u  
5 2 : E Z g  
r!n;een 
The e s t i m a t e s  used  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  w i t h i n  t h e  r a n g e  found i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  o r  a r e  lower t h a n  t h e s e  v a l u e s .  The r e a s o n  f o r  lower  
e s t i m a t e s  i s  t h a t  n o t  t o d a y ' s  a v e r a g e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  were compared b u t  
modern t e c h n o l o g i e s  f o r  a l l  energy  sys tems .  Thus r e c e n t  t r e n d s  i n  
s t a t i s t i c s  on h e a l t h  impac ts  have been e x t r a p o l a t e d  t o  d e s c r i b e  
e f f e c t s  of  l a r g e - s c a l e  modern t e c h n o l o g i e s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  of s o l a r  
power remote s i t i n g  was assumed,  and p u b l i c  f a t a l  d i s e a s e s  a r e  
caused  by c o a l  needed t o  m e l t  m e t a l s ,  e t c .  
T h e r e  a r e  s t i l l  l a r g e  a r e a s  o f  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  
and many p o s s i b l e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  had t o  be o m i t t e d  because  e i t h e r  a  
d o s e - e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  h a s  n o t  y e t  been e s t a b l i s h e d  o r  because  no 
a d e q u a t e  methodology e x i s t s  which would a l l o w  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of 
t h e s e  e f f e c t s .  The main a r e a s  o f  t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  a r e :  
Coal .  The g i v e n  e s t i m a t e  r e p r e s e n t s  o p t i m i s t i c  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  of  
-
t h e  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  t o  modern l a r g e  c o a l  mines.  E s t i m a t e s  of  p u b l i c  
f a t a l  d i s e a s e s  a r e  based on two e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s .  The lower 
boundary u s e s  t h e  median v a l u e  from Lave and t h e  upper  boundary i s  
based on t h e  lower  ( l i n e a r )  r e s u l t s  from W i n k e l s t e i n  a s  summarised 
i n  ( 1 2 ) .  I t  should  be no ted  t h a t  Hami l ton  (13)  g i v e s  a  range  from 
36 t o  240 p u b l i c  f a t a l  d i s e a s e s  based o n  100 c u r r e n t l y  used s i t e s  i n  
t h e  U.S. and i n t e g r a t i n g  o v e r  a l l  d i s t a n c e s  ( n o t  o n l y  up t o  80 km). 
Data on e m i s s i o n s  of  t r a c e  e l e m e n t s  and t h e  e f f e c t s  from emis- 
s i o n s  of b e n z ( a ) p y r e n e  (about  6% i n c r e a s e  of lung  c a n c e r  p e r  
3 I ng/m ( 1 4 )  have n o t  been i n c l u d e d .  
R a d i o a c t i v e  e m i s s i o n s  from c o a l - f i r e d  p l a n t s  were n o t  i n c l u d e d  
i n  Table  3. 
O i l  and  Gas. The o c c u p a t i o n a l  r i s k s  of o i l  and g a s  s u p p l y  from 
t h e  North Sea would be c o n s i d e r a b l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  l i s t e d  i n  T a b l e  3. 
The low f r e q u e n c y / h i g h  consequence r i s k  of d e s t r o y i n g  l a r g e  f i x e d  
of  f - s h o r e  p l a t f  o m s  and t h e  r i s k  of  d e s t r o y i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  c e n t r e s  by 
g a s  c l o u d s  from LNG t a n k s  h a s  n o t  been i n c l u d e d .  
LWR. E f f e c t s  a r e  based on a n  a v e r a g e  r i s k  f a c t o r  of 
- 
-4 2  x  1 0  /men-rem which i n c l u d e  c a n c e r s  p l u s  g e n e t i c  e f f e c t s .  
Low-frequency h y p o t h e t i c a l  r e a c t o r  a c c i d e n t s  ( 2 )  a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d ,  
and would c o n t r i b u t e  n e g l i g i b l y  t o  t h e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e s  g i v e n .  
S o l a r .  Remote s i t i n g  of s o l a r  p l a n t s  was assumed. Because of 
l a c k  of  e x p e r i e n c e  d a t a  had t o  be e x t r a p o l a t e d  from r e l a t e d  a c t i v -  
i t i e s  Ln o t h e r  i n d u s t r i e s .  
Some r i s k s  of energy  p r o d u c t i o n  c a n  i n  p r i n c i p l e  n o t  be i n c l u d e d  
i n  such  a  compar i son ,  s i n c e  they  depend n o n - l i n e a r l y  on t o t a l  pro- 
d u c t i o n  r a t e s .  An example i s  g i v e n  by t h e  r i s k s  of c l i m a t i c  change ,  
caused by C02-emissions from f o s s i l  f u e l  consumption.  
S i n c e  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  compare t h e  d a t a  a c r o s s  T a b l e  3 and 
s i n c e  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of r i s k  is  very  d i s s i m i l a r ,  t h e  n e x t  s t e p  of  
t h i s  compar i son  a g g r e g a t e s  i n j u r i e s  and f a t a l i t i e s  by assuming t h a t  
one d e a t h  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  6000 l o s t  man-days. The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  
a g g r e g a t i o n ,  which c e r t a i n l y  d o e s  c o n t a i n  a  v a l u e  judgement, a r e  
d i s p l a y e d  i n  F ig .  1. Whereas t h e  g r e a t e s t  r i s k s  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  a r e  
posed by e n e r g y  sys tems  o p e r a t e d  o n  c o a l  and o i l ,  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
of s o l a r  t h e r m a l  e l e c t r i c  c o n v e r s i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  a p p e a r s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  h i g h e s t  o c c u p a t i o n a l  h a z a r d .  
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The above-descr ibed  d a t a  g i v e  e x p e c t e d  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  normal i sed  
t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of  1 C;Ua of e l e c t r i c i t y ;  t h e  b e n e f i t s  a r e  ( e l  
g i v e n  by d i f f e r e n t  e l e c t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  and o t h e r  p a r a m e t e r s  
which a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  q u a n t i f y .  Consequent ly ,  a  c o s t / b e n e f i t  ana- 
l y s i s  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  r i s k s  and t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  impact  on s o c i e t y  and  
b e n e f i t s  be e x p r e s s e d  i n  common u n i t s .  I f  monetary t e r m s  a r e  used  
a s  such  a  common b a s i s ,  i t  p o s e s  t h e  d i E E i c u l t  q u e s t i o n  of  a s s i g n i n g  
a  monetary v a l u e  t o  a  human l i f e  and t o  workdays l o s t .  S e v e r a l  
a p p r o a c h e s  c a n  be used t o  d e r i v e  such  a  v a l u e .  
I m p l i c i t  v a l u e s  a r e  d e r i v e d  Erom p a s t  d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  mort-  
a l i t y  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  and imply t h a t  t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s  have been o p t i -  
1 FATALITY = 
6000 trlDL 
OCCUPATIONAL 
COAL OIL GAS LBi'R STEC 1 COP& OIL GAS LhR STEC 
FIGURE 1: Occupational and public man-days lost per GWa(e) 
for each energy system (9) 
mal. The most commonly used  Human C a p i t a l  Approach e v a l u a t e s  a  l i f e  
w i t h  t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  f u t u r e  l i f e - t i m e  e a r n i n g s  of  t h o s e  a t  r i s k  and,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  depends  o n  age and  s o c i a l  s t a t u s .  The Wi l l ingness - to -pay  
Approach u s e s  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay f o r  r e d u c t i o n  of spe- 
c i f i c  r i s k s .  The monetary v a l u e s  a s s i g n e d  t o  a  l i f e ,  d e r i v e d  by 
t h e s e  v a r i o u s  methods,  seem t o  c e n t r e  around $ 300,000.  T h i s  v a l u e  
r e f l e c t s  a  t r a d e - o f f  between t h e  two o b j e c t i v e s  of  maximising GNP 
and r e d u c i n g  r i s k s ,  and i t  is  o n l y  meaningfu l  i n  t h e  c ? n t e x t  of 
r i s k / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s e s .  
F o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c a l c u l a t i o n s  t h i s  v a l u e  of $ 300,000 h a s  been 
used.  A t  a n  a v e r a g e  e x p e c t e d  work- loss  of  6000 man-days p e r  f a t a l -  
i t y ,  t h i s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  $ 50  p e r  man-day. I n  t h e  c a s e  of i n j u r y  
and i l l n e s s ,  s o c i e t y  l o s e s  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  work and a l s o  i n c u r s  ex- 
p e n d i t u r e s ,  t h e r e f o r e  a  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  $ 100 p e r  man-day h a s  been 
chosen  ( 1 5 ) .  
R e s u l t s  of such  a  c a l c u l a t i o n  a r e  g i v e n  i n  T a b l e  4, which de-  
m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  h e a l t h  c o s t s  ( e x t e r n a l  c o s t ) ,  a s  q u a n t i -  
f i e d  by t h i s  p rocedure  a r e  about  1% o r  l e s s  t h a n  i n t e r n a l  c o s t s  
( 1 6 ) ,  and a r e  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  e s t i m a t e s  o f  e l e c -  
t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s .  Thus,  i t  seems t h a t  c o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  
is n o t  a n  a d e q u a t e  methodology t o  answer  t h e  problems pu t  forward i n  
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n .  
Coal O i l  Gas LWR STEC 
-- -- -- 
Capital 158 132 132 228 580-710 
O & M  17.5 8.8 8.8 17.5 98 
Fuel 114 228 19 9 61.3 50 (1) 
?bat-. t 79 (2) (2) 1.9 (3) 140-175 (4) 
Internal  Costs 368 369 340 309 865-1030 
Occupational 
Effects 0.77-0.82 0.5L 0.31 0.23-0.26 1-44 
Public 
Effects 1.2 - 7.1 0.33-2.25 0.39-0.4 0.08-0.1 0-04-0.17 
2.0 - 7.9 0.8 -2.8 
costs  
b of internalo. - 2. 0.2 - 0.8 
cos t  0.2 0.1- 0.12 0.17 
(1) Cost of e l e c t r i c i t y  transmission, 2000 Ian t o  load center. 
(2) O i l  and gas desulfurization a t  refinery,  natura l  gas 
p r ice  s t i l l  controlled in 1977. 
(3) Pieax-zero Rad-waste system, LWR includes decommissioning 
waste disposal. 
(4)  Extra cost  f o r  dry cooling towers required in deser t  
areas. 
TABLE 4 :  C o s t s  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  p r o d u c t i o n  ( m i l l i o n  U S $  i n  
1977/GWa). 
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COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF RISK REDUCTION 
The methodologies o u t l i n e d  above have s e v e r e  l i m i t a t i o n s  when 
app l i ed  t o  make a  d e c i s i o n  on whether o r  not  a  g iven  technology 
should be made s a f e r .  A method b e t t e r  s u i t a b l e  t o  d e a l  w i th  such a  
problem r e a l i s t i c a l l y  i s  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  (margina l  
c o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s ) .  
Sa fe ty  expend i tu re s  g e n e r a l l y  f o l l o w  a n  economic law of dimin- 
i s h i n g  r e t u r n s .  The g e n e r a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of t h i s  law i s  o u t l i n e d  i n  
Pig. 2 (16) and c a s e  s t u d i e s  have been g iven  i n  (15 ,17) .  The f i g u r e  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  reduce a  r e l a t i v e l y  h igh  r i s k  t o  a  
much lower l e v e l  (e.g.  A R1) a t  r a t h e r  low a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  
(e.g. A C1). However, i t  becomes more and more expens ive  t o  re-  
duce t h e  r i s k  even f u r t h e r  (e.g.  from S5 t o  S6). The r e l a t i o n  
A I?/ A C  ( i . e .  t h e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e )  a t  each  po in t  of t h e  curve  i s  a  
measure of t he  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of f u r t h e r  r i s k  r educ t ion  from the  
l e v e l  of s a f e t y  represented  by t h a t  p o i n t .  l l a rg ina l  c o s t s  of r i s k  
r educ t ion  a r e  measured i n  human h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  avoided p e r  u n i t  c o s t  
of r i s k  r educ t ion  (e.g. l o s t  man-days avoided p e r  m i l l i o n  $). Two 
main conc lus ions  can  be drawn from t h i s  f i g u r e :  
- t h e  margina l  c o s t  of r i s k  r educ t ion  i n c r e a s e s  w i th  t h e  
l e v e l  of s a f e t y  achieved;  and 
FIGURE 2: Cost-effectiveness of risk reduction (16) 
I OROERED BY VALUE OF L R ~ ~ A C ,  
AR1 
SMOOTHED COST-EFFECTIVENSSS CURVE 
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- f o r  any g iven  s a f e t y  l e v e l  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  reduce a n  
e x i s t i n g  r i s k  even f u r t h e r ;  hovever,  i t  is not  p o s s i b l e  t o  
reduce t h e  r i s k  t o  zero.  
Seve ra l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  need f u r t h e r  d i s cus s ion .  
F i r s t l y ,  should t echno log ie s  be made a s  s a f e  a s  t e c h n i c a l l y  a c h i e r  
a b l e ?  Though t h i s  vould be a  very  appea l ing  approach a t  f i r s t  
g l ance ,  our  d a i l y  exper ience  ?emonst ra tes  t h a t  t h i s  i s  not f ea s -  
i b l e .  I n  t h e  ca se  of au tomobi les ,  f o r  example, t h e r e  e x i s t  innumer- 
a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  i n c r e a s e  s a f e t y .  But i t  i s  obvious t h a t  n o t  
a l l  s t r e e t a  can  be p ro t ec t ed  by a  s e t  of c rash-fences  o r  suppl ied  
v i t h  s t r e e t l i g h t s ,  t h a t  not  a l l  grade-cross ings  can  be replaced  by 
underpasses ,  e t c .  Decis ions  on s a f e t y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  have t o  be made 
i n  such a  manner a s  t o  spend the  l i m i t e d  resources  of s o c i e t y  i n  a  
c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  vay. The tvo  conc lus ions  drawn from Fig.  2 imply 
t h a t  " sa fe"  i s  a l v a y s  determined by a  compromise be tveen  t h e  t vo  ob- 
j e c t i v e s  of us ing  l i m i t e d  r e sou rces  most e f f e c t i v e l y  (minimising 
c o s t )  and of ach iev ing  the  h ighes t  l e v e l  of s a f e t y  (minimising 
r i s k ) .  
Secondly,  any po in t  on t h e  curve i n  Fig.  2 ,  vhich  n i g h t  be 
chosen a s  a  l i m i t  vhere no f u r t h e r  r i s k  r educ t ion  i s  cons ide red ,  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by s p e c i f i c  expend i tu re s  per  u n i t  of r i s k  reduct ion .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  any m o r t a l i t y  r i s k  ave r t ed  imp l i e s  a  monetary va lue  
per  human l i f e  saved.  
This  r a t i o  has  t h e  same dimensions a s  t h e  "monetary va lue  of a  
human l i f e "  d i scus sed  above. However, i n  t h i s  con tex t  it  does  not  
t r y  t o  e s t a b l i s h  such a  va lue  but r a t h e r  s e r v e s  t h e  purpose of c o r  
par ing  margina l  c o s t  of r i s k  r educ t ion  i n  v a r i o u s  a r e a s .  Thus, i t  
can be decided where t o  spend the  l i m i t e d  r e sou rces  of s o c i e t y  most 
c o s t - e f f e c t i v e l y .  
An example of such  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  g iven  i n  Fig .  3 f o r  t he  
n u c l e a r  f u e l  c y c l e  of PWRs (17 ) .  S i m i l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  have been 
e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  BWRs. No such s t u d i e s  do y e t  e x i s t  f o r  t h e  f u e l  
c y c l e s  of o t h e r  energy systems though some e s t i m a t e s  e x i s t  f o r  par- 
t i c u l a r  r i s k  r educ t ion  measures, e.g. d e s u l f u r i s a t i o n  of f l u e  gas  
(15).  
THE RISK OF PRODUCING SAFETY EQUIPMENT 
Cos t - e f f ec t ivenes s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a l l ow f o r  a  comparison of marg- 
i n a l  c o s t s  of r i s k  r educ t ion ,  and can  i d e n t i f y  a r e a s  where t h e  same 
amount of s a f e t y  inves tments  would r e s u l t  i n  t h e  h ighes t  r educ t ion  
of r i s k .  However, they  do not  answer t he  more g e n e r a l  ques t ion  
about t o t a l  expend i tu re s  on s a f e t y  s i n c e ,  a s  sugges ted  by Fig .  2 ,  
any e x i s t i n g  r i s k  may be reduced beyond any g iven  l i m i t  a t  very h igh  
c o s t s .  Never the less ,  t h e  fo l lowing w i l l  demonst ra te  t h a t  a 
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FIGURE 3 :  R i s k  reduction v s .  cost  for the fuel  cycle of PWRs ( 1 7 ) .  
Each dot represents a spec i f i c  measure for risk reduction. 
p r a c t i c a l  l i m i t  t o  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  d o e s  e x i s t  b e c a u s e  e x c e s s i v e  ex-  
p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  w i l l  a c t u a l l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  t o t a l  r i s k  
t o  s o c i e t y .  
F o r  s a f e t y  measures  a t  e x t r e m e l y  h i g h  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  of  r i s k  r e -  
d u c t i o n  i t  becomes i m p o r t a n t  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n a l  and  
p u b l i c  r i s k  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  s a f e t y  equipment  it- 
s e l f ,  which h a s  n o t  been c o n s i d e r e d  i n  F i g .  2 .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  c u r v e  s h o u l d  be s l i g h t l y  m o d i f i e d .  As shown i n  F i g .  4 ,  a  l i n e a r  
t e r m  s h o u l d  b e  added t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  r i s k  d u e  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
s a f e t y  e q u i p m e n t .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  modi fy  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  F i g .  2 
i f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  low.  However, f o r  much h i g h e r  
v a l u e s ,  t h i s  l i n e a r  t e rm,  when added  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c u r v e ,  r e s u l t s  
i n  a summed c u r v e  f o r  t o t a l  r i s k  t h a t  p a s s e s  t h r o u g h  a  minimum. At 
h i g h  c o s t s  t h e  t o t a l  r i s k  c u r v e  no l o n g e r  a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  z e r o - l e v e l  
of r i s k ,  b u t  a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  r i s k  o f  p r o d u c i n g  s a f e t y  equ ipment .  The 
minimum o c c u r s  vhen  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  o f  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  ( t h a t  i s  
t h e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e  of  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  c u r v e )  a r e  e q u a l  t o  t h e  s p e c i -  
f i c  r i s k  of  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  s a f e t y  equipment  ( i . e . .  t h e  s t e e p n e s s  o f  
t h e  l i n e a r  t e r m ) .  
C a l c u l a t i n g  t h i s  r i s k  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  s l o p e  of  
t h e  s t r a i g h t  l i n e  i n  F i g .  4 ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  p e r  u n i t  
c o s t  o f  s a f e t y  equ ipment .  F o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  i t  was 
assumed t h a t  i n s t a l l e d  s a f e t y  equ ipment  c o n s i s t s  o f  30% c o n s t r u c t i o n  
work, 10% s e r v i c e s ,  and 60% machine t o o l s  p l u s  e l e c t r i c a l  equ ipment .  
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FIGURE 4: Principal relationship of cost-effectiveness of risk 
reduction considering the total economic system. 
Using a c c i d e n t  s t a t i s t i c s  of v a r i o u s  b r a n c h e s  of i n d u s t r y  and 
economic i n p u t / o u t p u t  t a b l e s  of a  c o u n t r y  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  con- 
s t r u c t  a  m a t r i x  i l l u s t r a t i n g  h e a l t h - e f f e c t  f l o w s  i n s t e a d  of  monetary 
f  l o v s .  A s i m p l e  mathemat ica l  p r o c e d u r e  ( t h e  i n v e r s e  Leont i e f  
M a t r i x )  a l l o w s  one t o  sum t h e  r i s k  i n v o l v e d  i n  a l l  s t e p s  o f  pre- 
p r o c e s s i n g .  The o c c u p a t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  used f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c a l c u l -  
a t i o n s  a r e  d e r i v e d  from t h e  1973 d a t a  f o r  t h e  F e d e r a l  Republ ic  o f  
Germany. T a b l e  5  s h o v s  sample r e s u l t s  f o r  some b r a n c h e s  of  i n -  
d u s t r y .  I t  c a n  be s e e n  t h a t  mining c a u s e s  t h e  l a r g e s t  h e a l t h  
e f f e c t s  p e r  u n i t  v a l u e  of goods produced ,  though i t  r e q u i r e s  l e s s  
t o t a l  working h o u r s  t h a n  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  J o b - r e l a t e d  d r i v i n g  f a t a l -  
i t i e s  a r e  l a r g e s t  f o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  
Taking t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  s a f e t y  equipment  mentioned above ,  t h e  
t o t a l  o c c u p a t i o n a l  r i s k  and t h e  r e q u i r e d  h o u r s  of work a r e  g i v e n  i n  
T a b l e  6. The d a t a  i n c l u d e  f a t a l i t i e s  and l o s t  working h o u r s  due  t o  
i l l n e s s e s .  They have been a g g r e g a t e d  by assuming t h a t  one d e a t h  i s  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  6000 l o s t  man-days. 
Whereas t h e  q u a l i t y  of  t h e  d a t a  o n  o c c u p a t i o n a l  a c c i d e n t s  i s  
r a t h e r  good, no s u c h  d a t a  e x i s t  f o r  t h e  r i s k s  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  pub- 
l i c .  A rough e s t i m a t e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  r i s k  a d d s  about  50% 
t o  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n a l  r i s k .  Thus, t h e  s p e c i f i c  r i s k  of p roduc ing  
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s a f e t y  equipment ( r  ) i s  e s t i m a t e d  t o  be about  3 x 1 0  
P  
Industry f'o~ol worklno Occupntlo~~ol Jobrelated Occupational Lost working 
l ~ o u ~ s  occlclc~rlal deathr drlvlng fatalitles chronic deaths hours 
( lo-=) (lo-') (lo-') 
Machlne tools & olectrlcal 82 O W  0.470 0.354 0.302 418 
equipment 
Mining 76 600 1.916 0.340 8.740 1040 
Stone and ea::h G3 200 1.182 0.356 0.894 438 
Textiles anc clothlng 110 600 0.270 0.314 0.232 336 
Services, p .ovisions 81 75 000 0.566 0.210 0.206 118 
fine good: 
Construction 101 000 1.492 0.592 0.344 830 
TABLE 5:  T o t a l  working hours  and occupat iona l  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  f o r  product ion o f  goods and 
services having a v a l u e  o f  one m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  
Total working hours 
Lost working hours 
Occupational accidental deaths 
Driving fatalities 
Occupational chronic deaths 
Total deaths 
* 
C equivalent death 
E equivalent lost working days" 
* 
death = 6000 lost man-days. 
TABLE 6. Total occupational risk of producing safety equipment 
worth one million dollars 
e q u i v a l e n t  d e a t h s  o r  180  e q u i v a l e n t  l o s t  man-days p e r  m i l l i o n  
d o l l a r s  o f  equipment .  More s p e c i f i c  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
l e a d i n g  t o  t h i s  v a l u e  o f  r a r e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  ( 1 8 , 1 9 ) .  
P  
The s p e c i f i c  r i s k  r s e t s  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  s t r a i g h t  l i n e  i n  
P '  
F i g .  4.  I t  a l s o  i m p l i e s  t h a t  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  $ 33 m i l l i o n  f o r  
s a f e t y  equipment  would c a u s e  1 e q u i v a l e n t  d e a t h  d u r i n g  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
and i n s t a l l a t i o n .  T h i s  v a l u e  c a n  now be used  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  mini-  
mum r i s k  o f  t h e  t o t a l  sys tem c u r v e .  T h i s  minimum o c c u r s  where t h e  
m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  ( t h e  " O p e r a t i o n "  c u r v e )  h a s  t h e  same 
s l o p e ,  though o p p o s i t e  i n  s i g n ,  a s  t h e  " I n v e s t m e n t "  l i n e .  At t h i s  
p o i n t  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  of s a f e t y  equ ipment  would re- 
s u l t  i n  one  e q u i v a l e n t  h e a l t h  e f f e c t  among t h e  workers  and t h e  pub- 
l i c  i n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  p r e v e n t  one e s t i m a t e d  e q u i v a l e n t  e f f e c t  among 
t h e  p u b l i c  a t  some f u t u r e  t i m e .  I n  o t h e r  words,  one s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
c e r t a i n  d e a t h  i s  caused  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t ime  t o  p r e v e n t  o n e  hypo- 
t h e s i z e d  d e a t h  a t  a  l a t e r  t i m e .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  any e x p e n d i t u r e s  on  
s a f e t y  measures  which exceed t h i s  minimum w i l l  c a u s e  more h e a l t h  
e f f e c t s  t h a n  t h e y  p r e v e n t .  Thus,  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a b o u t  $ 33 m i l l i o n  
p e r  e q u i v a l e n t  l i f e  saved  seems t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n  a b s o l u t e  l i m i t  i n  
p h y s i c a l  t e r m s  f o r  r e d u c i n g  r i s k .  ( I t  s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  s u c h  a  
p r i n c i p l e  i s  a l s o  used  i n  m e d i c a l  p r a c t i c e ,  e . g . ,  recommendat ions 
f o r  v a c c i n a t i o n  a g a i n s t  smal lpox  have been withdrawn s i n c e  t h e  r i s k  
of t h e  v a c c i n a t i o n  i t s e l f  became h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  r i s k  of c a t c h i n g  
t h a t  d i s e a s e ) .  
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C e r t a i n l y ,  r i s k s  t o  t h e  workers  and t h e  p u b l i c  would a l s o  occu r  
i f  i n s t e a d  of s a f e t y  equipment o t h e r  goods were produced. However, 
t h i s  do e s  no t  sug ge s t  t h a t  o n l y  n e t  e f f e c t s  should  be cons ide r ed ,  
s i n c e  t h e  p rod uc t i on  of o t h e r  goods would have some b e n e f i t  f o r  
s o c i e t y ,  and t h u s  t h e  r i s k s  c r e a t e d  by t h e  p roduc t i on  of t h e s e  goods 
should  be compared. 
However, i t  i s  not  proposed t h a t  t h e  ma rg ina l  c o s t  of r i s k  re -  
d u c t i o n  a c t u a l l y  be i n c r e a s e d  t o  t h i s  l e v e l  o f  $ 33 m i l l i o n  p e r  
e q u i v a l e n t  l i f e  saved.  c a i c u l a t i n *  from Table  6  abou t  1400 
man-years of l a b o u r  requi rements  would be a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s h i f t i n g  
one e q u i v a l e n t  d e a t h  ( o r  6000 e q u i v a l e n t  l o s t  man-days) from t h e  
t ime  p e r i o d  of o p e r a t i o n  ( o r  l a t e r )  t o  t h e  t ime  pe r i od  of con- 
s t r u c t i o n  w i t ho u t  a c h i e v i n g  any n e t  b e n e f i t .  
T h e re fo r e ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  remains how many man-days of l a b o u r  re-  
qu i rements  should  be used t o  p r even t  one man-day of h e a l t h  e f f e c t s .  
I t  i s  obvious  t h a t  t h i s  problem needs c o n s i d e r a b l e  s t u d y ;  a f i n a l  
s o l u t i o n  cannot  be provided h e r e .  A s  a  rough e s t i m a t e ,  i t  was 
assumed t h a t  s o c i e t y  c o u l d  expend one man-year of work t o  g a i n  one 
man-year of l i f e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  l o s s  of  one e q u i v a l e n t  l i f e  c a n  
be a g g re g a t e d  w i t h  59 work-l ives (1400 man-years) p e r  $ 33 m i l l i o n  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  t o t a l  inves tment  of 60 man-l ives o r  a n  e f f e c t i v e  
r  ( e f f )  of 1 e q u i v a l e n t  l i f e  p e r  $ 0 .5  m i l l i o n .  T h i s  va lue  i s  
P 
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c l e a r l y  dominated by l a b ou r  r e qu i r emen t s .  With regard  t o  r a d i a t i o n  
p r o t e c t i o n  i t  should  be noted t h a t  t h i s  va lue  would be e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
$ 100/man-rem. 
I n  o r d e r  t o  compare t h e  va lue  of r t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  g iven  
P  
i n  F ig .  3, t h e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e  of  t h i s  cu rve  i s  d i s p l a y e d  i n  Fig.  5 
i n  l o g a r i t h m i c  s c a l e .  I t  c a n  be s e e n  t h a t  a t  t o t a l  cumu la t i ve  c o s t s  
of about  $ 12 m i l l i o n ,  t h e  ma rg ina l  c o s t  of r i s k  r e d u c t i o n ,  con- 
s i d e r i n g  t h e  t o t a l  economic sys tem,  would r each  t h e  minimum de- 
s c r i b e d  i n  F ig .  4.  The combined r  ( e f f )  based on h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  
P  
p l u s  l a bo u r  r e q u i r e me n t s  i s  a l s o  p l o t t e d  i n  t h e  diagram. 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS ENERGY SYSTEMS 
So f a r  t he  term " r i s k "  h a s  been used  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  
expec tancy  v a l u e  of human h e a l t h  e f f e c t s .  I t  ha s  been r ecogn i s ed  by 
most of t h e  a u t h o r s  c i t e d  i n  t h i s  paper  t h a t  t h e  term " r i s k "  has  
a d d i t i o n a l  dimensions o r  a t t r i b u t e s .  However, i t  is not  ye t  
p o s s i b l e  t o  a c t u a l l y  q u a n t i f y  them. The re fo r e ,  a s  one  s t e p  i n  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  of  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e s e  d imens ions ,  s t u d i e s  a n a l y s i n g  p u b l i c  
a t t i t u d e s  towards v a r i o u s  energy sys tems  have been  under taken .  
The a t t i t u d e  concept  ha s  been chosen  s i n c e  i t  p rov ide s  a  frame- 
work f o r  a n a l y s i n g  p r e f e r e n c e s  and fu r t he rmore  h e l p s  t o  unders tand  
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reduction as derived in (17) 
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pub l i c  pe rcep t ion  of r i s k - r e l a t e d  i s s u e s .  ATTITUDE i s  he re  de f ined  
a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  a  pe r son ' s  g e n e r a l  f e e l i n g  of f avou rab l enes s  o r  un- 
f avou rab l enes s  toward a  g iven  o b j e c t .  It i s  composed of b e l i e f s  
about  t h e  r e l a t i o n  of an  o b j e c t  t o  a  s e t  of good o r  bad a t t r i b u t e s .  
A BELIEF ( a s  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  component) r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  i n fo rma t ion  a  
person  has  about  a  g iven  o b j e c t ,  measured i n  terms of  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  
judgement i n d i c a t i n g  whether  a n  a t t r i b u t e  i s  o r  is  n o t ,  and t o  which 
deg ree ,  a s s o r i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t  i n  ques t i on .  The EVALUATION of 
t h e  s e t  of  a t t r i b u t e s  ( a s  t h e  a f f e c t i v e  component) r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
f e e l i n g  of goodness o r  badness f o r  each  s i n g l e  a t t r i b u t e .  According 
t o  t h i s  concep t ,  a t t i t u d e  i s  cap tu red  a s  a  combina t ion  of a n  a f f e c t -  
i v e  and a  c o g n i t i v e  component (20) .  
F a c t o r - a n a l y t i c a l  t r e a tmen t  of  t h e  g iven  s e t  of a t t r i b u t e s  l e a d s  
t o  a  grouping  of i s s u e s  w i th  h igh  i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n a ,  i . e . ,  f a c t o r s .  
Determining t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of b e l i e f s ,  e v a l u a t i o n s  and 
of t h e  combined terms can  provide  i n fo rma t ion  about  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
s t r u c t u r e  of a t t i t u d e s  toward a  g iven  o b j e c t .  App l i ca t i on  of t h i s  
procedure w i th  d a t a  de r ived  from a  sample (N-224) of  t h e  Aus t r i an  
pub l i c ,  y i e l d e d  a  f o u r - f a c t o r  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  toward t h e  
use of nuc l ea r  power (21).  
Table  7 summarises t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of t h e s e  f o u r  f a c t o r s  t o  
a t t i t u d e s  of sub-samples PRO and CON t h e  use of  nuc l ea r  energy  from 
t h e  A u s t r i a n  p u b l i c .  It  can  be seen  t h a t  t h e  a t t r i b u t e  e v a l u a t i o n s  

d i d  not  d i f f e r  s t r o n g l y  between bo th  groups  though they  were 
g e n e r a l l y  more n e g a t i v e  ( o r  l e s s  p o s i t i v e )  f o r  t h e  CON group .  Thc 
main d i f f e r e n c e  i s  caused  by d i f f e r i n g  b e l i e f s  t h a t  t h e s e  a t t r i b u t e s  
a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  n u c l e a r  power. M u l t i p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  a v e r a g e  b e l i e f  
and e v a l u a t i o n  s c o r e s  f o r  each  f a c t o r  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  con- 
t r i b u t i o n  towards  a t t i t u d e s ;  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  CON group ,  t h e i r  a t t i -  
t u d e s  a r e  de te rmined  most s i g n i f i c a n t l y  by t h o s e  a t t r i b u t e s  which 
have p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a s p e c t s ,  second by i t e m s  v i t h  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  im- 
p l i c a t i o n s ,  and t h i r d ,  though  n o t  v e r y  s t r o n g l y ,  by n e g a t i v e  en- 
v i r o n m e n t a l  a s p e c t s  v h i c h  t h e y  r e l a t e  t o  n u c l e a r  pover .  T h i s  pro- 
bab ly  r e f l e c t s  c u r r e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  which c e n t r e  a round  t h e  r i s k  a s -  
p e c t s .  
The o p p o s i t e  p i c t u r e  emerges f o r  t h e  PRO group.  The b e n e f i t  
f a c t o r  c o n t r i b u t e s  most s i g n i f i c a n t l y  towards  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s .  
Second a r e  p o s i t i v e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a s p e c t s  which t h i s  g roup  r e l a t e s  
t o  t h e  u s e  of  n u c l e a r  energy .  The o t h e r  two f a c t o r s  make r e l a t i v e l y  
s m a l l ,  though n e g a t i v e ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
These r e s u l t s  a p p e a r  t o  r e f l e c t  some o f  t h e  major  p rob lems  en- 
c o u n t e r e d  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  d e b a t e  about  n u c l e a r  pover ,  where mutual  
' u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i s  i n h i b i t e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b o t h  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  t h e  
r i s k  a s p e c t s  w h i l e  opponents  d e f y  t h e  b e n e f i t s  and p r o p o n e n t s  t a k e  
them f o r  g r a n t e d .  
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Based on t h e  exper ience  of t h e  s tudy desc r ibed  above,  t he  
ques t ionna i r e  has been modified and i s  now being a p p l i e d  i n  va r ious  
c o u n t r i e s ,  f i r s t  w i th  sma l l e r  p i l o t  samples,  and l a t e r  on w i t h  l a r g e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  samples. This  c ros s -na t iona l  approach is  expected t o  
provide  in fo rma t ive  i n s i g h t s  about  i s s u e s  perce ived  s i m i l a r l y  and 
those  which a r e  country-dependent. F i r s t  a n a l y s e s  show t h a t  t h e  
methodology f o r  a t t i t u d e  measurement and t h e  g iven  s e t  of a t t r i b u t e s  
a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s .  Table 8 g i v e s  t he  c o r r e l -  
a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  between t h r e e  independent measures of a t t i t u d e  
toward the  use of nuc l ea r  power f o r  s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s :  ( a )  Z e b  de- 
n o t e s  t h e  a t t i t u d e  measure descr ibed  above, (b)  A deno te s  a mea- 
0 
su re  based on  t h e  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l  (22) ,  ( c )  P / C  deno te s  a ra-  
t i n g  on a s imple  "favourable/unfavourable sca l e " .  Genera l ly  t h e s e  
c o r r e l a t i o n s  can  be cons idered  q u i t e  h igh  demonst ra t ing  t h e  r e l e -  
vance of t h e  a t t r i b u t e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  importance r a t i n g s  w i t h  regard  
t o  t h e  ongoing n u c l e a r  deba t e  were e l i c i t e d  t o  o b t a i n  i n fo rma t ion  
about t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
d i d  r e f l e c t  t h e  i s s u e s  of major concern.  It cannot n e c e s s a r i l y  be 
expected t h a t  t h e s e  i s s u e s  a r e  of s i m i l a r  importance i n  a l l  coun- 
t r i e s .  Out of t h e  whole s e t  of 30 a t t r i b u t e s  on ly  t hose  a r e  l i s t e d  
i n  Table 9 which d e a l  wi th  r i s k  a s p e c t s .  To enable  comparison, t h e  
mean va lues  of t h e  importance r a t i n g s  were taken  t o  rank-order t he  
a t t r i b u t e s .  The t h r e e  samples shown lend themselves f o r  t h i s  type 
of comparison because a l l  t h e  respondents were u n i v e r s i t y  s t u d e n t s ,  
i . e . ,  had a s i m i l a r  educa t iona l  background. 
TABLE 8 
CORRELATIONS BETVEEN VARIOUS ATTITUDE MEASURES 
AUSTRIA (STUDENTS) 
PHILIPPINES (EMPLOYEES) 
PttILIPPINES (STUDENTS) 
JAPAN (STUDENTS~ OSAKA) 
JAPAN (STUDENTS~ TOKYO) 
BRAZIL (EMPLOYEES) 
F,R,G, (GEN~PuBL,, JULICH) 
F ,  R, G, (GEN. PUBL,, KERPEN) 
BRAZIL (STUDENTS) 
F.R.G. (STUDENTS 2 )  
TABLE 9 
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF RISK ATTRIBUTES 
H e a l t h  impact  
Impact  on f u t u r e  g e n e r a t i o n s  
Management o f  wastes 
La rge -sca le  a c c i d e n t s  
Env i ronmenta l  p o l l u t i o n  
C o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  
D e t e c t i o n  by senses 
Postponing a l t e r n a t i v e s  
Long-term c l i m a t e  
T h r e a t s  from t e r r o r i s t s  
Dependency on e x p e r t s  
P r o l i f e r a t i o n  
AUSTRIA 
( S t u d e n t s )  
PHIL IPPINES 
( S t u d e n t s )  
JAPAN 
( S t u d e n t s )  
AUSTRIA - PHILIPPINES R  r . 75 * *  
AUSTRIA - JAPAN R  r . 73 * *  
PHILIPPINES - JAPAN R  r .74** 
Resu l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  seems t o  be a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement 
on t h e  importance of r i s k  r e l a t e d  i s s u e s  (23). Comparisons of 
l a r g e r  samples on  a c ros s -na t iona l  b a s i s  a r e  expected  t o  provide 
f u r t h e r  and more d e t a i l e d  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  perce ived  b e n e f i t s  and 
r i s k s  of energy t echno log ie s .  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS I N  SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS 
To o u r  knowledge t h e r e  a r e  two main new developments i n  t h e  a r e a  
of s e t t i n g  s a f e t y  s t anda rds .  Whereas g e n e r a l l y ,  s a f e t y  s t a n d a r d s  
a r e  de r ived  by a d e t e r m i n i s t i c  approach,  r ecen t  t r e n d s  i n  r i s k  
assessment have l e d  t o  p roposa l s  f o r  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  s a f e t y  c r i t e r i a  
(24) such a s  t hose  mentioned i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n .  
Such s tandard  va lues  t a k e  i n t o  account pub l i c  concerns  about 
t hose  a c c i d e n t s  which go beyond t h e  d e s i g n  base a c c i d e n t  and which 
a r e  e s t ima ted  t o  occur w i th  very low p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  however, l a r g e  
p o t e n t i a l  consequences. An example w i t h i n  t h e  chemical  i n d u s t r y  i s  
given by t h e  Canvey I s l a n d  s tudy  ( 2 5 )  where, based on a probab- 
i l i s t i c  r i s k  assessment ,  p r even t ive  des ign  measures have been 
taken.  The second main development i n  s t anda rd  s e t t i n g  d i r e c t l y  
t akes  i n t o  account  a model of t h e  r a t i o n a l ,  r i sk-averse  i n d i v i d u a l  
which has  been summarised a s  fo l lows  ( 2 6 ) :  
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( a )  He p r e f e r s  a  lower r i s k  of i n j u r y  o r  dea t l i  t o  a  h ighe r  r i s k .  
( b )  He a s s e s s e s  a  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  r i s k  a s  a  h i g h e r  c o s t  t han  
a  s m a l l  i n c r e a s e .  
( c )  A t  ve ry  low l e v e l s  o f  r i s k  he  i s  c o n t e n t  t o  c o s t  t h e  r i s k s  
a t  some c o n s t a n t  v a l u e .  
( d )  As t h e  l e v e l s  o f  r i s k  i n c r e a s e  above t h e  p o i n t  a t  which he 
f e e l s  concerned h e  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  c o s t  he  p l a -  
c e s  upon them. 
These p r i n c i p l e s  have been a p p l i e d  t o  de t e rmine  a  v a r i a b l e  
v a l u e  which could  be used f o r  t h e  purpose  of  a  c o s t / b e n e f i t  ana- 
l y s i s  i n  t h e  a r e a  of  r a d i a t i o n  p r o t e c t i o n .  I n  app ly ing  t h e  ALARA 
p r i n c i p l e  ( a s  l o w  5s l e a s o n a b l y  a c h i e v a b l e ) ,  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  ( a ) is 
u s u a l l y  t r e a t e d  a s  a  c o n s t a n t  and d e n o t e s  t h e  c o s t  of u n i t  c o l l e c t -  
i v e  d ose  e q u i v a l e n t .  Thus a has  t h e  d imens ion  $/man-rem and can  be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  c o s t  of inves tment  which should  be spen t  t o  avoid  
one man-rem. At tempts  t o  q u a n t i f y  t h i s  a - v a l u e  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h e  
range  from about  $ lO/man-rem t o  some $ 1000/man-rem. 
The c o n s u l t a t i v e  document c i t e d  above s u g g e s t s  t o  app ly  a  v a r i -  
a b l e  a -value which would s t a d i l y  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  
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of r i s k ,  i . e . ,  t he  i n d i v i d u a l  dose  e q u i v a l e n t .  A subsequent  docu- 
ment recommends a  s t e p v i s e  approximation ( 2 7 ) .  
Conclusions 
Three methods t o  d e f i n e  a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l s  of r i s k  have been d i s -  
cussed i n  t h i s  paper ,  and i t  has been proposed that d i r e c t  compari- 
son of r i s k s  of s i m i l a r  systems and c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  of 
r i s k  r educ t ion  measures are s u i t a b l e  methods t o  de termine  s a f e t y  
c r i t e r i a .  Hovever, i t  has been po in t ed  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  is a  need t o  
develop  a  more complex measure of r i s k .  Many of t hose  parameters ,  
vhich should  be taken  i n t o  account ,  a r e  knovn. But i t  is l e f t  t o  
f u t u r e  work t o  a c t u a l l y  q u a n t i f y  them i n  such  a  way that they  can  be 
used f o r  s a f ey  r e l a t e d  d e c i s i o n .  
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RISK WITH ENERGY FROM CONVEN'TIONAL 
AND NONCONVENTIONAL SOURCES* 
Herbert lnhaber 
Atomic Energy Control Board, 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada 
Risk to human health was compared for five conventional and six nonconventional energy 
systems. The entire cycle for producing energy was considered, not just part. The most 
important conclusion drawn is that the risk to human health from nonconventional 
sources can be as high as, or even higher than, that of conventional sources. This result is 
produced only when the risk per unit energy is  considered, rather than the risk per solar 
panel or windmill. The risk from nonconventional energy sources derives from the large 
amount of material and labor needed, along with their backup and storage requirements. 
Risk evaluation is a relatively new discipline, and therefore the results presented here can 
be considered only a beginning. However, society should keep relative risk in mind when 
evaluating present and future energy sources. 
'Reprinted with permission from Science. Vol. 203. 1979, pp. 718-723. O AAAS. 1979. 
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of them depend on shale 011. ur m s .  
wave clergy. t d r l  enrrgy. Cod guikr- 
tpn. Ilrp-w& wood burnlng, p+other- 
rrul energy. nvclear fuswn. pub.Er- 
burnlne ud ~ K J W  breeding In nucle- 
ar res~ton.  The= an nor consided 
k r e  because o n  or more component$ of 
eumtu l  duo were m t  avpJ.ble. ohen 
because no modcls or pmlorypr h v e  
been uulyzed. AS IS noted below. a vldc 
v w t y  of duo on mUenalr and W re- 
quunnenu. public nsk. and other f=- 
ton vm mcded to perform a complete 
cakuluDn lor epch cystem. If and when 
full dau an avnJ;rble for any enrgy sys- 
[em m t  evalrvlcd hm. il should be pas- 
r ~ b k  to eva luc  11s overall nsk by the 
mctkoddoOy described hem. 
A1 but w o  oflhe energ). svstms were 
assumed to pmducc elccmc~ty as the fi- 
rul product. For soh r p x e  heutng. che 
r k d  enrgy produced wrr ulren lo 
comapond lo the e k t n c l i  energ). rhpl 
would have been requlmd to hut a 
bullding: such an usumpron leads u, an 
undemnrmauon ct nsk from thrr system 
by a few percent. For methand. it is & 
sumd Ih.l the m e c h a n d  energy it pro- 
ducm is equivalent to the elcclnclv that 
coubj h v e  teen u x d  to drive vehicles. 
The uunp* d solar s- hcrclng is 
an illusualion of my p n c d  tendency or 
policy to Dvr notronvmtiorul myy 
sysumr h b e n h  of the Q u h .  in m s  
of risk. vksmver pssibk. Thu  p o k y  
rvsr &opted to avoid any c l w m  of i d  
m n t  bin.  F u d r  e m d m  include 
asamnu lifetima w nonconvmwrul 
synoma much longer than h u  been ex- 
p n n r a u l l y  proved and +uumpciom of 
c rp r i r y  tor Lad\ f axon  prob.bly h e  
a than jurukd. 
Public actention to nsk IS o h  fc-
c u d  on p u t  or porentd cauuuophes. 
Wun of n d k ~ v ~ t y  fmm nuclear m- 
acton. failum of oil or 0.r p i p l i m .  
buntin6 of hydmkcv l c  duns - thu  
are vhu uptun Mlim. I t  IS custom- 
ary w notice o n  event t hu  O ls  100 
popb r u h r  t h n  LO n a v r  100 evmu  
t h  c r h  kill ON pnon. 
(%nrophn do take place. Thc actml 
or dmud risk to the puuic of dM 
fa i lum and accdmu u rsrron. vhi* 
low. M ncva  & zero. However. as is 
shovn beknv, the hen propmlon d 
nsk to h u m  heJB  fmm JI t h  encrly 
sysrcm conladered a either fmm indu+- 
virl and occupatmnd sources or pollu- 
uon &uu. That Is. nsk p m n i l y  1s In- 
cumd  by o n  pcnon or a small p u p .  
In the caktrlu~on o i  o v e d l  nrk. chat 
rcsultlng from cxasrmphes IS added to 
[hat of  a nonuuJrrophlc onpn. In o n  
sense. apples are k ~ n g  added to or- 
anges. but in another sense like things 
arc &~ng  added. rlncc the cost to so- 
ciety. u measured by the number of 
deuhs. 1s the same. The nsk of borh cat- 
artmphlc and noncautmphu wurces 
has &en de%nbcd 131. 


































































































































































































































































































